



**DELHI UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY**

~~TEXT BOOK~~

H8

H8

H8

[illegible]

M. I. T. Publications in International Affairs

C U R R E N T R E A D I N G S
O N
I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E L A T I O N S
Number 4

Edited by

NORMAN J. PADELFORD
Professor of International Relations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

F. Pauline Tompkins
Associate Editor

Addison-Wesley Press, Inc.
Cambridge, Mass.

1948

PREFACE

The articles and documents assembled in this fourth issue of Current Readings comprise supplementary material for the first half of the general college course on International Relations. Similar to preceding numbers, the present issue is intended to provide teachers and students with a wide range of analyses and contemporary applications of some of the fundamental factors of world politics.

Two main considerations have determined the emphasis of this book: the relative importance of specific international problems at the present time, and the quality and focus of available current literature. Consequently this collection differs somewhat in topical arrangement from Current Readings No. 2, issued a year ago. New sections have been added on sovereignty and geopolitics, while the section on population problems has been omitted. Likewise, the chapters on Foundations of National Power and on Principles of International Relations have been dropped for the present.

In response to numerous suggestions a chapter on contemporary aspects of Imperialism has been inserted. And because of lively student interest a separate chapter has been given to the formation and application of Soviet foreign policy. It is a matter of regret that insufficient materials were found to warrant a chapter on current phases of policy making in Great Britain.

New to Current Readings is the final chapter on Science, Humanism and Peace. This contains two distinguished articles which stretch the horizons of habitual thought on international relations. It is trusted that they will stimulate constructive thinking on steps which need to be taken "while the stream serves".

Acknowledgement is made, as before, to the Rockefeller Foundation for encouragement of this project. Appreciation is due to teachers in many parts of the country who have made suggestions for improvement of the collection. And thanks are extended to the authors and publishers who have consented to the reproduction of the articles contained herein. In permitting their use in this form they are making an important additional contribution to international understanding and education. The views expressed in the articles are those of the respective authors. They are not to be regarded as representing the views of the Institute or of the Editor.

Norman J. Padelford

Editor

CONTENTS

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
I FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	1
<u>Sovereignty and International Affairs</u>	
<u>Anglo-Soviet Debate on Sovereignty</u>	
Remarks by Mr. Hector McNeil U.N. Document A/P.V.88. September 22, 1947.	2
Letter by Professor E. Korovin New Times. October 8, 1947.	4
National Sovereignty and Individual Behavior By Gerhart Niemeyer. The Journal of Politics, August 1947.	8
<u>Geography and Geopolitics</u>	
The New Geopolitics By E. M. Friedwald. La France Libre, November 15, 1946.	17
Imperialism and Geopolitics By W. H. Greenleaf. The London Quarterly of World Affairs, April 1947.	23
Geopolitics and the United States By W. Watkin Davies. The Contemporary Review, August 1947.	29
The Mineral Position of the United States and the Outlook for the Future By Elmer W. Pehrson. Mining and Metallurgy, April 1945.	33
<u>Nationalism and Ideologies</u>	
War and National Character By Frederick Hertz. The Contemporary Review, May 1947.	49
Ideology or Balance of Power ? By William G. Carleton. The Yale Review, Summer 1947.	56

CONTENTS

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
<u>A Vital Fact in the Battle of Ideologies</u> By Francis Williams. The New York Times Magazine, January 25, 1948.	63
II IMPERIALISM	69
<u>Empires in Transition</u> By Vernon McKay. Foreign Policy Reports, May 1, 1947.	70
<u>The British Empire That Is to Be</u> By Lowell Ragatz. Nation's Business, July 1947.	84
<u>Expansion Under the Guise of Cooperation</u> By N. Rusakov. Soviet Press Translations, February 15, 1948.	90
III POWER POLITICS - BALANCE OF POWER	95
<u>U.S. Foreign Policy and the Balance of Power</u> By Robert Strausz-Hupe. The Review of Politics, January 1948.	96
<u>Balance of Power</u> By DeWitt C. Poole. Life, September 22, 1947.	101
<u>The Bevin Plan of "Western Union"</u>	109
<u>Excerpts of Statement by Foreign Secretary</u> <u>Bevin</u> January 22, 1948.	110
<u>Excerpts from Remarks by Former Prime</u> <u>Minister Churchill</u> January 23, 1948.	114
<u>What Is the Bevin Plan ?</u> The Economist, January 31, 1948.	115
<u>Five Power Treaty of Mutual Assistance</u> <u>and Economic Cooperation</u> Brussels, March 17, 1948.	117

CONTENTS

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
IV GREAT POWER RELATIONS	122
<u>America and Russia - Dangers and Hopes</u>	123
By Brooks Atkinson. The New York Times Magazine, June 1, 1947.	
<u>The Two Giants</u>	129
By Sir Harold Butler. The Fortnightly, December 1947.	
<u>Negotiating with the Russians</u>	135
By James B. Reston. Harper's Magazine, August 1947.	
<u>The Containment of Soviet Power</u>	146
By G. B. Thomas. Harper's Magazine, January 1948.	
<u>Do the Men in the Kremlin Want War ?</u>	153
By Drew Middleton. The New York Times Magazine, March 28, 1948.	
<u>The Soviet Union - A Mighty Bulwark of International Peace</u>	157
By A. Leontyev. New Times, September 17, 1947.	
<u>The United States, the United Nations, and Great Power Relations</u>	164
By Secretary of State George C. Marshall. May 5, 1948.	
V THE FORMATION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY	170
<u>The New Strategy in Foreign Policy</u>	171
By Robert T. Elson. Fortune, December 1947.	
<u>The Policy Planning Staff</u>	181
By Ware Adams. The American Foreign Service Journal, September 1947.	
<u>The National Security Council</u>	184
By James S. Lay, Jr. The American Foreign Service Journal, March 1948.	

CONTENTS

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
<u>The Senate's Role in Foreign Policy</u> By Elbert D. Thomas. World Affairs Inter- preter, Winter 1947.	188
VI THE CONDUCT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY	193
<u>The Men of Moscow</u> The Christian Science Monitor, January 15, 1948.	193
<u>Policy Making in the Soviet Union</u> Editor's note.	196
<u>What the Russian Generals Are Thinking</u> By Ellsworth L. Raymond. United Nations World, March 1948.	202
<u>Soviet Party 'Cells' Weave Pattern for Army Coups</u> By R. H. Markham. The Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1948.	206
<u>The Soviet-Finnish Mutual Aid Treaty</u> April 6, 1948.	210
VII THE PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY	212
<u>The Challenges of Open Diplomacy</u> By Paul-Henri Spaak. The New York Times Magazine, December 22, 1946.	213
<u>The Rivalry of Nations</u> By Walter Lippmann. The Atlantic Monthly, February 1948.	216
<u>The Foreign Service in Transition</u> By William P. Maddox. Foreign Affairs, January 1947.	222
<u>The Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Depart- ment of State</u> By William P. Maddox. Higher Education, October 15, 1947.	228
<u>The Foreign Service</u> By W. L. Burn. The Fortnightly, May 1946.	233

CONTENTS

<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Page</u>
<u>Portraits of Big Four From Lancaster House</u> By Herbert L. Matthews. The New York Times, December 7, 1947.	237
VIII PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW	240
<u>What Is Wrong with International Law ?</u> By Edwin D. Dickinson. Seventh Bernard Moses Memorial Lecture, May 22, 1946.	241
<u>The Crime of Aggression and the Future of</u> <u>International Law</u> By Philip C. Jessup. Political Science Quarterly, March 1947.	251
IX SCIENCE, HUMANISM AND PEACE	257
<u>Science and Statecraft</u> By Marshall H. Stone. Science, May 16, 1947.	257
<u>Report</u> By Raymond B. Fosdick. The Rockefeller Founda- tion: A Review for 1947.	263

MAPS

World Power Centers	271
Africa - Future of Empire	273

CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Sovereignty and International Affairs

The concept of sovereignty, as it applies to the national state, is about three hundred years old. Machiavelli first suggested it in his writings on the relations among states. A short time later Jean Bodin, famous French political scholar, further developed the doctrine, using it to justify political absolutism within a nation. The word sovereignty has been defined as supreme political power. Translated into active terms, this has come to mean the freedom of the state to exercise domestic jurisdiction and to determine its policies and activities unchallenged by any other nation. Nevertheless, governments do restrict, voluntarily, the exercise of sovereignty through the conclusion of treaties and agreements with other powers. However, in the last analysis this does not jeopardize the sovereign character of the state, for lacking a superior, extra-national authority to enforce treaty commitments, each of the participants reserves ultimate freedom of action to protect its national interests.

The United Nations Charter recognizes the sovereign equality of the member states. This juridical equality is expressed in the voting procedure whereby each member, regardless of size, population, or power, is allotted one vote. The concept of sovereign equality also has a special connotation in terms of big-power relations, standing behind and justifying the rule of unanimity.

History seems to indicate that those nations which profess a willingness to forsake sovereignty in the interests of the larger community are themselves either relatively small and weak, so that their sovereignty is of questionable worth at best in a world where might prevails, or they are seasoned powers which have exercised sovereignty over a long period and have the confidence of a majority of states. Consequently they are less jealous of their sovereign prerogatives, and less apprehensive regarding the effect on their policies of a world government in which their freedom of action would be circumscribed. Thus, within the United Nations, we find states like Australia urging a positive check on national sovereignty, and the United Kingdom and the United States arguing in favor of restriction of the veto power, while the Soviet Union, relatively new as a great power and feeling itself in a minority on all important issues, is opposed to any curtailment of sovereignty.

The gradual restriction of national sovereignty is basic to the solution of the deep political crises of the present century. As long as the great powers retain ultimate freedom of political action, and refuse to delegate decisive authority to a supranational agency, international

rèlations will continue to be characterized by an explosive anarchy in which war is the final arbiter of international disputes. Yet so deeply planted are the seeds of national sovereignty that the task of uprooting them will be a herculean one.

For readings on sovereignty see Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics, Chapter II; Charles H. McIlwain, "Some Considerations of Sovereignty," Common Cause, October 1947; Emery Reves, The Anatomy of Peace, Chapter 8.

Anglo-Soviet Debate on Sovereignty

In the opening discussions of the Second Session of the General Assembly Mr. Hector McNeil, British delegate, referred at some length to the perplexing issue of sovereignty, specifically to the Soviet conception of "absolute sovereignty". A fortnight later Professor Korovin, Soviet lawyer, responded to the McNeil remarks in a letter to the editor of the New Times (Novoye Vremya). Typical of so many Western-Soviet arguments, that on sovereignty resolved itself into a familiar pattern: Mr. McNeil saw in the Soviet concept a threat to the very existence of the United Nations, while Professor Korovin upheld the Russian definition of sovereignty as a vital protection for peace-loving nations against "imperialism".

REMARKS BY MR. HECTOR MCNEIL

U.N. Document A/P.V. 88, 22 September 1947

... if we are to have international agreement and stability there must also be ... a willingness among the nations within the defined and accepted limits, to submit themselves to international considerations and to accept and operate the decisions or the recommendations of the nations. Now Mr. Vyshinsky introduced a conception to which Mr. Molotov drew our attention last year, which is completely at variance with these necessities and which I must admit frankly does alarm me. It is the conception of absolute sovereignty.

I believe that at the back of Soviet thinking there is a tactical reason for insisting upon this idea of absolute sovereignty. Professor Korovin, the foremost lawyer of the Soviet Union, and a distinguished international figure...in a lecture reported in Pravda of 3 May 1947 says this:

"Sovereignty ... is a tool in the struggle of the ... democratic forces against reactionary-imperi-

alistic forces. Sovereignty under modern conditions is called upon to serve both as a legal and as an international-political barrier in defense against imperialistic encroachments and in providing the opportunity to construct the most progressive public and state forms -- socialist and peoples-democratic."

In an article by Professor Korovin in "The Bolshevik" of 19 October 1946, he argues that on the issues of sovereignty and traditional doctrines of international practice the capitalist states aim at maximum limitation, not to say liquidation of the concept of sovereignty in a world where there exists exploiter and exploited, weak and strong, metropolitan and colonial territories. If sovereignty as well as other legal guarantees of national independence and freedom are thus weakened, this, he says, is all to the advantage of the strong and will never benefit the weak. In a world parliament, he argues, the Anglo-American group is certain of a majority, and projects of this kind are merely an attempt of a bloc to dictate to the world.

Of course, we all understand the fears of the Soviet Government on this subject. They are an emerging power. They expect, and have confirmed from experience, that on many issues they would have fewer friends and fewer votes than the established powers. Nevertheless, it surely must be plain that if we are to adhere to this historically dated and outmoded conception of absolute sovereignty, we shall immediately place obstacles in the way of international agreement. In a fashion, it can be argued and can be shown that every treaty is a diminution of national sovereignty. In a fashion, it is true that membership of every international organization takes away from national sovereignty. That may have disadvantages. I do not think so. But it certainly is plain that the disadvantages of non-cooperation, as Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out to us, are much more hazardous. It does mean, if we take the second course of non-cooperation, that the world at least breaks into two parts.

Mr. Vyshinsky quoted in support of his theory the Charter, and I think he quoted it wrongly. The Charter does not insist upon absolute sovereignty. What the Charter does insist upon is the sovereign equality -- and ... [those are] the operative words -- of the member states. That is to say, that what one gives up the other equally must give up. That is the basis of any international contract, that the partners to the contract voluntarily cede for certain purposes functions of their sovereignty.

But in fact, surely this is admitted by law, by our presence here? There are problems, not only problems of a political kind but problems of an economic and social kind, that each of our governments

admit they cannot solve by unilateral action. Full employment, the limitation of disease, the removal of hunger, the development of energy, apart altogether from the limitation of conflict, are problems which the experts and governments of modern states agree they can only tackle in the context of international action.

Unless, therefore, nations are prepared to come to the table willing to discuss the delimitation of sovereignty in equity and by consent, this United Nations Organization is robbed of its meaning and our presence here is a farce. The functions of the Assembly, of the Security Council, of each of its Councils and all its subsidiary organizations are by that attitude thwarted and disturbed. They become instruments through which powers seek national advantage instead of instruments devised for international common interest. ...

LETTER BY PROFESSOR E. KOROVIN

Reproduced from New Times, No. 41, October 8, 1947

Speaking in the United Nations General Assembly on September 22, Mr. Hector McNeil, the British delegate, asserted that Soviet diplomacy and the Soviet doctrine of international law upheld the "outmoded conception of absolute sovereignty." He referred to a newspaper report of a lecture delivered by me on the Soviet and bourgeois conceptions of sovereignty.

What I actually said in my lecture on the subject of "absolute sovereignty" was as follows:

"The Soviet state categorically rejects the conception of 'absolute sovereignty,' and regards sovereignty, not as a manifestation of unrestricted arbitrary power, but as the principle of self-determination in domestic and foreign affairs."

The reader will therefore see that the view I expressed was diametrically opposite to the one Mr. McNeil fathered upon me. More, in this same lecture I stated that the doctrine of "absolute sovereignty" was a product of the disintegration of the feudal absolutist system, and that it had enjoyed its greatest popularity among reactionary German philosophers and jurists.

Consequently, to accuse the Soviet science of international law of a predilection for "absolute sovereignty" is to assert a deliberate and absolute untruth.

But Mr. McNeil is not only poorly versed in the Soviet literature on jurisprudence; he seems just as ignorant of generally known pronouncements on Soviet foreign policy, inasmuch as he claims that the latter too upholds the principle of "absolute sovereignty."

Let us recall a few facts. As far back as 1923, referring in his report to the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party to the amalgamation of the Soviet Republics to form the U.S.S.R., Joseph Stalin pointed out that "every amalgamation involves a certain restriction of the rights of the amalgamating parties," adding, however, that in this case the amalgamation guaranteed the republics entering the Union the "maximum of independence."

On January 23, 1936, replying to a statement made in the Council of the League of Nations by the Uruguayan representative to the effect that rupture of diplomatic relations was an act of state sovereignty not liable to control by an international organization, the Soviet representative declared:

"Only such a state can do with absolute sovereignty whatever it likes which is not bound by any international commitments. . . . International commitments would be worthless if a government could say: 'Commitments are commitments, but I am sovereign and may do whatever I please; I can ignore commitments at my own discretion.' "

Asked in the United Nations Security Council, on February 10, 1946, whether he considered that the United Nations Charter "restricted the sovereignty of sovereign states," A. Y. Vyshinsky, head of the Soviet delegation, answered with a categorical affirmative.

Similar pronouncements by Soviet statesmen could be cited without number. But those quoted are sufficient to compel admission as an undeniable fact that responsible spokesmen of the Soviet Union have never subscribed to the theory of "absolute sovereignty," but on the contrary have repeatedly and unequivocally rejected it.

The shafts levelled by Mr. McNeil at the Soviet conception of sovereignty were therefore aimed at the wrong target. This does not mean, however, that Mr. McNeil's conception of "relative sovereignty" and the Soviet idea of sovereignty are identical.

There was a time when representatives of Britain's ruling classes, Gladstone, for example, supported the sovereign rights of oppressed nations -- outside the British Empire, of course. There was a time when Britain's classical jurists held that the sovereign rights of peoples and states were the keystone of international intercourse.

But new times, new tunes, as the saying goes. Today old and young Conservatives, like Churchill and Eden, on the one hand, and pseudo-socialistic heralds of British imperialism, like Bevin and McNeil, on the other, come forward in touching unanimity as the gravediggers of sovereignty. Under the most diverse cries -- a "United States of Europe," a "Western bloc," a "World Government," the "Marshall Plan" and the like -- they call upon other nations to surrender their allegedly "antiquated" sovereignty and to entrust their destinies into the safekeeping of the British and Americans, either as a means of salvation from the atomic bomb, or for the sake of "international co-operation" -- understood in the sense of the "co-operation" between horse and rider.

The Soviet government and the Soviet people have an entirely different conception of sovereignty and international co-operation. At the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers on July 2, 1947, V. M. Molotov spoke of two different and diametrically opposite modes of international co-operation. The one, which has nothing in common with normal co-operation between states, is founded on the domination of certain states and the subordination of others; the other is genuine co-operation, co-operation between independent (sovereign) countries founded "on the development of political and economic relations between equal states, and in that case their national sovereignty does not suffer from foreign interference." Such co-operation "brings nations closer together and facilitates the task of their mutual aid."

Mr. McNeil's opinion to the contrary, the Soviet government insists on the principle of sovereignty not for "technical reasons," but for the sole and simple reason that respect for this principle follows from the very fundamentals of the Soviet social and political system.

In the storm and stress of the October Revolution, in the hard years of intervention and blockade, and in the last war the Soviet Union defended its sovereignty as its sacred right to build its life, in all its manifestations, on the new and progressive principles of socialist democracy. An essential feature of Soviet sovereignty is that it does not confine itself to formally recognizing the rights of the state, but strives to create all the necessary material conditions for the exercise of these rights.

In Soviet sovereignty we have the first example in history of popular sovereignty, in the genuine meaning of the term, inasmuch as Soviet society is not divided into antagonistic classes and is monolithic in its unity. Besides being a genuine popular sovereignty, Soviet sovereignty at the same time implies genuine national sovereignty, since it is the sovereignty not only of the state, but of every nation forming part of it. In this it differs from bourgeois sovereignty, which is a

mask for the class supremacy of the bourgeoisie of the dominant nation.

By virtue of these inherent characteristics of Soviet sovereignty, the struggle of the Soviet government for a democratic peace and for democratic principles in international relations generally "is in consonance with the paramount interests of the peoples of countries, big and small, with the vital interests of all peace-loving nations" (V. M. Molotov).

A truly democratic state will consent even to considerable restrictions of its sovereignty, provided they are voluntary, reciprocal and equal. This is true of the treaty on the formation of the Soviet Union. The recent treaties concluded between the popular democratic states of Eastern and South Eastern Europe are likewise founded on the principles of voluntariness, equality and reciprocity. But a democratic state will reject even the most insignificant restriction of its sovereignty if it is imposed upon it and is unilateral.

Under the conditions of today, the principle of sovereignty serves as a legal barrier defending nations from imperialist encroachment, from military and economic aggression. It is also the legal justification of the struggle of the oppressed peoples of colonial and dependent countries for emancipation from imperialist servitude, and for the opportunity to constitute themselves into socially and politically progressive states. That is why this principle holds such an important place in the policy of the Soviet state, and why it is so precious to every sincere democrat.

Mr. McNeil in his speech dilated on the inappropriateness of the claim of any party to have a "monopoly of truth." But far more dangerous than this alleged claim is the actually existing and operating monopoly of lies.

The representatives of this monopoly consider that any falsehood, fabrication, fraud or slander is permissible in combating the Soviet Union, Soviet policy and Soviet concepts. Mr. McNeil has identified himself with their discreditable company by completely misrepresenting the views of Soviet diplomacy and Soviet science. We can only express our condolence.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

By Gerhart Niemeyer

Reproduced from *The Journal of Politics* (copyright, 1947, by the Southern Political Science Association), August 1947, by permission of the editor. Dr. Niemeyer, the author of *Law Without Force*, is Professor of Political Science at Oglethorpe University. In the following article he suggests that the state cannot be expected to delegate sovereignty to a world society until individual attitudes have changed rather markedly. This emphasis on the ultimate responsibility of the individual represents a fresh approach to the problem of national sovereignty. Dr. Niemeyer also pleads for a closer integration of moral standards with the practices of governments, as a "condition of successful collective existence."

National sovereignty is generally considered the chief obstacle to the growth of an international society. Sovereignty means supreme power within a territorially defined social order, power designed to decide about its own interests, determine its own policies, administer its own affairs, and lay down its own laws. The fact that such sovereignty is vested in numerous nations at the same time causes conflicts not only because it brings into existence conflicting claims to national security, but also because it tends to create conflicting group moralities. There is almost universal agreement that national sovereignty must be overcome if there is to be an international society.

How is this general problem connected with individual motives, beliefs and loyalties? Can individual attitudes affect national sovereignty; can they change the nature of this phenomenon?

National sovereignty has often been blamed on a fixation in the minds of statesmen or scholars. Actually it can be shown that it is rooted in the daily behavior of millions of individuals who habitually rely on the sovereign power of their nation and thereby contribute, materially and psychologically, to its strength. In the last analysis, sovereignty springs from the functional and ideal solidarity of people living together within a certain territory. Hence it cannot be "given up" by governments unless the mental and physical habits of people in general are also re-conditioned.

I

Every law-abiding citizen is, in a sense, an agent of the public order and, hence, a contributor to the sovereign power of his government. He contributes to its power by relieving the government of the need for additional policemen, clerks, judges, and jails. He contributes to its sovereignty by conforming, in the exercise of this pub-

lic function, to the concrete decisions about public order which have been made by the government in the form of laws. In doing so, he accords to these decisions more weight and authority than to his own ideas or those of other agencies. Consciously or subconsciously, he thereby makes a choice. There are, besides the government, many other agencies which could provide him with notions about the way in which public order should be kept, such as local authorities, religious bodies, political parties, trade unions, or professional organizations (all of which actually did compete with the central authorities in past centuries). But the modern citizen, on the whole, looks to his national government as the agency whose judgments concerning public order motivate his daily behavior. He makes this choice without much reflection or reasoning mainly imitating other people who do the same. Himself conditioned, he conditions others through his example. The result is a very strong web of co-ordinated individual behavior which conforms to decisions of a central power and thus gives this central power sovereign rank among all other potential authorities.

Likewise, every taxpayer grants the right to determine his obligations toward the community to the central authorities. . . . The taxpayer . . . helps to build up sovereign power in three ways: by considering the government's claim on his money before every other claim of general welfare; by placing the government's decisions about common welfare above his own ideas and those of other agencies; and by sharing in the creation of the strongest concentration of financial power in the hands of the government. The resultant concept of group welfare also helps to place the government in the key position in the group's economic system

In a similar way every litigant who trusts his fate to the decision of the courts adds strength to the building of sovereign power. There are other systems of tribunals, besides the national pyramid of courts, even in modern society. Professional groups, ecclesiastical organizations, political parties and movements often maintain their own judicial facilities. In addition, there are international tribunals. The citizen by choice puts the national system of courts above all of these. There are two reasons for his confidence in the national judiciary. On the one hand, these courts are closely linked with the might of arms, money, and men which assures enforcement. On the other hand, national courts are considered to represent more nearly the community values which govern the citizen's conscience and by which he stands judged. The nation as a community of public order, a community of welfare, a community of defense, must also be a community of values. And the supreme spokesman for those values is the central national court, endowed with authority over all other levels of the judiciary. Though he may be dissatisfied with decisions by other tribunals, the citizen on the whole accepts the verdict of the Supreme Court as final, not only because no further appeal is available, but also because

no higher authority for the interpretation of the community values is conceivable to his mind. . . . Hence modern man, by fusing the system of courts with the system of government, establishes in his own mind a close link between sovereign power and moral values. The supremacy of the government over all agencies in its territory becomes a moral cause justified by the ethics of community life as upheld by the system of national courts. And the principles of these ethics, in turn, are conceived in terms of the concrete community which centers in the ordering, financing, and promoting agency of the government. National sovereignty stems from an iron-clad union between the practical needs and the moral concepts of modern individuals.

In the field of economic activities, national sovereignty is not as unquestioned as in other fields, although here, too, we can find an increasing tendency to bolster the supremacy of national authority. Competing interest groups in search of additional strength often resort to government aid in order to overpower their opponents. The same is true between organizations of labor and capital. Just as often, however, these interests achieve their ends through powerful organizations of their own, sometimes on the international scale, through organizations which may even rival governments in might and influence. Hence divisions and competition in the economic field tend as much to weaken as to strengthen national sovereignty.

It is from the average citizen and consumer that national sovereign power receives unequivocal support. The victim of maladjustments and contradictions in the economic system turns instinctively to the government as the only impartial and comprehensive power which can co-ordinate the economic efforts of all for the benefit of the whole. Yet the average man in the street supports his government's initiative in this respect passively and almost blindly, knowing that he cannot possibly grasp the intricacies of economic problems. In placing his government's decisions above his own and other people's ideas, he certainly attributes supreme rank to the central national authorities, but he scarcely contributes to them any additional strength. For he does not, by instinct, habit, or conscious decision, act as a public agent for the government's policy, but confines himself to nodding his approval to some energetic action which he feels is necessary. On the other hand, he does add might to his nation by his willingness to bear sacrifices for the sake of domestic employment. The citizen who favors protection of domestic industry and shoulders the consequent burden of a lower standard of living acts on the idea that the nation is the proper unit within which economic benefits ought to be shared and justly distributed. His insistence on the restricted welfare concept and his readiness to forego personal economic advantages for the sake of a national economic system elevates the government to the position of supreme arbiter and general director of all economic policies.

Thus we find that sovereignty is anchored deeply in the daily habits, feelings and ideals of individuals. Supreme authority is above all a function of realized community values and community interests. Hence the agencies of sovereignty are linked with millions of individual lives not only through solidarity of ideas but also through the practical stakes which each has in this partnership. This is the essence of "allegiance." The result is a group responding only to its own leadership and to nothing else and presenting to the outside such a compact unity that interference is not possible except by violence and superior force. This is the external aspect of sovereignty. At present, sovereignty is vested in more than seventy nation states. Our task is to overcome the international conflict of policies and interests resulting from this situation and to straighten the path for a future sovereignty embracing all of humanity. If our analysis is correct, we must conclude that national sovereignty cannot be "surrendered," "given up," or "delegated" by governments, but that it can be transcended only by changing those daily habits and feelings through which individuals, in their current behavior, build up the sovereign power of national states.

II

What precisely are the changes in individual attitudes at which we should aim in order to develop an international society? What concretely can be done to bring about some of these changes? Those are the crucial questions before us.

The problem of international society is primarily one of group relations. Our questions must, therefore, be modified in this sense: What kind of individual attitude causes groups to transcend themselves and to fit into a comprehensive society? Fitting into a comprehensive society is taken to mean: to envisage policies in general co-ordination with each other, to conduct activities in a generally co-operative spirit, and to settle disputes peacefully. Groups existing within nations are able, on the whole, to exist with one another on these terms -- nations in their mutual relations are not. How can the difference between these two kinds of group relations be explained in terms of individual behavior?

A widely spread theory holds that social groups within nations can afford to relax in their mutual relationships because they have been freed from fear for their security through the central government's monopoly of armed force. The inevitable conclusion from this view is that the solution of the security problem is the condition sine qua non of any international society worthy of that name. I cannot agree with this thesis. The quest for group security arises whenever members of a group feel that their collective interests clash with absolutely incompatible interests of other groups. Proof for this can be found in the fact that even groups within nations sometimes begin to fear, and

then organize to provide, for their own security. This is the case whenever they arrive at the conclusion that other groups pursue interests so radically different that the conflict with these groups becomes a question of life and death for either side. It seems, therefore, that the compatibility or incompatibility of interests is the primary problem, and the question of security only secondary.

Our question then needs still further modification in this sense: what causes individuals belonging to different social groups to feel that their collective interests are compatible with each other? Why do individuals in domestic group relations succeed in fitting their collective interests to that of other groups while they fail to accomplish this in international relations? The answer is that in each individual there is taking place a continuous adjustment between the separate interest of the group and the general interest of the entire community, i.e. the nation. The national interest operates both as an obligation for the sake of which people refrain from pushing factional viewpoints to an extreme, and as a frame of reference which provides people with a viewpoint broader than that of their group, thus enabling them to see conflicting interest as parts of a whole.

This adjustment in the mind of each individual is possible because the general interest of the nation is clear, understandable, concrete, and near to his experience. . . . Many official persons spend their full time defining, stating, propagating, and administering the nation's interest. They reach each individual through official utterances, symbols, and administrative activities. They do their utmost to make him as conscious of the nation's interest as he is of any special group interest of his own. . . .

Nothing comparable can be found beyond and above nations. The national interest is the topmost, and most comprehensive, in the series of various interests which are being realized by special institutions and administrators. That is one of the reasons why national interests are so irreconcilable. Individuals, unable to behold a more general interest in sufficiently concrete terms, put their trust, their energy, and their loyalty behind the interest of the nation, seeing in it the only real framework for the solution of social problems. The compactness of national sovereignty is thus re-enforced by the ambiguity of any wider-than-national interest.

Hence the first great obstacle in the creation of wider-than-national loyalties is that there is nothing to be loyal to, beyond the nation. The world idea is not represented by any common institution of general importance, any impressive symbol, or even an adequate term. There is no person or body with sufficient authority to determine "world interests," nor is there any institution whose roots would reach deep enough into the daily life of all human beings to elevate any of its statements about a world interest above the level of an hypothesis.

The United Nations in its present form does not discharge this function at all. It is a machinery through which sovereign nations can more easily reach a compromise between their conflicting interests. But a working arrangement between unrelated group interests and mutual adjustment under a comprehensive general interest are two different things. No amount of harmony which the governments may achieve within the framework of the United Nations can take the place of a specific world interest, conceived and stated by world authorities functioning in close contact with actual human needs all over the globe.

Hence one of the main tasks in the development of an international society must be to give the idea of humanity a concrete meaning in the daily experience of millions of individuals. This should preferably be done in the fields of economic, financial and monetary matters, and in general social conditions, because these constitute an environment in which most individuals have their daily share. ...

III

Common interests embodied in central agencies are the more tangible aspects of sovereignty. Individuals place these institutions, their decisions, policies and laws above their own opinions; that is, they pay allegiance to the persons, rules and symbols which visibly represent the commonweal. But there is more behind sovereignty than this allegiance which meets the eye. Existing independently of allegiance there is an emotional cohesion, an active spirit of union, which lends to allegiance its ultimate significance. We can observe this phenomenon even within the orbit of constituted nations: a region, even if not possessing central institutions of its own, is sometimes cemented together by a solidarity of feelings and values which effectively prevents any outsider from exercising authority there, except by superior force or express consent. ... Thus, the example of regions like Bavaria, Catalonia, and the South-Eastern States of America, Slovakia, etc., proves that sovereignty is rooted not only in allegiance to common institutions, but also in the direct solidarity based upon common beliefs and values.

If this is correct, national sovereignty cannot be overcome merely by establishing supra-national institutions and interest. In our present society, everything favors the strength of nations; if national institutions can sometimes be defied by the public solidarity of certain regions, then certainly international institutions would be helpless *vis-à-vis* the much more powerful feeling of vibrant national unity. Allegiance to international institutions will become a forceful reality only when it is justified and buttressed by a live sense of community embracing all mankind.

The phenomenon of public solidarity is rooted in common values and ideals. One feels a sense of belonging to a certain group

of people when one is aware of sharing with them judgments, ideals, prejudices and principles which one likes to take for granted. Our problem is, therefore: What are the chances of developing common values throughout the world, or of making people conscious of such common values as may already exist?

The most obvious answer is that there are certain basic ideas about right and wrong shared by practically all peoples. The elements of morality, such as govern the most typical relationships between individual human beings, show a common core accepted throughout the civilized world. Hence we meet again and again with the argument that the common people in all countries are really of the same mind and could get along with each other famously if left alone by their leaders. Usually this idea is advanced by travelers in foreign countries who note the universality of moral standards as manifested in daily life and find themselves in easy and perfect harmony with the natives they encounter. They overlook the fact that the same people who would agree with them on the decalogue, the idea of human welfare, and even the desirability of world peace, would sharply differ on the evaluation of the respective countries' governments and policies.

While good and bad have much the same meaning in personal relationships everywhere, the principles and values concerning our political existence are not related to these primary moral standards in a rational way. We have not developed our ideals of government, property, class relations, and foreign policy from the basic notions of right and wrong. We do not even see a necessary and systematic connection between the values of public life and the values of "private" morality. There are two different categories, neatly separated in our minds, one, that of public standards, the other, that of individual human relationships, "and never the twain shall meet." As a result, we draw our judgments in questions of public policy not from any system of rational thought but from accidental habits of mind, inherited prejudices, and subjective emotions. Since these opinions are so largely irrational, we cannot experience any solidarity of public values except with people who happen to share our background and traditions. On the other hand, the irrational character of our values regarding public life makes us extremely sensitive to any disagreement or difference in this field. Irrational standards are highly vulnerable, a fact which causes their proponents to feel great irritation as soon as they are even slightly questioned. All this combines to make feelings of national solidarity in our days more powerful than they really need to be.

The analysis also suggests the remedy. If, in spite of a world-wide common stock of moral principles, we cannot achieve any world-wide community of values regarding public affairs, because we do not form our public judgments on a basis of reasoned ethical ideals, then

there is hope only if we develop a more rational approach to the moral problems of society, governments, politics and economics. The aim is to recognize an unequivocal connection between the "primary" standards of morality, as observed in all individual concerns, with the value categories of public affairs. As it is not difficult to find oneself in agreement with individuals from all over the globe on questions of help and harm as between single human beings, it would be possible to arrive at a wider-than-national community of values if judgments on public affairs could be formed in rational connection with those fundamental notions of ethics. Only then would people find that they belong socially to a community wider than those of their own upbringing.

The experience of the 13th and 18th centuries shows that it is perfectly feasible to maintain a community of values not limited to national boundaries. The scope of common ideals does not have to be great: two or three really fundamental principles are sufficient. Two or three fundamental ideas are all that inspired the various ages of great cultural achievement with the vision which guided their common efforts. A vision, to be convincing, must spring from systematic thought encompassing the whole of man's social existence, his function in society, his hopes, expectations and duties. Hence leadership in developing such a view falls now, as it did then, to the social sciences. Social scientists, not as analytical scholars, but as creative thinkers are the only class of people from whom the world can expect the type of systematic reasoning through which common values in public affairs can be created.

The main obstacle to such an accomplishment in the social disciplines seems to be the general attitude of aloofness from moral questions. Dazzled by the success of the natural sciences, we have grown into a fatal habit of dealing with social problems as if man lived only in the realm of natural causality. Human society is analyzed in terms of natural forces. Moral standards are treated, in social studies, as a sort of private preference rather than a condition of successful collective existence. No efforts are being made to apply modern scientific method to the task defining the common good under increasingly complex circumstances. . . .

It would be naive to hope that social scientists from the entire world could sit down together and agree on certain formulas. It is equally mistaken to demand that any other kind of agreement on values formally precede the era of world peace. Values do not come into existence by agreements but by convictions. In the light of past experience, however, it is just as puerile to expect that any form of world peace will emerge just by hard wishing, in the absence of common values and ideals. . . .

... We cannot reasonably expect to develop anything resembling an international society unless we attain a minimum of common valuations. And we cannot overcome the power of national self-centeredness until mankind as a whole is reflected, in every individual's mind, as a definite community of moral ideals.

Geography and Geopolitics ♡

Geography has always played a major role in defining national interests and shaping foreign policies. Location, size and resources are influential in determining not only the potential strength of a state, the population which it can support and the kind of economy which will develop within its borders, but also to a considerable extent the relations which it will have with other nations. Developments in science and technology are affecting these forces, however. Air power is reducing the strategic significance of oceans as factors of national defense. Mechanized industry is rapidly consuming irreplaceable raw materials, exposing countries hitherto provided with abundant resources to mounting insecurity. Present-day media of propaganda such as the radio are appealing to the minds of masses to disregard the physical and economic facts of the world for political action. And instruments of technological warfare are already in a stage of development capable of destroying vast populations or nullifying the productive effort of whole nations. Statesmen and generals have perennially had to take account of the facts of geography. In some quarters "geopolitics" has been viewed as the rise of a new science; in others, it has become a basis for rationalizing state action. Whatever attitude be held toward the geopoliticians, students of international affairs cannot overlook weighing the importance of the establishment of strong power in certain geographical areas. Nor can they afford to dismiss lightly the effects of technological advancements upon physical realities. The readings which follow have been selected for their illustration of some of these points. For more general readings on geography and international relations see: Sharp and Kirk, Contemporary International Politics, Chapter III; Sprout and Sprout, Foundations of National Power, Chapter III; Simonds and Emeny, The Great Powers in World Politics, Chapter III; R. Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics; R. Peattie, Look to the Frontiers; Foreign Policy Association Headline Series No. 42, Main-springs of World Politics, by Brooks Emeny, Sections 2 and 3.

THE NEW GEOPOLITICS

By E. M. Friedwald

The following article is translated from La France Libre (publication of which was discontinued in 1947), 15 November 1946. This article discusses the profound influence which science and technology have had on geography and geopolitics in the last few decades.

At every period in history political and strategic conceptions have lagged behind science and technology. This is particularly true at present when science and technology have made such rapid and such revolutionary progress that they have already gone on to new achievements before statesmen and military planners have had the time to master them and foresee their political and strategic implications. A great scientific discovery or an important technical invention wrecks almost overnight . . . strategic conceptions which have dominated the life of nations for centuries. . . . To be sure, oceans and continents, rivers and deserts, mountains and plains have not changed in the course of five or six thousand years of history. But one begins to wonder to what extent these geographical realities, which have made a profound impression on the history of the past, still exercise an influence on the political life of the states of today.

It is certain that throughout history the progress of civilization . . . has introduced constant change into the political implications of geography. For thousands of years the desert effectively protected Egypt as the swamps did Babylon from the invasion of primitive hordes. But neither desert nor swamps were able to stop more civilized invaders. The ocean constituted an impassable barrier until man learned how to build ships and mastered the art of navigation and made of the ocean an ideal route for his communications. The valley of the Rhone, covered with dense forest, was impassable up to the time when man learned to use an axe, felled the forest and thus opened a route to the interior of the European continent. Whereas the facts of physical geography have remained practically constant, geopolitical facts have changed with the evolution of states, an evolution which depends not only on material factors but also on spiritual factors -- and they have changed above all with the progress of science and technology.

. . . in the past these changes were introduced gradually, without haste, mainly because the progress of science and technology was slow. Until the end of the 18th century the curve of material progress had remained almost horizontal. The great discoveries and technical innovations no doubt had a profound effect on the geopolitical map of the world, but they asserted their influence imperceptibly be-

cause they were rare. A century and a half went by between the introduction into Europe of gunpowder and the discovery of the unity of the ocean; more than two centuries passed between Magellan's voyages and Watt's discovery.

Actually it was not until the 19th century, when the curve of material progress started to rise rapidly, that geopolitical conditions started to change at a rapid rate. The progress of industrialization in Europe and the United States brought with it a new geopolitical factor of greatest importance; namely the geographical location of the deposits of the principal raw materials, above all coal which was the basis of large scale industry. The appearance of the railroad marked the beginning of a new age. The railroad came to be one of the most powerful means for correcting the geopolitical, that is, the strategic, disadvantages of states. It is only because of the Trans-Siberian Railroad that Russia has been able to keep eastern Siberia. Likewise the extension of the United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific was only possible with the aid of transcontinental railroads. Without them it would have been impossible to prevent the formation of independent states along the Pacific coast. The same phenomena, on a smaller scale to be sure, took place in all the European states. A well chosen railroad policy has tended to compensate for an unfavorable geopolitical situation.

It was not until the 20th century that the curve of scientific progress began to rise almost vertically and today, after half a century of an unparalleled rise, it is impossible to foresee where it will stop. In spite of the discoveries of the 19th century man had remained riveted to the earth and had only been able to surmount partially the obstacles which geography put in his way. From the point of view of geopolitics, the conquest of the air has been a veritable revolution the consequences of which it is still scarcely possible to calculate. More than airplanes are involved; from the strategic point of view the birth of the stratospheric rocket is no less important. But the full strategical implications of the plane and the rocket have only been evident since the discovery of the atomic bomb. With the explosives which were available before August 5, 1945, a Douhet strategy which consisted of limiting the theater of war to the air was impracticable because it required a disproportionate expense of manpower and matériel. Near the end of the war the most powerful air force was only able to drop some tens of thousands of tons of explosives each month, whereas to break the will of a powerful enemy it would probably have been necessary to drop a hundred thousand tons in 24 hours. With the appearance of the atomic bomb, Douhet's dream is by far surpassed. One atomic bomb is capable of producing the same effect as a fleet of 210 super-fortresses although requiring a minimum of manpower.

The atomic bomb, however, is only the utilization for war of a new source of energy the appearance of which marks the beginning of a second industrial revolution. For nearly two centuries the location of coal deposits has been one of the principal geopolitical factors. Because coal is too bulky to be transported long distances economically, the location of coal deposits determined a priori the possibility of a nation to become a great power. The raw materials for atomic energy can, on the contrary, be transported with the greatest of facility over extreme distances. The appearance of this new source of motive power is destined to produce a true industrial revolution in regions which, up till now, have not had the means of becoming industrialized. Thus more and more will the profound divergence which separates the twelve industrial nations from the rest of the world disappear.

Today we are living in a world which has been reduced to the dimensions of a small province of 100 years ago -- a world whose most distant point can be reached by plane in less than 48 hours and by radio in less than a tenth of a second. From the geopolitical point of view the terrestrial globe, far from being divided by geography into watertight compartments, is tending, under the impact of science and technology, to become one and indivisible. The great geopolitical reality of today is the unity of the world, even though political reality ... indicates a divided world.

Nothing illustrates better this paradoxical contrast between the new geopolitics and politics than the reappearance of the question of the Dardanelles, in a form almost identical with that of a century ago. There are few geographical locations which have exercised such a profound and such a durable influence on international politics as the Straits. This influence was fully justified in a world politically and strategically dominated by the rivalry between maritime and continental powers. The Straits formed one of the strongest defensive positions in the world, permitting the power which held them to exercise a veritable local mastery of the sea. It is from there and from there alone that Russia could be seriously menaced by maritime power. This danger was all the more real because the southern flank exposed to sea power constituted the principal industrial and agricultural reservoir of Russia. It is through the Straits also that there passed, before 1914, two-thirds of the wheat exports on which rested the balance of Russian payments and credits abroad. A possible closing of the Straits signified practically the cessation of Russian commerce and economic catastrophe. Russia, enclosed in the continental Eurasian mass, tried to open a passage toward the sea, and for historical, political and economic reasons, the Mediterranean attracted her more than the Atlantic, Pacific, or the Persian Gulf. England, on the other hand, very naturally attempted to prevent the appearance of a potential adversary capable of menacing the British positions in the Mediterra-

nean, especially since the digging of the Suez Canal had made the Mediterranean the great route of the Empire; thus the great Anglo-Russian rivalry of the 19th century with the Straits as the bone of contention.

What remains of the question of the Straits in the age of the plane, the stratosphere rocket and the atomic bomb?

From the strategic point of view, the Aegean Sea has shrunk to the dimensions of a narrows. An aerial force having bases in the innumerable islands of the Aegean Sea, or on the eastern coast of the Balkan Peninsula, or on the western coast of Asia Minor, can block all traffic entering or leaving the Straits as easily as the coastal batteries of the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus could 30 years ago. Therefore, the possible control of the Straits alone would have no offensive value for Russia, since a Russian fleet (assuming that fleets are not relics of the past within a few years) leaving the Straits in the direction of the Mediterranean would have to run the gauntlet of another narrows 325 miles long which can be dominated from the air as easily as the Dardanelles are from land. The same consideration applies to future Russian imports and exports, assuming that the Soviet Union desired to increase its commercial exchanges with foreign countries. What now is the defensive value of the Straits? It would seem at first sight that Russia, once established in the Dardanelles, would enjoy a greater security since she would be able to deny entry into the Black Sea of any enemy fleet. It might be noted in this connection that, under modern conditions, the defense of the Straits can be assured from bases situated in Bulgaria, but does anyone think seriously that the future enemy would be foolish enough to deploy the whole apparatus of an expensive and probably out-dated war machine when a few atomic bombs carried by as many planes, or a few rockets can produce a much more satisfactory effect?

To all that the Russians could reply, and do reply indeed, by recalling the completely analogous position which England occupies in the Suez Canal zone. And now Great Britain is preparing to evacuate Egypt simply because she has understood that the rise of aviation and the appearance of the atomic bomb have transformed the strategic aspect of communications in the Mediterranean and in the Suez Canal, the defense of which can henceforth be assured by other bases. As a matter of fact, in war time England can no longer maintain its communications in the Mediterranean at will as in the past. So Suez (like Gibraltar) ceases to be the relay point of the great route of Empire and becomes the key serving on the one hand to establish a blockade of the Mediterranean, and on the other to shut in enemy fleets capable of threatening the route to the Cape. But in order for the Canal to play this key role it is not necessary to keep British troops in the Canal Zone. A strong air force established on the island of Cyprus, at Malta, in Palestine and probably even in east Africa, can just as effectively

permit the Canal to fulfill its principal strategy. That is why the evacuation of Egypt by the British troops presents many less risks than it would appear at first sight.

It is difficult to believe that the Russian leaders are thinking in terms of narrows, coastal batteries and fleets in the age of the plane, the rocket and the atomic bomb It is more probable . . . that the Russian aims in the Straits are political rather than strategic in the narrowest sense of this term. Turkey constitutes the only break in the cordon sanitaire which Russia has reconstituted for its own purposes against the west; it is the only country bordering on western Russia which has not yet adopted the Soviet form of democracy and which has succeeded up until now in keeping a certain measure of political independence. It also occupies a vital strategic position between the Soviet Union and Arabic Near East which contains the greatest natural reservoir of oil in the world. Even atomic energy does not seem likely to compete with oil, at least in the near future. On the other hand, the Straits control not only the exit from the Black Sea, but also communications between Turkey and Greece both of which separate the Soviet bloc from the eastern Mediterranean. The establishment of Russian bases in the Straits would have, as a natural effect, the inclusion of Turkey in the Soviet sphere of influence, and Turkey would become the ideal springboard for Russian diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Near East. Greece would soon follow, as would Syria and Iraq.

Basically the question of the Straits is only one aspect . . . of the rivalry between east and west. The other, the crucial aspect, is the problem of Germany.

It has become evident that the principal motive of the occupation of Germany by the Anglo-Americans and the Russians is no longer today the necessity of preventing the rearmament of the Reich, or the desire to re-educate the Germans. The two groups no longer fear Germany. They are taking a position against each other. Scarcely had the victory been won when the principal allies were trying to outdo each other in winning over the former adversary. The Russians remember the maxim of Lenin, "He who governs Germany governs Europe"; the Anglo-Americans, the warning of Mackinder, "He who governs eastern Europe . . . dominates the world."

In 1904 Sir Halford Mackinder set forth his conception of the "geographical pivot of history", a conception which he broadened in Democratic Ideals and Reality, published at the end of the first World War. The British geographer considered that world history resulted from the pressure which the people enclosed in the plains of Eurasia have exercised on the peoples established along the coasts. He saw the geographical pivot of history in the plain extending from the Arctic

coast to the central deserts and from the Jenissei River to the isthmus between the Baltic and the Black Sea. This is the Heartland, the middle plain, the greatest natural fortress of the world, which offers ideal conditions for terrestrial mobility and contains immense natural riches, while enjoying the enormous advantage of being inaccessible to sea power. It dominates strategically the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa which, in reality, only form a single continent, and the world island which, with the British and Japanese isles, contain fifteen-sixteenths of the population of the world. Mackinder's thesis was that a displacement of the balance of forces which brought about the expansion of this pivot state towards the coastal countries of Eurasia would permit this state to build a fleet capable of surpassing those of all the other powers together, and would assure for it the mastery of the world. This could be the case especially if Germany or China were to ally themselves with Russia, or succeed in conquering her. Mackinder considered that Germany, bordering upon the plain on the only side where it is easily accessible, was strategically the best placed power to make itself master of the Heartland. That is why, at the end of the first World War, he asked for the establishment of a belt of independent states between Germany and Russia, uttering his famous warning: "He who governs eastern Europe dominates the Heartland; he who governs the Heartland dominates the world island; he who governs the world island dominates the world."

This conception was adopted as the foundation of world strategy by the geopolitical school of Haushofer and dominated the political thought of the Third Reich. ... Germany ... will never again be able to attack the Heartland alone. The roles are reversed. It is Russia today which is the greatest continental power of the world and which occupies all the east of Europe as far as the line which goes approximately from the Adriatic to the North Sea. The pivot state of Mackinder is approaching closer and closer to the seacoast and this state holds in its hand a trump ever so much more powerful than the Pan-Slav movement of Tsarist Russia. ... It is easy to understand why ... Mr. Byrnes said that the United States ... would not withdraw its army of occupation before the other powers did the same. It is easy to understand also the reasons which have led Mr. Churchill to bring back to life ... the idea of a United States of Europe

Today, however, the Heartland no longer has the same strategic significance it had in the beginning of the century, or even just before the last war. To be sure, it is still one of the richest reservoirs of resources, perhaps even the richest and greatest natural fortress of the world. But fortresses today are much more vulnerable than they were in the age of infantry and fleets. And one of the principal modern resources is scientific and technical skill. In 1939 the great world plain could still be seriously threatened only from the west. Today

with planes capable of reaching the antipodes without intermediate bases, with rockets which can soon be aimed at targets situated several thousand miles away, and especially with the atomic bomb, the plain can be threatened from all directions.

On the other hand, the fleet as a main instrument of political power is, in all probability, a thing of the past. The most powerful of fleets is powerless against modern arms. To dominate the world in the age of science and technology requires not only immense material resources, but also the ability to build with them the most effective and most highly perfected machines. Although the Heartland possesses ample material resources it cannot measure up to the West in scientific and technological capacity -- and will not be able to for several generations. But it is an entirely different matter with Germany which possesses to a very high degree scientific tradition, technical skill and a veritable genius for organization. It is on this level, rather than on that of geopolitics, that the future course of events may be determined.

IMPERIALISM AND GEOPOLITICS

By W. H. Greenleaf

Reproduced from The London Quarterly of World Affairs, April 1947, by permission. In the following article Mr. Greenleaf dissects the theory of geopolitics and indicates some of its inherent fallacies, particularly as developed and practiced in Germany.

'Geopolitik' say the editors of the German Journal of Geopolitics, 'is the science dealing with the dependence of political events upon the soil. It is based upon the broad foundations of geography, especially political geography, which is the doctrine of political organisms of space and their structure. . . . Geopolitik aims to furnish armature for political action and guidance in political life. . . . Geopolitik must come to be the geographical conscience of the State.' The analysis of political geography, no longer trammelled by academic isolation, becomes the basis of a compound instrument for action wielded by a science which seeks to translate State-power into terms of national aggrandisement and territorial expansion. But, in itself, Geopolitik is not a modern concept; it is new only in name. The course of this fundamental idea can be traced from the dawn of history -- the Persians under Xerxes, the Macedonians led by the militant Alexander who cried that he had no more worlds to conquer, the Roman expansion, all of these are ancient examples of what in modern times would be regarded as the political and economic expression of imperialist principles which underlie a policy of extension of national

influence by the acquisition of colonies and dependencies. Fundamentally similar in regard to their ultimate aims Geopolitik and Imperialism may be said to differ, however, in the means by which these would be accomplished. Imperialism is a half-conscious and yet deeply-felt urge to expansion; by the application of so-called scientific principles and the emotional driving-force of Imperialism, Geopolitik seeks to attain the same ends but in a more rational manner. ...

The Theoretical Background ✓

Modern German Geopolitik found its roots deep in the soil of the political geography of the last century, in the work of von Humboldt and Ritter, both well-known geographers of the early 1800's. It was upon the basis of these researches that the theoretical groundwork was laid down in 1896, by Friedrich Ratzel, a Professor of Geography at Leipzig, in an essay 'On the Laws of the Spacial Growth of States'. As well as a geographer Ratzel was a trained natural scientist, and brought to bear upon politico-geographical problems a mind conditioned by an attitude which he would be inclined to adopt in this sphere as well. It is not surprising, therefore, that he deduced as being applicable to the life of States, laws similar to those propounded by natural scientists. The activity of the State was for him inescapably determined by the geographical location and topographical structure of the territory over which it exercised its sovereign will. The State appears, however, not as a legal machine, but as a living organism animated by one of 'the mightiest causes of historic development', the Raummotif or space-motive. Driven by this innate force, and subject to geographical conditioning, the State-organism moves forward or backward over space, absorbing either by conquest, or amalgamation, neighbouring States of a type similarly conceived. This space-concept was a result of the influence upon Ratzel of the extent of North America where he had travelled widely, and the westward movement of the American 'frontier'. He superimposed upon a world of generally small nation-States a continental view of life which was in time to become global in its significance.

Ratzel had many disciples, foremost among whom was a Swede, Professor Rudolf Kjellen, who developed extensively the idea of the State as a biological organism which must grow and extend its dominion in order that it may live. Such expansion is not due to lust or aggressive conquest but is a natural and necessary growth. He even distinguished various stages in the development of States -- birth, baptism, death and resurrection. This process, bringing the State into conflict with its neighbours, resolves the course of history into a Darwinian process of selection on an international scale, with nations instead of individuals, competing in the struggle for survival. For these new ideas Kjellen coined a new name, Geopolitics. He considered that every aspect of the domestic and external affairs of State and society

were to be regarded as the legitimate subject of concern and ministration of this new science. A subsidiary branch of geopolitical study, ethnopolitics, deals with demographical problems as they bear on population policy as a power factor in relation to the outside world. The economic ideal is to be found in Autarkie or national self-sufficiency. A State should seek to provide those essential commodities necessary for the maintenance of its population and industry from the potential to be found within the borders of its own realm. The art of government is, to the geopolitician, merely a means whereby the several conflicting interest-groups and social classes which go to make up a society may be welded into a single united whole, which may better serve the foreign policy of the State. To further this end the government may resort to suppression of all hostile opinion. Kjellen suggests that it may even be justified in going to war merely to divert internal conflict into the field of unity in foreign policy; but this step should not be taken without due deliberation, as it may have dangerous consequences -- especially if the war is lost! ... Totalitarian dictatorship is therefore an integral part of any geopolitical system of government.

... in 1904, Sir Halford Mackinder, in an address given before the Royal Geographical Society entitled The Geographical Pivot of History, gave to the geopolitician, unwittingly, that impetus which derives from a practical application of theoretical principles. The task which he set himself was to determine the nature of those geographical features which have been throughout history most coercive of human action; for in so doing, we may uncover those forces which will condition the future distribution of power among the nations of the world. The most important of these features has been the vast extent of the Asiatic steppe; for from the raids of the nomadic inhabitants of this region, carried out over a period of a thousand years, the most revolutionary changes have resulted, changes which have considerably influenced the political structure of medieval and therefore of modern Europe. Until the coming of the 'Columbian' age of discovery, the peoples of that girdle of insular lands which surround this pivot region or 'Heartland', lacked the mobility of the Turanian invaders, and were unable to retaliate. But the discovery of the Cape route to the Eastern ocean opened up many new power possibilities. The relations of Europe and Asia were altered -- sea power neutralised the mobility of the horse and camel-riding nomads which had previously threatened the very existence of Western civilisation. While a sea-revolution was going on the power of Russia swept eastward through Asia, and now, with the world again a closed unit, and with land mobility augmented to an unbelievable extent by the technological improvements brought about by that process called the Industrial Revolution, the 'Heartland' is once more in that central position which it occupied in the pre-Columbian epoch. Moreover, it has become apparent as a result of the process of economic and political integration which has been taking place

in the pivot region, that this area possesses an incalculable agricultural and industrial potential, which is only rivalled in its significance by the region's supreme strategic importance.

Geopolitics Comes to Germany

Between them, Ratzel, Kjellen and Mackinder laid the foundation-stones upon which the superstructure of the German Geopolitik was, in aftertime, to be built up by Professor Karl Haushofer of the Geopolitical Institute at Munich. Haushofer had been a member of the General Staff in the First World War, and realised that Germany's defeat was due to the waging of a disastrous two-front war, a situation which arose out of lack of effective unity of purpose in a grand strategy which wavered between the two objectives of domination of Western Europe, and control of the Euro-Asian pivot region. After becoming acquainted with the ideas of his geopolitical predecessors, he saw that if Germany allied herself with Russia, and in this manner, gained semi-control of the 'World Island' of Euro-Asia and Africa the stage would be set for the act of world domination, with Germany as one of the sovereign powers. This was to be the supreme climacteric of history. And 'To this end', Haushofer said, 'we must educate our masters', and for this he worked up to June 22, 1941. He was a close friend of Rudolf Hess, and through him sought to influence the Nazi leaders with his ideas, by attempting to eliminate those differences, ideological, political, and economic, which widened the cleavage between the Germany and the Russia of the inter-war years. Following Spengler, he argued that the 'West' was in decline, its culture no longer able to enrich Germany, which must therefore turn in the opposite direction and partake to an increasing extent in the cultural activities of the East. He was careful to add that the German and not the Eastern culture and way of life would in the long run inevitably prove to be the predominating influence. It was by means such as these that he tried to win the support of the National Socialists for his policy of alliance with the U.S.S.R. It is not known precisely to what extent he was able to effect this. Be that as it may, the historian of Hitler's rise to power specifically denies that Haushofer exercised any control at all over Hitler and the conduct of Germany's affairs, and that he therefore failed in his self-appointed task.

The relations of Haushofer to the Army tell a different story. He had been a soldier and in the development of his Geopolitik he must have given full consideration to military questions. He was certainly in closer touch with the High Command than with the Nazi clique for, to the professional soldier Geopolitik must have been an interesting basis for strategical plans. So, the important lesson learned by the German Army Command was that Germany's interests could best be

served by an alliance with Russia, a lasting alliance, based upon true political understanding, not one of military convenience like that of August, 1939. But this development was rendered abortive by Hitler's racial and ideological monomania concerning the Soviet Union. Hitler was merely the exponent of a crude, imperialistic Welt-Politik and the cool, scientific evolution of a 'Euro-Asiatic Transcontinental' power system must have influenced him only to a very small extent, if at all. So the conception of Haushofer as the mysterious power-strategist behind the walls of Berchtesgaden disappears. Possibly it was this underlying division of theoretical background which, aggravated by defeat in the field, brought about the Generals' plot against Hitler. It is, at least, significant that Haushofer's son, Albrecht, was implicated in this conspiracy. The attack on Russia was the end of Haushofer's hopes and plans. Geopolitik as a co-ordinated doctrine of world domination had failed.

Criticisms of Geopolitik

Playing upon those ever present influences -- natural patriotism and a community of economic interest -- the bases of that unity and cohesion which normally characterise those citizens of whom a society is constituted, a geopolitical imperialism can in times of crisis and uncertainty, especially in the economic sphere, reduce the rational powers of resistance of a society to impotence by specious argument and promises of national wealth and power with consequent advantages accruing to the individual, and forge the society as a weapon to be employed by the State-power for purposes of aggression. A case in point is the German watchword, Lebensraum. A generation, defeated in war and economically insecure, proved ideal in their reactions to the call of this mysterious concept. It must have been to some extent realised that it is impossible adequately to define what is meant by 'living space'; but the effect that this emotional appeal had upon the German people may best be compared to the feelings called forth by the ideas of 'Liberty' and 'Democracy' in this country and in the United States. In this way, the idea of Lebensraum, played, in the geopolitics of Haushofer, the role of an efficient and convenient emotional weapon to weld the mass of the people into one united whole, and to set them upon the road which leads ultimately to aggression and war. The economic and population difficulties with which Germany was faced were not to be solved by acquiring more territory merely but by strengthening friendly contacts with other nations and so bringing about increased economic intercourse with all the advantages which would follow from this. To the German geopolitician and to the Nazi such methods were, however, entirely unacceptable for it would have been impossible in this way rapidly to bring about a German-dominated Europe. In order to achieve this end the German leaders adopted and adapted the geopolitical concept of Lebensraum -- the religion of the 'living-space' which stems directly from Ratzel's Raum-motiv -- and its whole philosophy, which

is epitomised in the words of Spinoza which Haushofer so often quoted: 'One has only as much right in the world as one has power'. And to the geopolitician land means power.

The theoretical basis of Geopolitik is as faulty as its political background. One of its essential theses is the State as an organism. This analogy has long been a device adopted by political theorists for purposes of argument, but it is essentially inadequate. If the State is an organism, it must be of an extraordinary kind, because there pertains to its members a freedom of movement utterly unlike that within the body of any other known existence; and to claim, as Kjellen did, as observable in the life of States, normal growth as of a human being, is surely carrying the process of argument by analogy to the point at which it deserves only derision. Such theoretical methods as these are bound to be inconclusive because the separate comparisons drawn are never with the same kind of living organism; and even where there is agreement on this point it is lacking as to the extent to which the analogy should be made. The State is, in fact, not an organism but an organisation. Ratzel was probably aware of the difficulties involved especially where the comparison is between the State and an organism of the higher orders; indeed, he stressed the fact that the inferences as to the nature of the State to be drawn from such an analogy are, as he put it, 'spiritual and cultural, rather than physical in nature'. Kjellen, however, seeking only a means of justifying the activities of that aggressive, omniscient power-mechanism which, under the influence of the geopolitician, the State was to become, ignored the objections which such methods would logically entail; and by accepting as immutable truths the twin heresies of the biological laws of State expansion and of excessive geographical determinism -- a belief which, as Mackinder saw, is equally indefensible -- he rendered an iniquitous doctrine theoretically specious.

In the formulation of his Geopolitik Haushofer made two fundamental mistakes. Firstly, he overlooked the possibility of the implications of the pivot region being noted by other observers; and secondly, that they would remain hidden from the power which controlled the 'Heartland'. To preserve the peace of the world and to prevent the resurgence of another Hitler, we must not fall prey to these misconceptions. It might be argued that the coming of the jet aeroplane, and the evolution wrought by the atom bomb, give the lie to all the inference of geopolitics. But this is the superficial view only. They do not permanently affect the power possibilities which are inherent in control of the 'Heartland'; they merely alter the temporary balance of power.

GEOPOLITICS AND THE UNITED STATES

By W. Watkin Davies

Reproduced from The Contemporary Review, August 1947, by permission of the editor. In this article Mr. Davies, of Birmingham University in England, examines American foreign policy in terms of its geopolitical bases and ventures the opinion that geography "is the most fundamental factor in foreign policy."

An eminent American historian in this country has recently been expounding what he terms the American Diplomatic Revolution. It is a challenging description of certain far-reaching changes which are now taking place in the traditional attitude of United States citizens towards international relations. It is the way they are reacting to the bewilderment which most of them felt when they found themselves involved, entirely against their wish, and clean contrary to their traditional policy, in two world wars. So much of the case is apparent to the ordinary citizen. The scientific student of foreign policy, however, goes farther, and seeks to understand the reason for these unwelcome consequences of the policy of no entanglements. That is how it comes about that geopolitics is much studied in America just now. It was an Englishman, Halford Mackinder, who laid the foundations of the science. Among American scholars, it was the late Professor N. J. Spykman who did most to adapt it to the facts of the world position of the United States. In his hands it has lost all its German aggressiveness, and come to mean simply the planning for the security of a country in terms of the geographical factors. Admittedly it implies the rejection of collective security, and a frank recognition of the fact that the international world is and will long continue to be governed by power politics. Geography is the most fundamental factor in the foreign policy of states because it is the most permanent. What, then, are the geographical assets and liabilities of the United States?

There are five great land masses in the world; and of these Eurasia alone, until the recent growth of the United States, has been a great power-centre. A cylindrical map centred on the Western Hemisphere shows the United States encircled by the land masses of the Old World, regions which are the world's greatest centres of population, and also of its economic and military strength. For America the Atlantic world is by far the most important region, and Europe is the centre of that region. Looking at it across the intervening ocean, the United States sees this formidable European centre of power with Britain lying astride all its lines of communication. British sea power lies between Europe and the United States. So long as it is there and effective, no European State can launch an attack against America, nor could America launch an attack against Europe. Between southern

Norway and the Bay of Biscay lies the heart of industrial Europe, and its greatest war potential; threats from any point along that line have always been regarded by British statesmen as a danger to the homeland itself. But the security of the Mediterranean route has also always been regarded as of paramount importance; and there the danger is at such points as Marseilles, Trieste, Salonika and Constantinople, where Europe's economic strength can project itself into the Mediterranean basin. Between the two world wars British Governments attempted to apply the traditional policy of balance, but soon discovered that no combination of European states was strong enough to outweigh Germany. If Germany had defeated England and Russia in 1941, she would have been able to organise the whole of Europe for war; the Ukraine would have become her granary; all Africa would have been searched for tropical products; and from the western bulge of Africa routes would have radiated across to the eastern bulge of Brazil. Then the United States would have found itself, for the first time, confronted by a Power which it could not hope to match. The two world wars opened the eyes of Americans and made them see that only by adding their own might to that of England could they maintain that balance of power in Europe upon which their security had always depended.

The Pacific is for the United States far less important than the Atlantic. Much of its land mass faces the Polar Sea and the Indian Ocean. Distances are vast. The inhabitants are mostly so poor that they provide but the slenderest of markets. The balance of power within the region, down to the fall of Japan, depended upon the relative strength of that country, China and Russia; to which must be added the varying factors represented by the pressure which outside States, such as England, France, Germany and the United States were able to exert. Now, however, the balance has been destroyed; and Russia and the United States are endeavouring to reconstruct some sort of equilibrium out of a prostrate Japan, a divided Korea, and a distracted China.

The oldest debate in the realm of United States foreign policy is that between isolationists and interventionists. That the balance of power in Europe and Asia did not concern the United States, who would be able to maintain her security behind her broad ocean moats, and flanked by the friendly and powerless territories of Canada and Latin America, was the argument upon which the case of the former rested. For the interventionists, on the other hand, the balance of power in Europe and Asia is the first line of defence; American territory, North, Central, and South, being but a second line. Gradually, however, events opened the eyes of the isolationists to the inadequacy of their traditional line of defence. The consequence was an ever-widening zone to which the Monroe Doctrine was deemed to apply, until by 1940 it apparently included such distant outposts as Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, and even the West African coast. Both isolationists and

interventionists have always assumed the friendliness and integrity of the whole Western Hemisphere; with a United States predominance varying from hegemony to the benevolence of the good neighbour. . . .

. . . There is no reason for supposing that the New World, with its twenty-two independent States, will, any more than Europe, come to form one harmonious whole; for there exist within it the same distrusts, oppositions and national ambitions that have so often broken the peace of the Old World. Except in times of obvious danger, the United States and Latin America have always been more interested in Europe and Asia than in one another. Canada has never participated in Pan-American conferences, and Argentina has done so always with marked hesitation. . . .

In such a period of global warfare as was ushered in by the first world war military strategy has to consider the world as a unit, and to think of all parts in their mutual relationships. The statesman now works in a world which is a single unit of forces. His understanding of the factors which will influence the peace and security of his own country must extend to include the whole surface of the globe and all the elements that affect the strength and weakness of States. A geopolitical region is, of course, not the same thing as an ordinary geographical region; the latter is static, the former dynamic, changing with every shift in the centres of power. . . .

. . . [According to] the geopolitician, the cardinal maxim for the statesman is not to avoid encirclement but rather see to it that, whether encircled or not, no other State shall become so powerful as to make its victory a foregone conclusion in the event of war breaking out in the future. A nation loses its freedom the moment it becomes obvious that it would not be able to stand up to any likely enemy. Europe has always in the past been the world's great power-centre, though rendered innocuous by the fact of being a mosaic of many independent States, all of which in the long run succeeded in preventing unification under one government. Victory for the Axis in Europe and Asia would have meant the unification of all Eurasia, and the United States could not have withstood a Power of such magnitude. Having narrowly escaped so dire a peril in 1941, the United States now resolves to prevent any nation or alliance of nations from emerging as a dominant Power in either of the two regions of the Old World (Europe and Eastern Asia) from which American security could be threatened.

As geopolitics sees the Old World, it is made up of a Heartland (now virtually synonymous with the Union of Soviet Republics) and a girdle of Rimlands, stretching from the Arctic coast of Canada, along the western Scandinavian shores, through the Mediterranean and the Middle East, on to the farthest coasts of China. It is contended that he who controls the Rimlands rules Eurasia, and that he who rules

Eurasia dominates the whole world. Twice already, in 1917 and 1941, has the United States gone to war to make certain that the Rimlands should not come under the control of a single Power. Thus the geopolitical significance of the second world war is seen to be the struggle for the control of these Rimlands of Europe and Asia. At one moment Germany controlled the western half of this girdle, and Japan the eastern half; and it was then that the people of the United States saw in a flash that the foundations of their security had crumbled away. One asset alone remained to them, apart from their own energy and resources, and that was the fact that England stood unconquered, providing for them a base and a bridgehead for the reconquest of the vital Rimlands. The old isolationist belief that the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the control of the Panama Canal would suffice as defences was at once discarded; and it was realised that an unconquered England and a divided Europe were a sine qua non.

From all this it is logical to infer that America would never contemplate the possibility of an England neutral in a war between the United States and Russia. It also makes it clear why the United States has thrown its mantle over Greece and Turkey, and has become actively interested in the position in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Without doubt it would intervene in similar manner if any portion of the Rimlands were to be in danger of falling under the control, direct or indirect, of Russia, now the only power-centre capable of attempting to unite both Heartland and Rimlands under its control. An immensely long frontier line, comprising the northern coast of Canada, the western and Mediterranean coasts of Europe, Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean littoral, and the China coast up to Korea, all of it now dominated by the United States or the British Commonwealth, contains the territories of Russia and her satellites as a spoon holds an egg. Tradition indicates the various points at which Russia habitually seeks to penetrate this frontier -- the Dardanelles, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Korea, Manchuria; to these historic localities we must now add Petsamo, Trieste and Salonika. British and American power, resting upon adequate bases, now encircles the globe, supporting the countries of the Rimlands, few if any of which are capable of putting up much of a fight on behalf of their own independence. Island bases controlled by the United States stretch like stepping-stones from the western exit of the Panama Canal to the coasts of Asia. The Indian Ocean is in the keeping of the British Commonwealth, of which it has, in fact, now become the strategic centre. British also is the secondary line of defence, strengthening the Mediterranean first line, and safeguarding the oil wells of the Middle East, which stretches across Africa, with Kenya as its eastern, and Nigeria as its western, pillar. West of that, at the Azores, the United States again resumes responsibility; and so across to Brazil, and up through the Caribbean Sea with its island bases to Newfoundland, Greenland and the Far Canadian North.

La Politique de toutes les puissances est dans leur géographie is a well-known dictum of Napoleon. The geopolitician would agree with him. In a world of international anarchy, foreign policy must aim above all at the improvement or at least the preservation of the relative power of the State; and power, in the last resort, means the ability to wage successful war. In geography lie the clues to the problems of military and political strategy. Geography is the most fundamental factor in foreign policy because it is the most permanent.

THE MINERAL POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

By Elmer W. Pehrson

Reproduced from the April 1945 issue of Mining and Metallurgy, by permission. The amount and quality of a nation's mineral resources are of primary importance in assessing its world power position. No state is wholly self-sufficient in resources and accordingly programs of conservation and stock-piling, efforts to discover new and available sources of supply, and the expanded use of synthetic materials constitute major tenets in national security planning. In the following article Mr. Pehrson, who is Chief, Economics and Statistics Branch, Bureau of Mines (U. S. Government), examines the present mineral outlook in the United States, and suggests various steps by which to preserve and implement our resources.

Opinion seems widely divergent as to where we stand with respect to future mineral supply. From some quarters we hear that the United States is about to become a "have-not" nation and about to experience the evil consequences such a situation would entail. Others claim that we are still a treasure house of stored-up mineral wealth, the surface of which barely has been scratched. The data to be presented here support the conclusion that neither of these viewpoints is correct and that we are far from exhaustion of those mineral resources that are basic to our industrial economy. However, exhaustion is well advanced in a number of important subsidiary minerals so that we can no longer drift along with the easy-going philosophy that the earth will provide. ...

... Since 1900 mineral production in the United States has exceeded that of the entire world prior to that time. Since 1915, production of mineral fuels has achieved outstanding significance, largely because of the rapid rise in petroleum production and the accompanying growth of automotive transportation. Metals have ranked second in importance in recent years with the nonmetals other than fuels holding third place. The importance of metals in war is clearly indicated by the peaks experienced in both war periods. ...

The unprecedented rate at which we have been depleting our mineral resources and the difficulties in securing sufficient minerals to sustain the war program have focused attention on the need for reviewing and clarifying national mineral policy. This in turn has indicated the need for an appraisal of reserves, for such data obviously are a prerequisite to an understanding of the mineral problem. As a contribution to this objective the Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines began a study of available information on mineral deposits with a view to preparing estimates of national reserves. This work has been under way for over a year and an initial report will be completed shortly.¹ ... Many basic decisions on national policy will have to be made by our leaders within the next few years, and those decisions can be made more wisely if the objective judgment of experts is available. The data to be presented should be used with the understanding that reserve estimates are subject to change even under the best of conditions, particularly when attempted on such a broad scale. The estimates therefore represent preliminary figures only.

I shall place major emphasis on those reserves available under present economic conditions and technologic practices. They may be referred to broadly as "commercial" reserves. Future supply-demand relationships and prices, as well as progress in mineral technology, are not susceptible to precise determinations. Consequently the economic and technical factors involved in estimates of commercial reserves, in addition to the geological factors, must be analyzed in broad terms. ... The estimates for most commodities include measured, indicated, and inferred ore, using the official definitions that have been established for these categories. Notable exceptions are petroleum and natural gas, for which it was felt that available data did not permit estimates of inferred reserves with any acceptable degree of accuracy.

Future discoveries uncertain

In appraising the significance of present estimates of commercial mineral reserves, consideration must be given to the possibilities of discovery not contemplated in the inferred ore included in the estimates. We may start with the assumption that the potential mineral areas of the nation have been heavily prospected and most of the surface deposits or those whose presence is indicated by superficial phenomena already have been found. This assumption is substantiated by the decline in new discoveries. ... The rate of discovery of metalliferous deposits has been declining at an alarming rate for half a century. It is significant that no major metal producing district comparable to Butte, Bisbee, Homestake or the Coeur d'Alene has been

¹ See Mineral Resources of the United States, prepared by the staffs of the Bureau of Mines and Geological Survey, Public Affairs Press, Washington 1948.

brought into production in the United States since the active development of the Picher-Miami lead-zinc deposits of the Tri-State area about 1916. Few important copper discoveries have been made in the present century. Most of the large deposits producing today were known before 1900. The largest discovery since then has been the United Verde Extension mine at Jerome, Ariz., but production from this property was relatively insignificant in terms of national needs, the entire output in the twenty-odd years the mine operated having amounted to only a half-year supply at normal rates of consumption.

True, new mines have been developed, but the large ones were the result of the application of improved technology to deposits whose presence had been known for many years; and the small ones in the aggregate contribute but a small part of the national requirements. Future additions to the national reserve will depend largely on the success achieved in utilizing known low-grade deposits not available economically at present and the discovery of deep-seated or concealed deposits, the presence of which is not easily discerned. . . . Additions to known or inferred reserves of most minerals, therefore, depend on technologic progress and the success of carefully planned and scientifically executed exploration.

The effects of these programs on our mineral reserves obviously cannot now be evaluated with assurance and opinion varies widely as to the probable outcome. New deposits undoubtedly will be found as will extensions to known orebodies not contemplated in present estimates of inferred ore. In general, however, I believe that the risks and costs involved are too great to warrant the assumption that our present estimates will be increased greatly through future discovery. In any event, the outlook does not justify determination of national policies solely on the expectation of large additions to our commercial reserves through the discovery of new deposits.

Present reserves compared with past production

To indicate the approximate degree of exhaustion that has occurred the estimates of remaining reserves are compared in Fig. 4 with the original reserve, which was determined by adding the total production through 1943 to the reserve estimates of Jan. 1, 1944. The chart includes 25 of the major industrial minerals for which reasonably reliable estimates can be made. It does not include building materials, with which the United States is amply supplied, nor does it include some important minerals of which the United States is notably deficient, such as tin and nickel.

Outstanding features of the chart are the relatively favorable position in coal and the fertilizer materials, and the relatively depleted state of our metallic reserves. No exhaustion has taken place in the original reserve of magnesium and nitrogen, the supplies of which are




Fig. 4. Proportion of original mineral reserves remaining as measured, indicated, or inferred commercial ore, 1944.

virtually inexhaustible, because of the abundance of brines and ocean water from which we obtain magnesium, and of air from which we extract nitrogen and other valuable elements. Air and water are two minerals whose importance should not be overlooked although, of course, they present no reserve problem. At the other extreme is mercury, of which only 3 per cent of the original commercial reserve is believed to remain. . . .

The percentages shown for natural gas and petroleum are based on proved reserves only, which tends to exaggerate the depletion that has taken place in these industries. The exhaustion indicated for antimony, manganese, and chromium are of nominal significance only in view of the fact that domestic resources have not made important contributions to national requirements, as will be shown later. Somewhat more significant is the situation shown for tungsten, vanadium, and bauxite, although we also have been large importers of these materials in the past. The position of iron ore is a matter of some concern from the long-range view because of its essentiality to our industrial structure. Of more immediate concern is the depleted state of our copper, lead, and zinc resources, and we have also drawn extensively on our commercial reserves of gold and silver.

Fig. 5 shows the estimated commercial reserves of various minerals in terms of year's supply at the average annual rate of consumption from 1935 to 1939. The data should not be interpreted as indicating that production large enough to meet the prewar rate of use

could be sustained for the periods indicated. Many of the minerals shown are not now being produced in quantities equal to domestic requirements, and as depletion progresses the maximum or optimum rate of production declines for obvious reasons. The availability of those minerals that are essentially by-products, such as antimony and silver, is further restricted by economic and technologic factors that control the rate of production of the minerals with which they are associated. Nine of the 33 minerals shown on the chart are available in quantities equivalent to more than a 100-year supply at the prewar rate of use. Only four fall within the 25-to-100-year supply bracket, while eight qualify in the 5-to-25-year group. The reserves of the remaining twelve are small, representing less than a five-year supply. The significant point is that if we make a division at the 35-year level, a period but little more than the usual interval between wars, 21 of the 33 minerals fall below the line, and this group includes petroleum, copper, lead, and zinc, in the production of which we have led the world for years.




Fig. 5. Commercial reserves in 1944 in terms of annual average rate of consumption, 1935-1939.

The rate of production that the remaining reserves can support in the future is no less important than the size of the reserve. Production of those minerals of which we have over a 100-year reserve

could be extended to meet any demand that can reasonably be expected. Moderate expansion of postwar production of sulphur, fluorspar, and natural gas over prewar peak rates doubtless could be accomplished if justified by economic conditions. It is doubtful if copper production could be expanded much over present rates and a decline is expected in a decade. Petroleum production already is reported to have reached or exceeded optimum rates and any increase in output at this time would be at the expense of efficient recovery. For the remaining minerals shown on the chart decreasing rates are likely within a relatively few years.

Submarginal resources

The foregoing analysis indicates that some of our "blue chip" mineral resources have been depleted to a critical point. This raises a question as to the possibilities of developing our submarginal resources, the order of magnitude of which is shown in Fig. 6. In this

ORDER OF MAGNITUDE OF SUBMARGINAL AND HIGHLY SPECULATIVE RESOURCES				
Supply based on average annual rate of consumption from 1935 - 39				
<u>OVER 500 YEARS</u>	<u>100 TO 500 YEARS</u>	<u>25 TO 100 YEARS</u>	<u>5 TO 25 YEARS</u>	<u>LESS THAN 5 YEARS</u>
Iron Ore	Bauxite	Flake Graphite	Asbestos	Antimony
Magnesium	Manganese	Petroleum	Cadmium	Industrial Diamonds
Nitrogen	Molybdenum		Copper	Lead
Phosphate Rock	Vanadium		Chromite	Platinum
Potash			Fluorspar	Quartz Crystals
Salt			Gold	Tin
Sulfur			Mercury	
			Mica (black)	
			Nickel	
			Silver	
			Tungsten	
			Zinc	

NOTE - The availability of these resources is highly speculative or remote because of uncertainties in basic estimates, high costs of recovery, or technologic problems involved in their utilization. They do not include commercial reserves

Fig. 6. Years' supply of submarginal and highly speculative U. S. mineral resources, 1944.

chart an attempt has been made to show the years-supply equivalent of submarginal and highly speculative resources. The availability of these resources varies considerably but on the whole is remote because of uncertainties in basic estimates, high costs of recovery, or technologic problems involved in their utilization. Although they represent a substantial potential national asset and offer a fertile field for research most of them must be considered as largely unavailable under any economic conditions that can be expected, at least in the next quarter century.

Comparison of this list with Fig. 5 reveals that with few notable exceptions submarginal reserves are roughly proportionate to commer-

cial reserves. No estimates of submarginal resources of coal are available, but in view of the large known quantities of commercial coal, such estimates would be of academic interest only. Noncommercial resources of nitrogen, magnesium, and salt for practical purposes may be regarded as limitless and also of academic interest at this time. Potential reserves of phosphate rock, molybdenum, potash, iron ore, and all forms of sulphur are significant because they assure ample supplies of these important raw materials for many years to come if we are willing to pay the price for them. The large submarginal resources of bauxite, manganese, and vanadium afford a measure of safety against possible shortages of these strategic materials in future emergencies and eventually may even provide peacetime industries. The bauxite in this category is largely high-silica and high-iron ore that cannot compete with high-grade foreign ores. In addition to this off-grade bauxite are large quantities of other minerals to supplement our marginal resources of raw materials for the production of aluminum. Flake graphite is available in fairly large quantities but it is of low quality compared with foreign materials. Its use would be costly and the products made from it inferior. The position of petroleum on the chart is based on the statement of Wallace E. Pratt that the ultimate production of the United States should total at least 100 billion barrels. Obviously this must be regarded as highly speculative. From the long-range view, the submarginal resources of the other minerals appear to offer only moderate expectations of an improved reserve position in the future. This group includes such important materials as copper, lead, zinc, tin, nickel, and chromite.

Because of the many uncertain factors involved and the limited information available on submarginal resources, the foregoing conclusions must be regarded only as an extremely rough indication of the possibilities now apparent.

Outlook for the future

... Coal is the priceless ingredient that protects the industrial health of the nation; it is the nation's No. 1 asset, although our agricultural friends might dispute this assertion. Iron ore certainly ranks second among the minerals, and because of the widespread use of the internal-combustion engine we must accord petroleum third place. ...

Coal. The five great centers of industrial and military power have developed around large coal resources. The United States, England, Russia, Japan, and western Europe are the principal coal-producing regions of the world and owe their position in world affairs largely to that fact. Coal is essential in the production of steel and mechanical power and these are the primary requirements for industrial development. The United States is fortunate in having the largest reserve in the world, but the tremendous contribution of coal to the nation's welfare is too little appreciated by the public, which is prone

to regard the coal industry as an occasional source of annoying labor-management disputes and disagreeable fuel shortages. We have no serious difficulties of supply in sight, although the reserves of high-grade coking coals are none too plentiful and may present some problem in the not-too-distant future.

... If we are to turn to our coal reserves for liquid fuels in the future, the rate of exhaustion probably will more than treble, and the need for conservation will be correspondingly greater.

Although we have used up a substantial part of our anthracite, our basic position in coal is outstandingly good, although it would seem that a wiser nation would use its reserves a little more prudently even though the day of reckoning on shortages is centuries away.

Iron Ore. Iron ore ranks second to coal in national importance only because experience indicates that steel-making slightly favors the coal areas. Four of the five great centers of industrial power have outstanding iron resources. Japan is notably deficient and has attempted to overcome this weakness through aggression and commercial expansion. The United States is well supplied with iron ore, although the reserves do not match those of coal by a wide margin. Ernest F. Burchard, of the Geological Survey, and Albin C. Johnson, of the Bureau of Mines, estimate that the reserves of iron ore of present commercial or usable grade total 5,478,000,000 long tons, of which about a third is classed as inferred ore. Total production through 1943 was 2,613,000,000 long tons so that 68 per cent of the original reserve, based on present estimates, still remains. ... In addition to this commercial reserve is a potential reserve of 63,000,000,000 long tons of submarginal ore, the utilization of which will depend on technological advances and economic conditions. ...

Fig. 8 shows the past production of pig iron and iron ore and an appraisal of the possibilities during the next quarter century. The forecasts for 1970 were based on an analysis of the probable demand for steel assuming that per-capita consumption in 1970 might lie between 0.60 and 0.73 tons. These represent increases of approximately 25 and 50 percent over the predepression rate of 0.48 tons. With a population of 156,549,000 in 1970, steel requirements would be between 94,000,000 and 115,000,000 tons, the lower figure appearing the most likely. At the normal operating rate of 75 percent of capacity, plant requirements would be between 125,000,000 and 150,000,000 tons. The present installed capacity is 93,500,000 tons.

Pig iron requirements in 1970 were computed on the assumption of a slight increase in the use of scrap and a corresponding decrease in the ratio of pig iron to steel. The latter was estimated at 65 percent in 1970 compared with 68 percent during the past decade. On this basis




Fig. 8. Past, present, and potential production of iron and iron ore in the United States, 1900-1970.

pig iron requirements in 1970 would be between 61,000,000 and 74,500,000 tons. Present capacity is 67,500,000 tons.

...

Although the total iron ore reserves appear ample to meet domestic requirements for a prolonged period, we shall soon be confronted with a major problem because of the exhaustion of the direct-shipping ores of the Lake Superior district, found chiefly in the Mesabi Range in Minnesota. This ore represents the cream of our resources because the deposits can be mined cheaply and the ore used directly in the blast furnace without prior treatment. Direct-shipping ores of Minnesota account for half of the total production of the country. At the 1942 rate of extraction the remaining tonnage represents only seventeen years' life, and the rate of production will begin to decline in the near future. The problem is made more acute because 90 per cent of the production of these high-grade Minnesota ores comes from the open-pit mines that contain only 57 percent of the reserves. Exhaustion of these mines is therefore quite imminent. Declining rates of production at the open-pit mines can be offset only in part and for only a few years by increasing the output of direct-shipping ore from underground mines and concentrates. The total estimated reserve of commercial-grade ore in the Lake Superior district is equivalent to less than 25 years' life at current rates of production. Obviously, if the district is to continue to supply large tonnages, development of the low-grade ores must be started in the near future.

The open-pit mines provide great flexibility in production because mining can be stopped completely, if necessary, with low maintenance costs and little adverse effect on production capacity, and it can be increased quickly in periods of heavy demand. During the present war this resource has been of inestimable value in making possible our enormous steel output. The impending loss of this facility is thus a matter of major national interest because it has served as a gigantic stock pile which has supplied the needs of the nation in times of heavy demand and national emergency. If we are to become dependent on our lower-grade ores we shall have to build large plants to treat them. Such plants provide rigid limits on production capacity and if surplus capacity is maintained to meet peak demand, depreciation and obsolescence on a large scale will have to be faced.

Failure to develop the low-grade ores of the Lake Superior district eventually would lead to dependence on foreign sources of supply. In view of the large tonnages required, maintenance of shipments from foreign sources in time of war would present a major problem of national defense. Because of this and the high essentiality of steel in war, it would seem unwise for the United States to allow its self-sufficiency in iron ore to fall to dangerous limits. . . .

Petroleum To forecast future trends in domestic production and consumption of petroleum taxes the ability of the most ambitious crystal-gazers. The difficulty arises in trying to reconcile the extraordinary growth of this industry with the relatively limited reserves reported available -- approximately twenty billion barrels. . . . the reserve is equivalent to about a twelve-year supply at the 1944 rate of extraction. Most experts think more oil will be discovered, but few of them venture a guess as to how much or at what rate. Wallace E. Pratt's estimate of an ultimate yield of at least 100 billion barrels already has been mentioned. On this basis we have a total speculative reserve of seventy billion; thirty billion barrels have been produced to date. Even this quantity of oil, however, provides only about a forty-year supply. Fortunately our chemical brethren have devised methods of making petroleum products from abundantly available raw materials so that in the long run we need not worry about shortages.

...

Unless the rate of discovery improves, production may be expected to decline in the near future. Against this is the ever-increasing demand for petroleum. The per-capita consumption has increased from less than half a barrel in 1900 to 12.1 barrels in 1944, with the upward trend continuing at a rapid rate. No prediction of future trends can be made with assurance because of the uncertainty as to various pertinent factors. Some believe that the use of automobiles was approaching saturation before the war, and that the increase in per-capita consumption of motor fuel should taper off. This use normally accounts for

about 45 percent of the oil consumed, the remainder being used largely for heating purposes. ... At the 1944 rate, oil demands in 1970 with the expected 13 percent increase in population would be 1.9 billion barrels. This would seem a minimum expectation.

Currently known petroleum reserves would not permit production to meet even the minimum demand 25 years hence, so if future discoveries fail to remedy the situation we are faced with the need for developing supplemental sources of supply. Under peacetime conditions substantial quantities of oil could be obtained from the Caribbean area and if necessary from more distant sources. This would seem to be the most economical solution of the problem. If for any reason foreign supplies were unavailable we can turn to other domestic sources. Secondary recovery from depleted oil structures has begun already and could be increased considerably at higher prices. Synthetic liquid fuels offer a feasible though more costly solution. For this purpose natural gas offers the cheapest source of these products for the immediate future, but the supply is relatively small. Tar sand, oil shale, and coal (including lignite) also are available, and in the aggregate represent an enormous reserve. The largest, though not necessarily the lowest cost source of synthetic liquid fuels, is coal. ...

... As with iron ore, large-scale dependence on foreign sources for such a strategic commodity is objectionable from the standpoint of national defense. Insurance against shortages in future emergencies could be provided by setting aside proved oil fields as a national petroleum reserve. The minimum requirement in the event of a decline in domestic oil production is the establishment and maintenance of a synthetic fuel industry of sufficient size to provide a nucleus of proved technology and experienced personnel which could be expanded in an emergency. ...

Copper, Lead, and Zinc occupy a significant position among the minerals of secondary importance to the basic national economy. The United States has long had virtual self-sufficiency in these metals. However, our resources were unequal to the demands of this war and large imports have recently been required. ... output of copper and zinc has been only moderately higher and that of lead substantially lower than in World War I. This record can be ascribed in part to various causes such as manpower and equipment shortages, the fact that the industries had not fully recovered from a protracted depression, and insufficient price; but the ore-reserve situation was the principal contributing cause. That depletion is well advanced in these industries is an inescapable conclusion from the record and the present knowledge of remaining reserves.

Copper reserves in 1944 have been estimated ... at 20,000,000 tons of recoverable metal under prevailing conditions. Since they in-

clude some reserves available only at premium prices they may be considered as a generous appraisal of commercial reserves under normal conditions. A quarter of the tonnage is classed as inferred. It is estimated that production could be maintained at the rate of 1,000,000 tons per year for nearly ten years, following which would come a gradual decline to exhaustion. Submarginal resources have been estimated at 10,000,000 tons of copper contained in 1.25 billion tons of material.

Estimated reserves of six-cent lead under prewar operating conditions ... were only 5,000,000 tons in 1944, of which only a third was classed as measured and indicated. Under emergency conditions the total reserve, including the six-cent lead, was estimated at only 6,600,000 tons. Peak war production 1942 was 27 percent below the all-time peak established in 1925.

The quantity of zinc available at 6c. in the reserves estimated ... was 11,200,000 tons of recoverable metal, more than half of which was in inferred ore. Under emergency prices the total reserve was believed to contain nearly 17,000,000 tons.

Production of lead and zinc may be expected to decline within a few years. ...

... Fig. 10 shows the status in 33 principal industrial minerals in the five-year period 1935 to 1939. Manganese, chromite, and nickel




Fig. 10. Ratio of production to consumption of leading mineral products, exclusive of building materials.

are indispensable in our industrial structure, yet we have imported almost all of our needs for decades. These deficiencies and others that may develop need cause little anxiety as to national security provided proper steps are taken to buttress our defense against shortages in time of war.

We have been able to export part of our production of the first nine minerals listed in the column at the left of Fig. 10. The tenth mineral, natural gas, is not exported to any extent. We are a net importer of most of the metals. On the basis of available reserves and probable postwar domestic requirements we can continue to export for some time all but two of the minerals we shipped abroad before the war. An import status for copper and petroleum is likely within a decade. Domestic reserves or installed capacity could support for various periods an improved "have" status for iron ore, barite, nitrogen, potash, and possibly fluorspar if such status were desirable. On the other hand, greater dependence on foreign sources of zinc, lead, cadmium, mercury, bauxite, vanadium, tungsten, platinum, and block mica is indicated. Little change can be expected in the remaining commodities, which are chiefly imported. Submarginal resources of our deficient minerals that give us a potential "have" status under emergency conditions and at high prices are those of bauxite, manganese, vanadium, flake graphite, chromite, nickel, and mercury. As previously noted, our submarginal resources of manganese, vanadium, and off-grade bauxite and other aluminous minerals are relatively large in terms of prewar consumption rates.

How should national policy be altered?

From the foregoing analysis, and assuming our appraisal of domestic resources to be reasonably correct, our dependence on foreign sources for supplies of certain minerals will be greater in the future than it was before the war. The question thus arises as to the significance of these changes and what alterations in national policy should be made to meet them. . . .

National defense. A major responsibility of the nation is to maintain its ability to defend itself from aggressors, and to this should be added, in anticipation of postwar international political co-operation, the assurance of its ability to carry out such responsibilities as may be assigned to it. As our self-sufficiency declines, our military power is adversely affected, and the problem of strategic minerals becomes more acute. Thus, the need for large-scale stock-piling is of utmost importance; because stock-piling is a device for supplementing our domestic resources, the stock piles should be made up largely from foreign materials, for that is the only way we can add to our basic mineral resources. It is the surest way of guaranteeing our basic security in minerals in time of need. Some have suggested that, in view of the impending "have-not" position in certain minerals, we

should shut down our mines and preserve the resources remaining in the ground for future emergencies. From a theoretical viewpoint this argument has appeal but practically the cost is too great. It imposes too severe a burden on the present generation by asking it to swap a bird in the hand for only one crippled bird in the bush to be saved for the use of future generations. The program would result in resource waste because much of the unmined portions of deposits now developed probably never could be recovered after a prolonged shutdown. Also, the abrupt curtailment of mining would present a serious social problem in readjustment of the population that would be stranded in isolated mining areas. Huge capital losses would be incurred. For these reasons, the proposal does not seem to merit serious consideration.

Our national security cannot rest entirely on stock piles. Experience since 1939 clearly demonstrates the fallibility of even the experts. They cannot foresee with certainty the magnitude or duration of an emergency. So we need a second line of defense to provide against mistakes in stock-pile planning. Our marginal and submarginal resources can give us that additional insurance. Exploration for new deposits should be carried on vigorously and methods for processing these materials should be perfected and plans made for emergency production. Such a program might lead to the development of new peacetime industries. Our large deposits of manganese, vanadium, and aluminum-bearing materials offer interesting possibilities.

The program just outlined is essentially the same as that recommended to Congress by the Army and Navy Munitions Board in its recent report on strategic materials.

Although the accumulation of stock piles from foreign sources should be a basic requirement for national defense, a large-scale stock-piling program could also provide a reservoir into which domestic materials might be placed in times of depression with resultant economy to the nation and benefits to the mining communities. Consider the advantages that would have accrued had we kept a reasonable measure of employment in the mining areas during the depths of the depression, and stock-piled the surplus production for future use. Not only would the effects of the depression in the mineral producing areas have been less severe, but we would have had a substantial inventory that would have eased greatly the procurement problem of the last few years.

...
Tariffs. Tariffs is a subject of paramount importance in any consideration of the problem of mineral supplies, and we would be far from astute if we failed to recognize the pronounced trend toward reduction of tariff barriers. ...

... My own view is that the removal of the tariff on those minerals of which we produce only a small part of our needs and the ac-

quisition of emergency stock piles at normal prices will prove to be the most economical in the long run. If this viewpoint does not prevail and the subsidy is to be continued it should be paid directly by the Government and the consumer given the benefit of buying his raw material at a world price.

...

Because of conditions peculiar to the mining industry, there should be restraint in the downward adjustment in these mineral tariffs. Cuts should be planned with due regard to the social and economic consequences. ... Drastic changes in import duties ... would seriously injure the competitive position of domestic producers and result in extensive unemployment in our metal-mining areas and depression in the regions surrounding them. Because mining is usually the only occupation in the region, the problem of stranded population could be expected. ...

... a clearly defined long-range reduction program should be adopted that will coincide as closely as possible with the exhaustion of resources. ...

Conservation. ... History shows that as a nation we talk a great deal about conservation but are unwilling to put up much cash for it. In the lush days of our industrial growth, we were little concerned about the extravagant use of resources to achieve low-cost production. Now that we are beginning to feel the effects of exhaustion perhaps a more farsighted view may prevail. Some waste of resources occurs through lack of techniques with which to do a better job of producing and using minerals. Much progress has been made in this direction through research and the efforts of our profession. Research and engineering and the scrap-metal industry should be recognized as the greatest conservational forces at work today, and the nation owes a debt of gratitude for their accomplishments. On the other hand, increasing labor costs and taxation are decidedly anticonservational. Painstaking efforts to reduce costs to permit mining of marginal ores by technical improvements can be wiped out by wage and tax increases, yet the latter are inevitable consequences of our social progress.

... In view of the rapid rates at which we are exhausting our mineral deposits, ... conservation is decidedly in order; but its ultimate effect on our basic mineral position will not be highly significant. Our best hope for substantial improvement in those minerals where exhaustion is near lies in research on our submarginal resources and in taking the risk of prospecting for concealed deposits that now lie hidden in the earth's crust. These measures should be carried on vigorously, but while we hope for successful accomplishment we should also take measures to facilitate the procurement of more of our mineral requirements from foreign sources.

Nationalism and Ideologies

Two of the most important concepts which serve to perpetuate world anarchy are nationalism and ideology. Both spring from deep historical roots, and are essentially philosophical and emotional in context. Consequently they constitute powerful instruments in the conduct of international politics.

Nationalism is peculiar to the modern nation-state. It is usually preceded by an explanatory adjective -- American, Russian, Japanese, etc. It is a vertical concept inasmuch as it tends to draw sharp lines between sovereign states and to identify the people within a country with the national interests pursued by that state. Thus nationalism is integrally related to the idea of patriotism, and as such it becomes an exclusive and divisive force in international relations.

In contrast, ideology is not usually confined within national boundaries. It thus may be viewed as a horizontal concept uniting peoples of different nations. Therefore to the extent that ideology is effective, it tends to minify the loyalty of a people to a particular state, tying them instead to other groups in other countries who share their common ideological beliefs. If fascism (nazism) was the most prominent example of an ideology in the 1930's, communism is such today. In the former case, although fascism in Italy tended to be closely allied with Italian nationalism, in Germany the concept of a racial elite, and the propaganda which aspired to make of nazism the gathering place of all foes of communist philosophy, resulted in the German ideology being extended well beyond German national borders. Today communism has "cells" throughout the world, and although a strident Russian nationalism at times makes it difficult to distinguish between the goals of world communism as an ideology and of Russian nationalism as a form of Soviet policy, the distinction does exist to a very real degree.

The democratic tradition, with its emphasis on a basically free society, and on the dignity and worth of the individual, constitutes the other leading ideology in the contemporary political world. To its standard flock the peoples of Western Europe, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the United States -- peoples who share in the heritage of parliamentary institutions.

To a unique degree today, nationalistic and ideological rivalries have coalesced so that the states which are vying for political position in the game of power politics are also opposed to each other on ideological grounds. Among the most recent illustrations of this political-ideological split were the Italian elections in April, in which the opposing national interests of the Soviet Union and the United States were vividly witnessed in the pre-election campaign of communists versus democrats.

For general readings on the subject of nationalism and ideologies see Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics, Chapter VIII; Sharp and Kirk, Contemporary International Politics, Chapters V and VI; Emery Reves, A Democratic Manifesto, Chapters IV and V; William Ebenstein (ed.), Man and The State, Chapters VIII, X, and XIV; E. H. Carr, Nationalism and After; and Current Readings on International Relations, No. 2, Chapter II.

WAR AND NATIONAL CHARACTER

By Frederick Hertz

Dr. Hertz discusses nationalism as an historical and sociological phenomenon and analyzes the close relationship between nationalism and ideology. He stresses in particular the influence which a desire for prestige and power exerts in the formation of foreign policy and indicates some of the difficulties in resolving international disputes as a result of conflicting national ideologies which make mutual compromise almost unobtainable. Reproduced from The Contemporary Review (The Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 1947), May 1947, by permission.

Every thoughtful student of our age must be struck by a strange and fateful contradiction. On the one hand the development of traffic and cultural contacts has swept away countless diversities between nations and tends to assimilate the whole world to the same pattern of civilisation. On the other hand the spokesmen of many nations lay increased stress upon the diversity of national character, praising the virtues of their own nation and disparaging the character of others. In the two world wars both camps made great use of the argument that the enemy had started the conflict under the impulse of his perverted national character, and legions of writers -- exempt from military service -- were busy demonstrating that the whole history and civilisation of the enemy bore testimony to his aggressiveness and striving for world domination. The war was interpreted as a conflict between peace-loving and war-loving nations, . . . and it was assumed that the differences in their national characters were very deep-rooted and persistent.

The idea of a national character is, of course, very old, but it has in our time assumed a new and sinister significance through the rise of modern nationalism. The elucidation of this point makes it necessary first to enter into the discussion of the nature of nationalism, national sentiment and a nation. . . . The great pioneers of the idea of nationality such as Rousseau and Herder hated the militaristic Power State as a gaol of nations and originator of wars. They had the vision of free peaceable nations united by fraternal love and living in concord

with other free nations. In the nineteenth century liberals hailed and encouraged every movement for national liberation and unification as conducive to the fulfilment of their dreams. In reality nationalism has proved the greatest enemy of all liberal ideals and the greatest menace to civilisation.

In the eighteenth century the word Nation obtained great vogue as the battle-cry of all progressive forces. It meant a free, self-governing, sovereign people, possessing prestige and power and a character of its own. By "nation" was further understood the upper classes, those possessing wealth and education, who considered themselves alone capable of government, prestige and power. . . . In 1757 Lord Chesterfield said: "We are undone at home and abroad. The French are masters to do what they please in America. We are no longer a nation." This did not mean that the English people had ceased to exist. It meant that England had lost her prestige, and it shows that prestige and power was already at that time regarded as the principal criterion of a nation. It may be said that very frequently the word "nation" does not merely signify a people but a people with a claim to prestige and power.

From a sociological point of view a nation is a group with a territory and a specific kind of group consciousness called national sentiment. The territory has often been compared to its body and the sentiment to its soul. Most conflicts between nations were about territory claimed by more than one nation, and usually each of the rivals had some title conflicting with that of others. The principal titles invoked were: historical continuity, a common language, security and living space within "national frontiers," a common religion, civilisation or character, and alleged common blood. Apart from these "objective" titles there is the "subjective" claim based on the will of the people concerned to belong to a nation. This latter claim would certainly be the strongest from the liberal and democratic point of view if the result of a plebiscite would not largely depend on the demarcation of the territory in which it takes place. This way therefore easily becomes a vicious circle. Conflicts of nations about a piece of territory claimed on "national" grounds are often very complex and difficult to settle. Group consciousness means loyalty to common values and solidarity. Each group has a common ground of traditions, interests and ideals, and this common mentality has often by analogy been called its character, though even the smallest group shows a variety of types. With the development of large nations social and political differentiation and antagonism increased, and the growth of political and social liberty gave scope for interminable strife.

The particularist tendencies would have disintegrated and possibly destroyed the nation if it had not been strengthened by the development of a special safeguard, namely the national ideology. An ideol-

ogy means a great number of views on events, personalities and institutions, and some co-ordinating generalisations. It serves the purpose of imbuing the group with a feeling of unity, self-confidence and pride. A national ideology consists of traditional values such as the national language, of interests such as security or living space, and of ideals, for example, liberty, or a great mission. The traditions connect the nation with its past, the interests with its present, the ideals with its future, thereby leading to the idea of an immortal national personality towering above the short-lived present generation. It must further be remembered that every nation has more or less been formed by conquest. Ambitious rulers gradually brought together a number of small peoples, irrespective of and often against their will. In the course of time there developed a common language, common institutions and a feeling of belonging together, a solidarity between the populations of different territories and between the different ranks of society. This was the germ of national consciousness, but its full unfolding, and its growth to great power, was effected by the gradual evolution of the national ideology. As all nations have been mainly formed by war, the memory of warlike deeds and heroic actions plays a great role in their ideology. It pictures the noble descent of the nation, glorifies its present strength, virtues and achievements, and visualises its great world mission in the future. Certain views of other nations, mainly of a derogatory kind, form also part of the national ideology. It has the tendency to give a national significance to every fact which can be used for its purpose, even to peculiarities of food, drink, games, costumes, and so on. In the last resort the ideology tends to become a substitute for a national religion, especially in a country with different rival Churches, or where religion has lost its force.

A very important tendency in every national ideology is the striving for the formation of a national personality. . . . Popular imagination likes to personify the national virtues in figures such as Britannia, John Bull and the British lion. Every nation possesses such symbolic figures, but it is not those pictorial personifications which are of decisive significance. The most far-reaching implications of the idea of a national personality are the usual concepts of a national character, national will, national self-determination, national honour and national responsibility.

These notions have in their popular form a great influence on politics. Yet they are obviously quite incompatible with common sense, at least as they are commonly understood. How can a nation numbering millions of members possess one single character or will? How can a common honour or responsibility between them be construed by any stretch of logical argumentation? If those terms are to make any sense they must be understood in a way allowing for the existence of many different characters and wills and for various sorts and degrees of

responsibility. This is only possible if character and will are not understood as strict unities, but as constellations of numerous forces or as functions with countless variables. Even the character and will of an individual, however, is hardly ever a strict unity; it resembles rather a bundle of contradictory, badly integrated tendencies among which the balance is constantly shifting. The unity of a group, and particularly a large group, is still more restricted and changeable, and actually is more an ideal than a reality. As far as there is unity it is a product of integration by the national ideology, and the degree of integration differs not only in different nations but also within the same nation according to time and circumstances.

Every nation has its ideology, but it is not the same set of ideas which strengthens the national loyalty of its various sections. One German may be proud of belonging to the nation of Frederick the Great and regard his character as typically German. Another may hate everything for which he stands and regard Goethe as the embodiment of the true German character. In normal times few people reflect on such questions as why or how far one owes loyalty to one's nation. That loyalty is not a product of reasoning, but it is strengthened and guided by it if the necessity arises. Then the one asks himself: How would Frederick the Great act now? and the other: How would Goethe have behaved? Between the sectional ideologies there is, of course, a good deal of overlapping. Every section interprets the national memories in its own way and ignores what does not fit into its sectional ideology. The masses everywhere have a preference for certain national ways of living, and are therefore inclined to regard their own nation as the best, and many also more or less look down on aliens, particularly on competitors of a different race.

If the national character is defined as the totality of customs, habits and beliefs widespread in a nation, then the national ideology forms only a part of it, namely that referring to the nation as such or to other nations in comparison with one's own. ... In comparison with the mentality of a people in former times the modern ideologies are more reflective, restless and ambitious, but also less generally and sincerely held, less deep-rooted and persistent. In the olden times a whole people may have ardently clung to some tradition, ready rather to perish than to abandon it. Modern man is usually sceptical of all beliefs, and normally resents attempts to impose them upon him by force or to demand from him the subordination of his personal or sectional interests to nebulous general ones. He may be swept off his feet by the outbreak of a great crisis, or be intoxicated for some time by the highly developed technique of demagogic mass-suggestion. But soon he will begin to criticise, to grumble and to lose faith, unless every criticism is suppressed with an iron fist. This is the reason why a dictatorship cannot be moderate but must be ready to crush the slightest resistance with utmost ruthlessness. If the elaborate

machinery of terrorism and propaganda is broken and discredited, it is most improbable that the majority of a nation should maintain its faith in the gospel which the dictator had rammed down their throats. In normal times sectional interests of classes, parties, etc., are usually stronger than the national ideology. Every national ideology comprises ideas fostering the maintenance of peace and others endangering it. In different nations the resultant may more or less work either for or against peace. . . . The forces endangering peace are mainly founded in the primitive fact that all great positions, such as great power, great wealth and great cultural achievements, arouse envy, jealousy and rivalry among nations no less than among individuals. It is further a fact that modern man is particularly susceptible as regards his prestige and prone to suspect that somebody else is looking down upon him. Every nation has an historical background full of struggles with other nations and is burdened with the legacy of national prejudices and animosities. . . . There are of course also opposite tendencies which encourage the growth of goodwill, sympathy and co-operation between the nations. The national ideology therefore presents a constellation of divergent tendencies and often an uneasy balance between them which even a small incident may tilt with disastrous consequences.

National sentiment in itself is not necessarily aggressive, but under the influence of modern national rivalries it easily develops in a dangerous direction. The striving for prestige and power often grows to such an extent that they become the principal aims of national aspirations while economic and cultural interests are subordinated to them. This particular form of national sentiment should be distinguished from the more harmless one, and I have proposed to reserve the designation of nationalism for a mentality in which the striving for national prestige and power plays an inordinate part. This is also the French and German usage, whereas according to English and American usage any national feeling, whether harmless or dangerous, is called nationalism, which often leads to great confusion. Nobody would call any striving for social improvement socialism, or any interest in military matters militarism, but I admit that the line of demarcation between the harmless and the dangerous forms of national sentiment is difficult to draw. . . . The blinding effect of nationalism may induce the rulers of some nations to unleash the horrors of war, and it may induce others to dictate peace terms devoid of justice and moderation. Moreover nationalism is not always or exclusively directed against foreign nations. It may also aim at the oppression, exploitation or expulsion of national minorities within the State. It may find expression in discrimination against coloured races and individual aliens, in the persecution of Jews, and in economic or cultural nationalism.

Nationalism lays great stress on the idea of a national personality high above all the individuals who now belong to the nation. It is inspired by the belief that a nation has interests, an honour and a morality different from, and even opposed to, those of the individuals. The terrible implications of this doctrine need hardly be pointed out. The history of all nations abounds with examples of how strongly the longing for prestige and power has sometimes swayed public opinion and determined a policy leading to war or the edge of war. . . . Thiers, [the eminent French historian,] in 1853, pointed out "the innate French need for excitement, manifesting itself right through French history, content at times with the expression of conflict in ideas, but usually needing ultimate expression in actual war." Guizot declared that "while other nations hated war, France actually liked it. It is an amusement she is sometimes forced to refuse herself, but it is always with regret. She submits to peace with the reluctance with which you (the English) submit to war. Peaceful policy is called and in one sense is anti-national." Bismarck says in his Memoirs that among all nations, as a rule, those kings were the most popular and beloved who had been the most war-like. There was no evidence in the history of European peoples that sincere and conscientious attention to their peaceful welfare had ever satisfied their emotions as much as the glory of war, victorious battles and the conquest of foreign territories.

The craving for crude excitement, the admiration of power, and the enthusiasm for heroes has deep roots in human nature. The owners of newspapers, the makers of films, and the writers of fiction know that a blood and murder story finds a much greater public than the image of a peaceful, idyllic life. But this does not mean that the average man wants himself to take part in the killing and to risk being killed. For our democratic age it is certainly true that the great majority of men in all nations desire nothing more than peace and a good life. The problem, therefore, arises why the rise of democracy has not resulted in lasting peace but was followed by the outbreak of the most terrible wars. A classical example will always be the failure of the German democratic parties to prevent the German militarists from starting two world wars. But also, on other occasions and in other nations, liberals, democrats and socialists have not been able to live up to their convictions though their sincerity was beyond doubt.

. . . it is entirely misleading to interpret historical processes on the assumption that the original intention is revealed by the outcome, and that if, for example, a nation went to war, or came under a dictatorship, this must have been of set purpose, the result of long, careful planning. The French Revolution promised Liberty, Equality, Fraternity to all nations. But, despite the sincerity of its noble intentions, it degenerated very quickly into aggression, wars of conquest, oppression, the dictatorship of Napoleon, and, finally, led to the rise of nationalism all over Europe. . . .

The causes of the tragic miscarriage of so many generous aspirations are very complex. After the first world war public opinion everywhere blamed its coming and outbreak upon "secret diplomacy," upon the hidden intrigues of diplomats and generals. But what actually sowed the seed of antagonism, poisoned the relations between nations, and blinded the ruling circles as well as other large sections of the peoples . . . was mainly the public doings of journalists, writers, professors and demagogues, most of all of the neurotic demagogue on Germany's throne and his helpers; it was the agitation of Pan-Slav and Pan-German fire-brands, which created an atmosphere of deep distrust and animosity and erected high ideological barriers between the nations. . . . international affairs have become the playground of mass emotions "Public opinion" has now become the dominating force. A French writer once defined it as the sum total of our prejudices. It is partly an accumulation of psychological and historical oversimplifications, wishful thinking and vague aspirations whose implications are not realised by the masses, . . . an ideology designed to flatter national vanity and to make the voters believe that they understand and control foreign politics without having spent any time on studying its problems. The majority of the electorate have little knowledge of, and little interest in, foreign politics. . . .

Conflicts between modern nations very easily become questions of prestige, and this renders their prevention so difficult and the consequences of a clash so devastating. In former times the rulers could often find a solution acceptable to both sides and also to the peoples concerned. In our time, a conflict between nations arouses a fanaticism which makes any reasonable compromise impossible. The greatest obstacle to an understanding is that each of two rival nations can look at the objects of dispute only through the coloured spectacles of its own national ideology. In most conflicts there is some right and some wrong on each side, and it is often very difficult to say which nation is the more aggressive, especially since there are so many different views of what constitutes aggression. The outbreak of acute conflicts is usually preceded by a long process of mutual estrangement in which the nationalists of both nations blow up the smouldering fire. The coming of a crisis is often due to a small incident. It resembles mountaineering in dangerous conditions where a small incident may set in motion a mass of ice and snow that becomes an avalanche which nobody can stop. The people has usually no alternative to accepting the consequences, and the official propaganda machine arouses the necessary patriotic enthusiasm. Once the die is cast there is no way back. Even reasonable and far-sighted men are no longer free to make a stand. In the face of the prevailing mass hysteria they are powerless, and, moreover, must reckon with the fact that now in the opposite camp, too, the war-like forces have gained upper hand, and that any reversal of the fatal step, or any active resistance, would not guarantee a peaceful and just solution. . . .

... the interpretation of a complicated historical process leading to war as the outcome of a deliberate striving in the alleged national character is a primitive misreading of history. Every nation has had periods when its war-like sections got the upper hand. Even the Swiss and the Swedes -- now the paragons of peaceableness -- once played a very aggressive part. In our time one of the main reasons of the victory of aggressive sections over the peaceable ones was that the latter were paralysed by conflicting ideologies. The repudiation of that fallacy, however, does not imply that nations are not responsible for actions of their governments. They are certainly responsible for damage done in their name, but no nation has the right to punish or degrade another nation as a whole. There are guilty individuals but no guilty nations, unless in a sense of guilt which is beyond punishment by human beings.

IDEOLOGY OR BALANCE OF POWER?

By William G. Carleton

Reproduced from *The Yale Review* (copyright 1947, by Yale University Press), Summer 1947, by permission of the editor. In the following article Professor Carleton of the University of Florida examines the influence of nationalism (and the balance of power) and ideology on the course of international relations, and concludes that the former has played a more significant role. However, he suggests that ideological factors, which are becoming increasingly important in contemporary world politics, may eventually be decisive in determining the relations between states.

...

What is the chief element in formulating the foreign policy of a nation? Is it ideology or is it balance of power? Is it both? If both, which weighs the more?

Did Sparta and Athens fight the Peloponnesian War because of the conflict of their social and political systems or because each feared the collective power of the other? ... Did Burke's Britain fight Revolutionary France because of Tory fear of the Jacobins or because Britain feared for the balance of power? Did the United States go to war with Germany in 1917 and again in 1941 because of a conflict of cultures or a conflict of power?

...

Nations differ from each other in cultural and institutional patterns. But institutions inside nations are forever undergoing changes. These changes bring on institutional conflict within nations. Some fear these changes while others favor them. Very often the institutional conflict taking place inside one nation is at the same time also taking

place inside other nations. In other words, the struggle for institutional change often cuts across national boundaries.

...

The decisive institutional conflict of any age has come to be known as the "ideological" conflict. While, in general, that conflict was in the seventeenth century waged over religion, in the eighteenth century over constitutional and representative government, and in the nineteenth century over political democracy, in the present century it is being waged over Socialism.

That the institutional or ideological conflict is waged inside many nations at the same time, that the new institution struggling to be born is farther advanced in some countries than in others, that this conflict cuts across national lines and leaves people and groups within the various countries with ideological sympathies for similar groups in other countries -- all of this enormously complicates international relations. International wars often take on the appearance of deep-seated ideological conflict involving not only national interests but future institutional and cultural development. Men who belong to minority groups are often torn between two loyalties -- loyalty to ideology and loyalty to nation. Such men may be damned as "Trojan horses" and "fifth columnists" if they follow their ideological impulse; they may be damned as disloyal to their ideology if they follow their national impulse.

What if a situation arises in international politics in which ideology and national interest do not coincide? In that case, which is put first by those who conduct the nation's foreign policy -- ideology or national interest?

As we look back on the past, it seems that, when the hour of decision struck, the national urge was generally stronger than the ideological. During the Thirty Years' War, in an age when the chief ideological conflict was religious, Catholic France went to the aid of Sweden and the German Protestants in their conflict with Catholic Austria. To Cardinal Richelieu and other French leaders of the day it was more important for France to check Austria, for the Bourbons to humble the Hapsburgs, than for Catholics to stand together against Protestants. In the late seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century, it usually seemed more important to the absolute monarchs of Vienna and Berlin to check the French nation than that Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns, and Bourbons should stand together in ideological alliance to maintain absolutism against the slowly rising tide of constitutionalism. Britain fought Bourbon France, Revolutionary France, and Napoleonic France, for while the ideologies shifted and changed, the national rivalry and imperialist conflict did not. In more recent times, Tsarist Russia has been allied with republican France, democratic Britain with oligarchic

Japan, democratic America and democratic Britain with Communist Russia, and Communist Russia with Nazi Germany. National interests make strange bedfellows -- in the face of a threat to the balance of power, nations will make alliances with the ideological devil.

...

... it would be a mistake to come to the conclusion that because ideology has not played the leading part in historic international relations it has played no part at all. ... Where national interests and dominant ideology within the nation coincide, a national war can be made to appear an ideological one, morale can be strengthened, and enthusiasm intensified. If a nation possesses considerable ideological unity it will be in a stronger position to win a war; if a nation's enemies are ideologically divided those enemies will be more susceptible to fifth-column tactics. When a country is rising to challenge the old balance of power, nations thus threatened will make alliances more easily and earlier if they have similar institutions and cultures; alliances will be more difficult and will come later (perhaps too late) if the nations thus threatened have dissimilar institutions and cultures.

Just as national interests and balance-of-power considerations seem to have been the most important causes of war, so also they seem to have been most affected by war. The results of international wars seem to have been more significant in their national and balance-of-power aspect than in their ideological aspect. The Grand Alliance against Napoleonic France checked France and saved the European balance of power but did not succeed in arresting the spread of revolutionary ideas. ... at the close of the First World War, it appeared that middle-class democracy would triumph in the world, but now we can see that instead, the First World War marked virtually the end of the advance of middle-class democracy in any large areas of the world. However, the First World War did parry the German threat to the balance of power Again, the victory of the United Nations in the Second World War saved the world from a second German threat to the balance of power -- that much is certain. Perhaps it will also have hastened Socialism, but, in any event, the ideological results are not so clear as the national ones.

It seems, then, that the influence of great wars on the cultural and institutional trends of the time is exaggerated. These trends arise out of conditions and forces operating within the nations. Wars affect them. Wars may accelerate these trends or slow them up. Wars hardly create them.

... The great national wars, according to Marxist doctrine, have been wars in the interests of the dominant economic classes in the warring nations -- conflicts of rival imperialisms. Where, in the past, ideology has seemed to split the dominant class, such ideological conflict, according to the Marxists, has been superficial or at least

secondary to that class's economic interest. When a threat has appeared to the economic interest of the dominant class, these secondary ideological ranks have been closed in the class interest masquerading in the name of the nation. Of course, say the Marxists, the Catholic landlords and business men of Elizabeth's day rallied to the fight against Catholic Spain because their profits were involved. ...

To be sure, the great conflict is ideological, say the Marxists -- an ideological conflict between the exploiting capitalists and the exploited workers -- and when this ideological conflict comes to the fore and cuts across national states, then the conflict between nations will be a sham and a swindle, the ideological factor will become stronger than the national factor in international relations, national wars will be converted into civil wars, and the erstwhile dominant economic class, now embattled, will find it more and more difficult to cloak its class interests in the garment of nationalism.

It may be that the Marxists are correct as to the future. It may be that the ideological will supersede the national as the number one factor in international relations. It may be that now the great institutional conflict within nations has come to be directly economic (and not indirectly so, as in the case of many of the ideological conflicts of the past) and the fundamental issue easier for all to see, that more and more will men respond to the class and ideological appeal rather than the national appeal. And if men more and more are learning to think as the Marxists do ... then it is quite possible that our century will see international relations conducted in fact and in name more along ideological than national lines. ...

At present, the United States and the Soviet Union face each other as the predominant powers of the earth. Each is viewing world politics in a different light from the other.

Our policy-makers are thinking more in the old terms of nationalism, self-determination, and the balance of power. Soviet influence on Leftist parties the world over is looked upon largely as old fashioned aggression and imperialism. There is widespread fear that Russia as Russia will upset the balance of power in Europe and Asia....

The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, are thinking more and more in terms of ideological conflict, class warfare, social politics. To Soviet policy-makers the contest in the world today is not so much one between the United States and Russia as it is between world fascism and world Communism. And those in other countries who follow the Soviet lead take much the same view. Communists and extreme Leftists the world over are giving their allegiance not so much to nations as to ideology. Russia is merely the instrument to be used in spreading ideology. Moscow influences Communist parties in all countries, and Communist parties everywhere influence Moscow. There is common

indoctrination, consultation, co-operation. It is a two-way street, though the pre-eminence of Russia in the movement makes the outgoing counsel from Moscow weightier than the incoming counsel.

If a third world war should come -- a war between the United States and the Soviet Union -- for millions of Leftists the world over that war would be viewed almost exclusively as an ideological one. In countries where the extreme Left is in control, national policy would be made less on the balance-of-power idea and more on ideological consideration. In the United States, where Marxist ideas have scarcely penetrated at all, the war would be viewed in the old nationalistic terms. It would be a war to protect our shores from invasion, to uphold the balance of power, to save the world from Russian domination. ... Our own failure to take into account the enormous strides the ideological point of view has made among the masses of people in Europe and Asia in recent decades, and particularly since the Second World War, might betray us into making very serious mistakes in the conduct of that war.

Should the Communists eventually win control in important countries outside Russia -- in China, in Germany, in France, in Italy -- it is quite possible that ideology would triumph over nationalism and a new international state emerge. After all, the nations themselves were built not so much on contract as on class and functional foundations. The feudal states of western Europe were put together into national states by the rising bourgeoisie joining hands across the boundaries of feudal provinces and communes. Just as the national state (which sometimes cut across nationality) was made by the bourgeoisie, so a new international state may be made by the co-operation of Leftist parties joining hands across national boundaries. If an international state should come about in this way, then, of course, the old balance of power as played by national states will be relegated to the historical limbo. The Communists still confidently expect that Communism will lead to such an international state.

Of course, the Communists may be wrong about this. Nationalistic forces may be stronger than Communist intentions. When the Communists come into actual power in a country they inherit the national paraphernalia -- the nation's history, culture, aspirations -- and concessions have to be made to them. The Russian Communists have made many concessions to nationalism. The Chinese Communists have often pursued a course independent of Moscow, and if they should gain actual power in China they might have to follow an even more independent course. ... And the moderate Socialists ... have ... made many more concessions to nationalism and have proclaimed this as a virtue. Moreover, if the United States should use the moderate Left (Socialists) to check the extreme Left (Communists), such a policy might help to prevent a third world war and also help to halt a trend

towards a Communist world state with the Soviet Union as its nucleus. Then, too, it is even possible, as Edward Hallett Carr has suggested, that in a state where everybody's work and wages and social security are dependent upon government, where the mass of people will seem to have as direct a stake in the national government as at one time only the bourgeoisie enjoyed, the mass of people may feel even more keenly their tie to the national government, and Socialist states might end by being as nationalistic or even more nationalistic than bourgeois states. If this should turn out to be the case (although the Marxist analysis that private ownership of the productive processes and private profits are the basis of imperialism and international conflict may prove to be sounder) then Socialism, like the Commercial Revolution and the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution and the early stages of the Industrial Revolution before it, will have ended by intensifying nationalism, in spite of the aims and intentions of many of its disciples. And then, should Socialism spread and thus turn out nationalistic, the old historic pattern of the national balance of power would continue the dominant role in international relations, even though Socialist and Communist states remained nominal members of an international organization like the United Nations.

Of one thing, I think, we can be sure: even the creation of an international Communist state would not end the conflict over power. Within the international state would be different social and economic groups with different interests. They would fight for control, just as groups and classes within national states now fight for control. The international state would end the national balance-of-power conflict, but it would not end the ideological conflict inside it. The ideological conflict of the future will be different, but it will continue in some form. Even if the Marxists should achieve one-half of their ideal, the international state, they would not succeed in achieving the other half -- the abolition of all its internal group differences. Within the international state would be geographical sections, cultural diversities, a wide gamut of different industries and economic enterprises, and various social classes: commissars, managers, engineers, technicians, skilled workers, unskilled workers, farmers, and so forth. These various factors and groups would generate conflict over government policies and there would arise struggles for power which even Communist purges could not keep down. These struggles would cut across the old national boundaries.

...

... We are perhaps too close to events of the last thirty years to be able to see just how far the old foundations of nationalism have already been eroded away. In the fifteenth century, participants in the wars of Louis XI and in the Wars of the Roses were too close to those events to realize that feudal power was being overthrown before their very eyes and a strong national power built. So probably with us today.

The historians of the twenty-second century, more clear-eyed than we, may look back and see that the great international wars of the twentieth century were in fact dissolving nationalism and building internationalism.

For nationalism today is truly beset from all directions. Among the dissolving agents are: the cumulative impact of technology and science resulting in the continued drastic elimination of distance and space, the atomic bomb, the release of atomic energy, and the overwhelming necessity of having to extend international functionalism to control what in the future will probably be the world's most important source of industrial production; the palpable absurdities of fascist nationalism and the revulsion from fascist nationalism even in countries which experienced it; the realistic education given millions of men who participated in the great wars of the twentieth century in areas remote from their homelands; the glaring fact that real national power in the international power conflict is today possessed by only two nations, leaving all other nations as mere outsiders with no important power; the growth of international cartels; the Socialist appeal to the brotherhood of man; the Communist insistence on international action and the actual co-operation of Communist parties from country to country; the Socialist outlook of many of the "nationalistic" leaders of the colonial countries in revolt against imperialism; the body of practical experience in international co-operation gained through the League of Nations and the United Nations. . . .

Thus anyone called upon to answer the crucial question in international relations today would be, I think, on safe ground in saying that, from the rise of national states and up to about now, the chief element in international relations has been nationalism and the national balance of power. But he should warn the questioner not to be misled by this historic fact or by the superficial aspects of the present diplomatic duel between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially as that duel is generally interpreted in the United States. Because this middle of the twentieth century may be witnessing the epoch-making shift in the foundation of international politics from the nationalistic balance of power to ideology, evidence of which we shall ignore at our peril.

A VITAL FACT IN THE BATTLE OF IDEOLOGIES

By Francis Williams

Reproduced from The New York Times Magazine, January 25, 1948, by permission of The New York Times and the author. Mr. Williams is a member of the British Labor Party and was a former editor of The London Daily Herald. In the following article he discusses the fundamental differences between Communism and Socialism, thereby indicating the inherent incompatibility of the two ideologies.

In the battle of ideologies that today sweeps across Europe one fact among many of great significance stands out. It is that this struggle is not simply one between communism and capitalism but between communism and socialism.

Why is this? Why is it that when the Communist parties of eastern Europe call together a new international in the shape of the Cominform they name as the enemies not just the capitalist system that communism has always regarded as its traditional foe but equally the Socialist parties with which superficially they might seem to have much in common? Why does the Russian radio put Attlee and Bevin, leaders of the British Socialist Government, high in the list of those that Communists regard as enemies of the people?

In the past many people have assumed a common interest between Socialists and Communists. Indeed to many they at one time appeared -- quite wrongly -- to be interchangeable terms. It is true that Socialists and Communists have both advocated in their economic philosophies the common ownership of all the resources of production and have attacked the system of industrial organization by private enterprise for profit.

What, then, is the gulf between them? . . .

Fundamentally the difference arises from the Socialist belief that changes in society can be secured, and should be secured, by parliamentary and democratic means (using democratic in the commonly accepted western European and American sense) as opposed to the Communist belief that they can be secured only by a successful seizure of power followed by a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Historically communism has flourished where there have been autocratic systems of government; socialism has developed in countries where there have existed liberal parliamentary systems based on a wide franchise.

British socialism has a special and individual character because it has grown and developed from peculiarly British roots and has been influenced hardly at all by the Marxist philosophy. The breach between it and communism has always existed. Unlike British socialism, Continental socialism springs from the same roots as communism although it has sharply diverged from it theoretically and practically during its development. This divergence, which has steadily increased with the years, is due partly to the shape taken by the Communist ideology under the influence of Lenin and Stalin and partly to the effect of historical differences in the political development of western and eastern Europe.

Both had their roots in the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels. The central thesis of this philosophy is that the stage of economic development reached by society alone determines its form, its political pattern and its cultural development and that ethical considerations such as those which largely inspired British socialism have therefore no genuine significance. From this the Marx-Engels thesis proceeded to argue that the whole course of human history is to be seen as a continuous struggle between materialist interests in which first one class and then another becomes dominant and is overthrown as the economic pattern of society changes.

When the original Socialist doctrines were first enunciated, and specifically when the Marxist theory of the inevitability of the class struggle was first advanced, the franchise was even in the most politically advanced countries restricted to a narrow class. Because of that restricted franchise and because they could not conceive of a voluntary agreement on the part of those holding political power to distribute it more widely by an extension of the franchise, early continental Socialists did not see any possibility of socialism being established by parliamentary means. They conceived of it as coming only at the end of a revolutionary struggle.

They expected the pattern of history as shown in the English Civil War and the French Revolution to repeat itself and the proletariat to do as the bourgeoisie had, in their view, done before them -- obtain power by force. Their expectation was falsified by history throughout western Europe where, in fact, there was during the latter half of the nineteenth century a steady extension in the franchise because of the impact of liberal ideas on all classes. In Russia and most parts of eastern Europe, on the other hand, there was no such extension and autocratic systems of Government remained.

It is from this historic fact that the first cleavage between socialism and communism is to be traced. Liberalism begat liberalism; autocracy begat autocracy.

The Socialists of the West became convinced as a result of the extending franchise that many of the social and economic reforms they sought and even their ultimate ideal of a classless Socialist society could best be achieved by parliamentary and constitutional means. They were moreover persuaded that there was an absolute value in the precepts of parliamentary democracy. They became evolutionary Socialists.

In the east socialism took the road that autocracy and repression marked out for it. Its advocates became increasingly convinced that their object could only be achieved by force and that such small social reforms as could be achieved by other means were only trickery designed to emasculate the forces of revolution. They became revolutionary Socialists -- or Communists.

This divergence has also been increased by the developing course of Communist philosophy and by the history not only of the Russian Revolution but also of the Communist parties in other countries and their relationship with the working classes whom they claim to represent and to be alone capable of representing.

"The Communists," said Marx and Engels, "do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties. They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole." But in active fact they have never been able to convince the working classes that this is so.

Even in Russia at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution the Communist party was only a tiny insurrectionist group. And even three years after the Revolution the total active membership of the Communist party in a country with a population of 150,000,000 people was only 600,000. And of that 600,000 only 70,000, or less than 12 per cent, were industrial workers, genuine members of the proletariat. Similarly outside Russia and particularly in countries such as America and Britain, where parliamentary democracy has flourished, the great mass of industrial workers have persistently refused to recognize the identification with themselves that the Communist party claims.

This refusal of the real, as opposed to the theoretical proletariat, to measure up to the Communist specifications has had important consequences.

It has imposed upon the Communist party the necessity to create a mythical, "idealized" proletariat in whose name communism can act even when, as so often happens, it acts in a way of which the actual living proletariat does not approve. Communism becomes the interpreter of the "real will" of the proletariat by which it means not what the actual existing workers want but what they would want if they were, by truly Communist standards, enlightened. It thus sustains itself by

creating, like many primitive religions before it, a god after its own image. It demands and receives from its followers a passionate and uncritical devotion that shall be capable of sustaining them through many bewildering shifts of policy and in many intellectual illogicalities because it is guided not by reason but by the inner revelations of the Proletarian Will.

Because this mystical proletarian god has no relationship to actual working men and women the standards of conduct that communism enjoins and accepts are set apart from those of humanity; they are not those of the kindly ordinary struggling people of the world but of an angry proletarian god of communism's own creation. In the service of that god, all cruelties, all betrayals of normal human values are justifiable.

Moreover since the Communist holds that the logical inevitable development of history is toward the climax of conflict between classes each seeking economic power -- a struggle in which the workers "have nothing to lose but their chains" -- it is his duty to turn himself into a "conscious and tempered revolutionary worker" subject to the disciplines and restrictions upon individual decision that such a service entails.

He must seek to educate the workers to accept the fact of impending revolution in every non-Communist society. . . .

Revolution grows out of disunity; therefore he must foster disunity if he can. . . . In France and Italy the Communist has had a duty to promote strikes and disorder not because of any immediate advantage that might be secured to the workers as a result but because by so doing he might create the conditions that would make revolution possible.

Nor does the work of the Communist end with the victory of the proletarian revolution . . . according to the Marxist analysis such a revolution by achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat ends the class struggle. It ends too the need for strong Governments since Governments exist only to impose the will of the minority upon the unprivileged majority.

But the "conscious and tempered" Communist worker cannot in fact trust the proletariat to do what is best for itself even in an era in which it is dominant. It becomes necessary to have a second dictatorship within the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The proletariat must dictate to the rest of the community and suppress all non-proletariat opinion lest the operations of a parliamentary democracy restore the bourgeoisie to power. But the proletariat must itself be dictated to and must not be allowed to discuss even within its own ranks alternative doctrines to communism, such

as social democracy. For the Communist having made the revolution wants to make sure that it will be a truly Communist one.

... Thus the dictatorship of the proletariat first narrows itself into the dictatorship of one party out of several possible "working class" parties, then into the dictatorship of a small group which is the executive of that one party and finally perhaps into the dictatorship of one man who holds the administrative strings that give him control of the party executive.

That is the logical and inevitable end of communism. It is one to which the democratic Socialist with his belief in the ethical as well as the economic motives in human behavior and his devotion to the liberal doctrines of individual freedom is utterly opposed.

Moreover the Communist conception, based as it is on the thesis that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the final conclusion of a historical process, implies inevitably a conception of democracy completely alien to that of the constitutional Socialist parties. ... any opposition party is by the mere fact of its existence undemocratic and must be destroyed in the interests of "true democracy."

Similarly the maintenance of a legal system independent of the state and capable of decisions opposed to state policy is "undemocratic" because the proletarian state is the sole repository of democratic values.

But the evolutionary Socialist working through constitutional means and by parliamentary processes is conscious, and must be conscious, of the fact that a change at a general election may put his party in the minority for the time being. The defense of the rights of minorities, of the freedom to oppose a legal system that can, if need be, defend the private citizen against the excesses of the government of the day is therefore to him an essential obligation since he in his turn may need the protection of the rights and freedoms he assures now to his opponents.

Finally, ... the loyalties of the Communist are not to his own nation or society but to the international proletariat. ... the pattern of policy to be followed by the Communist in all countries flows naturally and logically from those in which the revolution has been successful. He must put their interests above those of his own nation because in so doing he is serving the interests of the world revolution of which they are the first successful expression.

This is a conception which the rulers of modern Russia utilize frequently for purposes that are much more Russian than genuinely Communist. It is a conception to which the evolutionary Socialist is utterly opposed. For it is the essence of evolutionary socialism that political and economic developments vary from country to country and

that socialism in each, since it is concerned with human beings as human beings and not simply as automatons in a world-wide class struggle, must adapt itself to national traditions. It must fit itself to the pattern of life in the community of which it is a part. It cannot become the subservient instrument of an external power as the Communist doctrine demands.

It is in all these factors of differing philosophic outlook, historic development and political experience that the conflicts between socialism and communism are to be found.

It is because of them, to use the most striking current example, that the Socialist parties throughout Europe are anxious to cooperate to make the Marshall Plan successful while the Communist parties use all their influence to try to sabotage and wreck it. ...

To the Communists ... it makes more likely the possibility that they most fear ... the possibility that the leftward forces in western Europe will everywhere follow Britain in taking the path of democratic evolutionary socialism instead of following Russia along the road to revolutionary communism.

The gulf between socialism and communism is wide and deep for they represent not only different approaches to the political and economic problems of the day, but a fundamental disagreement as to the way of life men and women should be persuaded to follow.

This is one of the truly significant facts of the modern world. It is a fact that no student of affairs, no politician, no man or woman concerned with the shape of the future can afford to ignore.

CHAPTER II

IMPERIALISM

The age of modern imperialism had its origins in the latter part of the fifteenth century, growing out of the early voyages of discovery. In the beginning the vast colonial empires which accrued to England, Holland, France and Belgium were notable chiefly as economic and financial assets to the mother countries. Although other motives have inspired nations to seek colonies in the intervening centuries, the economic factor is still regarded as fundamental by at least one school -- the Marxists -- who have identified imperialism with the monopoly stage of capitalism.

Political and military factors have also played a prominent role in imperialistic expansion. Many nations have considered that a colonial domain enhanced their power position in the conduct of international relations. Other states have regarded island bases, straits, and strategically located territories as essential to military security. The factor of prestige has also influenced some countries to pursue imperialist policies. This was especially the case in the decision of the German Kaiser to acquire an empire in the closing years of the last century.

Notwithstanding these motives of realpolitik, governments have been at pains to rationalize imperialism as a civilizing and Christianizing mission. The "white man's burden" was, moreover, endowed with sufficient zeal on the part of sincere believers that the myth of enlightened overlordship was unsullied over a period of decades.

Following the First World War a metamorphosis gradually took place in imperialism. White superiority was challenged by the black and yellow races. Nationalism began to sweep across Asia and Africa, quickened by the concept of self-determination proclaimed in the West and by Soviet propaganda commiserating with the "exploited" peoples. The Mandates System under the League of Nations introduced -- albeit only to certain former German and Ottoman territories -- the principle of international responsibility for the development of so-called backward areas. In the next three decades this was followed by the successive emancipation of Iraq, Egypt, India, Burma, Transjordan, and the Philippines, and by the establishment in the East Indies of an Indonesian Republic.

At San Francisco the United Nations Charter included a plan for a Trusteeship System (to replace the former Mandates System) with more extensive supervisory powers lodged in the organs of the United Nations. And a significant Declaration of Principles regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories was written into the Charter, binding all members of the United Nations in the treatment of their own dependent lands. Coincidentally, notable experiments in international col-

laboration were begun in the form of the Caribbean Commission and the South Pacific Commission. Furthermore, Britain, France and the Netherlands inaugurated extensive revisions in their colonial policies aimed at elevating the status of the native peoples and their economies. Among the most significant developments has been a switch of emphasis by the British to Africa south of the Sahara, wherein they hope to build a new bastion of world power for the years to come.

Despite these changes the Soviet Union has continued to flay the Western Powers for their imperialist rule and has sought by every means within its command to hasten the end of Western ties with the peoples of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. This has precipitated one of the greatest struggles for power ever witnessed in international relations.

For general readings see Sharp and Kirk, Contemporary International Politics, Chapters X, XI; F. L. Schuman, International Politics, Chapter IX; P. T. Moon, Imperialism and World Politics, Chapters I, IV, XIX.

EMPIRES IN TRANSITION

By Vernon McKay

Reproduced from Foreign Policy Reports, May 1, 1947, by permission of the Foreign Policy Association. Mr. McKay is one of the Research Associates of the Association and has made an extensive study of the changes taking place in the British, French and Dutch colonial regimes.

Does the end of World War II mark the dawn of a new era in the colonial world? Or is the present movement to widen the scope and quicken the tempo of reform simply an accelerated version of the old policy of "gradualism"? Spokesmen for the leading empires contend that "colonialism is dead," but a widespread feeling persists that the world's three hundred million dependent people, who inhabit more than one hundred colonial possessions, gained little or nothing from the war for the Four Freedoms. What are the facts?

Three Colonial Planners

Nearly two-thirds of the three hundred million colonials are subjects of Britain, France and The Netherlands, each ruling sixty to seventy million people with a wide variety of racial and cultural traits. The nature of post-war planning for these three empires is typified in the character of the men who head the colonial ministries -- Arthur Creech Jones of Britain, Marius Moutet of France, and Jan Anne Jonkman of The Netherlands. All three are Socialists or Laborites whose

parties have recently come to power in post-war political overturns. All three are men of intelligence, integrity and good will, who have devoted intensive study to colonial problems and have long been advocates of reform.

Fifty-five-year old Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies in Britain, is sometimes facetiously called a "poacher turned gamekeeper." Before joining the cabinet, Jones often criticized British colonial policy from the floor of the House of Commons, which he entered in 1935. Long a leader in drafting the policy of the Labor party on colonial affairs, he was -- until his entry into the government -- chairman of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, a Socialist organization devoted to the study of colonial problems.

Marius Moutet, seventy-one, is Minister of France Overseas (a new title given the Ministry of Colonies in January 1946). Having served on the Central Committee of the Socialist party since 1895, he has had a long and distinguished career. . . . Moutet's prominence as an advocate of colonial reform dates from the days of the Popular Front cabinet of Léon Blum (1936-38) when, as Minister of Colonies, he sought to enact some of the progressive policies to which France has now returned.

Minister of Overseas Territories in The Netherlands (also a new post-war title) is fifty-five-year old Jan Anne Jonkman who, before he left for Java in 1919, received the degree of Doctor of Indonesian Law at the University of Leyden. His doctoral thesis emphasized the desirability of having an Indonesian national basis for the educational system of the Netherlands East Indies. Until his capture and internment by the Japanese in 1942 he had an active career as magistrate, prosecuting attorney and member of the People's Council in the Indies.

Associated with these official spokesmen are large administrative and advisory staffs who assist in the formulation of policy, and maintain its continuity whenever a political change brings in a new minister. The British Colonial Office, for example, has added more than ten advisory committees and sub-committees since the beginning of the war to supplement its five pre-war committees. The most recent of these bodies is the important Colonial Economic and Development Council established in 1946 to advise the Colonial Secretary on the whole field of colonial development. The Colonial Office also has geographical departments of long standing, each dealing with matters affecting a given area.

Colonial reforms, however, are not the prerogative of colonial ministers alone. Major decisions of policy in each of the three countries require approval by the cabinet, in which a variety of conservative elements may be indirectly represented. Opposition to reform is

by no means limited to vested interests seeking profits in the colonies. Military and naval men are concerned with the need to strengthen the mother country's strategic position, while others think in terms of imperial prestige. A reforming colonial minister not only has to combat the ignorance and indifference of the general public, but also must overcome strong opposition from two groups within his own domain -- European settlers in the colonies, and conservative colonial administrators. As a French critic has recently written of his fellow countrymen who settled in Algeria, they are "vigorous, hardworking, brave in battle, proud to be French but, like all peoples living in a rural environment, avid of profit, little conscious of the great political changes afoot in the world and unsympathetic to the rapid social development of surrounding peoples."

Local colonial administrators often allow their pride and concentration on immediate problems to obscure their vision on the colonial question as a whole. This attitude was partly responsible for opposition in Britain to the Colonial Office plan for a Malayan Union to overcome long-standing hindrances to Malayan national unity. ... Inertia is another great enemy of change. ...

In the past this combination of elements opposed to reform has often proved too great even for ministers with the best intentions, and there is danger that when the present impetus to reform weakens, the conservatives will reassert themselves. Two signs of the times, however, hold out promise for the future. One is the growing importance of colonial ministries... . The second good omen is the increasing number of younger men in colonial administration -- men whose education has been influenced by current trends of world change, and who want to get things done. ... While conservative officials of long service will be difficult to displace, one of the new British reforms provides for retirement of civil servants before they reach pensionable age... .

Economic Aid for the Colonies

The new colonial plans of Britain, France and The Netherlands place special emphasis on constitutional changes to grant dependent peoples a greater voice in colonial administrative structures. Progress toward democracy, however, depends on the "twin pillars" of economic development and educational advance. Democratic government will be hard to achieve as long as 90 per cent of the people cannot read or write, and standards of living scarcely remain at the subsistence level. ...

Outstanding in the economic field is the new willingness of mother countries to provide financial aid for development of their possessions. In the age of economic individualism it was a cardinal belief not only that each colony must be self-supporting, but that finan-

cial aid "would imply pauperization and make impossible any progress towards political responsibility." This laissez-faire policy has now been abandoned under two pressures -- the rise of Socialist governments, and the need for export markets to maintain living standards at home. If colonies are to become better markets, they must have higher standards of living. Hence Socialists and conservatives are able to agree on the importance of colonial economic development. Ironically, however, this change in attitude comes at a time when Britain, France and The Netherlands are so impoverished by war that they are able to provide only the most limited financial help.

Britain's first Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed on July 17, 1940. A second law enacted on April 25, 1945, provides for the expenditure by British taxpayers of about \$480 million over a ten-year period beginning in April 1946. Of this sum \$44 million will serve as a reserve against emergencies, \$94 million will be spent for research, higher education and other general plans, and the remaining \$343 million will be divided among individual colonies and regional areas. The highest grant, totaling \$92 million, will go to Nigeria which has the largest population (23,000,000) of any British colony.

A significant condition under which colonial governments receive grants from this fund is that they give full recognition to trade unionism. ...

Even more important in many respects is another British innovation -- state intervention to replace or restrict private enterprise. ... A Cameroons Development Corporation, with a capital of £1,750,000 raised by the Nigerian government, was inaugurated at the beginning of 1947 to cultivate rubber, bananas and oil-palms on a communal basis over an area of 250,000 acres. All profit is to be "ploughed back into the Cameroons." More impressive, however, is a new public corporation plan to create what an American observer calls "the biggest socialized farming development to be found outside Russia." Announced by the Labor government on February 6, 1947, it aims to turn wasteland in Kenya, Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia into 107 mechanized farms of 30,000 acres each, for the annual production of 600,000 tons of much needed vegetable oil from groundnuts (peanuts). Each farm will provide permanent employment and a village community for 300 Africans at a total cost of more than \$100 million advanced by the British government.

Other British plans benefiting colonial peoples include the West African cocoa marketing scheme, and a new colonial mining policy. The cocoa plan, worked out by the Churchill government in 1944 and taken over by the Laborites with little change, creates two government-directed monopolies in Nigeria and the Gold Coast to buy, sell and ship

West African cocoa, eliminating some of the profits of the middleman and stabilizing prices for the benefit of both native producers and British merchants. A British White Paper on colonial mining policy issued in December 1946 recommended to colonial governments that (1) government geological surveys replace or supplement private prospecting, (2) mineral rights be vested in the Crown, (3) mining operations be undertaken directly by colonial governments if necessary to insure social objectives, (4) satisfactory labor conditions be provided, (5) mining leases be limited to not more than twenty-one to twenty-five years, and (6) no exclusive licenses be granted for all mining in any colony. ...

French plans for economic development of the colonies have been retarded by unsettled conditions both at home and in the empire. It should not be forgotten, however, that as far back as 1934-35, the first French Imperial Conference proposed a comprehensive "Fifteen Year Plan" involving the expenditure of over eleven billion francs. ... The Ministry of France Overseas is drawing up development plans for the overseas territories, and has been authorized to form state companies and mixed companies. ... An investment fund for the economic and social development of France Overseas is being created to provide needed capital, which may be supplemented either by direct government subsidies or money contributed by the territory concerned. A central Bank of France Overseas will also facilitate the development program. Much of the French effort to date has been directed to war-devastated areas like Indo-China and North Africa. ...

Like France, The Netherlands is hampered by the unsettled political future of its empire. ... the Netherlands Indies requires a minimum of \$500 million for reconstruction Plans for Indonesian economic development depend on the nature of the political settlement, but on the basis of past records, the Dutch may be expected to do as much or more than the British or French. Since it has been estimated that Indonesia provides a livelihood for about 400,000 Netherlands, its importance to the Dutch is obvious. Conversely, Indonesia needs Western capital and industry. ...

Educating Colonial Peoples

Difficulties in the path of colonial economic development are paralleled in the educational field where the three powers, particularly the British and French, have worked out elaborate two-fold programs for mass education and higher education. The Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies has recommended for Britain's colonies in Africa (1) the extension of schooling for children with the goal of universal education within a measurable time; (2) the spread of literacy among adults and the development of literature and libraries without which there is little hope of making literacy permanent; (3) the planning of mass education of the local community as a movement of

the community itself; (4) the effective co-ordination of welfare plans and mass education plans so that they form a comprehensive and balanced whole. Since the British are convinced that a popular mass education movement must be based on literacy in African languages, English is employed only at the end of the first three or four years of study. For higher education Britain intends to establish universities "at as early a date as possible in those areas which are not now served by an existing university." Education at government expense is now being given in Britain to 4,000 men and women from the colonies who were in the armed forces during the war. ...

French educational reforms for Black Africa are even more elaborate than those of the British. ... they call for elementary schools in all villages of at least fifty boys and girls of school age, with all instruction given in French. Provision is also made for advanced primary schools, vocational schools, specialized educational institutions in all territories for more advanced natives, and colleges for training native teachers. ... The French hope to establish in West Africa 66 teachers' schools and 50,000 grade schools for 2,500,000 pupils. Fifty thousand teachers are to be trained within twenty years, and all children are to be brought into the system within fifty years. Similar arrangements have been worked out for Equatorial Africa.

Dutch educators ... are reported to have developed an extensive plan for mass education in the Indies but, unlike the British and French, the Dutch have not published such proposals. This delay is doubtless caused by the uncertain future of Indonesia, for the Dutch have, comparatively speaking, a good record in colonial education. ...

British, French and Dutch educational plans deserve high praise, but the fact is often overlooked that they face gigantic obstacles. The chief problem, "so vast that at the moment it seems insuperable," is one of finance -- a "vicious circle" of the kind frequently encountered by colonial reformers. To support education, local revenue must be developed, but without the education necessary to teach colonial peoples how to exploit their own resources, local revenue cannot be much increased. ...

Another difficulty is that public support for compulsory education will have to grow among backward peoples "before its general enforcement is possible." True, educational opportunities are still so few that this problem may seem unreal, but in Southeast Asia the natives "demand education only so far as it has a money value." The holding power of the schools must also rise, for everywhere in backward countries pupils tend to drop out at an early age. Children are needed at home to help augment family incomes.

A third subject widely discussed is the language to be used as a medium of instruction, and the culture to be transmitted. ... Educa-

tors agree on the importance of teaching a "world language" (such as English, French or Dutch) if backward peoples are to profit from modern science and technology. Most educators emphasize, however, that native cultures should be preserved, and that teaching should be in the native language for the first few years. The Dutch and British act on this principle, but the French, in keeping with the assimilationist tendency of their colonial policy, use the French language whenever possible as the sole medium of instruction. Justifying this policy in Black Africa, the French contend that since "hardly any African language possesses a written literature, education given through the medium of an African language cannot open the door to a true culture."... France hopes to create a "French-African culture," and expects that the use of French "will have a unifying influence, and will tend to draw the heterogeneous races of Africa closer together as members of the French community."...

New Constitutional Structures

... France and The Netherlands propose constitutional "unions" of the colonies and mother country, while Britain's numerous new constitutions for individual colonies present something of a patchwork appearance. All three empires are giving greater representation to natives in colonial governments, and announce that self-determination is the ultimate goal. ...

The French Union, outlined in Articles 60 to 82 of the new French constitution adopted by the National Constituent Assembly on September 28, 1946, will be composed of two component parts: the French Republic (Metropolitan France and the overseas departments and territories), and the Associated Territories and States (Tunisia, Morocco and the Indo-Chinese Federation). The President of the Republic is to serve as President of the Union, which will have its own High Council and Assembly. The High Council, which is to assist the government in the conduct of Union affairs, is to be composed of a delegation from the French government, and "of the representatives that each Associated State is permitted to accredit to the President of the Union." Representation in the Assembly will consist "half of members representing Metropolitan France and half of members representing the overseas departments and territories and the Associated States" (the precise character and distribution of this representation to be determined by organic law). The Assembly of the Union cannot make laws but is to examine legislative proposals which are submitted to it by the National Assembly of the French Republic, or by the government of the Republic, or by the governments of the Associated States. It may also approve proposals submitted by one of its members, and send such proposals to the National Assembly, the French Government, and the High Council.

The Netherlands-Indonesia Union, outlined by Dutch and Indonesian negotiators in November 1946 and formally approved on March 25, 1947, is also to be a complex structure, including several new political entities. The first of these is the Republic of Indonesia which the Dutch government "recognizes ... as exercising de facto authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra." Secondly, a United States of Indonesia, to be created before January 1, 1949, will include three parts -- the Republic of Indonesia, Borneo, and the Great East (Celebes, the Moluccas, Dutch New Guinea and the Lesser Sunda islands). Third, a Netherlands-Indonesia Union, also to be created before January 1, 1949, is to consist of two component parts: the Kingdom of the Netherlands (comprising The Netherlands, Surinam and Curacao), and the United States of Indonesia. Nominally the Netherlands-Indonesia Union will be headed by the Dutch monarchy, but its organs and statutes are to be created by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia together, and its purpose is to promote Dutch and Indonesian "joint interests" which are defined as "cooperation on foreign relations, defense and, as far as necessary, finance as well as subjects of an economic and cultural nature." The United States of Indonesia is to be a member of the United Nations.

In political representation as in educational policy the assimilationist tendency of the French is responsible for one sharp difference from British and Dutch practice. French colonies alone have representation in the national parliament. Britain and The Netherlands contend that the colonies should develop their own institutions rather than be drawn closer to the mother country. ...

Southeast Asia

The conflict between imperialism and colonial nationalism has reached its peak in Southeast Asia where the ... liberation of India and Burma, and the violent rebellions in Indonesia and Indo-China, seem likely to culminate in self-government for nearly 500,000,000 people. On May 17, 1946 Britain also promulgated a new constitution of Ceylon... . Controversy over Britain's 1945 plan for a Malayan Union to bring "efficiency and democratic" progress to Malaya reveals one of the most complex problems in the colonial world. ... a mounting storm of criticism in Malaya and Britain will probably force the Colonial Office to accept a Malayan proposal for a Federation of Malaya in which the Sultans will retain more of their old rights, and the Malays will lose fewer of their citizenship privileges over the Chinese and Indians. In Hongkong, according to a statement made by the Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons on March 4, 1947, a Municipal Council with an elected majority is to be created "on the widest representative basis possible."

Sarawak and British North Borneo, formerly under indirect British control, have been made crown colonies. This action was ac-

accompanied by a new effort to centralize British policy and action in Southeast Asia; an Area Governor's Conference, an Area Defense Council, and an Area Political Committee have been created. Evidently Britain, while liberating India and Burma, seeks to strengthen its strategic position elsewhere, a trend which may in part account for the refusal to grant Dominion status to Ceylon.

This growing tendency to rely on colonies as strategic bases is not peculiar to Britain. It is common to all the empires, and is recognized in the United Nations Charter.

Indo-China. France's war-time plan for Indo-China outlined an Indo-Chinese Federation with an elected legislature, linking together five separate governments in Tonkin, Annam, Cochin-China, Cambodia and Laos. But the unexpected strength of Annamite opposition led the French on March 6, 1946 to recognize the Republic of Viet Nam (Viet Nam is the ancient name for Annam) as a "free state having its government, its parliament, its army and its finances forming part of the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union." Annamite nationalists hope to incorporate all three Annamite lands (Annam, Tonkin and Cochin-China) in the Viet Nam Republic, but the French on February 4, 1947 officially proclaimed Cochin-China a "free state associated with France within the framework of the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union." ...

... an autonomous Cambodian government was recognized with French officials remaining in an advisory capacity. A French Commissioner of the Republic will have authority over affairs concerning French nationals, foreigners, and Indo-Chinese other than Cambodians. The Cambodian government is drawing up a constitution for a limited monarchy with an elective bicameral legislature. ... Whatever the outcome of the present fighting, the peoples of Indo-China will in the future have a far greater voice in determining their own affairs.

Indonesia. ... Indonesia ... is to have three major parts -- a Republic of Indonesia with de facto independence, and two autonomous Republics of East Indonesia and Borneo in which the Dutch will have greater control. In the Republic of Indonesia, a provisional constitution allocates vast power to President Soekarno, but in practice much of this power has been transferred to representative bodies. Formation of a provisional state of East Indonesia was proclaimed on December 24, 1946 A conference ... is to work out a similar status for Borneo.

Black Africa

The disintegration of European empires in Southeast Asia has no parallel in Africa south of the Sahara where self-government is still a long way off. ...

British Colonies in Africa. Progress toward self-government in British Africa is most advanced on the west coast where the impact of the war produced an increase in trade and in urban population. Costs of living mounted, and trade unions grew rapidly. Less than 5 per cent of the population of Nigeria and the Gold Coast are literate but 90 per cent of these educated Africans are concentrated in the south as professional men, civil servants, teachers, commercial employees and politicians. They watch world trends with interest, are active in local politics, and show a growing interest in the economic and educational achievements of the Soviet Union.

To prepare the way for self-government in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, Britain is increasing native participation in both regional and central administrations, and is granting "unofficial" majorities of Africans on the Legislative and Regional Councils

In British East and Central Africa, where white settlers are often more numerous, no such extensive changes are planned although the general aim of British policy is to increase representation of Africans by Africans on the Legislative Councils. . . .

French West and Equatorial Africa . . . The French intend to reorganize the present system of local consultative councils, and supplement it by elected assemblies (composed partly of Europeans and partly of Africans), endowed with deliberative powers on economic and financial matters, and consultative powers on other questions. At the same time representation of the African colonies in the French parliament has been appreciably increased. French West Africa, which had one deputy and no senators in the pre-war parliament, now has twelve deputies in the Assembly and will have nineteen members on the Council (which replaces the Senate in the new French constitution). French Equatorial Africa had no representation in the pre-war parliament, but is now allotted six deputies and eight council members. Black Africa will also have, of course, a large share of the representation in the yet to be created Assembly and High Council of the French Union.

. . . Black Africa is ultimately to be a "single great Federation," or possibly two Federations (West Africa and Equatorial Africa) within the French Union.

The Arab World

Strong antagonism between Britain and France has arisen over contradictory policies pursued in the Arab world. Britain feels that its imperial interests are best protected by recognizing and even fostering a rising Arab nationalist movement, while the French stress the importance of protecting minorities from an imperialist tendency in Arab nationalism. They consider ill-advised the "extremely rapid methods of emancipation" adopted by Britain.

World War II ... brought independence to Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan (where British troops remain). It has also affected the prospects of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, for whatever the outcome of the present dispute between London and Cairo, the British apparently are at least prepared to allow the Sudanese to determine their own future after a preparatory period now estimated at twenty years. Italian sovereignty over the Arabs of Libya was ended by the Italian peace treaty, although the future status of this area, now under British military occupation, is still in dispute.

Algeria. ... in French North Africa ... the strength of parties advocating independence for Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria has mounted. France considers these three territories the "brightest jewels" in its Empire, and expects to retain them while making concessions to nationalist aspirations. ... An edict of March 7, 1944 granted full civic rights to 80,000 Algerian Moslems of the "westernized upper classes," and increased the representation of Moslems who are not French citizens from one-third to two-fifths on the local assemblies. ... Algeria ... has thirty deputies (fifteen European and fifteen Moslem) and will have fourteen delegates in the Council. ...

Tunisia and Morocco. ... France hopes to placate the nationalists of Tunisia by concessions made in the fall of 1946 which (1) add two Tunisians to the Council of Ministers (making a total of six French and six Tunisian Ministers); (2) open all administrative positions to Tunisians on a basis of equality with Frenchmen; (3) increase the powers of the Grand Council in budgetary matters; and (4) decentralize the administration by making municipal governments elective. ...

Although "probably less than three thousand" Moroccans have identified themselves with the nationalist movement in that country ... President Vincent Auriol and other members of the French government favor granting Morocco self-government within the French Union in the near future.

The West Indies

Fifteen territories in the West Indies have belonged to Britain, France and The Netherlands since the early days of European expansion into the new world. British possessions -- which include the Bahamas, Barbados, British Guiana, British Honduras, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Trinidad and the Windward islands -- were swept by a series of riots in 1937-38 ... attempts were made to remedy the situation, one of which was the creation of a West Indian Development and Welfare Organization financed by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. Outstanding among political reforms was the grant of a new constitution to Jamaica in 1943 under which the first election with universal suffrage was held in 1944. Property qualifications on the right to vote were eliminated in Trinidad, British Guiana and Barbados.

The Colonial Office has also endorsed a movement to unite the West Indian colonies in a self-governing federation. Such reforms as these represent a decided step forward, although they have by no means satisfied West Indian demands. ...

The three French territories in the West Indies -- Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana -- elected their own municipal and General Councils and were represented in the French parliament even before the war. On March 20, 1946 they were officially given the same status as the departments of metropolitan France. ...

Dutch territories include Curacao (with Aruba and lesser islands) and Surinam (Dutch Guiana). The people of Curacao and Aruba have the highest standard of living in the colonial Caribbean. ... the Dutch ... [have, however, recognized] the possibility of a further arrangement of the relations between The Netherlands, Surinam and Curacao [in their new commonwealth plan].

Caribbean and South Pacific Commissions. Perhaps the most significant of Caribbean innovations is a project launched in 1942 by Britain and the United States, and subsequently joined by France and The Netherlands, to promote the social and economic development of the entire area. A rise in standards of living is the greatest need throughout the Caribbean. To the extent that the Caribbean Commission succeeds in this task it will inevitably prepare the native peoples for a larger share in their own governments. At Canberra, Australia on February 6, 1947, delegates of the six governments which administer non-self-governing territories in the South Seas signed an agreement establishing a South Pacific Commission modeled on the Caribbean arrangement.

Many other scattered outposts of empire in the Mediterranean, the Pacific Ocean and elsewhere are profiting from these new colonial trends. To mention only a few, Malta is getting self-government and economic aid, the people of Cyprus are going to play a greater role in the management of their own affairs, and New Caledonia is to have a more enlightened regime. What Britain, France and The Netherlands are doing will also influence the colonial policies of Belgium, Spain, Portugal and other powers.

Colonial Policies in Comparison

... despite contrary assertions of many imperial spokesmen, the fundamental aim of all three powers is to preserve their empires. ... All three powers justify this fundamental aim by arguing against the fragmentation of colonial empires into small independent states at a time when the trend everywhere is toward federalization in the hope of reducing economic conflicts and raising living standards. But methods of saving the empires vary considerably, the phrase "self-determination" being given different interpretations. ... Britain tends

to interpret it as meaning association or independence, while France inclines to limit it to assimilation or association. The Dutch conception is nearer the British than the French. ...

Post-war circumstances have favored the British, enabling them to take the lead in colonial development. France and The Netherlands have been handicapped by violent rebellions in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the internal political situation is less confused in Britain, where Socialist reformers, and conservatives seeking export markets, are in agreement on the importance of raising colonial purchasing power and living standards. ... Psychologically, Britain came through the war with flying colors while France and The Netherlands, overrun by the Nazis, are more obsessed with determination to hold on to what is left of past prestige, power and riches. ...

Here is the principal difficulty of the French Union which, in its ideal form, is an admirable concept. French aims have already encountered the rigid opposition of Arab nationalism in Syria and Lebanon, and Annamite nationalism in Indo-China -- and the independence movements in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco will have to be handled with extreme delicacy. Black Africa, it is true, has not yet developed sufficiently to have strong nationalist feelings. Even in this area, however, the Ewe tribesmen in the French trust territory of Togoland have asked for union (under British trusteeship) with the Ewes of British Togoland. Since nationalism is probably the outstanding political force of the twentieth century, it is unlikely that natives of Black Africa will follow a different path. The peoples of the world may need interdependence more than independence but the record indicates that economic and cultural progress intensify national feeling. This does not mean that no attempt should be made to guide nationalism into constructive channels, but does raise the question whether the French Union or the looser British system is best adapted to modern needs. ...

Both Britain and France seek to preserve their empires by eliminating the excesses of exploitation and promoting native welfare. The British goal is neither better nor worse than the French, but British methods may achieve a larger measure of success because they are more adaptable to present conditions.

Is Gradualism Fast Enough?

... history will probably record that the end of the war marked the dawn of a new era in the colonial world. Three forward steps of great importance have been taken. First of all, the war put seven Asiatic countries on the road to independence, and ended Italy's sovereignty over the three African territories of Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland. ... Whatever obstacles these developments may yet encounter, the trend is unmistakable and will have widespread repercussions.

The second important step forward is the role to be played by the United Nations in dependent areas. International trusteeship (Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter) is an improved version of the League of Nations system for supervision of mandated territories. Even if no more than 15,000,000 dependent peoples are brought under UN supervision, the Trusteeship Council ... will focus world opinion on colonial problems and tend to set international standards for all colonies. Similar work by the International Labor Organization will continue to improve working conditions in dependent areas. Finally, for non-self-governing peoples outside trust territories, Chapter XI of the Charter establishes a unique set of international colonial principles binding the signatories to a series of political, economic, social and educational obligations.

The third of the colonial advances brought on by the impact of the war consists of the new plans of the various imperial powers, three of which have been the major subject of this study. In one sense these individual programs may be considered as efforts by the colonial powers to carry out the principles accepted in Chapter XI of the UN Charter. ...

... No thoughtful person ... should fail to ask the question: "Is gradualism fast enough?" Certainly it is too slow for nationalist leaders who, no matter what progress is made, have bitter memories of past abuses. It is hardly surprising, therefore, if many dependent peoples are impressed by the record of the Soviet Union. In most poverty-stricken backward areas, the individual liberties cherished in the Western democratic world have little meaning. The world at large has been estimated to hold only about 600,000,000 people who share the traditional democratic freedoms, as opposed to 1,600,000,000 who do not. To the latter, Moscow's suppression of political liberties is likely to appear less impressive than Russian economic and educational achievements.

... Lord Hailey, dean of British colonial experts, ... [suggested] that Britain should try to benefit by the Soviet example without departing from the British policy of "respecting the traditions and customs of the African people." If this policy is actually put into practice by imperial powers, a colonial new deal to strengthen world democracy can become a reality. Dependent peoples will find less attraction in the Soviet system if more and more of the profits from colonial development are ploughed back into the colonies. ...

Whether gradualism is fast enough will depend on the sincerity and vigor of each colonial power in pushing its reform program, and on the success of the United Nations in promoting an international approach to the problem. Economic improvement must proceed simultaneously with educational and political advance. Independence may not always

be the ideal goal, but if colonial rulers are honest in their professed aim of transforming empires into associations of free nations, they must ultimately grant dependent peoples the right to choose between association and independence. Otherwise the colonial world will remain a breeding ground for war.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE THAT IS TO BE

By Lowell Ragatz

Reproduced from Nation's Business, July 1947 (published by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Washington, D.C.) by permission of the Managing Editor and the author. Dr. Ragatz, a specialist on imperialism, is Professor of European History at George Washington University. He regards Africa as the heart of "Britain's Third Empire-Commonwealth" upon which Britain is pinning her hope for survival as a world power. On the significant developments taking place in Africa see also "The Future of the British Colonial Empire" by Marjorie Nicholson in The London Quarterly of World Affairs, January 1948; Volney D. Hurd, "The Atlantic Concept: Four Continents Mesh in Western Civilization", The Christian Science Monitor, April 3, 1948; and by the same author, "South of the Sahara: Untapped Africa Waits Specialized Development", ibid., April 5, 1948; "The Penetration of American Capital into Africa", by V. Linyetsky (Izvestia, June 11, 1947) in Soviet Press Translations, October 1, 1947.

The war has drawn to a spectacular close. The break-up of the British Empire is the talk of the globe. The conclusion prevails that "England is done for." In Britain gloomy forebodings respecting an uncertain future dominate the scene; in Russia, France and Germany there is loud rejoicing over England's collapse and impending changes in the balance of power.

The time, however, is 1783 not 1947.

The overseas possessions slipping from the mother country's hands are the 13 American colonies, not India, Burma, Palestine and Egypt.

For 175 years, England had been building a great world state embracing desirable lands in America, Africa and Asia. This first British Empire, centered in North America, was built in face of keen rivalry with the Dutch and the French. The 13 coastal colonies were not lost through despotic rule at the hands of a callous parent state but, rather, through an ill-advised attempt to make them hew the line in a new imperial setup following the Seven Years' War (1756-1763)

after having allowed them to go their own way almost unhindered for generations. . . .

With the heart of the old empire lost, Britain's sun in the 1780's appeared to be setting. Nonetheless, the generation following witnessed the building of a second British Empire ten times the size of the first, together with unprecedented industrial, commercial and financial expansion. These made Britain the dominant world power of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and raised the English standard of living to the highest level the world had known.

Compensation for the loss of the American colonies was found quickly in Oceania, Africa and Hindustan. Since criminals could no longer be dumped along the Atlantic shore of North America, Australia was occupied as a new convict colony. . . . India, with its 300,000,000 potential customers, became the chief jewel in the new imperial crown. By 1914, one out of every four Englishmen lived off the Indian connection, and for years, firm determination to safeguard the peninsula had shaped foreign policy.

Meanwhile, New Zealand was colonized in 1840, the Dominion of Canada was created in 1867 and myriads of islands in the Pacific were brought under the Union Jack. These gains, coupled with the acquisition of Turkish and German colonial lands at the close of the first World War have given the British Commonwealth today an area of 13,330,000 square miles with 560,000,000 inhabitants.

The erection of a vast world state by little Britain -- but slightly larger than Wisconsin and Illinois, with a mere 11,000,000 inhabitants in 1800 -- has been a major political phenomenon of modern times. Such an unparalleled feat is explained by a unique combination of circumstances operating over more than two centuries. Britain's insular position, in Europe but apart from the continent, left her free to pursue her own interests . . . untroubled by invasion dangers.

. . . Concentration on colonial enterprise while continental powers dissipated their strength in European warfare, plus the evolution of an enlightened colonial policy according overseas Englishmen large control over their own destinies, gave the nation primacy in empire building.

Emergence of the Industrial Revolution in Britain about 1750 to meet the colonists' incessant demands for wares, and the spurt given manufacturing during the quarter-century embracing the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars which delayed mechanization on the continent, made Britain the workshop, the freight carrier and the banker of the world.

When the spread of the factory system in Europe proper increasingly cost her customers there, she found alternate markets

among India's millions, in her rapidly-developing daughter nations Australia, Canada and New Zealand, in the new South American republics whose independence she sponsored in order to gain their trade and in China where one fifth of the human race lay crowded along an easily accessible coast. The period 1875-1914 has been hailed as the Golden Age of British history.

The play of new forces was, however, already challenging her dominance by 1900. Germany, the United States and Japan emerged in turn as industrial rivals. Their more efficient new plants, coupled with superior marketing techniques and geographic advantages in distribution, placed Britain progressively on the defensive. The first World War accentuated her loss of leadership by consuming her capital, by transferring much of her overseas trade to America and Japan and by stimulating manufacturing in the dominions.

Lost ground never was regained despite valiant effort Exhaustion of her coal resources, the rise of nationalism in Egypt, Palestine, India and Burma, the disruption of the Chinese market through a generation of strife and prostration resulting from a Pyrrhic victory in the second World War once more have called for a reorientation of Britain's interests if catastrophe is to be averted.

Empire is changing

In 1947, as in 1783, a basic shift in interests is under way. Frankly recognizing that her day in Asia has closed, even as her position in the New World was abruptly altered by the American Revolution, Britain today is not merely abandoning the Near and Middle East and resigning herself to the loss of the bulk of her China trade -- she is shifting the center of her empire to Africa and is preparing to stage a spectacular comeback by developing the virgin resources of that amazing continent.

To most Americans, with vivid recollections of Livingstone, Stanley and Martin Johnson plus a dash of Trader Horn, "Africa" brings to mind a kaleidoscopic jumble of desert wastes, steaming jungles, sheiks, pygmies, bushmen and circus creatures in the wild. Nothing could, however, be further from fact. Africa, one third larger than North America and with a population of only 25,000,000 less is, in reality, today the last world frontier -- a continent incredibly blessed in fertile lands and mineral wealth.

Through most of modern times, Africa has been an exploitation area and has formed the classic land of European imperialistic enterprise. Settlement has occurred only in the northwest and the south and, to a limited extent, along the western coast and in the east-central highlands. . . .

By 1914, all save two fragments, Liberia and Ethiopia, were under European political control -- the largest real estate deal in his-

tory had been concluded within two generations. Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Germany and Italy were parties to this transaction. The first World War removed Germany, and Italy faces the same fate as a result of the second. The construction of modern ports and strategic railways, the development of mines and the opening of agricultural lands more recently have made the area a favorite investment field.

Now ... postwar Africa has become a land of extensive immigration and settlement. The old "Dark Continent" is, in 1947, the uprooted European's Promised Land. With recent progress in aerial navigation, remote interior highlands well-suited for white settlement have become accessible. Advance in tropical medicine, refrigeration and air-conditioning is opening up lands hitherto unsuited for white habitation.

Multitudes of war-weary Europeans, intent upon beginning life anew under more auspicious circumstances, have turned to Africa as the practical answer to their dreams. Africa-bound ships are booked months in advance. A mass migration of peoples involving both victor and vanquished in the late war has opened and promises to match the outpouring of Europeans to the New World and Australasia in the 19th century.

British empire builders

Britain ... is capitalizing this situation to the full in her determination to continue as a major power. Through the enterprise of such empire builders as Cecil Rhodes, Harry Johnston and Frederick Lugard, one third of Africa (4,000,000 square miles) now lies at her disposal. British lands include the choicest portions of the continent and a population of 65,000,000 -- almost half of the whole. Wide range of climate and of soil provides limitless agricultural possibilities. Britain's African forest and mineral resources are among the world's richest. Coal and water power facilities insure extensive industrialization.

Britain's peculiarly favored position is obviously one of great potentialities

East Africa offers the brightest immediate prospects. Here lie Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika Mandate and Nyasaland, with a population exceeding 15,000,000. Vast inland plateaus are suited ideally for white settlement. Extensive emigration to Kenya and Tanganyika set in after the first World War and veterans of the late conflict are today swarming into both as homesteaders.

Cotton, sisal, rubber, coffee, tea, tobacco, copra and tin are leading exports. The growth of cotton production in Californialike Kenya has been spectacular, and Kenya cotton is expected to free Britain from dependence on the American product before 1975.

The hot coastal plains of Kenya and inland valleys of Uganda are already heavy rubber producers and a yield rivaling Malaya's is anticipated. A big-game extermination program was launched in Kenya in May [1947] to clear vast areas for peanut production to help meet Britain's acute fat shortage.

Plans to convert these four dependencies into the Dominion of East Africa are maturing. The famed Kenya White Paper of 1923, declaring that "the interests of the African races must be paramount" and that "when those interests and the interests of the immigrant races conflict, the former should prevail," enunciated the most enlightened native policy the world has known and marks a milestone in interracial history.

The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, in the upper Nile valley, is jointly owned with Egypt, but Britain's withdrawal from the latter country will in no way affect the Sudan's status. One third the size of the United States, and with a population of 7,000,000, it can support three times that number. Grain, vegetable oils, cattle, gum arabic and cotton are produced in abundance but large fertile belts are still untouched. Three million acres of black cotton soil lie at the junction of the Blue and White Niles. Long staple cotton, grown on irrigated lands, has a great future here, and the Sudan seems destined to replace Georgia's Sea Islands as the chief production area for this essential commodity. Exports are shipped down the Nile and also by rail to Port Sudan. British Somaliland, astride the lower Red Sea, safeguards the ocean outlet.

At the lower end of the continent are the Union of South Africa, South-West Africa Mandate, Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland Protectorates. The Union, with an area seven times New England's and a population of 11,250,000, produces one third of all gold mined today and contains the richest diamond beds now in operation. Coal and industrial metals, too, are found here in abundance. Under the impetus of war demand, manufacturing made notable strides and Johannesburg . . . is rapidly becoming one of the world's great industrial centers. Farming and ranching make the Union an important food production area, and fruit exports are cutting heavily into American sales abroad.

South-West Africa, a semiarid tract greater than Texas, mandated to the Union in 1920, is largely untouched. Popularly known as the African Arizona, it has extensive tracts well suited to ranching. Irrigation holds possibilities for agriculture and rich mineral deposits have been located. As yet, it has but 300,000 inhabitants, including a mere 35,000 whites.

The two Rhodesias, long owned by Cecil Rhodes' South Africa Company, were taken over by the British Government two decades ago.

Southern Rhodesia consists largely of farming lands, ideally suited for European settlement, and figures prominently in veteran settlement projects. Some 75,000 whites already live there, but the country can easily support several million in addition to the native population.

Grain, cattle, cotton and tobacco are important export items and this competition has appreciably cut American exports to Europe. Semitropical Northern Rhodesia has, as yet, attracted few settlers. Both are rich in industrial minerals, notably manganese, chrome and copper, and will greatly strengthen Britain's position in the metallurgical field. Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland are native preserves. The first two are undeveloped, but all are suited for meat and grain production.

Dominion of Rhodesia

A movement to convert the two Rhodesias and Bechuanaland into the Dominion of Rhodesia is making headway. Should the Union of South Africa ultimately secede from the British Commonwealth under impetus of Boer nationalist agitation, this new dominion, with its incalculable mineral wealth and fat farming lands, will assume the Union's old place in the imperial structure.

British West Africa embraces six distinct political entities -- Nigeria, Cameroons Mandate, Gold Coast, Togo Mandate, Sierra Leone and Gambia, with an area of 500,000 square miles and a population of 30,000,000. West Coast cacao sets the world price. Palm oil, spices and cotton are also leading agricultural products.

Nigeria has been the scene of notable political and economic experiments converting it into a model tropical dependency. Indirect rule, under which native chieftains function as officials in the British administrative system, has brought spectacular results. Alienation of land has been banned, the plantation system has not been permitted to take root and cultivation of tropical crops by individual small producers has brought prosperity to natives who consume huge quantities of British merchandise. Extensive tin deposits are a priceless asset.

This, then, is British Africa, heart of Britain's Third Empire-Commonwealth, to which the weary motherland is exporting her surplus millions in the hope that their exploitation of virgin lands will enable her to continue as an industrial giant and a leading world state. The gamble is the greatest in her history, but the stakes are high and there is no alternative if she is to survive.

Will her expectations be realized? Chances appear much in her favor. Her vast holdings are well balanced economically, their products are in keen world demand, settlers in the various African dependencies are of sound stock and alert to the opportunities their new homes afford, and no serious rival confronts her anywhere in the continent.

The careful student of history today sees British imperial affairs falling into a familiar pattern -- a shift of balance in empire to meet new world conditions, designed to effect a gigantic trade revival and speedy recovery.

While the unique circumstances giving Britain world leadership have passed, the over-all picture is far from gloomy. Reconstruction brings acute problems, but they need not prove insurmountable. . . . If, through altered economic conditions, she can no longer dominate world affairs, the current reshaping of her empire about the fresh lands of Africa affords definite promise that she will at least continue great. [See map of Africa, page 273. Ed.]

EXPANSION UNDER THE GUISE OF COOPERATION

By N. Rusakov
Pravda, December 11, 1947

The English translation of this article appearing originally in the Moscow daily is reproduced from Soviet Press Translations, February 15, 1948 (copyright by the Far Eastern Institute of the University of Washington), by permission of the editor. This article is included as a sample of Soviet writing on Western imperialism. It purportedly describes American policy and activities in Latin America as a phase of what the Soviets charge to be an imperialist plan of world domination. For other articles in this vein see "The USA and the Arctic" by P. Grinin in Soviet Press Translations, November 15, 1947, and "Polar Fever in America" by V. Golant, in ibid., February 15, 1948.

United States relations with the South American countries are most instructive. They are typical examples of the "cooperation between a horse and its rider," and the position of their roles is perfectly clear. The basic resources of the Latin-American countries have been seized by the capitalist monopolies of North America.

The oil industry of Venezuela, which is fundamental to the whole economy of the country, has been completely appropriated by foreigners, chiefly Americans. There is not a single nationally owned oil field in Venezuela. Only nine percent of the extracted oil is refined within the country, and even this is done in refineries belonging to Americans. Oil production in 1946 showed a fifty percent increase over 1944; whereas the national income from oil showed an increase of only five percent, the income of the Creole Petroleum Corporation (a subsidiary of the American Standard Oil Company) increased twenty-four times.

Oil production in Colombia, a country bordering on Venezuela, is also monopolized by the American Standard Oil Company.

North American capital has taken over the processing of Chile's mineral wealth, particularly copper and nitrates. In his book Pan-American Economics, Olson states that ninety-five percent of the copper and sixty percent of the nitrates mined in Chile belong to Yankee monopolies. Eighty-five cents out of every dollar earned from the sale of nitrates remains in the USA.

American capital dominates the mining industry of Bolivia, one of the world's chief sources of tin.

As averred by the newspaper Tribuna Popular, on February 21, 1947, United States investments in Brazil, plus her indebtedness to the United States, constitute approximately \$750,000,000. American capitalists draw no less than a twenty percent return on this capital, which means an annual currency drain of \$150,000,000 from Brazil to the USA.

Half the territory of Paraguay (200,000 square kilometers) is under the control of the Standard Oil Company. More than half of all cultivated land in Cuba is held by American magnates. Two American companies, United Fruit and Standard Fruit, control the economy of the central American countries.

The North American monopolies have similarly set up shop in Argentina, which receives as its share over one-tenth of all United States investments in Latin America.

During World War II, the United States substantially increased the scale of its colonial enslavement of South America.

All the machinery of expansion has been brought into action. A number of economic, political, and military agreements have been concluded with the Latin-American countries. A decline in the importation of American articles of consumption has brought these countries some development in the textile and footwear industries and other branches of light industry. This led some people to hope that South America would be industrialized with United States aid. But these hopes proved to be unfounded illusions.

The economic development of the Latin-American countries is directed by North American monopolies through the vicious method of strict specialization for each country in the production of one or more items of agriculture and the mining industry destined for export to the USA. The development of other branches of the economy, particularly heavy industry, is not permitted. All the attempts of the countries to escape from their position as a source of cheap raw material and a market for expensive American goods, are stifled.

The United States Export-Import Bank has refused a loan to Chile for the development of the oil industry, upon the frankly cynical pretext that the Standard Oil Company is seeking to obtain an oil concession from Chile. At the moment the USA has promised Mexico a loan, but with the proviso that it must not be used for industrial construction.

In an attempt to consolidate and expand its monopolistic position in southern markets which was secured during the war, the United States is blocking every attempt of the Latin-American countries to inaugurate an independent policy of foreign trade. When Cuba, for instance, tried to exchange its surplus sugar for Ecuador rice and Mexican oil, her "good neighbor" threatened a complete halt in the export of Cuban sugar, which threatened the entire economy of that country.

The North American monopolies are profiting to the full on colonial exploitation. The average annual profit of the American companies in Latin America is as high as seventeen percent!

In 1942 the Brazilian government shipped its entire rubber crop to the Rubber Reserve Company, an American monopoly. This company had recruited 54,000 workers. Exhausted by hunger and fever and without medical aid, the workers in this "rubber army" began to die off. By June 1944, more than 22,000 of the original 54,000 had perished.

As attested by Soule, Efron, and Ness in their book, Latin America in the Future World, two-thirds of the Latin-American population have insufficient food, two-thirds are illiterate, one-half suffer from chronic infectious diseases, and two-thirds do not enjoy social security.

This deplorable condition among the masses of the people suits the "good neighbors" and Wall Street, for it corresponds to the selfish aims of the dollar expansionists. At the Pan-American Conference of Chapultepec in 1945, the USA promised some economic concessions to the Latin-American countries, in return for which the latter, in their turn, made important political concessions. But inasmuch as the United States has new objectives for its "good neighbor" policy in Western Europe, it refuses to fulfill these promises. Even if it does make a few insignificant concessions to a few Central and Latin-American countries, it is only on the condition of eliminating trade barriers -- that is, of granting complete freedom of action to American capitalists. These loans are granted only to governments that agree to mortgage their country, as the Brazilian and Chilean governments have done.

The foreign policy of a majority of the Latin-American governments is dictated by the State Department of the USA. Thus, to please reactionary circles in the United States, the Brazilian and

Chilean governments, against the will of the people in their own countries, recently severed diplomatic relations with the USSR.

During the war the United States consolidated its economic and political domination of the Latin-American countries, crowding out German, Japanese, and also to a considerable extent, British capital. Moreover, under the pretext of Western Hemisphere "defense," they effected the subjugation of these countries in military matters as well, for these countries were enmeshed in a network of military bases and deluged with numerous military missions. On May 5, 1946, President Truman advanced his plan for standardizing the army equipment of all American countries. According to this plan, the cost of maintaining the armies would be borne by the Latin-American governments, while the arming, training, and administration of these armies would be done by the USA.

"We need hoes and plows," wrote the Brazilian newspaper Jornal de Debates on June 27, 1947, "and Marshall offers us rifles and bullets. We export produce which might serve to feed our hungry people, and in exchange we receive from the United States not tools for productive labor, but weapons to defend the luxurious life of Wall Street magnates and capitalist democracy."

"The Yankees," wrote the Uruguayan newspaper El Debate, "talk about 'military defense' for the American republics under United States leadership, when the sole danger threatening them results from the extreme imperialism of the ruling class and the plutocracy of the USA itself."

The latest act (in point of time but not in final reckoning) of United States imperialist expansion in Latin America was the signing of the so-called "Treaty for Mutual Aid," at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the American countries, which took place at Rio de Janeiro from August 15 to September 2, 1947.

The USA exerted tremendous efforts to prevent any discussion of the real economic problems of the Latin-American states at the Conference, discussions which might mar the picture of complete "harmony" and "unity" among the countries of the Western Hemisphere, as exhibited to the world by Marshall and Vandenberg. On the eve of the Conference the Brazilian journalist, Murilo Marroquim, wrote: "We are about to participate in the conference without a stitch on our backs, and without any realization of what we are to defend. . . . The impression has been created that we are forced by a certain power to participate in the conference."

At the Conference the United States delegation succeeded in securing a pledge from the Latin-American governments to cooperate in any escapades of the American militarists. The aggressive intent

of this treaty emphasizes the absence of any real threat to the American countries from abroad.

The treaty restricts independent relations on the part of the Latin-American countries with the United Nations Organization, inasmuch as the governing board of the Pan-American Union, which is directed by the USA, is assuming the function of a "liaison body" between these countries and the United Nations Organization.

The aggressive acts of United States imperialism are meeting resistance from the Latin-American people. The Hitlerite bogey of "the Communist menace," which has been unleashed for the purpose of distracting attention from the dark intrigues of American monopolies, has not achieved its aim.

The Latin-American peoples will not be reconciled with their role of underprivileged vassals to the new conquistadores -- the greedy usurpers from Wall Street.

CHAPTER III

POWER POLITICS - BALANCE OF POWER

The struggle for power is basic to every form of politics, and provides an essential key to an understanding of international relations. In an anarchic world the possession of power is the only ultimate guarantee of national security. Accordingly, the relations among states are characterized by a constant maneuvering for position as each country seeks to increase its power potential vis-à-vis other states. This may be done in many ways: through the creation of a powerful military establishment; the negotiation of a system of alliances; the acquisition of bases, colonies, or spheres of influence; foreign economic policies; the judicious use of propaganda; the development of a strong national economy. In its effort to acquire power a nation may be motivated by aggressive designs (as were Japan, Italy and Germany in the 'thirties) or, as in the instance of the Western democracies, it may strive merely to approximate a balance of world forces in order that no state will have sufficient power to jeopardize the peace and security of others.

The concept of balance of power is one of the oldest in international politics. It reached its apogee after the Napoleonic Wars when the statesmen of Europe effected an equilibrium among the great powers which lasted nearly a century. Throughout this time no major war occurred on the Continent. Since 1914 the balance of power system has failed to prevent war. For a time after World War I many confidently hoped that the League of Nations would provide a better substitute. The tragic history of the past thirty years, however, and the antagonistic state of Soviet-American relations today have led many persons to argue for a return to balance of power politics.

Fundamentally, the world power situation is radically different today from what it was during the nineteenth century. Where there were formerly five or six states of first-class magnitude to share in the balance of power, there are today only two really great powers. Nor is there at present a third nation with strength sufficient actually to balance the scales between the two super-powers. Proponents of the equilibrium school urge the creation of various power groups to try to offset Russia and the United States. Other political analysts challenge, however, the logic and feasibility of forming additional political blocs. Stressing the historical trend toward the political interdependence and unity of the nations, they adjudge efforts further to divide the world as highly unrealistic. Instead, they urge that international political cooperation be expanded through the United Nations so that there may be an eventual unification of the world rather than perpetual division. (For an excellent statement of this thesis see Professor Arnold J. Toynbee's address delivered at Chatham House, May 22, 1947, and reprinted in his volume of essays entitled Civilization on Trial, published April 1948 by the Oxford University Press.)

Power politics since World War II have shown a tendency to try to encompass both courses, notwithstanding their mutual incompatibility. Even as the representatives of Moscow and Washington meet together in the United Nations, efforts are simultaneously made to develop power alignments directed against each other. That one of these two courses must ultimately prevail seems inevitable.

For general readings on power politics see F. L. Schuman, International Politics, Chapter VII; Sprout and Sprout, Foundations of National Power, Chapter I; E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, Chapter VIII; Hans Morgenthau, "World Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century," The Review of Politics, April 1948; Current Readings on International Relations, No. 2, Chapter VIII.

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

By Robert Strausz-Hupe

Reproduced from The Review of Politics (copyright 1948, the University of Notre Dame), January 1948, by permission of the editor. In the article which appears below Mr. Strausz-Hupe presents the case for the establishment of a new balance of power in western Europe and the Far East as the only feasible means of preserving world peace.

International politics, like nature, is a system of processes. There are no simple causes and effects of historical developments. The record of the past tends to determine the present -- until circumstance intervenes. Peoples, like individuals, are at the mercy of what is called chance, and an apparently meaningless combination of circumstances may frustrate the culmination of long-developed tendencies. . . . The basic conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is the central issue of world politics. . . . The brief interlude of illusion which separates Yalta from Flushing Meadow, has come to an end, and the second attempt at world organization has failed before ineluctable power-political realities.

It is no coincidence that contemplation of this failure has given rise to renewed interest in a doctrine which accepts the realities of power politics as a matter of course and seeks to harness the very forces of power politics for the purpose of preserving peace. The doctrine of the Balance of Power is simply a rationalization of recorded experience: world polity has met at various stages of its evolution the threat of concentrated and uncontrolled power by devising systems of makeweights which tended to restore with some degree of automatism the equilibrium whenever that threat became excessive. Such appar-

ently unlike phenomena as the Concert of Powers of the nineteenth century and the "checks and balances" of the Constitution of the United States are examples of the Balance of Power principle in action. It requires no subtle logic in order to demonstrate that the principle remains valid as long as international politics, the politics of a multi-nation system, remains a subject of discourse.

The problem of U. S. foreign policy is the restoration of the balance of power in Europe and Asia. The Harvard address of the Secretary of State inaugurates that policy of restoration and exposes the fallacy of the doctrine of the Super-Powers, to-wit, the condominium of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union which was to preside over the liquidation of the vanquished and the administration of the status quo under the titular supervision of the United Nations. It points emphatically to what could have been ignored only as the result of a colossal oversight: without the mediation, the makeweight, of an independent and integrated Europe, there is not only no balance of power but there is no room in which U. S. foreign policy can operate without colliding immediately and everywhere with the Soviet Union. This misconception can be ascribed only to a pathetic overestimation of British resources and ignorance of the European continent, its topography and its actual and potential resources. It is possible that compounded error has made war inevitable in the near future. If there is an alternative to war it is the execution of the design adumbrated by the Secretary of State and carried forward into the plan of sixteen European nations for the co-ordination -- in fact the unification -- of European economy.

This plan, the Report of the Paris Conference ... is a cautiously economic-objective presentation of the European problem and its projection into the near future. Yet its political implications are plain: the core of the problem is the atrophy of the iron ore-coal complex and the agricultural deficit of western Europe, the most important and intimately related aspects of European crisis. Since both questions -- how to budget food requirements and increase the productivity of heavy industry -- are unanswerable except in terms of a German settlement, they are basically political, and not economical.

The collieries and foundries of western Germany are the most important component part of the iron ore-coal complex of western Europe; the laboring population of western Germany, the largest segment of industrial population on the continent, is more highly dependent on food imports than any neighboring population. This condition is not the result of political machinations, but of the economic geography of Europe. The "Crisis of the Ruhr" has become acute ... for the rest of Europe, as a consequence of the defeat of Germany; the underlying conditions of that crisis are determined by the historical and geographical setting of European industrialization and are known

to every European schoolboy. The arrangements agreed upon at Potsdam do not reflect that elementary knowledge.

The Report of the Paris Conference candidly states that its projections rest upon the assumption that "the pre-war flow of cereals from eastern Europe" (will) be restored by 1951. This assumption, and it is a crucial one, is rendered meaningful only by consideration of the political and strategical situation which explains forcefully why "the pre-war flow of cereals from eastern Europe" has been diverted from its traditional course. This problem, too, is essentially a German problem and belongs within the context of a German settlement. . . .

The partition of Germany has cut off the 48 million inhabitants of the western zones of occupation from over half of all the arable land of pre-war Germany. It is the diversion of the agricultural surplus of eastern Germany and the Danube Basin towards the east and away from western Germany which accounts for the chronic characteristics of the production crisis of western Germany. . . . All available evidence points to a far-reaching re-orientation of east-European trade and integration of east-European national economies within the Soviet orbit. Soviet theory and Soviet practice accords primacy to politics over economics, and nothing in the record suggests that Soviet policy will yield to economic logic -- be its arguments ever so persuasive as regards the "natural" correspondence of east-European agricultural surpluses and the industrial export capacity of western Germany. . . .

Thus there remains, by the force of circumstance, only one alternative, and that alternative suggests a wholly novel form of European economy: the crystallization of tendencies towards west-European unity. For it is only within the generous frame of that unity that the pivotal question raised by the Report of Paris can be answered, namely the radical re-orientation of west-German economy. . . . The execution of the task requires the meshing of economic measures with bold political decisions. No amount of subsidies can restore German industry to its former position as the "power house" of Europe. The question put in mere economic terms is this: can 48 million Germans, in order to gain their livelihood, replace the markets they lost in the east by new markets in western Europe and over-seas, and can, under prevailing conditions, the western peoples be expected to submit permanently to the consequent expansion of German trade and industry? Under prevailing conditions, the forced segregation of western Germany under military rule and unsettled claims of Germany's western neighbors, the answer to this question, the businessman's question, must be emphatically given in the negative. It must be so given because there is no satisfying answer to the dilemma of European security as posed by the juxtaposition of a highly centralized and industrialized Germany and the rest of Europe.

To escape the dilemma one has but to ask the underlying, the real question: can peace agreements be written which accord the peoples of Germany outside of Russian rule a measure of political and economic autonomy, yet satisfy legitimate claims to security against renewed German aggression? In sum, can the German people be integrated in European society? ... the re-orientation of west-German economy, predicated not only upon the expansion of western markets but also upon a re-distribution of German population, must fail without the full co-operation of France. And without France there cannot be even the semblance of a united western Europe.

The very finality of German defeat and the urgency of European problems to which World War II has given rise, are fecund with immense possibilities. The greatest of these is to break with the "traditional" Germany, the highly centralized Germany so efficiently organized for rapidly shifting its weight from east to west and west to east, and integrating the spiritual and physical resources of western, and least Prussianized, Germany with those of the principal area of western civilization. It can be shown by projections based on past trends of population growth and economic productivity of peoples within the Soviet orbit that the integration of western Europe, inclusive of western Germany, Spain and Italy, satisfies, at least for the next twenty years, the minimum conditions for maintaining the balance of power in Europe. If the policy of the United States is wedded to the principle of the balance of power -- and it has been argued here that it is -- then the unification of western Europe must be its main objective. This does not mean that that unity can be or need be imposed from without. The idea of unification permeates not only such agreements as the Belgian-Dutch-Luxembourg Customs Union and the Dunkerque Treaty between France and Britain providing joint plans for reconstruction but the vastly more comprehensive scheme which emerges from the Report of Paris. The idea does not carry within itself a spectacular and immediate realization, but it can serve as the central point of orientation for the daily actions of diplomacy. ...

The United States is confronted in the Far East by a pattern strikingly similar to that of European affairs: the partition and paralysis of the Japanese-Korean-Manchurian iron ore-coal-hydroelectric power complex, key area of Far Eastern industrialization; the lowering of the Iron Curtain in Korea; and the emergence of Soviet satellite powers in the northern borderlands of China. In the Far East, too, the problem is the restoration of the balance of power, that is, the revival of autonomous regional power capable of balancing Soviet power.

The strategy of U. S. foreign policy is simple; its pursuit involves immense difficulties. No comprehensive formula, such as European recovery by budgeting European resources and rationing American

financial aid, can do justice to these highly complicated and volatile conditions. There is, moreover, the danger that emphasis placed in the dissemination of public information on the European economic plight tends to obscure not only the political realities of the European situation but the very real political and military commitments of the United States in Europe as well as in the Middle East and eastern Asia. It is this deliberate restriction of debate, because of allegedly weighty considerations of domestic politics, to matters which can be paid for but need not be fought for, which invites a psychological, if not a military, Pearl Harbor. Modern statesmanship must seek to grasp the problems of world politics in their totality and convey the interrelatedness of at least the most significant phenomena, economic, military and political, to the people. . . . The processes of history, the history of changing power relationships, cannot be seen in their true shape if approached with ideas muddled by emotion. It is true that foreign policy must include in its calculations the idiosyncrasies of individuals and vulgar pre-conceptions, to-wit, the irrational. But foreign policy is essentially anticipation and thus a special form of the calculus of probabilities. The variables are the power potentials of the Powers and the sum total of domestic resources available at any given moment for implementing a move on the board of diplomacy.

War-time experience and the ubiquity of federal agencies engaged in collating statistical data and planning activities has greatly furthered public understanding of the organic interdependence of various realms of social, political and economic activity and thus also of foreign policy and the domestic household. The support of measures designed to bring about administrative coordination, to survey and budget national resources available for granting foreign subsidies, and to build up reserve of scarce strategic raw materials and develop new processes in order to husband strategic raw material deposits threatened by depletion, reflect awareness of the close relation between domestic organization and resources on one hand and foreign commitments on the other. It must be pointed out, however, that this awareness as regards the relation of the national balance of resources and commitments to the international balance of power does not extend to such vital topics as population growth and immigration, bi-partisan, or rather non-partisan, approach to military, military-scientific and foreign political issues, the formation of public opinion on questions involving national security, and tariff legislation.

American policies in Europe seek to restore, although perhaps not along the straight lines of strategic purpose, a system of balances which can be maintained with the greatest economy of force. Such a system must be conceived as a dynamic one, not as a device for freezing the status quo. . . . The time available for creating such a system is, indeed, now. The population dynamics and the economic transfor-

mation of Asia are creating problems which will, in the lifetime of most men now living, overshadow any problem facing the western world. . . . But the dangers looming on the margins of the contemporary scene can now be clearly perceived. The Science of Prediction does approximate the shape of things to come. Armed with its findings, American policy makers can now seek creative solutions and devise policies, instead of waiting for the catalyzing action of sudden emergencies.

BALANCE OF POWER

By DeWitt C. Poole

Reproduced from Life Magazine (copyright 1947, by Time, Inc.), September 22, 1947, by permission of the publisher. In the following article Professor Poole, who was for many years a career diplomat in the American Foreign Service, outlines a program for the establishment of a complex system of balance of power. Only thus, he avers, can the sharp and uncushioned rivalry of the United States and Russia be prevented from exploding in another world war. (See map, p.271.)

Which comes first -- freedom or peace ?

. . . The first specification for our kind of world is not peace but freedom. . . .

Freedom, as we shall show shortly, is to be had in only one kind of world. That is a world in which power is widely distributed and balanced; a world of complex balance of power. The most obvious alternative, a world in which power is concentrated at a single point, spells empire and tyranny. But the second alternative is little better; it is what we have now. A good balance of power must be complex. A simple balance, like the present one between the U. S. and Russia (alias: two armed camps) does not serve freedom or justice or peace; it is dangerous and unstable. If a new complex balance does not soon replace the present simple confrontation, world empire will ensue and freedom be destroyed. Even if it is an American empire, freedom will be destroyed.

A world of complex balance of power is for us the familiar world in which we feel at home. This world began with the Renaissance 500 years ago. Far from perfect, it has been tolerable, exciting and progressive. With balance of power came freedom and with freedom a flowering of the human spirit unprecedented except in classic Greece, where also there was complex balance of power. In the interval between the Grecian and the modern world came empire and its aftermath. For 200 years imperial Rome insured peace, imposed justice

but denied freedom. A Dark Age followed, and civilization had to be rebuilt with pain and sweat.

In 1945 this painfully rebuilt world was again destroyed. The ultimate and controlling aim of American foreign policy must be to bring us from the present crisis into a new world of complex balance and of freedom. How?

Our kind of world and how to get it

Concretely the U. S. must work to have alongside of the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. six or eight centers of power comparable to them in weight and independent of them both. The standard of power is set by the U. S. and Russia. We could not reduce these power centers if we would. The other power centers (1.6 billion people are in question) must be brought up toward the American-Russian level. This is neither easy nor impossible.

The practical means is federation. First, federation in EUROPE. Sixteen European nations are at work at Paris concerting their postwar recovery, following Secretary Marshall's invitation; three (Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg) have already formed a customs union. The size, shape and nature of any federation or federations of Europe will be primarily decided, of course, by the peoples involved. Political hindrances continue formidable, but Europe is under instant economic pressure. It is in the field of economics that the U. S. can offer the surest help.

Applied first in the Ruhr, going further as requested, American engineering talent can help revitalize all of Western Europe. Europe may be economically viable only as a whole; but since the Iron Curtain blocks the way at present, we must begin in Western Europe with what is at hand. What concerns us is that there should come into being soon a genuinely European Europe, strong and free.

Next, CHINA. The U. S. needs and desires a strong China, independent of other world powers. Russia seeks a manageable China. As between Communists and Nationalists in China, only the Nationalists can create -- if either can create -- a strong and independent China. That is why we should be for the Nationalists and their leader, Chiang Kai-shek.

Of all the unawakened countries of the world, China has the greatest potential. By underwriting the Monroe Doctrine the British statesman, George Canning, called in the Americas to redress the European balance after Napoleon; similarly a strong China offers American statesmanship a chance to stabilize the Pacific. Should success in this role someday go to China's head and lead her into imperial adventures as they led Japan, then the U. S. on that day would of course become China's enemy. But at present the opposite is the case: *the*

replace the Japanese unit in the international balance -- not against Russia but against anybody -- is America's controlling interest.

Now free, INDIA becomes important in the international balance. As India starts her new life divided into Pakistan and Hindustan, the fact (long obscured under British rule) that India is not a unitary nation is made manifest to all. But when India's wounds heal and she proceeds through the next stages of industrialization, she will be compelled toward federal unity in order to protect the independence of her parts. The U. S. should favor and can help in this process, at the moment by taking a direct interest in her industrial development.

Similarly we can and should encourage the renaissance of the MOSLEM WORLD. Geographically there are two Moslem worlds and probably two potential Moslem federations. In the Near East the Pan-Arab movement hitherto has been mainly a diplomatic scarecrow. But if the Near Eastern desert is watered and developed by American oilmen and engineers, Arab nationalism could become a serious international political reality.

In INDONESIA, also predominantly Moslem, the old colonial system is in agony, as also in Indo-China. The U. S. should assist the realization of an Indonesian federal state. It may ultimately include Indo-China, Malaya and other strengthening neighbors.

Federal possibilities based on cultural affinity may also be present in the LATIN-AMERICAN WORLD. The cultural movement called Hispanidad is largely a Franco invention, but once Franco is removed and Spain is free the natural links between Spain, Portugal and Latin America may take political form.

A sound statesmanship in North America would not be alarmed by this development nor regard it as an infringement of our hemispheric unity. We shall in general be wise to look with favor on cross-ties and multiple relationships wherever they arise. We aim to bind the world together, not fence it into parcels.

The BRITISH are now in the process of erecting their main overseas bastion in Africa. Field Marshal Smuts talks of a South and Central African federation with its center at Pretoria. On the other hand the British may turn in again toward Europe, sharing and promoting federation there. In either event it is imperative that the U. S. help the British make themselves again a power more nearly equaling the U. S. and Russia. The British command an important physical position. They are for us indispensable coworkers. The more Britain cleaves to Europe, the more Canada, Australia and New Zealand can be counted independent centers.

In sum, then, adding federative possibilities to existing powers, we come out with a total possibility of some 10 power centers of some-

thing near the same order of magnitude. That would be a world of complex balance of power, and so of freedom, and so a world in which we could be content. It would be a peace of freedom -- an American peace.

The balance of power and Original Sin

The theory that a complex power balance is the best, perhaps the only, guarantee of freedom begins with Original Sin. Man being imperfect as he is, power concentrated and uncontrolled will always be abused. As Alexander Hamilton put it, "The spirit of moderation in a state of overbearing power is a phenomenon which has not yet appeared, and which no wise man will ever expect to see." Conscience is not enough; the safeguards of freedom must be intensely practical. Keep power from concentrating. Find safety in numbers. Separate and make numerous the repositories of power; let them watch and check each other. This our Founding Fathers knew as the theory of checks and balances, though some of them called it balance of power. They would have agreed with Ortega y Gasset: "The state of liberty results from a plurality of forces mutually resistant."

Throughout history this hardheaded and skeptical doctrine has had only two foes: 1) those equally hardheaded, the tyrants, who seek power for themselves by overriding checks and safeguards, 2) political idealists. The idealists believe that somehow governors will emerge who are wiser and more virtuous than the generality. Plato, in the Republic, would rely on breeding these supermen -- his philosopher-kings -- eugenically like racehorses. Up to the French Revolution, Europe touched kings with divinity. That experiment ran three centuries, and the kings turned out to be ordinary clay. Following this the German philosopher Hegel enthroned not a flesh-and-blood monarch but an abstraction, "the State" as "the expression of the Divine Will on earth." The secular fruit of that idea has ripened for our time in Hitler's "leadership principle" and the absolutism of the Politburo at Moscow.

Today the political idealists take a slightly different tack: if we all really try to make the United Nations work or turn it into a world government, won't a balance of power be unnecessary? Quite the contrary; a complex balance of power, which does not now exist, is the only basis on which the U. N. could ever work, especially if it is hoped to turn it into a federal government of the world. Swiss, American and other experiences of federation show that the closer the political association, the more necessary balance of power becomes alike to freedom and to justice. Successful federation, A. V. Dicey tells us, requires "approximate equality in the wealth, in the population, and in the historical position" of the participants.

The U. N. is still largely ineffectual because of its suppliant position vis-à-vis both the U. S. and Russia and the client position of

too many of its members. Americans expect U. N. to be an association of free nations. Only against a background of complex balance of power can it become so.

The atomic bomb and Russia

But hasn't the atomic bomb changed all this? ... Technically we hold in our hands the means to wipe freedom from the earth. What do we do? After long prayer and thought we propose to share control of the secret internationally. The Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch proposals were nothing more nor less than a scheme for putting the balance of power in action. Our temporary and instinctively uncomfortable monopoly of atomic power was to be shared in such a way that no single power would ever again enjoy a monopoly.

Russia's lone refusal of this offer marks her as the principal foe of the balance of power in the world today -- whether from tyrannical or idealistic motives matters not. Russia having refused, we have no choice but to maintain a strong defensive posture, remaining trustees of the bomb as long as science permits and maintaining strength equal in all respects to Russia's as long as this direly oversimplified power balance lasts. But for the long term our controlling aim remains a world of complex balance of power in respect also to atomic fission.

The justice of the future

If many people (and not just a dozen or so in Berlin, Moscow or some other capital) are to enjoy freedom, there must be a frame of order. Freedom as we understand it, meaning freedom for all, requires justice. Here also is a problem in the balance of power.

A while ago the intercourse of nations was framed, after a fashion, by Christian morality and the Natural Law; but their influence has faded. ...

Some new order of universal justice must take hold of men. If the Russians win or if want of patience or fear or economic stress at home impels us to try our hand at empire, then the Russians or we can clamp on a frame of justice from above -- so-called justice. But with freedom kept alive, as it will be if Americans do not foreswear themselves, the establishment of justice is no quick or easy task. Justice under freedom ... is a slow and natural growth, rooted in popular custom. The rootage of a new international justice must be found in a new community of outlook among the nations.

In more innocent days it seemed likely that Western Christian culture might someday embrace the world. It has not done so, and it is now unmistakable that any community of outlook which is to be realized among the nations must be composite. Unless and until empire stamps out freedom, we must look forward to a ceaseless process of

selection and amalgamation, an unending competition of ideas and absorption of ideas into the common mind by tested superiority. That is only possible among equals.

The cultural imperialism of Communist Russia, which seeks to dominate the world, is specifically an attack upon the West Other cultures in the world offer other resistances to Communism. The mystic individualism of the Hindu, the instinctive tolerance (wu wei) of the Confucian, the God-bitten clannishness of the Moslem, the somber pride of the Latin, each presents a separate puzzle to the Communist missionary. While Marxist "science" is infinitely adaptable to different cultures, the more different kinds of resistance its agents have to face, the more likely they are to be confused and defeated in the end. Western capitalism is not the only answer to Marxism nor even the best one. The best one is a variety of political and economic theories which will lose Marxism in a glorious shuffle. Complex balance of power means a balance of ideas as well as of armies. Thus understood, complex balance of power becomes the parent of a new world community of outlook and a new frame of justice.

Peace, empire and Russia

...

Peace is the bait of empire. Whoever truly believes in the pacifist idea should welcome the victory of the German arms, said Hitler. He did not mention that peace would be at the price of freedom. So in the end, there would be neither freedom nor peace. . . . Today the Russians offer peace -- at the price of freedom. The Russian way is that of Rome. . . . The issue between the U. S. and Russia today is not private enterprise vs. Communism. The decisive issue is that between freedom and empire; between the idea of power centralized and uncontrolled as against power distributed and balanced.

Balance of power is an American idea

Recent American generations have been disposed to think of balance of power as European. The principle is even more thoroughly American. . . .

In the foreign policy of the U. S. balance of power has alternated with neutrality as a determinant of action. The preferred position, naturally, has been neutrality; but whenever imperialists or adventurers have so far upset the general balance as to menace freedom, the American people have stood ready to intervene or have intervened.

. . . Jefferson exclaimed to his friend Leiper [in 1815], "It cannot be to our interest that all Europe be reduced to a single monarchy" Jefferson hoped "that a salutary balance of power may ever be maintained among nations."

The victories of Trafalgar and Waterloo lifted the Napoleonic threat, and five years later the accent had gravitated to neutrality. . . .

Our Civil War being over and danger of European intervention past, there set in for the U. S. a privileged international position. British naval supremacy, dedicated to economic rather than political imperialism, was one source of our security. Another was the continuance of a complex balance of power on the Continent of Europe. The two combined to yield the American people -- free, gratis, and for nothing -- the shield and buckler of external freedom; and swift accretions of strength at home put the cap upon a situation certain to lull Americans toward complacency.

At the end of this long, bright interval Theodore Roosevelt cut through to underlying facts. In 1911 ... T. R. said to a German diplomat, "As long as England succeeds in keeping up the balance of power in Europe, not only on principle, but in reality, well and good; should she, however, for some reason or other fail in doing so, the United States would be obliged to step in at least temporarily, in order to re-establish the balance of power in Europe, never mind against which country or group of countries our efforts may have to be directed."

It was not Roosevelt, however, but Woodrow Wilson who had to meet the situation, and to Wilson as to other Americans of the present century, "balance of power" seemed alien and unclean. ... Before leaving the U. S. [for the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Wilson] ... had denounced the balance of power in the second of his Four Principles of Feb. 11, 1918. He stipulated therein that "peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power." Instead there was to be "self-determination."

The slight duration of the Versailles respite, compared with Utrecht's 80 years and Vienna's century, has elicited some second thoughts on balance of power. The critical point for our cognizance today is this: Though Wilson rejected ... the phrase "balance of power," Wilson held ... to the conviction that any single domination of Europe must imperil freedom everywhere, and must therefore be resisted.

...

World War II confronted the people of the U. S. once more with the dilemma of neutrality and their own proper interest in the fate of Europe. President F. D. Roosevelt never openly invoked the principle of the balance of power. ... during 1944 there were published in the Saturday Evening Post articles by Forrest Davis based on talks with President Roosevelt, and the latter is said to have reviewed before publication what Davis wrote. The following passage is in point: "Our historic interest, like England's, has demanded a European balance of power wherein no single nation commands all the Continent's resources and manpower to our potential disadvantage. Stripped to the bare es-

sentials, we fought in 1917 and are fighting now to prevent the mastery of Europe by one aggressive power.”

In each war we took up the final challenge and spent our blood and treasure in a cause which (as Gladstone once said of England) was not immediately our own. We accepted a fate which others had prepared for us and fulfilled the last cruel necessity of the principle of the balance of power defensively conceived.

The challenge is the kind we know about

The world today is far more compact and explosive than it was in 1941. In order to survive we must advance consciously, without more delay, from the purely defensive into a constructive and preventive stage of our historic quest for freedom through balance of power.

Fruitless negotiations with the Kremlin, whose lack of common purpose was writ large from the outset, have slowed our start. Historical momentum took us some distance nevertheless. At least we have been unable to persevere in policies which pointed away from a balance of power, such as the Morgenthau plan for Germany and the Stilwell-Vincent line in China. It is now time to confess explicitly our devotion to the balance of power, and to draw the scattered manifestations of our policy into a worldwide plan. Such a plan would commit us:

1. To support “the common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any Power whatever,” as we have begun to do in Greece and Turkey. And beyond that --

2. To lead the world, if we can do so, toward a new complex balance of power in fact, moving thus from the defensive into a constructive and preventive phase.

Leadership in these regards was until recently with the British. But during four centuries they had never to face a situation so threatening as the present or to act with so little outside help as we may look for. Probably never has a people held the general fate so unequivocally in their hands as do Americans at the present juncture. Upon us has descended, without reversion, guardianship not only of our own ideals but that legacy of the Western World of which our ideals are part.

The challenge is harsh and exacting beyond precedent. However, one very interesting and encouraging aspect has been little noted. It is this: The two specific problems which now challenge us abroad are precisely those problems which have engaged the chief effort of our domestic life. So far we have bested them at home.

In the U. S., as in other countries, industrialization brought on power-concentrations as dangerous to freedom on the domestic scene as were Napoleon and Hitler internationally. Resistance to these concentrations, the struggle to maintain a complex balance of power in

our domestic social organism, brought forth the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and related legislation. Campaigns against overconcentration were led by Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt. The same imbedded principle has recently driven Congress to check the overconcentrated leadership of union labor. At home as abroad the issue has been -- empire or freedom? It may make today's international task less alien and forbidding to remember that.

...

Secondly, there is the problem of promoting a new world community of outlook, as a frame of justice. We know that problem domestically as the "melting pot." Setting out with "a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs," as Jay cheerfully noted in The Federalist, we have absorbed into one community, in great numbers and at times swiftly, nearly as wide a variety of race and culture as exists over the globe. The census of 1940 showed that more than one fourth (35 million) of the American people either were born abroad or had foreign-born parentage; that nearly one fifth (25 million) did not have English as their mother tongue, and that nearly one sixth (20 million) stemmed, in the immediate sense just indicated, from the politically high-pressure area of Central and Eastern Europe. Yet the melting pot has worked.

A successful foreign policy must always, in a democracy, be the renewal and extension of policies that work and are held dear in domestic life. We have now to lead in making effective on the scale of the world the principles which have shaped our life at home.

The Bevin Plan of "Western Union"

On January 22, 1948, Foreign Secretary Bevin made an historic address in the English House of Commons proposing negotiation of an accord among the Western European nations. This was widely heralded as the beginning of a "Western Union" to protect the West against the mounting dangers of Soviet and Communist pressure. Former Prime Minister Churchill rose to applaud the statement as being in line with the views which he had expressed in his Fulton, Missouri speech two years previously. The Foreign Secretary's proposal marked a step in the direction of redressing the present unbalanced power situation in Europe by adding to individual French and British strength the united power of a group of Western nations welded together in a common accord. French statesmen had already indicated their desire to re-establish the European balance. (See, for example, the speech by former President Charles de Gaulle at Bar-le-Duc on July 28, 1946.) Of extreme significance in terms of historic British policy, the Bevin

proposal signified the abandonment by England of its long-held role of "balancer" of European power relationships. As long as the concept of Western Union persists, Britain must be identified with it. The initial gain resulting from Mr. Bevin's speech was the signature of the Five Power Mutual Defense Treaty at Brussels on March 17, 1948.

EXCERPTS OF STATEMENT BY FOREIGN SECRETARY BEVIN
January 22, 1948

Reproduced by courtesy of the Associated Press
(Boston Office)

We are indeed at a critical moment in the organization of the post-war world. And decisions we now take . . . will be vital to the future peace of the world.

The solution arrived at at Yalta was looked upon by His Majesty's Government at that time as a sensible compromise between conflicting elements.

But there is no doubt that, as it has evolved, it has revealed the policy on the part of the Soviet Union to use every means in their power to get Communist control in Eastern Europe and, as it now appears, in the West as well.

It, therefore, matters little how we temporize and, maybe, appease or try to make arrangement. It has been quite clear, I think, that the Communist process goes ruthlessly on in each country.

We have seen the game played out in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and, more recently, in Rumania.

. . . other attempts may be made elsewhere. Thus the issue is not simply the organization of Poland or any other country, but the control of Eastern Europe by Soviet Russia, whose frontiers have, in fact, been advanced from the Kuriles to Stettin, Trieste and the Elbe.

You have only to look at your maps to see how Soviet Russia since the war has expanded. And yet all the evidence is that she is not satisfied with this tremendous expansion.

The great issue in Greece is similar to the others I have mentioned. . . .

I beg all my friends in this House to face the facts. This is a dangerous situation. It is a case of power politics. . . .

The United Nations has been brought in, but has been flouted by the Balkan neighbors of Greece. There is a real danger that they and their Soviet mentors may make a great blunder over this business. I would advise, in all solemnity, great tact. Provocations like these lead sometimes to great developments which we, and I hope they, are anxious to avoid.

I say no more than that it is dangerous in international affairs to play with fire.

It is the considered view of the Government that attempts to settle international affairs by political barrages and by wars of nerves reduce the chances of finding acceptable solutions and make agreement difficult, if not impossible. Propaganda is not a contribution to the settlement of international problems.

They are all so important that the only way to solve them is to deal with them coolly and calmly on their merits. . . .

No one disputes the idea of European unity. That is not the issue. The issue is: If European unity is achieved, can it be done without the domination or control of any one great power? That is the issue that has to be solved.

The British policy, which had been carefully considered in connection with Europe, had been based on taking into account three principles.

The first is that no one nation should dominate Europe.

The second is that the old-fashioned conception of the balance of power as an aid should be discarded if possible.

Thirdly, that there should be substituted Four-Power cooperation and assistance to the states of Europe to enable them to evolve freely, each in its own way.

As regards the first principle, I am sure this House and the world will realize that if a policy is pursued of trying to dominate Europe by any one power, by whatever means, direct or indirect, one has to be frank with one's self, and you are driven to the conclusion that it will inevitably lead again to another World War. I hope that idea will be discarded by all of us.

It is this which His Majesty's Government has striven, and will continue to strive, to prevent. With the old-fashioned balance of power, it was a question of having a series of alliances and so manipulating them that, as each state moved in a particular direction, it was counteracted.

On behalf of the Government I have stated that we will not use, as an instrument of policy, smaller powers so as to produce difficulties between the larger powers, therefore giving the smaller powers a chance to evolve under the umbrella of the four, without a feeling of fear or conflict.

But His Majesty's Government cannot agree to Four-Power cooperation while one of those Four Powers proceeds to impose its political and economic system upon the smaller states. . . .

We had hoped that the end of the war would have meant the end of the police state and all instruments of this character.

I would emphasize and repeat now that the friendliest relations should exist between Russia and the States on the Russian frontier -- indeed, not only on the frontier. We want those friendly relations with everybody. ...

But it is quite a different thing from cutting off Eastern Europe from the rest of the world and turning it into an exclusive self-contained bloc under the control of Moscow and the Communist party.

The European Recovery Program brought all this to a head and made us face up to the problem of future organization. We have not pressed for a Western union, and I know that some of our neighbors were not desirous of pressing it, in the hope that when we got the German and Austrian peace settlement agreement between the Four Powers, this would close the breach between East and West and thus avoid the necessity of crystallizing Europe into separate blocs.

We have always wanted the widest association for Europe including, of course, Russia. It is not a new idea. In 1944, there was talk between my predecessor and the Russian Government about a Western association.

Anything which the British Government does now will not be directed against the Soviet Union or any other country, but we are entitled to organize the kindred souls of the West, just as they have organized kindred souls in the East.

In January, 1947, Stalin talked similarly with Field Marshall Montgomery. In 1946 I indicated to Molotov the intention of entering into negotiations for an Anglo-French treaty.

When the European Union proposal (Marshall Plan) was put forward in the same spirit, it was offered in exactly the same way to the whole of Europe, including Russia.

There were no grounds to fear that it was to be directed against the Soviet Union or used for any ulterior purpose. ... It is no secret that Molotov threatened both ourselves and France that we should have to look out for squalls if we went on with this recovery program.

Quite quietly I told him that Great Britain had been accustomed to threats, that we had faced them, and that we should not allow them to prevent us from doing what we thought was right. ...

The nations of western Europe have much to unite them -- common sacrifice in two wars, their parliamentary democracy and their striving for economic rights and conceptions of and love for democracy.

I was quite convinced, and I am now, that there was no political motive behind the Marshall effort other than the overriding human motive of helping Europe to help herself and so restore the economic and political health of this world.

The United States power and resources, and indeed, the power and resources of all the countries of the American Continent, will be needed if we are to create a solid, stable and healthy world. . . .

We are not now proposing a form of political union with France, although we shall work with the closest possible contact and work for ever-closer cooperation between the two nations.

With that end in view, our representatives at Brussels, the Hague and Luxembourg were instructed yesterday to propose talks in consultation with their French colleagues. I hope that treaties will be signed with our near neighbors, the Benelux countries, making with France an important nucleus in western Europe.

We shall also have to go outside the circle of our immediate neighbors. We shall have to consider including the new Italy, whose eventual inclusion is no less important than that of the other countries of western Europe.

The western organization of Europe must be economically supported, and that involves the closest possible collaboration with the commonwealth and overseas territories, not only the British but the French, Dutch, Belgian and Portuguese territories overseas.

The other two great powers, the United States and Soviet Russia, have tremendous resources and there is no need for conflict with them in this matter at all.

There can be economic cooperation between the western European countries and the overseas territories with which they are associated under a system of priorities which would create the quickest, most effective and lasting result for the world.

This tremendous cooperation would stretch through Europe, the Middle East and Africa to the Far East. In no case would it be an exclusive effort, but one with the object of making the whole world richer and safer.

In the Middle East we have a long-standing friendship with the Arab. I have repeatedly said to the United States and the Soviet Union that the Middle East is a vital factor to world peace and that, in addition, it is a lifeline for the British Commonwealth. . . .

His Majesty's Government have striven for the closer consolidation and economic development and, eventually, for the spiritual unity of Europe as a whole, but in eastern Europe we are presented

with a *fait accompli*. No one there is free to think or speak or enter into trade or other arrangements of their own free will. The sovereignty of the eastern Europe nations is handicapped.

What of the West? Neither we nor the United States nor France is going to approach western Europe on that basis. It is not in keeping with the Western spirit or Western civilization. If we are to have an organism in the West, there must be a spiritual union.

It must be on terms of equality and must contain all the elements of freedom for which we all stand. That is the goal we are now trying to reach. It cannot be written down in a rigid thesis or a directive. It is more of a brotherhood and less of a rigid system. ...

In spite of all the opposition set up and the propaganda blared out, which will no doubt be increased after this debate, we shall pursue a course which will seek to unite Europe. If the present division of Europe continues, it will be by that act and will of the Soviet Government, but such a division would be inconsistent with the statements of the highest Soviet authorities and of Stalin himself. We shall not be diverted by threats or propaganda or fifth-column methods from our aim of uniting, by trade, social, cultural and all other contacts, those nations of Europe and of the world which are ready and able to cooperate. The speed of our recovery and the success of our achievements will be the answer to all attempts to divide the peoples of the world into hostile camps. ...

EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS BY
FORMER PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
January 23, 1948

Reproduced by courtesy of the United Press
(Boston Office)

I cannot help ... feeling content to see not only the British but also the American Government has adopted to a very large extent the views which I expressed at Fulton [Mo.] nearly two years ago and have indeed in many ways gone far beyond.

... It is a year now since I spoke at Zurich. There I pleaded for the ideal and objective of a united Europe and later we formed a committee of all parties in this country.

We welcome everything that was said by the Foreign Secretary yesterday about the more intimate relations we are having with France, also with what are called the Benelux countries, and I presume with Switzerland, if she would wish, and also, I am glad to hear with Italy. We give our true support to this policy.

We are told there should be a European association of Socialists for Socialist parties. Nothing could be more unwise or more reactionary than that. Once you try to do it you put yourself on the same level as those trying to make a united Communist movement. . . . Let us try and keep the idea of a united Europe above party divisions. . . .

When I spoke at Fulton I said I did not believe the Soviet Government wanted war but the fruits of war. I overwhelmingly hope and pray that the view I then expressed is still correct. I cannot tell. I should not blame His Majesty's Government if, even with all the information at their disposal, they were also not able to come to a definite conclusion.

The Soviet Government have not used their overwhelming military power in Europe to march westward to the North Sea channel or the Atlantic Ocean. Nevertheless, it is common ground among all parties that the situation has deteriorated

The best chance of avoiding war is, in accord with the other Western democracies, to bring matters to a head with the Soviet Government and to arrive at a lasting settlement. . . .

WHAT IS THE BEVIN PLAN ?

Reproduced from The Economist, London, issue of January 31, 1948, by permission of the editor.

The . . . days that have passed since the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons have brought many second thoughts about western union. But they will not remove the first impression of boldness, hope and determination which was made by Mr. Bevin's speech. He set the faltering pulse of western Europe beating more strongly; he scattered a cloud of doubts and hesitations about British policy; and he demonstrated to the world that he has at last, after long waiting, rallied opinion in Parliament and in the country behind him. He recognised that Russia would not co-operate in the recovery of Europe on any but its own terms, and faced the fact that Britain can no longer control from outside the balance of power in Europe, so heavily tipped by the presence of the Russian army on the Elbe. The conclusion he drew was -- in present and immediately predictable circumstances -- the only possible one: that the nations of the west must work out a common economic, diplomatic and defensive policy. With this decision Mr. Bevin has headed British foreign policy in a new direction.

Where exactly does this new direction point? First of all, an important distinction has to be drawn. Economic, diplomatic and defensive collaboration of the western governments, carefully planned and vigorously carried out, will help to ensure the security and recov-

ery of western Europe in the next five years, and it might reduce the number of ineffective neutrals among the smaller Powers. This is the short-term policy. But western union, in the full sense of the term, is a long-range project, largely irrelevant to the needs of the present save in the dynamic appeal it can make to constructive and energetic minds in the west. It implies political and economic arrangements of a most ambitious and complicated kind: customs union, joint production plans, organs of consultation and authority, common defence forces, joint development of dependent territories and, almost certainly, a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and western Europe. That is the long-term policy.

With the best will in the world, little can come of such projects in less than a decade; and for the next five years western Europe should have its hands full with the execution of the Marshall Plan and the organisation of its security. But the thinking and the movement in those directions can be begun, and the short-term arrangements can be made, with the long-term objective in view. . . . co-operation of the sixteen governments in the Marshall Plan should be used to test the principles and machinery with which economic union of the west might be achieved; and any military agreements should be framed in the spirit of the provisions laid down in the Charter of the United Nations for regional security organisations. . . .

Obviously, . . . differences . . . must distinguish a western union from the eastern bloc. . . . To achieve anything like western union in reasonable form and time will demand from the British and other governments creative energy and planning skill of the kind which defeated Germany. The effort will have to be made against a background of international tension, active Communist opposition and low standards of living.

For the immediate future, the task of the British Government is, clearly, to formulate and declare the priorities which this new stage of foreign policy will demand. They are not difficult to list: preparation for executing the European Recovery Plan . . . ; the closest political and economic collaboration with France, on a basis that will assist moderate government there; practical proposals for the association of western Germany with the European Recovery Programme; full consultation with the Dominions on the implications of this new direction in British policy; exhaustive study with them, and with the western governments, of the possibilities of eventual customs union, and of its effects on Commonwealth ideas of preference and economic collaboration.

. . . Mr. Bevin has, rightly, refused -- and this should be noted in the United States -- to accept the "either-or" of western union or Commonwealth association. He believes that the systems could be

made to interlock; but how to do so is far from clear. This is not the only question raised by the proposal for customs union -- as the Benelux governments have discovered in five years of negotiation. Some way has to be found of reconciling the nineteenth-century technique of customs union with such innovations as government planning of full employment, bulk buying, and intervention to defend standards of living -- policies which are far from uniform in the countries likely to be interested in western union. If these problems are not tackled, as they have been by France and Italy, the whole project of a customs union is likely to be still-born.

It is still difficult to foresee exactly what openings for close co-operation and integration the execution of the Marshall programme may offer. But there is everything to be said for setting up now in western Europe an executive agency, capable of seizing and developing opportunities as they occur. ...

Mr. Bevin has a great gift for expressing -- in homespun and sometimes stumbling phrases -- the mood and hope of ordinary men and women in Europe. After six years of war and two years of "phoney peace," their desire for stability and friendliness is very strong -- strong enough, indeed, to resist the bitterness and guile of the Communist "cold war" if an objective can be offered them worth working for. For this reason, and because the announcement that the basis of British postwar policy had collapsed could not be made in cold blood -- Mr. Bevin was right to speak in warm and visionary terms. ...

**FIVE POWER TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION**
Signed at Brussels, March 17, 1948

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Belgium, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas,

Resolved:

To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations;

To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;

To strengthen, with those aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united;

To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;

To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;

To take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression;

To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defense, they have appointed . . . plenipotentiaries: . . .

Who, having exhibited their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the high contracting parties will so organize and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, co-ordination of production and development of commercial exchanges.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the consultative council referred to in Article VII as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of or prejudice to the work of other economic organizations in which the high contracting parties are or may be represented, but shall on the contrary, assist the work of those organizations.

Article II

The high contracting parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialized agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries. The high contracting parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible application of recommendations of immediate practical interest relating to social matters adopted with their approval in the specialized agencies. They will endeavor to conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security.

Article III

The high contracting parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples toward a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

Article IV

If any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all military and other aid and assistance in their power.

Article V

All measures taken as a result of the preceding article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the high contracting parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article VI

The high contracting parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other high contracting party or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of the present treaty. None of the high contracting parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the high contracting parties.

Article VII

For the purpose of consulting together on all the questions dealt with in the present treaty, the high contracting parties will create a Consultative Council which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit. At the request of any of the high contracting parties, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit the high contracting parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy; or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability.

Article VIII

In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the high contracting parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions:

The high contracting parties will, while the present treaty remains in force, settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice by referring them to the Court, subject only in the case of each of them to any reservation already made by that party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that party may maintain the reservation.

In addition, the high contracting parties will submit to conciliation all disputes outside the scope of Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation is appropriate and other questions for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any party to the dispute shall have the right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation.

The preceding provisions of this Article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions or agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement.

Article IX

The high contracting parties may, by agreement, invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited. Any state so invited may become a party to the treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the Belgian Government. The Belgian Government will inform each of the high contracting parties of the deposit of each instrument of accession.

Article X

The present treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government. It shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for 50 years.

After the expiry of the period of 50 years, each of the high contracting parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government shall inform the governments of the other high contracting parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each notice of denunciation.

In witness whereof the above mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Brussels this 17th day of March, 1948, in English and French, each text being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other signatories.

For Belgium: SPAAK.

For France: BIDAULT.

For Luxembourg: BECH.

For the Netherlands: VAN BOETZELAER.

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland: BEVIN.

Editor's Note

According to the Chronology of International Events and Documents, Volume IV, No. 6, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Mr. Bevin remarked after the signing ceremony:

"This treaty has been designed to bring together good neighbours, maintain good relations, and proceed with an organism which is bound to benefit not only ourselves, is not even limited to Europe, but will be of great advantage to all the world. The treaty is not an end, it is just the beginning."

M. Bidault declared: "On the road from Paris to Brussels there is scarcely a town or village after which a battle has not been named. This drama has lasted too long. We are here to put an end to it. The five of us, to begin with, will defend peace and security."

M. Spaak stated: "The democratic Europe which we want to defend and organize is not limited to our five countries and, therefore, we have foreseen that others may one day rally to us to reinforce our task. United already with the Netherlands and Luxembourg by links which are becoming closer, Belgium gratefully accepts the aid which France and Britain are bringing to us."

Baron van Boetzelaer noted that Holland had always regarded neutrality as the main line of her foreign policy and this policy had contributed to a disequilibrium among the European Great Powers. "The pact of the Union of Western Europe which we sign today definitely puts an end to the possibility of our remaining neutral in the event of one of the five signatories being the victim of aggression in Europe."

CHAPTER IV

GREAT POWER RELATIONS

The conditions of world politics today are in various respects unique. In the past there have usually been four, five or six first-class powers operating simultaneously in international relations. At present there are only two. Never has the actual and potential power of the principal states been so immense. Nor has the gap between the greatest and the leading secondary states been more profound. And seldom has the difference in political ideology between the two most influential states been as absolute as that which underlies the national policies of the United States and the Soviet Union today. These facts create an unusual and dangerous situation. In the absence of other decisive power in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, and because of the world-wide interest which they have taken in matters relating to peace and security since the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union meet in direct contact on virtually every question of contemporary world politics. Because each has come to conceive of the other as its principal potential foe, mutual cooperation becomes increasingly difficult. Every important issue which arises, whether within the United Nations or outside, is viewed as a test of position and of strength. Watching with mounting apprehension the alleged political, economic and military designs of one another, each has begun to look to tokens of military strength to further what it considers to be its national interest. Even United Nations' deliberations have been conducted on the level of political skirmishes accompanied with talk employing the language of warfare.

Present great power relations are fraught with consequences of gravest import. For this reason it is important that every student of international affairs devote careful attention not only to the moves that are made by each power in the near future, but even more to the underlying objectives, attitudes and methods of the two great powers. The readings which follow have been selected because of the contribution which they severally make to understanding these factors.

For general readings see W. T. R. Fox, The Super Powers; V. M. Dean, The United States and Russia; W. Lippmann, The Cold War; W. T. R. Fox, United States Policy in a Two-Power World (Memorandum No. 24, Yale Institute of International Studies); H. Baldwin, The Price of Power; B. Brodie, "How Strong is Britain?", Foreign Affairs, April 1948, pp. 432-450; Current Readings on International Relations, No. 2, Chapter IX.

AMERICA AND RUSSIA - DANGERS AND HOPES

By Brooks Atkinson

Reproduced from The New York Times Magazine, June 1, 1947, by permission of the editor of the Sunday Department and the author. Mr. Atkinson is a New York Times correspondent who was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for his series of articles on Russia. Here he explores some of the leading factors conducive to peace and to hostility in American-Soviet relations, and suggests that the success with which the United States resolves its economic and social problems may do much to determine the future appeal of communism.

Between the United States and Soviet Russia political relations are obviously serious and possibly grave. But despite the bitterness apparent on every level, they are not dangerous now. Although the pure logic of our relations has pointed toward war for at least two years, war is impossible now and by no means inevitable eventually.

We are going through a period of armed truce. Strict Marxians believe that communism and capitalism will have to fight a war eventually, and thousands of non-doctrinaire Americans, with a shrug of their shoulders, have for years expressed the same opinion. But Soviet and American political interests have not clashed yet and need never clash if the Soviets remain within the orbit we formerly acknowledged eighteen months ago as their legitimate sphere of influence -- that is, along their own borders.

Whether or not our relations descend from grave to dangerous depends upon the experience both have in trying to maintain the peace over the next five years, upon the stability of France, the control of Germany's recovery by all the Allies and, most of all, upon the strength of democratic life inside the United States.

At present neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is prepared to fight a major war against a powerful opponent, or, specifically, against the other. In view of the present condition of the Soviet Union, Russia unaided could not fight an aggressive war against a modern army for three reasons.

First, socialism in Russia has not yet succeeded in bringing a backward country so far forward. ...

Second, the destruction by the invading Nazi armies was calamitous. ...

Third, Russia has been suffering for several months from a serious shortage of food. ...

There is another factor -- less tangible but real -- that weighs against war. The Russian people love peace as passionately as any in the world. Having suffered deeply during the war they sacrificed so much to win, they would be dejected by the prospect of another war against a country which, there is reason to believe, they are inclined to like. Just as Americans believe that the Soviet people, taken apart from their tyrannical Government, are a good people at heart, so Soviet people think that Americans are good people at heart, but misguided by vicious and imperialistic capitalists bent on destroying the Soviet Union.

At the moment the Soviet Government, which is congenitally nervous and suspicious, is taking all measures short of war to secure itself against aggression and promote its influence. Ultimately it expects to be the inspiration and source of power for the world. It expects capitalism to collapse; and the economic and political paralysis of Western Europe and the poverty of England seem to the Russians to confirm the Marxian doctrines. Despite the truculence and delusions of the Soviet Government, the Russian people are not aggressive; and if there is anything they do not want, it is another major war piled on top of the misery and suffering they are still going through.

Nor is the attitude of the United States warlike. In respect to food and productive plant, we are in the strongest position of any country in the world. But the people of America do not want a war, never did and never will. The rapidity with which we have permitted our military strength to disintegrate is the true measure of our peaceful intentions. No one who knows anything about warfare can talk complacently about going to war in cold blood, as though all that were needed would be the mechanical process of dropping a few atomic bombs.

Furthermore, it is doubtful that so large and loosely organized a country as Russia could be conquered in that mechanical fashion. With our tight economic and cultural system, which exists by infinite interdependence, America would be more vulnerable to atomic warfare; and since an atomic bomb attack would be not a remote Pearl Harbor but a surprise attack at the heart of our country, we would lose the element of time that in the past has made it possible to prepare defenses.

Since no other country has a stock-pile of these terrible weapons an attack on the United States is not possible now. But an attack by the United States is possible in fact; that is, we have the weapons. But it could scarcely succeed on the easy terms many people envision. What is certain is that the deliberate use of atom bombs on a recent ally would, in the first place, leave the vast majority of the Russian people unharmed, build up undying hatred and resistance in the hearts of a patriotic people and also in sympathetic people in other countries;

and, in the third place, it would negate before the world every spiritual value we maintain that we stand for.

Some people talk very big in this country -- as big as the bellwethers of the Russian Communist party. But the facts of our current military position hardly bear out the belligerence of our idle conversation. For America's distaste for military service amounts to a passion. ... America's enthusiasm for leaving a war is like the enthusiasm of students for the end of the school year -- joyful and disorderly. As an American general once bitterly declared, we have only two speeds -- five miles an hour and a hundred miles an hour.

...

For the next five years, and probably longer, war is not an immediate danger. Continued association within the United Nations may avert war indefinitely. Unless the Soviets withdraw from the only world organization, both of us will have a wholesome opportunity to test each other's strength and sincerity, and we may also find out whether their political and economic system or ours is going to meet the needs of the world or whether various systems, like the American, the Russian, the English, the Swedish and others can coexist. Meager as the accomplishments of the U. N. have been, the American and Soviet statesmen have continued to meet in public there to discuss vital problems and have dealt with each other on more subjects than before or during the war.

Since the stakes are higher, it is difficult to understand why the Soviets so recklessly endanger the security of the U. N. by sabotaging so much of its vital business. The stakes are the peace of the world. The awful menace that hangs over the world, despite basic good intentions, is the atomic bomb. We have proposed to turn the bomb over to international control But the Soviet Union has specifically blocked the plan for international control of atomic energy. . . .

Apart from the bomb, the Soviet Union has blocked most of the activities of the U. N. by a paralyzing use of the veto and by boycotting most of the U. N.'s subordinate activities, on which the world is counting for progress and security. The Soviet delegation does not participate in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UNESCO, the International Labor Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization, relief, Civil Aeronautical Organizations, and the International Trade Organization. Nothing could go much further toward the effective creation of two hostile worlds than the negative attitude of the Soviet Union toward the U. N.

Curiously enough, this does not correspond to the attitude of the Government toward the U. N. in Russian internal propaganda. For the U. N. has been systematically described to the Russian people as a world organization that grew logically out of the war collaboration

of the Big Three, which was very popular in Russia. To the Russian people the U. N. has been portrayed as a progressive step toward world peace.

...

The current violent attacks on the integrity of the United States might be construed as deliberate action by the Government in that direction, although violent talk is normal in the Russian press. Master of propaganda, the Government controls public opinion and it can persuade the people that the United States, in both the U. N. and the Foreign Ministers Council, is threatening the security of the Soviet Union and plotting world hegemony by sinister means. Since the Russians have a passionate love of their own country, at least equivalent to our love for America, that propaganda line would appeal to a vital national emotion, help to unify the people and strengthen their resistance. In short, the Soviet Government could quickly reverse itself about the U. N. with at least a large measure of public opinion at home.

As long as the Soviet delegation remains in the U. N. the hope for world peace also remains and there is still a margin of time in which some of the world's worst crises can be solved. But there is reason to believe that the Soviet Government never really shared America's buoyant enthusiasm for the U. N. as outlined at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco. Although the U. N. makes a good speaker's platform from which the Soviet Government can address the world, the Soviet Government cannot accomplish much else against such consistent opposition. For neither its ideas nor its attitudes are popular. Although the Soviets like to have friends abroad they have lost friends as a result of their slow, artful and unyielding procedures. There are circumstances in which the Soviet Government might consider further participation in the U. N. a political liability.

Part of the trouble in the U. N. derives from the nature of the Soviet Government. It is not organized for collaboration by means of conferences, meetings, negotiations and agreements. By nature it is a dictatorship. In its working technique it is a conspiracy, for it has never recovered from the conspiratorial methods it used to win the revolution.

Under the doctrine that the end justifies the means, the technique of conspiracy has a certain moral value to the Soviet leaders and their adherents, for it has generally succeeded. It has put the Bolsheviks in power; it retains control of the Soviet Union and ultimately it expects to dominate the world by Marxian logic pushed along by political action.

...

No one except the leaders of the Communist party knows the extent of Soviet planning for the world revolution. Although the Comintern was publicly disbanded in 1943, the foreign Communist parties

continue as before with propaganda and conspiracy. As in the case of conspiracies in general, there is little concrete evidence to go on, and the public statements of the leaders are designed for tactical effectiveness rather than foreign enlightenment. It does not really change the situation when Stalin makes a benevolent speech or Molotov makes a fighting one, for the methods and objectives of doctrinaire Communists are always the same.

Whatever the source of the conspiratorial technique may be, the organization of the Soviet dictatorship is not by nature geared to collaborate with the rest of the world. Concerned with the development of power and the control of outside states, it cannot comfortably participate in a U. N. which is based on the self-determination of people and designed to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Nothing in the spirit of Russian communism accepts the principle of the political and intellectual freedom of the human mind. In the circumstances, it is highly probable that our relations will for a long time continue to be much as they are now -- unpleasant, strained, rancorous, bitter, sullen, resentful. There is no general solution that we can afford to make. For we cannot compromise on freedom and the rights of man. We cannot abandon our national convictions.

Since our differences cannot be reconciled in the reckonable future, we have to look to ourselves for security. If the members of the Politburo are right when they say that Russia's strength is her only security, the same applies to us, for our situation in respect to them is the same as theirs in respect to us. During this period of an armed truce, which may lead either to war or world peace, we must be certain that we do not fail at home. For the peace of the world depends less on the truculence and force of the Soviet Government than on our ability here to fulfill the promises of democracy -- which are freedom for individuals, individual opportunity and a progressively high standard of living.

...

The Marxists expect us to fail. They consider our freedoms as pure matters of form, like voting for candidates selected by political machines. ...

... By dogmatically shutting their eyes to the wholesome aspects of American life they find abundant evidence in our current affairs to bear out the scientific prophecy of a capitalistic catastrophe in America. That may be one reason why they are not in a hurry to make peace with Austria, Germany and Korea. They think that our bargaining influence will dwindle as our economy goes to pieces

What happens here now has world significance. The lack of stability in our society strengthens the hands of parties and groups

that are hoping to capitalize on our failure. . . . our economic system has not been in sound condition for twenty years. The recovery from the long depression was based on the abnormality of war production. We spend considerable time in smug praise of a system that is still shaky.

Since capitalism has given America its material abundance, no appreciable part of the American population wants to see the system changed. But we are entering a world era that is more or less socialistic. Although we are the world's greatest source of food and goods, we will have to trade with countries that must trade on a national basis. In other words, we are moving into a world influenced by planned economies -- which, incidentally, derive from a Soviet Russian idea.

. . . our limited forms of planned economy include TVA, the other big dams, the soil conservation program, the conservation of forests, and social security legislation; and the controls on the "free enterprise" system include such deep-seated devices as the Federal Reserve Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Securities and Exchange regulations. Since the trend of the world is toward rather than away from planned economy it is likely that the capitalism of America will have to conform.

. . .

What our position in the world requires is an economy of abundance -- the peacetime equivalent for our wartime achievement. Since private industry has developed the enterprise and the techniques that have always given our economy its impetus, it would be ideal if private industry and labor could voluntarily provide the planning that would make the most efficient use of our resources and plant and distribute the profits in the form of a constantly rising standard of living and a constantly widening field of individual opportunity.

But if private industry and labor cannot make our system work efficiently, the people will have to provide the planning through the national government, which might be the road to collectivization -- something that Americans apparently do not want. For planned economies by Government order are dangerous and may lead to totalitarianism which substitutes force for the democracy and enterprise that we are trying to preserve. No one is forgetting that the success the Russians have had with a planned economy has been at the expense of freedom, and the Labor party in England has not yet demonstrated that it can plan economy and preserve English liberties simultaneously.

By virtue of many circumstances we have the margin of a few years to develop a democracy, which has already had a long record of achievement, into a democracy that promotes human happiness by widening individual opportunities and deepening individual securities. In the current crisis the contest is not between capitalism and socialism

or communism. The economy is not the point at issue. What we cannot tolerate is a world dominated by a tyranny that murders dissenters, deals with human beings in the mass rather than as individuals, ruthlessly moves large masses of people around from one place to another, dumps them into concentration camps and remains impervious to human misery.

But we cannot resist it with angry words and hatred. Confronted with a myriad of political choices, we have to keep in mind the human being who stands in the middle everywhere -- the unwitting victim of power politics from both sides in the United States as well as in Greece, Turkey, China and other countries. In view of the bold statements of our credo in the Atlantic Charter, the burden of the proof is on us. To increase food and industrial production, to achieve national stability, to raise the standard of living, to enrich the spirit of man by general freedom -- those are our assets. If we use them wisely we can prevent another world war.

THE TWO GIANTS

By Sir Harold Butler

Reproduced from *The Fortnightly*, December 1947, by permission of the Editor. The virtual disappearance of the great powers of a generation ago and the rise of two new world powers in their stead comprise two of the most significant facts in the twentieth century. Some of the deeper underlying causes for the latent hostility between Russia and the United States are considered in the following article by Mr. Butler, an experienced British diplomat and author of *The Lost Peace*.

That bygone world which some of us knew at the beginning of the century has vanished completely. In its place another world has come to birth, whose political structure, economic organization and social values are so totally different that a comfortable Victorian who went to his grave in 1900 would be sorely perplexed to adjust himself to our present outlook, were he accorded the doubtful privilege of reincarnation. In his day there were four "great powers", all of them European, in whose hands the destinies of the world reposed. There was Britain with its fabulous wealth and its immense Empire, still effectively centralized and directed in London; there was France, culturally supreme and despite the rankling memories of 1870 still wearing the military halo of its Napoleonic and Bourbon glories; there was the Austro-Hungarian Empire stretching from the Adriatic almost to the Black Sea, still enjoying some of the prestige of its Holy Roman tradition, though fast decaying of dry rot within. And then there was

the new imperial Germany, pushful and pretentious, too noisy and martial to be ignored.

These were the "powers" in whose orbits the lesser States of Europe and Asia revolved without too much fear for their security. For some purposes Russia might be added, but it hardly belonged to the fraternity. Since the collapse of the Holy Alliance, it had only played an intermittent part in European affairs. It had never really been part of Europe or shared its spiritual heritage. Save for a few thousands of nobles and intellectuals, its people still breathed the air of medieval serfdom and illiteracy. Russian industry was insignificant and the prestige of Russian arms, already dimmed by the Crimean and Turkish wars, was grievously besmirched by the Japanese. Russia could scarcely be called a "great power" in the proper or European sense of the word except by courtesy. Nor indeed could the United States. Though respectable by virtue of its size, its growing wealth and its seventy-six million people, it took but slight interest in the rest of the world and displayed little power or inclination to interfere with the designs of the European magnates. Its military forces were negligible, adequate enough to crush the outlying flotillas and garrisons of Spain in Cuba and the Philippines, but not a serious factor in the logistics of power-politics. Its occasional gestures in favour of the "open door" or "the freedom of the seas" no doubt required humoring, but they were symptoms of commercial rather than political ambitions.

Such was the old world. Though beneath the brilliant surface seeds of disruption were beginning to germinate, western civilization dominated the universe; intellectually, economically, militarily, Europe had no rival under the sun. Its supremacy seemed secure beyond challenge, and yet in less than two generations it had withered and disappeared. As the result of two fratricidal wars the European society of nations was disrupted and brought low. By 1947, so far from directing the destinies of the other continents, it lay broken and exhausted, no longer able to control its own fate. Its four "great powers" had fallen from their high estate. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had vanished from the map. Germany, after two insensate bids for world-domination, had collapsed in rubble and ruin, the victim of her Third Empire dream, as Moeller van den Bruck, one of the Nazi prophets, had foretold. France, bled white in the first war, had crumbled under the impact of the second, and became a prey to the internal strife gnawing at its vitals. The British Empire had gone, and in its place a new commonwealth of nations had arisen, still bound together by old ties and traditions, displaying unsuspected powers of cohesions and common action in war, but unfocussed, no longer speaking with a single voice. India and Burma had claimed the right to order their own affairs Britain itself, drained of its reserves of wealth and manpower by two crippling victories, no longer presided over the world's economic

and financial arrangements, but was fitfully struggling to recover its own stability and solvency.

But as the star of Europe had waned, two new constellations had begun to dominate the firmament. The first war had transferred economic supremacy from Britain to the United States. The second war produced the astonishing spectacle of great American armies sweeping across Italy, France and Germany, and firmly establishing themselves in Vienna and Berlin. From the east came a portent of equal significance. Millions of Russians, Uzbeks, Kazaks, Mongols and other Asiatics rolled over the Polish plain, the Carpathians and the Balkan mountains, until they halted face to face with the American legions in the valleys of the Elbe and the Danube. Europe had witnessed nothing like it since the dissolution of the Roman Empire. In Asia too these two huge powers confronted each other. American fleets and armies had moved irresistibly across the Pacific, had penetrated deeply into China and had overthrown Japan, while the Russians had once more overrun Manchuria and met the outposts of the United States in Korea. At the key-points of the world these two giants stood over against each other. They had raised the conception of power to a new scale of magnitude, no longer a national but a continental scale, demanding the control of immense aggregates of men, machines and materials. They could have no peer, unless the British Commonwealth could discover a new formula of collective action and expression, whether in peace or war. The future of the world, and particularly of Europe, depended upon the relations between these two gigantic protagonists.

That is how matters now stand. These momentous events are so recent that their meaning can hardly yet be fully grasped. We are still wondering at them ... trying to estimate the consequences of the revolution in world-politics which is unfolding before our eyes.

At first sight the plunge of the United States into the full flood of international affairs seems surprising and contradictory. One remembers what happened in 1919, when the American people recoiled sharply back into isolation, disowning President Wilson, repudiating the League, precipitately withdrawing its troops from the Rhineland, refusing any part in guaranteeing European stability. One remembers how, when war began to loom once more, Congress erected a legislative wall designed to immure the country in an impregnable neutrality, how President Roosevelt's warning against the dictators was scouted as "warmongering", how in 1939 the great mass of public opinion hugged the belief that, whatever happened in Europe, America could keep out. ...

... What then has happened to change the national outlook? Why has the American people, Republicans and Democrats together, now taken a leading part in creating the United Nations, and an ardent

interest in all its proceedings? ... Why is the Administration offering further to help Europe on condition that it will help itself and making repeated efforts to rescue China from economic chaos and civil war?

These are all pertinent questions. The answer given by the Russians and their friends is that Americans have become bellicose and imperialistic overnight, but nations do not change like that. Anyone who wanders about in the drug-stores and motor-camps of America will find the people just as pacifist at heart as they were in the 'twenties or 'thirties. But they have seen and learnt much in the interval. Millions of them have fought all over the globe. They have demonstrated American power not only to the world at large, but most of all to themselves. Now they know that they cannot avoid being the greatest power and that as such they cannot avoid the consequent responsibilities. That has been a chastening reflection. Instead of an outburst of jingo pride in the "American century", the immense achievements of the United States' forces provoked heart-searching and misgiving. The last thing the ordinary man or woman wanted was to give their money and their sons to preserving a Pax Americana in the world. ...

...

The primary aim of any foreign policy is to ensure the national security, and it is that consideration which carries most weight with the people of any country. The United States is no exception. ... When General Marshall with his unique authority had stated that "it no longer appears practical to continue what we once conceived as hemispheric defence as a satisfactory basis for our security; we are now concerned with the peace of the entire world," the average American was prepared to believe him. He hoped for a real peace based upon a thorough understanding with Britain and the U.S.S.R. and fortified by a strong and effective United Nations. But until that hope was realized, he ruefully accepted the obligation to remain in Europe and to promote its economic recovery.

To this cautionary motive was added the missionary zeal for the democratic faith as handed down by the fathers of the Republic. The Atlantic Charter was the expression of the principles for which Americans had fought and on which alone they believed that peace could be securely founded. When those principles were openly flouted and derided by the Russian leaders, not merely on the Moscow radio, but actually from the United Nations platform in New York, when instead of free elections and the spread of personal liberty Americans saw minority parties seizing power by force and maintaining it by judicial murder and police inquisition throughout eastern Europe, the old American hatred of tyranny stiffened their resolution to oppose the expansion of Russian power.

And what of the other giant? The sudden emergence of Russia as a super-power is something of which Lenin can hardly have dreamed.

Less than thirty years ago the new revolutionary regime was digesting the humiliating treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Riga. The country was utterly exhausted by the frightful upheaval through which it had passed. During the two succeeding decades, it underwent other convulsions -- two devastating famines, two political massacres, the violent extinction of peasant proprietorship and the relentless drive for industrialization. On top of these successive crises had come the terrific ordeal of the war. The slaughter and devastation wrought by the Germans in Russia, with a thoroughness and a viciousness of which they alone were capable, was too great to be reducible to any accurate statistics, but its magnitude may be deduced from Mr. Zhdanov's statement that "any modern capitalist state having suffered such damage would have been thrown back decades and would have become a second-class power."

... Nevertheless, the ... [U.S.S.R.] emerged from the conflict with a military prestige and a political power, which no Czar had ever commanded. ...

... No one could doubt that the Russian Empire was more secure than at any time in its history. With the forces of the United States shrinking rapidly under irresistible popular pressure, with the British forces contracting with equal rapidity under the spur of financial inanition and dearth of industrial manpower, there was no possible menace to the Soviet realm. With a vast programme of reconstruction on its hands it was confidently expected to co-operate with the western powers in restoring peace, freedom and stability to Europe, and in buttressing the authority of the United Nations.

These agreeable anticipations have not been realized. Instead the actions and the propaganda of the Russian directorate since Yalta seem to have been designed to create an unending struggle for world-power between west and east. In view of the disparity of their industrial strength, it is improbable that the Soviet leaders contemplate any armed conflict with the United States in the near future, but they may very well hope to win a series of bloodless victories in Asia and in Europe by the subversive tactics, which paid Hitler so well in Austria and the Balkans. The appeal of communism is more potent and better staged than that of fascism. It commanded a great deal of sympathy in eastern Europe, where the peasants and industrial workers had suffered acutely under the dictators and crypto-dictators of the 'thirties. It has an insidious attraction in any country which is in economic distress and political chaos such as the war has bequeathed to so many nations of Europe and Asia. The methods by which such situations can be exploited are scientifically expounded in the Soviet textbooks on the art of revolution, and are enthusiastically applied by disciples fired with the fanaticism of the faith or the lust for personal power.

But the antipathy between the two giants is not just the antagonism between capitalism and communism; it goes much deeper. No

doubt the Russian leaders are profoundly convinced of Lenin's dictum that "it is inconceivable that the Soviet republic should continue for a long period side by side with imperialist states; ultimately one or the other must conquer." But that is not the whole of their difference with the west, or even its most fundamental feature. The United States is cast in the European mould of thought. Its law, culture and social philosophy are derived from European sources. Though they have enriched the content of western civilization and enlarged its horizons, Americans infallibly belong to it. The opposite is true of the Russians. They have passed through none of the crucial experiences which went to form the ethos of the west-Roman administration, Christendom, the Renaissance, the rise of democracy, the industrial revolution. Until 1755 Russia had no university; until 1917 it knew no rule but oriental despotism working through a servile bureaucracy and an arbitrary police. It has known no other rule since. There is no instinct or understanding for freedom as known in the west, and therefore little desire for it. Moreover, there are two atavistic forces which have always offered a powerful opposition to western influences -- the Orthodox Church, the secular enemy of Rome, and the Slav mystique. Both these forces were mobilized during the war. The resurgence of the Slav race and its spectacular triumph over the Teutons after 500 years of defeat gave the Russians a sense of national mission and power comparable to that which had transformed the outlook of the United States.

And so the world lies in the shadow of these two continental powers -- alike conscious of their newly discovered strength, imbued with deep-seated traditions and habits of thought which could not be more radically antipathetic. But each has its characteristic weaknesses. The Russian Empire is still held together by the rigid bonds of a totalitarian dictatorship rather than by the natural cohesion of a well-knit society. It is still industrially and socially backward, still suffering from the economic and spiritual devastation of the war. Its external aggressiveness may well be calculated to conceal those internal stresses. The United States has yet to acquire the constitutional techniques, which will enable it to act with speed and effect without submitting every decision to a popular referendum and protracted congressional debate. Though it has made much headway towards framing a national policy, it has yet to prove its capacity to pursue it consistently in spite of the agitations and caprices, which distract the purposes of any democratic government, but to which American political life is particularly prone. What may be the outcome of the contest between these two super-powers, no one can foretell. Upon them hangs the fate of Europe -- whether it can preserve the freedom of thought and the supremacy of the individual to which it first gave birth, whether its ideals can slowly penetrate the Soviet barriers now being so feverishly cemented against them, or whether they will gradually be crushed out by the juggernaut of the all-powerful state, denying the right of

private lives. These are the issues which find their most absolute expression in the Russian and American ideologies. There may perhaps be some middle way, for which this country and others are obscurely groping, but its discovery would not solve the problem of peace. Neither Russians nor Americans believe that there is any halfway-house between free enterprise and complete state socialism, nor are they attracted by the notion. Through its own dissensions Europe has disqualified itself for leadership. That role, like the continent itself, is now in dispute between the two new giants.

NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS

By James B. Reston

Reproduced from *Harper's Magazine* (copyright, 1947, by Harper and Brothers), August 1947, by permission. The following cogent analysis by a veteran reporter of *The New York Times*, who has observed many important conferences in the past few years, sheds revealing light on some of the major causes of the troubled American-Soviet negotiations.

Negotiating with the Russians is like playing tennis on a court without lines or umpire. If the indefatigable Mr. Molotov hits one into the net (as he often does) and cries "good," there is nothing you can do about it except argue. If you call in the French, the British, and the Chinese, and they all say, sorry, it went into the net, Mr. Molotov is not only adamant but angry. Did we not agree, he says, on "the rule of unanimity"? If he is in a bad mood, or if the Politburo feels that they need the point badly, Mr. Molotov will veto the others; if not, Mr. Molotov will "compromise": he will agree to play the point over.

This does not remove the need to negotiate some kind of live-and-let-live agreement with the Moscow government, but it complicates the process. The European Advisory Commission, which was established long before the end of the war to co-ordinate the postwar policies of the Big Three, met over 500 times and accomplished virtually nothing. The Council of Foreign Ministers, established at Potsdam in 1945, held 122 meetings over fifteen months before it reached the basis for agreement on the minor European peace treaties, and some of the most important aspects of these, such as the future of the Italian colonies and the governorship of Trieste had to be set aside and are still unsettled. And, of course, the Japanese peace has not been tackled and six weeks of negotiation at Moscow on the German and Austrian treaties last March and April ended in stalemate.

The reasons for this are that we and the Russians start with different objectives and mentalities, are suspicious of the objectives of each other, and adopt totally different methods of negotiation. It is not, by any means, as some people say, a question of semantics alone (one wishes it were); it is not merely that we define "democracy" and "freedom" and "liberty" in different ways, but that each is determined to get a world in which his ideas of the individual and the state will prevail. It is not only that we negotiate in different ways, but that the entire role assigned to negotiation and diplomacy is more limited in Soviet strategy than in ours. (We think we can settle most things with talk and dollars; they use more diverse weapons; they are more effective in attaining their ends by political organization, infiltration, and bribery than diplomacy.) "The difference between us," former Secretary of State Byrnes told Molotov toward the end of the Paris peace conference in 1946, "is that we start with the facts and try, however falteringly and even selfishly, to reach true and fair conclusions, while you start with the conclusions you want and try to select and twist the facts to your own ends."

There is a good deal in this, but it is not alone that they select and twist the facts to suit themselves. The trouble in trying to define their methods is that their actions are so contradictory. They were willing to break up the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London on the legal technicality that the Potsdam Declaration did not state that France should be represented in the council. One was impressed after that conference with the legalistic quality of their minds. But several months later, when the second meeting of the Council was held in Paris and they wanted to impress the French electorate with their friendliness to France, they insisted that France should participate in the discussions.

On the issue of conceding U.S. trusteeship over the Pacific islands, they opposed any discussion of the question for months, arguing that the whole thing should be left over until the Japanese peace conference; but just before the German and Austrian talks started in Moscow last March -- where they wanted to argue that those who had contributed most to the military victory should get special concessions in the peace treaties -- they switched their line completely and led the fight for our getting the islands on our own terms. As one diplomat put it recently: "You can't define their mentality; you can only report specific illustrations of how it works, and let the reader judge; they balance the books every day."

The most obvious fact about their negotiators is that they are held on a very tight rein by the Politburo. They do not attempt to conceal this. During the Greek border investigation last spring, Mark Ethridge, the U. S. delegate on the United Nations' commission, asked A. A. Lavrishev, the Soviet delegate, to look over a U. S. proposal.

The Russian agreed. He read it and said it looked all right to him but added that, of course, he would have to send it to Moscow. Forty-eight hours later he came back to Mr. Ethridge and said: "I oppose every word of this. In fact I oppose it twice as violently as I ever thought I could."

The tight rein applies not only to junior officials like Lavrishev but to Molotov as well. ...

... Soviet negotiators never agree to anything the first time it is discussed. When in doubt, their answer is "nyet!" As a result, our negotiators have adopted the tedious procedure of running over the agenda as quickly as possible so that the Russians can demonstrate to the Politburo that they are in the proper disagreeable frame of mind. When that demonstration has been made, we can then begin to think about negotiation.

Unlike the British and ourselves, who find it useful and illuminating to discuss the question at issue informally and without commitments, they do not like to "explore" topics outside the council chamber. Occasionally, at critical points in the negotiations, they will discuss the crisis on the side, but in general they look on the habit of informal discussion before the conference opens as an Anglo-Saxon trick designed to outmaneuver them in the formal negotiations.

II

In the formal meetings, either at the Council of Foreign Ministers or in the United Nations, they are tireless. ... When he had finished with four or five hours of tense debate in the Waldorf Towers, former Secretary of State Byrnes was usually exhausted -- but not the Soviet team. They shuttled back and forth between the meetings of the Council and the various sessions of the UN at Lake Success and Flushing and (unless it suited their tactics at the moment) were usually prepared to keep the discussions going long after everybody else was ready to quit.

... Negotiators who are working under rigid instructions do not tire as quickly as men who are given broad powers of discretion. The former can merely repeat their instructions over and over; the latter have authority to use discretion and must take responsibility for the concessions they propose. This imposes on the negotiators of the Western Powers much more responsibility and a great deal more tension.

This raises another interesting comparison between the negotiators of the East and West. In his book on the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Harold Nicolson commented on the perils of weariness and friendliness in diplomatic negotiation. On the one hand, he noted that the negotiators then were tired from the great war and that their ordeals of exhaustion at the council table encouraged an aptitude for the

superficial rather than for the essential, for the expedient in preference to the awkward, and for the improvised as an escape from the carefully studied conclusion.

Also, he observed that one of the most persistent disadvantages of all diplomacy by conference was the human difficulty of remaining disagreeable to the same set of people for many days at a stretch. Thus, he concluded, many false decisions and misunderstandings grew out of hasty agreements which were, in turn, the result of weariness, and of such pleasant human qualities as shyness, consideration for others, affability, and ordinary good manners.

The observation is relevant now because it provides so many interesting parallels and contrasts with the negotiations after this war. Franklin Roosevelt was a friendly man. He had great confidence in his ability -- as he often said to Harry Hopkins -- to "deal with Stalin." But these very qualities of weariness and friendliness sometimes led the late President into the very imprecisions, improvisations, and impetuous judgments against which Nicolson had warned.

Late in the Yalta Conference, Marshal Stalin mentioned that he wished to raise, in connection with the organization of the new United Nations security organization, the special position of some of the Soviet states. Mr. Roosevelt was ready for this one.

He had heard rumors that Stalin might wish to give all the Soviet Republics a seat in the future council of nations. This rumor had been discussed by Mr. Roosevelt with some of his aides and they had all agreed that the entrance of these states into an association of sovereign nations would not only establish a Soviet voting bloc, but would enable the Soviet Union to manipulate the rules of the organization to suit itself.

When Stalin raised the question, therefore, Roosevelt immediately tried to head him off. He said that he hoped Marshal Stalin would not ask for separate representation, for if he did, the United States would feel obliged to ask for separate seats for all forty-eight states of the American federal union.

Stalin listened to the interpretation of this remark and then did something Roosevelt had never seen him do before. He rose from the table in obvious displeasure, walked all the way round it, came back to his seat and said, in effect, to Roosevelt:

"You think that you in the West are the only ones who have internal difficulties. I assure you this is not true. I have serious difficulties in several of my own states, particularly those that have suffered grievously in the war. I am not asking for separate representation for all the Soviet Republics, but only for Byelo-Russia and the Ukraine."

The sympathetic nature of Roosevelt was touched by this admission; the politician in Roosevelt was moved. Here was the very symbol of authoritarian power admitting that all wasn't jake at home and that he had to find some way of doing with several of his states what Roosevelt had had to do so often with some of the American states: devise some way of appeasing them.

Well, said Roosevelt, that was different. He didn't realize Stalin had a problem like that, and since he did, he (Roosevelt) would instruct the American delegation at San Francisco to support the acceptance of the Ukraine and Byelo-Russia into the UN. The point is, unfortunately, that while what Stalin said was interesting, it did not really alter the essential point of principle: that the UN was an association of independent states, and the Ukraine and Byelo-Russia were no more independent in the formation of foreign policy than New York and Texas. But the President let it go out of friendliness; and though Churchill demurred slightly, he too passed it by because it was difficult to oppose Roosevelt and Stalin.

As a result of this casual act, the United States had to go to San Francisco and make a deal with the Latin American states to bring Argentina into the UN so that we could make good our promise about Byelo-Russia and the Ukraine. And today we see the consequences: under the terms of the UN charter, the USSR is deprived of the right to vote or veto in the early stages of a dispute to which it is a party. But all it has to do to evade this is to have the Ukraine start the dispute. Then the USSR can retain its right of vote and veto on the fantastic assumption that the USSR and the Ukraine are entirely sovereign and independent of each other.

... Mr. Byrnes ... found [at the London Council of Foreign Ministers] ... that friendliness did not beget friendliness and compromise did not beget compromise

... Soviet negotiators are not personally disagreeable. During negotiations, they do not hesitate to use any tactic, including the provocative personal attack, to gain their ends or even simply to make a point. As soon as the session ends, however, they are generally courteous and even affable. ... A session may end ... in the most bitter harangue, and ... Molotov and Vishinsky will treat the whole thing as a day's work done and immediately drop the manner assumed before adjournment.

The Russian ideas on compromise and interpretation of agreements ... are vastly different from our own. In the UN Commission on Conventional Armaments, the United States put forward a proposal on the procedure to be followed in the discussions. Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet delegate, countered with a different plan of procedure. After studying his suggestions, the United States delegation thought it saw a

way in which the two proposals could be co-ordinated, so our representative later introduced a compromise, combining the two plans. Mr. Gromyko's reaction to this was not that we were trying to meet him half-way in the interest of understanding. He remarked that our compromise merely proved that we must not have had much confidence in our original proposal, and therefore, he concluded, since the Soviet delegation did have confidence in theirs, why shouldn't it be accepted?

Even when the representatives of the West meet almost all the points in a Soviet argument, the Moscow negotiators sometimes do not go along with the final proposition. When Syria and Lebanon appealed to the UN to get British and French troops out of their territory, Vishinsky took up their argument and led the fight on their behalf. One by one, the British and French met every major demand. Finally the Syrians and Lebanese accepted the concessions and agreed to an American resolution which contained them, but in the end Vishinsky vetoed the resolution because it was not worded precisely as he wanted it.

...

The Soviet Union has, of course, accepted many compromises in the postwar negotiations. The charter of the United Nations, and the texts of the satellite peace treaties abound in them, but the actions of the Soviet Union in many cases suggest that, to them, compromise is not a terminal adjustment of differences but a half-way station to their original goal.

The best illustration is the case of Trieste. ... We proposed ... the compromise of internationalizing the city. The Soviet Union accepted the compromise. As soon as it was accepted, we operated on the principle of compromise; we gave up trying to get the city for Italy, but the Russians defined the compromise not as an end but as a means to their original end. For additional months thereafter, they sought to twist the rules of the compromise in such a way that Yugoslavia would have the control of the city, if not the actual sovereignty over it. ...

...

Stalin and Churchill had a specific agreement that Greece was to be left in the British sphere of influence, but not only did the Soviet Union concentrate the weight of its propaganda against the British there after the agreement, but U. S. official information shows a direct chain of command from Moscow to Yugoslavia to the direction, by a Yugoslav general, of the guerilla bands in Greece.

Even the specific letter of agreements among the major allies has been openly violated. The most famous case is the ... Potsdam agreement

The effect of this sort of thing has been disastrous. For the negotiators of the United States, the first reaction was one of dismay. When they observed the same tactics applied, not only to issues in-

volving Eastern Europe but to issues in the UN -- like the veto, the creation of the security organization's military force, and so on -- dismay gradually developed into opposition, and finally into a kind of resentment and frustration.

The sense that compromise is not a settlement but a way-station; that diplomacy is not only a means of settling issues but a device for preventing settlement so that other agencies of the Soviet Union can attain national ends; and that even clearly-stated written agreements can be violated with cynical contempt -- these have developed an attitude of mind in which effective negotiation is extremely difficult. The lack of agreement on basic things like the control and development of atomic energy, Germany, Austria and Japan is bad enough; what is worse is the growing sense in Washington that even if all these questions were wiped off the agenda tomorrow on our terms, the agreements would mean very little. The circle of suspicion is now complete.

III

What is the explanation of these disturbing incidents? What is the strategy behind the Soviet tactics? And what, if anything, can we do about it?

To explain the foreign policy of any country, it is usually necessary to look at its philosophy and tactics at home. If we do this with the Soviet Union and ourselves, the explanation of differences over the council table is more apparent.

To begin with, the United States and the USSR differ on the very nature and purpose of intergovernmental negotiations. The process of negotiation lies at the very heart of our national lives in this country. We negotiate with each other on almost everything: workers negotiate with their employers; employers negotiate with each other; industries negotiate with agencies of the government; the legislature negotiates with the executive; ... etc., etc.

In these negotiations, the combative and acquisitive habits of man being what they are, each side tries to achieve what is best for himself, but that instinct is usually qualified by this principle: that both sides must be reasonably satisfied with the final agreement if there is to be a continuing and satisfactory relationship between the parties concerned. For all the harsh words spoken between Walter Reuther of the United Automobile Workers and C. E. Wilson of the General Motors Corporation in their collective bargaining discussions, both sides accept this principle and the principle induces compromise.

Russian traditions and Russian life, however, are different. For all the propaganda out of Moscow about the "town meetings" of the peasants, and votes of the people, life in the Soviet Union does not mesh through the lubricating devices of negotiation. In the Politburo

itself, there is undoubtedly an active exchange of ideas, but for the rest, the workers, the peasants, the managers, and even the artists are told by the state what to do. Even Molotov does not "negotiate" with Stalin.

In short, the principle that lies at the heart of what we, in self-government countries, call "negotiation" does not predominate in the Soviet Union: the Russians do not come to the council table with the idea that it is in everybody's interest for the other parties to be satisfied with the compromise too.

They appear to have started the postwar negotiations with their allies, not in a mood of compromise, but on the assumption that the experience of the war had changed nothing; that this was the same old United States and Britain which had opposed their revolution at the end of the first world war and sent expeditionary forces into the new Soviet Union to bring them down; that we were really out to encircle them and that Stalin's analysis of the situation (in The Problems of Leninism) was right: "The world," wrote Stalin, quoting Lenin, "has been severed into two camps, the imperialist camp and the anti-imperialist camp. . . . We are living, not merely in one state but in a system of states; and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist interminably side by side with the imperialist states. Ultimately, one or another must conquer. . . ."

From time to time, Stalin has expressed the view that the two systems could live peacefully together, but the attitude of his negotiators from the start of the peace negotiations was one of extreme suspicion. They appeared from the end of the war to accept the melancholy assumption that we were really out to create an anti-Soviet bloc for the purpose of destroying them; they seem to have based their diplomacy on that premise, and that was undoubtedly one of the greatest diplomatic blunders of our time.

It is not difficult to see how the blunder was made. We did intervene in their affairs after the first world war; we did send our troops into their country; we did try to bring them down; we did outlaw them and ridicule them and refuse to recognize them for a generation; and the men we ridiculed and vilified for nearly twenty years (this rabble from the gutters and ghettos of Eastern Europe, Churchill called them), these men who lived like hunted animals in their formative years and were forced to govern against a hostile world after they took power -- these men (who had naturally developed a conspiratorial mentality in the process) were precisely the same men who were now negotiating for Russia in the settlement of a second world war (which they did so much to win).

Though the blunder, therefore, is easy to explain, it is nonetheless real. For the central fact is that while the leaders of the Soviet

Union were the same, the United States and Great Britain were not the same, as they assumed. It is, of course, a matter not of fact but of opinion, but can it seriously be argued that the United States and Britain ended the war in a mood to create an anti-Soviet bloc and encircle the Soviet Union?

I worked during much of the war in London, and the rest of it in Washington. From the end of 1941 until the latter months of the European War, the feeling in Britain for the Soviet Union was not only one of sympathy but of genuine friendship. Indeed, so profound was this British friendship for the Russians that, if it had not been squandered by Moscow's campaign of vilification of the British and its roughhouse diplomacy in Eastern Europe and the UN, no British government could have remained in office if it had opposed the Soviet Union's legitimate territorial and political ambitions.

In Washington, the feeling toward Moscow was much less friendly, but here again it can scarcely be denied that, despite all the shouting against the Soviet Union by many of our conservatives, the United States government and the American people were willing to collaborate generously with Moscow in rebuilding the world and preserving world security.

The Soviet government, however, apparently did not believe this. It overlooked the spectacle of a noisy, friendly, casual, generous, fair America coming, like itself, out of isolation, and fumbling toward a policy that would look forward instead of backward. It seems to have chosen instead to believe the barbaric yawns from the Tribune Tower and to believe, God help us, that these represented America.

Once this deeply pessimistic analysis of the United States and Britain was made, the pattern of their diplomacy developed with ruthless consistency: they seized at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco on the American proposal of the "veto"; they interpreted the "rule of unanimity" among the Big Five, not as an obligation to work out a compromise program of leadership for the security of all nations but as a device to achieve security for themselves; they defied their written agreements at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam and in the process created the very anti-Soviet coalition they feared the most.

Finally, that most disturbing prospect of all began to haunt the council tables: it began to settle in the minds of the negotiators on both sides that what they were really seeking were two different worlds of the mind and spirit. The East wanted a world in which the state was supreme; the West a world in which the individual was above the state; the East assumed the right of the big state to dictate to the small; the West fought for more equal responsibilities for the small; the West argued for the reconstruction of Europe; the East divided it, denied it the raw materials of reconstruction, and played politics with its misery.

IV

Negotiating with the Russians under these conditions is a new and delicate problem for the United States. These two countries are not only the two most powerful nations in the world, they are the two most different countries in terms of ideology and, what is equally unfortunate, they also happen to be the least experienced of the big states in the conduct of international negotiations.

Our inexperience has been aggravated in recent years by constant shifts at the top of the State Department. Our Secretary of State at the first Moscow Conference in 1943 was Cordell Hull; the Secretary of State at the Yalta Conference was Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.; James F. Byrnes was our chief negotiator at the third Russian conference in Moscow in December, 1945; and General Marshall represented us at the last meeting in Moscow.

It would seem that in such an intricate and sensitive situation as this the United States will probably have to devise some way of getting a little more stability at the top, and may, indeed, have to build up an experienced team of young men to study and concentrate on the technique of negotiating with the Russians.

The point of this is not that our negotiators have been outwitted by the tactics of the Russians, or that they have been deceived by the amiable qualities of the human heart. The point is that this new diplomacy by open conference and by exhaustion is a unique problem, requiring exceptional and unusual powers of physical, intellectual, and moral endurance; that the problem will persist for many years; and that our capacity to deal with it will influence the fate of millions of people, the security of the Republic, and perhaps the peace of the world.

It is necessary, therefore, to define it accurately, to see where we have gone wrong in the past, to look to the future and prepare for it The essential problem on both sides is lack of faith in the other. This lack of faith cannot be removed quickly, as Henry Wallace thinks, by some dramatic gesture like destroying all the atom bombs, or, as Molotov has intimated to Byrnes, by doublecrossing the British and dividing the world into two neat spheres of influence. It can, however, be minimized in these conferences by greater clarity on the part of our negotiators, and by the development, if possible, of a stable policy, supported by both political parties in the economic as well as the political field of foreign policy.

Also, it might be helped by direct negotiations between the President and Marshal Stalin. It is an astonishing fact, but nevertheless true, that the heads of these two states and their deputies have tried to make peace with everybody on the other side in the war but have never yet made a single attempt to run over the basic questions that keep them from making peace with each other.

... the limitations of diplomacy in this situation should be emphasized. There is no "solution" to the Russian problem, in the sense of there being some neat quick way of getting rid of it. We are, as the diplomats say at the United Nations, "seized of the question," and will probably have to deal with it for the rest of our lives. ... Diplomats can solve some problems: they solved the Canadian Fisheries question and it took only 128 years (1783-1911) to do it. But problems like the Russian problem are different: you do not solve them; you devise ways of living with them.

One of these ways is diplomacy, but it is only one way. Diplomacy, as Mr. Nicolson defines it, is not an end but a means; not a purpose but a method. It seeks, by the use of reason, conciliation, and the exchange of interests, to prevent major conflicts arising between sovereign states. It is the agency through which nations seek to adjust their objectives, by agreement, rather than by war.

For the present, however, the process of adjusting objectives by agreement at the council table is not making progress. There has been very little reason or conciliation between Washington and Moscow in recent months. The real conflict, indeed, is taking place in an area between diplomacy and war; not in direct negotiations between the Russians and ourselves, but in a test of political and economic strength outside the council chamber in key areas in Europe and Asia.

It is in this area between diplomacy and war, the area of political and economic organization, that the Soviet Union is really effective. Diplomacy, as the Soviets wage it, is, as Joseph Alsop says, a process of erosion. But the vital thing is that while this incredibly tedious process is working in the various capitals, the more effective political techniques of the Soviet Union are changing the history of the world with incredible speed. By organizing the shop stewards in the labor unions in Germany; by controlling the supply of newsprint and food in Europe and doling it out to the weak and the faithful; by organizing and financing the Communist parties and destroying the center parties on the continent; and by appealing to the dreams of hungry men, the Soviet Union has created a political technique that can take over a country in little ... time

It is definitely in this area that they have progressed rather than in the field of diplomacy. Indeed, if they are sincere in their protestations that what they are looking for is peace and understanding in the West, they are diplomats of dubious ability. But on the other hand, if they are seeking at the council table to create and sustain conditions in which the political technique of infiltration will work, then they have succeeded brilliantly.

THE CONTAINMENT OF SOVIET POWER

By G. B. Thomas

Reproduced from Harper's Magazine (copyright, 1948, by Harper and Brothers), January 1948, by permission. In the following article a British student of world affairs discusses the changes which have occurred in Anglo-American-Soviet relations since the end of the war, with special emphasis on American attitudes and policies toward Europe and Russia.

... The current political axiom is that all today's international dangers and uncertainties are due to the machinations of the Communist party and to the aggressive foreign policy of the Soviet government. The people who subscribe most passionately to this view, especially in the United States, are those who during the war were disposed to look upon the Soviet Union with all the benevolence of a kindly uncle watching his wayward nephew make good. They were the people who were inclined to believe that Soviet democracy had some very notable qualities that were lacking in the democracies of the West, even while they were prepared to admit that some aspects of the Communist form of government were profoundly distasteful to them; who considered that the Western world had a great deal of responsibility for the sullen isolation in which the Soviet Union hibernated in the years between the wars; and who pinned their hopes for the future to the continued collaboration of the Big Three -- to an eternity of Teherans and Yaltas.

...

We can see now how wrong they were, many of those rosy war-time views. ... So long as Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky continue to expound Soviet foreign policy in the terminology to which we are becoming accustomed, there is little danger of our falling back into our old state of uncritical admiration. What we must now guard against is the danger lest we fall into an equally grievous error at the opposite extreme. Not only are we now inclined to view every Russian move with suspicion, we are also disposed to lay all the blame for the present international tension upon the Soviet government. This is a dangerous mistake. More dangerous, perhaps, than the earlier one to which we fell victim for a time.

The proximate cause of the present state of international relations ... is the profound and in some respects the abrupt change in the foreign policy of the American government. ... Where there was acquiescence, at times even connivance, with Soviet plans, there is now resistance. Where there was blindness, there is now understanding. Where there was somnolence, there is now a taut awareness.

II

There was one curious difference between the British and the American attitude toward the Soviet Union during the war. The British government, with its long experience of Russian diplomacy and its memories of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, was disposed to be more critical and more suspicious of the Soviet government than the American was. But the British people were, on the whole, far more friendly toward the Soviet Union than the American people, and far more unreserved in their admiration. . . . The uncritical admiration of all things Russian by a large part of the British electorate often made it difficult for the British government to defend even vital British interests.

The British government's difficulties were increased by the attitude of the American government. American politicians and officials, like the mass of the British people, had come to believe that Russian leaders themselves did not mean what they said, or had said in the past; any more than the majority of British politicians believed Hitler meant what he wrote in Mein Kampf -- until it was too late. Their conclusion was that all would be well if only America were sympathetic to the Russian point of view; and that Stalin and his Party leaders would ultimately respond to large doses of American kindness. In 1943, indeed, the American government was able to claim two great victories to the credit of this policy of appeasement: first, the dissolution of the Comintern; second, the re-opening of some of the least dilapidated of Moscow's Orthodox churches. From these victories the leaders of American foreign policy derived considerable encouragement. Their aim now became to draw the Soviet Union more directly into the affairs of the world, and to tempt the men of the Kremlin to play an open and responsible part in the settlement of international problems, in co-operation with their American and British colleagues. For all these efforts Washington enjoyed the close support of British public opinion. I do not mean to suggest that the British government was unresponsive to these American dreams, but Downing Street was more cautious in calculating the price that might have to be paid for their realization.

So much for the political factors that inspired the two governments. The military factors were even more important. There is no doubt that responsible military opinion in Britain and in America feared, for a time, that Russia might pull out of the war once her troops had got to the Polish border, to the Curzon Line, thus leaving a large part of the German Army intact to continue the struggle against the Western Powers. So long as this fear existed political sacrifices to ensure a continuance of the Russian military effort were inevitable. The same considerations arose over the Pacific war. Mr. Byrnes has now told us that President Roosevelt's military advisers urged him to

pay any price for assurances that Russia would enter the Japanese war. Stalin gave the assurance and carried it out to the letter. The price was paid by Europe and, to a lesser extent, by China.

There is one further factor in American foreign policy that must be noted. It has its roots in the general American attitude toward Britain. Even among those who are most sympathetic to the British point of view there is a vague undercurrent of hostility against Britain as the center of an "empire." ... The consequence of this subconscious prejudice was that in any purely Anglo-Russian difference, American politicians tended to view the Russian side of it from a more sympathetic angle.

As an example of how this attitude worked out in practice, let us take a momentary glance at developments in the Far East. It was with something like equanimity that America connived at the Russian claim to Port Arthur and Dairen. But the announcement that Britain was clinging to Hong-Kong was treated with icy disapproval. In seeking to draw the Soviet Union more deeply into the arena of world politics and world responsibilities, American foreign policy tended to assume the part of honest broker, mediating between the rival imperialisms of Britain and of Russia, with the balance tilted in favor of Russia. In practical terms, it meant that America was helping Russia to extend her influence and authority -- if not in a positive sense then at least negatively -- by not standing in the way, while at the same time continuing to sap away at the foundations of British policy. ... American foreign policy was basing itself upon the fallacy that the Slav leopard had somehow changed its spots, while the old British lion was as wickedly powerful as ever.

It is this basic American fallacy that is mainly responsible for the division of Europe. The blunt rejection of Mr. Churchill's plea for an Anglo-American thrust through the Eastern Mediterranean into the Balkans made Russian domination of Southeastern Europe inevitable. The Soviet government made it plain enough what were their plans for the Balkans when they suddenly declared war upon Bulgaria. It was a declaration for which the Western Powers had often asked, and which the Soviet government had as often refused. Then, without any warning, after Bulgarian plenipotentiaries had actually opened armistice negotiations with Anglo-American representatives in Cairo, Russia struck. The venue of the armistice talks was transferred to Moscow. Russia took the lead, in spite of the fact that she had been at war with Bulgaria for only a few hours. The result was that Bulgaria was taken under Russian protection and suffered nothing for her war crimes.

The Greek insurrection was plotted then, but the warning signs were not heeded. Consider the almost open hostility with which British intervention in Greece was received in the winter of 1944. Now

American intervention -- economic and political intervention -- has taken the place of British. ...

... we saw America supporting the Russian demand for the veto right in the Security Council, in the teeth of the strongest opposition from the British Dominions; and America deferring to the Russian request that she be given three votes in the assembly of the United Nations. After all, Britain controlled so many votes there. Wherever one turned one saw American acquiescence in Russia's plans, with Russia trumpeting her belief in Big Three unity -- for the undeclared but obvious reason that it paid such handsome dividends. ...

Now it is America who is challenging the principle of Three Power unity and its results, not Russia. No wonder then that the Russians say they are being betrayed. ...

III

The question that haunts the European mind today is whether American foreign policy, having now taken its bearings, will stay firmly on its new course. To a very large extent this depends upon the underlying assumptions of this policy. If these are erroneous and false, the new foreign policy does not stand much chance of reaching port -- at least, not without some casualties, of whom the nations of Europe, still living in the twilight of the war, will be the first. The most dangerous of all false assumptions is that Soviet foreign policy, after a short period of wartime friendliness, has somehow changed its course. From that assumption flows the false argument that if only America makes another effort to meet the Soviet point of view all will be well, and Russia will once again be found willing to play the game according to Western rules. If this argument were accepted we would have to resign ourselves to another period of American appeasement whose scope would be limited only by the restraints that the Kremlin itself imposed upon its appetite.

It must be admitted that European apprehensions in this respect have not been mitigated by Mr. Byrnes' book. ... It was his mistaken belief in the fluidity of Soviet foreign policy -- as distinct from the day-to-day tactics of the Kremlin -- that led him, in spite of his growing suspicions, to administer new doses of appeasement. How else can one explain his sudden decision to fly to Moscow in December 1945 after the studied insolence of Mr. Molotov at the London meeting of Foreign Ministers in September? Or the fresh concessions on the Italian treaty that he offered to Mr. Molotov in November 1946 at the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York?

The fact is that Soviet foreign policy has been consistently revisionist. Its acceptance of the status quo for a very short time before the war, and its acquiescence in Big Three unity for part of the war

period, were purely tactical and provisional. When the Munich settlement had once again made Europe's frontiers fluid after twenty years of the uneasy Versailles Peace, Stalin was quick to take advantage of the fact. He was equally quick to take advantage of a similar fluidity in the Far East, caused by Roosevelt's determination to bring the Red Army into battle against Japan. Soviet foreign policy has never been static in the sense that British and French foreign policy became static after 1914. It has always been restlessly on the move seeking new points at which it could penetrate into the Western world. ... It has its origin, in part, in the spirit of expansion which throughout history has always troubled the souls of the Muscovite leaders.

...

Combined with the Marxist drive and the sad romantic search for the end of the horizon there is another feeling which goes deep into the Russian soul The Russian intellectuals of the nineteenth century ... who created the structure of thoughts and beliefs and superstitions which swept Russia toward catastrophe in 1917, and upon whose fly-blown heritage the Soviet regime is so largely based, had the deepest contempt for and hatred of anything that could be labelled "bourgeois." ...

This is the ideological fabric into which Russian foreign policy is woven. The resultant pattern presents the world with the same problems as those with which it had to deal at the end of the Napoleonic wars when Russian power was also at its zenith, and when countless millions looked upon the Czar as the Apostle of Peace and the divine liberator. Then, too, the enigmatic attitude of the Russian government kept European chancelleries in a flutter of excitement and apprehension. "The Czar's talk was of peace; but he maintained his huge armies in being and concentrated, for the most part, on the western and Balkan fronts of his empire. He preached unctuously the gospel of fraternity and mutual trust; but his agents were meanwhile carrying on dark intrigues in every court and country in Europe, and it is not surprising that to Austria, most timid of powers, he seemed, to quote Baron Vincent, to be 'disguising under the language of evangelical self-abnegation schemes of far-reaching ambition.' " So writes Mr. W. Alison Phillips, in the Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, about those difficult years that followed the Congress of Vienna. ... the social doctrines professed by the Politburo have not altered the nature of the diplomatic problem. ...

We shall have no difficulty about understanding the practical aspects of the diplomatic problem facing us if we accept the viewpoint of Soviet historians, which many Western historians share, about the essential character of the last war. According to this view, the war which ended in 1945 was not a second world war, but was the final phase of the Thirty Years' War which began in 1914. During its course

some of the principal Powers engaged in it suffered more than others from the vagaries of fortune. The first catastrophe occurred in 1917 when Russia was knocked out, but in 1918 the remaining members of the Coalition were able to destroy the Austro-Hungarian Empire and to put Germany temporarily out of action. In the armistice that followed, Soviet Russia rather than Germany was treated as a defeated nation, a circumstance which caused her to fall out with her former allies and to come to terms with her former enemy -- just as Czar Alexander did at Tilsit in 1807. Owing to continued Allied disagreements, Germany made a quick recovery, and she was able to resume a full-scale offensive in 1939 after some preliminary skirmishes. In 1940 there came the second catastrophe of the modern Thirty Years' War. France was struck down, and even Britain was in mortal danger. But thanks to the recovery of Russia, the original coalition was finally victorious.

Seen in this context, the Russian eclipse in 1917 is of greater significance than the French in 1940 only because it was of longer duration. If France (to say nothing of Britain) was able to keep all the territory she had in 1914, plus all that she had added in 1918, why should Russia be less favored? So Russia's first aim was to regain all that was lost in 1917. By the time the victory bells rang out in 1945, the 1914 frontiers of Czarist Russia had been almost fully restored. It is true that large parts of Finland remained independent, but the port of Koenigsberg was not a prize to be despised as a reward for that loss. Within the same period, most of the treaties signed when Soviet power was at its lowest ebb had been thrown upon the scrap heap.

The second aim of Moscow's foreign policy became to attain those objectives Russia would have achieved if she had been among the victorious powers at the Armistice of 1918. That meant supremacy in the Balkans -- in the place of the supremacy that Austria and Prussia lost by their defeat. It meant also a demand upon Britain to carry out the secret treaties and agreements of 1915 in which Northern Persia was allotted to Russia, and Constantinople and the Straits as well. ...

There has never been any secret about any of these Russian aims. ...

IV

... transfers of territory, ... encroachments upon the sovereignty of other nations, were not due in the first place to any new Russian aggressiveness, nor were they the direct and immediate result of a Russian military victory over a powerful enemy. They have this much in common: they came about with the acquiescence of friends, and not against the will of a mighty foe; they were the results of the weaknesses and mistakes of those governments -- first the German and later the American and the British -- with which the Soviet government for tactical reasons had established a temporary understanding.

If this interpretation of recent events be correct, then the remedy for our present troubles is to be found in Washington and London; it is not to be sought in any Muscovite conversion. The fault lies in ourselves, not in any Kremlin stars. The truth is that the Russian danger is the product of international weaknesses and is the result of a flaw in the policy of the Western Powers; just as the Communist danger, on the national plane, and on the assumption that there is no forceful intervention from outside, is the consequence, not the cause, of a breakdown in a country's social mechanism.

When "X" wrote of the "containment of Soviet power" in Foreign Affairs, he was clearly thinking along these lines. "Containment" is obviously the only possible policy in present circumstances; and there is now little doubt that that is what Secretary Marshall has set himself to do. But "containment" is only half a policy; or rather it is only a negative policy; it is not dynamic; it carries no inspiration and no real comfort to all those without whose help Soviet power cannot be contained. Its consequence may well be, unless some more constructive ingredients are added, the turning of Western Europe into a deserted no-man's-land across which American power and Russian power glare at each other in vindictive isolation.

The aim of this policy of "containment" must surely be to save, first Western Europe, then Europe as a whole. ... it is a matter, now, of strengthening all those forces, not only in Europe but throughout the world, without whose support the policy of "containment" cannot succeed. ...

... we nevertheless observe that America continues to sap away at the strength of those countries which have a major part to play in working out the power groupings that will lead the world to a new equilibrium.

There is, for example, the hostility of many influential Americans to France. This hostility is having very damaging effects on French national pride, and has made it far more difficult for the French government to play its part as a bastion of Western civilization. The offhand way in which Washington has rejected French suggestions about the Ruhr and the impatience with which French pleas for more German coal have been turned down, are not calculated to encourage the French to have full confidence in their American friends. I do not of course assert that the French are necessarily right in all their claims. But I do maintain that to give way to French claims, even if not always justified and even if it is done at some sacrifice of American interests or prejudices, is cheaper, provided it leads to the restoration of French political stability and power, than to reject them, since a rejection paves the way for a further encroachment of Soviet power.

Nor is the continued sniping at British power calculated to serve American ends. ... India, Palestine, the Middle East -- no one can deny that British difficulties there have been immeasurably increased by American critics, official and unofficial. I am not accusing these critics of being mischievous or wrong, but I do say that they have been irresponsible. ...

... It is quite evident to us, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, that America's new attitude toward Soviet power demands a complete overhaul of American policy toward her friends.

It demands also a far greater caution in the discussion of foreign affairs, less wild talk about the prospects of a new war. It may well be that such talk does no harm in the United States of America. But it does infinite harm in Europe; indeed every American declaration about the imminence of war adds immeasurably to the cost and difficulty of European rehabilitation. It tends to increase internal tensions in many European countries, and to that extent it increases the disruptive influence of Communism. ... It plays the Russian game; it is their policy to increase internal strains and stresses so as to widen those crevices in the social structure in which Communism thrives. The more Communism thrives, the less chance there is that the work of national reconstruction can go forward; and the more costly becomes the work of rehabilitation. And without the rehabilitation of Western Europe, there can be no containment.

We are, then, at the beginning of a new era in American foreign policy; at that preliminary stage where the new course has created the maximum of international disturbance -- of inevitable disturbance. If something more than mere disturbance is to come out of it, the helmsmen plotting the further stages of the new course will have to take a great many hitherto neglected facts into account.

DO THE MEN IN THE KREMLIN WANT WAR?

By Drew Middleton

Reproduced from The New York Times Magazine, March 28, 1948, by permission of the editor of the Sunday Department and the author. The effect of internal Russian conditions on foreign policy and hence on relations with the United States is discussed in this article by a Times correspondent who has lived many months in Russia.

... it is my firm conviction that in the present critical international situation the Government of the Soviet Union does not want to resort to war if it can be avoided.

... It does, however, regard war as an instrument of national policy and is preparing for war in the future. And the United States, considering the scope of Soviet ambition and the basic tenets of communist ideology, must as the leading capitalist power be the enemy.

There is no way of predicting when the Soviet Union will feel itself ready for that war which I am convinced its leaders believe is inevitable. But under the present system in the Soviet Union there is no guarantee that the Soviet Union will ever be powerful enough to risk war with the United States. My own belief is that the restrictions of the Soviet regime will in the end cramp the creative impulse in the economic as well as in the cultural life of a mighty people and that the cruel barbarism of a police state directed against the minds as well as bodies of the subjects will murder national morale.

The future, including war, is in our hands, the hands of the people of the United States. If we wish to prevent war we need only be strong, strong enough from the military standpoint to convince Soviet leaders of the futility of war, and strong enough from the political standpoint to restrain the chairborne strategists and typewriter comandos who urge a "preventive war."

If we are strong enough in the military and in the political sense there need be no war, preventive or otherwise. If we turn ourselves into a fascist state with the military in charge, whooped on by their light-headed political adherents, we will in time find ourselves fighting not only the Soviet Union but the rest of the world as well.

When does the Soviet Union want war? A distinguished British general said recently he would bet everything he owned that Russia would not be at war, unless attacked, in five years; half of what he has that Russia will not be at war in ten years, and nothing at all that she will not be at war in fifteen years.

Although the Soviet Union does not want war now there will be no decrease in the warlike tone of its propaganda to the world or to the Russians. There is a strong military tradition in Russia; there has always been a large army with its consequent influence on the highest level of Government. Nowhere in peacetime is glorification of war greater, nowhere else are people so often informed of how sweet and honorable it is to die for one's country. But millions of words turned out on these themes and on the might of the Soviet armed forces should not divert us from the hard facts which at present discipline the Government of the Soviet Union from war. Facts, as Mr. Molotov is continually reminding us, are stubborn things.

Let us begin with the first fundamental reason why the Russians do not want war with the United States now. This is that the people who count in Russia, the highest circles of the Government, the Communist

party and millions of young men and women who run Russia in the sense that they direct and administer its economy, have an absolute confidence that the future is theirs.

I do not mean that they believe this in the ideological sense, although this attitude is important. Communists do believe that communism is bound to emerge victorious in any struggle -- economic, political or military -- with capitalism. But the bulk of these people are not Communists. They are young men and women fired by the opportunities inherent in the richness of Russia. They believe that with its almost limitless physical resources both in Russia and the satellite states, its vast manpower and its single-minded authoritarian regime determined to make the Soviet Union the most powerful country in the world, Russia will reach that level and achieve the world leadership exerted by Britain a century ago and by the United States today.

... Under any other system their qualities, given free rein, might in time make their dreams come true. But under communism their dreams in time will fade into the long nightmare of economic inefficiency produced by the glorification of party orthodoxy.

But at present the attitude is there. It is one of the strongest impressions I received in Russia. And one must always remember that Stalin and the Political Bureau also believe that time is on their side.

Read "The Problems of Leninism" by the dictator and you will see how he views the world: The Soviet state progressing to new and ever greater victories, the Communist ideology sweeping from continent to continent and capitalism and socialism, in the British sense, faltering downhill toward oblivion.

Stalin's confidence is ... disquieting For in addition to being the high priest of the new religion he is also a practical executive of great experience and sagacity. He understands richness and the potential power of the Soviet Union although it is obvious he does not understand the length of time it will take to complete the industrial revolution there.

This leads us to the second fundamental reason why the Russians do not want war now: the Soviet Union's weakness relative to the United States. ...

To begin with, there is no comparison between the Soviet industrial economy, which is the basis upon which wars are fought, and that of the United States. In dealing with the Soviet Union we are dealing with a nation halfway or perhaps only a third of the way through its industrial revolution. There is plenty of evidence of inefficiency and low productivity of Soviet industry at this stage of Russia's industrial revolution. But I call attention to one enormously important fact: the

Soviet Union will this year manufacture at the most optimistic estimate seventeen to twenty million tons of steel.

There is an interesting statement by Stalin on the subject. In the summer of 1946 he said, in answering a question put to him by a correspondent, that it would be six to eight years before industrial areas occupied by the Germans could be restored to the production levels of 1940. Admittedly Stalin is a politician, and a most astute one, but after three extensive visits to the areas mentioned I am convinced that he underestimated the situation. . . .

. . . the Soviet Union suffered close to fifteen million casualties in the second World War. This awesome total includes other losses which would make any government, no matter how dictatorial or blind, and I do not think that the Political Bureau is blind in this respect, take warning.

The casualties included hundreds of thousands of young technicians and mechanics which a country must have if it is to complete its industrial revolution and expand industrial production. Those who survived or who have been trained since the war are an overworked minority striving to boost production and at the same time teach slow-witted peasants who are being driven into industrial labor. Add up these factors, Soviet industrial backwardness, destruction by war, casualties, the industrial adolescence of the people, and you have the second fundamental reason why the Soviet Union will avoid war with the United States now and for some years to come.

These two reasons explain why the Political Bureau has been content to wage war by political means: sapping the strength of old and famous states until the time was ripe to overthrow their governments with an armed minority, eliminate parliamentary and personal liberty and include them in the growing Soviet empire.

And it explains why in the case of Greece the Russians have failed and failed pretty woefully to achieve a victory. The British maintained a garrison in Greece. It was and is a small garrison. It was not disposed tactically, but as long as it was there it checked Soviet ambitions.

For the Russians were not willing to risk a clash with the troops of the United States' closest friend in international affairs. And they certainly would not risk a clash with troops of the United States. It may be that the Yugoslavs will precipitate a crisis in Trieste by such an attack. My opinion is that in such a case the Soviet Union because of the two fundamental reasons outlined above would do all in its power to prevent an extension of a shooting war.

In considering Soviet anxiety to avoid combat, remember that Greece is important not only politically but strategically to the Russians.

A victory for communism in Greece would guarantee a Russian foothold in the eastern Mediterranean close to the Dardanelles. Nor would it have been, save for the presence of a handful of Western troops, a particularly difficult victory to win. In Greece -- as in many other countries -- the United States has been forced to guarantee a government rotten with corruption and inefficiency and a people so sorely stricken they would welcome any change.

If we are strong enough and if we accept the duties and restraint that international military strength implies, the Russians' political offensive can be halted elsewhere. That is what the lesson of Greece tells us. And if we become strong enough we can avoid that future war.

The Russians do not want war now. It is up to the people of the United States to show them that war at any time would be futile. This would be only just. For it was the people of the United States who forced the speediest disarmament in history and allowed the Russians to get away with political murder in Europe.

THE SOVIET UNION - A MIGHTY BULWARK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE

By A. Leontyev

Reproduced from New Times (Novoye Vremya), September 17, 1947, published by the newspaper Trud in Moscow. In this, as in many other Soviet-published articles, great power relations are viewed in an ideological framework, and American-Russian rivalry is conceived as an inevitable struggle between an exploiting, expanding capitalist society and a peace-loving communist state.

... There is ... an evaluation of the outcome of World War II. fairly widespread in the foreign press which holds that the effect of the war has been to strengthen two powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, and to weaken all other countries, and that therefore Soviet-American conflicts of interest are inevitable and relations between the two powers are bound to deteriorate.

... it is unsound to the core.

In the first place, it should be evident that the war has strengthened the two powers in different ways, and that their enhanced strength springs from different causes. He who forgets this cannot possibly understand the present world situation, and his picture of realities is bound to be distorted.

The United States was the only big power that sustained no damage in the war, but on the contrary grew richer by it. To be more

precise, it was the American monopolies, who control the country's economy and policy, that grew richer. It is this that explains Washington's increased activity in international affairs and its undoubted greater capacity to exercise pressure on temporarily enfeebled and impoverished countries. But only a very biased observer can close his eyes to the deep contradictions both in the domestic and foreign policy of the transatlantic republic.

One need only mention the recurrent big strikes in America's key industries; the steady growth of unemployment and curtailment of production since the war; the increasing difficulty of finding export markets, and the haunting spectre of a profound economic crisis. On the other hand, the weak sides of Washington's present foreign policy are becoming more apparent with every month and every day. For American expansion holds out to the nations not the peace they yearn for, but new conflicts and convulsions. It is consequently encountering increasing resistance and constantly giving rise to fresh antagonisms. It is enough to say of the American expansion drive that in the eyes of the peoples of Europe and Asia it is the heir and successor to the Nazi schemes of world domination.

The difficulties experienced by the United States at home and abroad cannot be attributed to the deliberate malice of any person or persons, although it is true that they are greatly aggravated by the shortsighted and self-seeking policy of the ruling plutocracy. Fundamentally, these difficulties are the inevitable fruits of the modern capitalist system. Capitalism in the twentieth century has entered a period of general crisis; it has lost its former strength and stability. The foundations of the capitalist world system were already badly shaken by the first world war and the triumph of the Soviet revolution in Russia. It was still further weakened by World War II. The chariot of history rolls inexorably on, and it is not to be stayed either by the atomic bomb, or by the talk of "people's capitalism" so fashionable nowadays in America, talk that is just as little capable of changing the nature of present-day monopoly capitalism as the monk Gorenflot was able to change the nature of pork by christening it fish.

As to the Soviet Union, the increase of its strength springs from quite different sources, and is of quite a different character, for the Soviet Union fought the war under conditions different from those of America. There is no need to stress again the fact that it bore the main brunt of the struggle against the chief aggressor, and that this struggle cost it immense losses and sacrifices. Yet notwithstanding this the Soviet power represents a mighty force in the post-war world. The war only added to the monolithic unity of Soviet society and cemented the bonds of alliance between its classes of free workers of town and country and the ties of friendship between its nationalities. No attentive observer can help being impressed by the moral and political

unity of Soviet society. The Soviet people are coping manfully and successfully with the formidable task of rehabilitating and further developing their national economy, and they face the morrow with invincible confidence, knowing that it holds in store for them neither crises nor unemployment, nor any similar evil.

In foreign affairs, the Soviet Union's policy of resolutely and consistently struggling for enduring, democratic peace among nations has won it the sympathy of millions of people all over the world and the unreserved support of all genuine fighters for progress. The Soviet Union's enhanced weight in international affairs is the perfectly natural result of the decisive role it played in liberating mankind from the fascist scourge. As the countries temporarily weakened by the war recuperate their strength, the international prestige of the Soviet Union, far from diminishing, will increase, because the Soviet policy is not to encroach upon the sovereignty of other countries, but to support their integrity and independence.

Hence it is clear that the enhanced role of the Soviet Union in the post-war world is of quite a different character from that of the United States and leads to quite different consequences. It is therefore wrong to bracket the two countries in one category.

... in international affairs the Soviet Union represents the force to which the future belongs, ... it is a great socialist power with the most advanced social, political and economic system in the world.

It was the Soviet social and political system, about which so much malicious nonsense was written and is still being written in the reactionary press, that scored the supreme victory. The war demonstrated its strength and solidity, and disclosed to the whole world the innate sources of its might and growth.

... millions all over the world know that there is a Soviet country, where for the first time in history real democracy has been inaugurated, where all inequality, direct or indirect, between citizens is discountenanced, where all discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality or sex is precluded, where the worker has been emancipated from exploitation and is guaranteed the right to work and to equal pay for equal work.

It is not surprising that the working classes and the oppressed nations of the world, crushed beneath the iron heel of imperialism, look upon the Soviet Union as a country where their most cherished aspirations have been realized. As Stalin said, Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union, is "the herald of the movement of toiling humanity for emancipation from capitalist slavery," the "standard of the struggle of the working people of the world, of all oppressed races and nations for their liberation from the rule of plutocracy and imperialism."

... In ... [countries] that were liberated from fascism by the Soviet Army -- the people have acquired the effective opportunity to arrange their lives according to their own wishes. ... In these countries firm popular regimes have been set up which really enjoy the support of the masses; the foundations of a new, popular democracy have been laid In ... countries ... which have come within the orbit of British and American imperialism, the reactionaries, by violence and deceit, are still preventing the realization of the hopes and aspirations of the people. In these countries the political situation is unstable, the caliphs of the hour maintain their rule not by the will of the people but by the grace of the dollar, the democratic rights of the people are openly and grossly flouted, the economy is in a state of collapse and rapacious profiteering rules supreme. ...

It is a well-known fact that a country's home policy determines its foreign policy. Having taken upon itself the epoch-making task of building and consolidating a socialist society at home, the Soviet Union proclaimed entirely new principles of foreign policy, implying a resolute and consistent struggle for enduring peace and friendship among nations.

These principles of Soviet foreign policy came as a complete surprise to people wedded to the old ideas and concepts. As they conceived it, every great power worthy of the name must have, or at least strive to have, its spheres of influence, and must seek to expand into the most remote corners of the earth. It must keep jealous watch to maintain a balance of power, and must regard every other state as a potential adversary. As to peaceable states, only the smaller countries can be regarded as such, and not all of them by far. Their peaceableness is enforced, it is dictated by their weakness. Moreover, under certain circumstances, as past and present experience shows, even small and middle-sized countries are not averse to imperialist ambitions and warlike enterprises.

One need only recall the incessant sabre rattling of the reactionary rulers of post-Versailles Poland. And in our day the Dutch plutocrats, with the help of American tanks and jet planes, and the diplomatic support of Washington, are trying again to enslave the Indonesian people, who outnumber the population of the centre of the Dutch colonial empire eight times over.

According to the old concepts, a great power must maintain an attitude of haughty arrogance towards small and middle-sized countries. It must strive to dictate its will to other states. And so fist-banging on the diplomatic table is the accepted practice, especially in negotiations with a weaker party. Of course, in this enlightened age, diplomats have to pay verbal tribute to the equality of nations, national sovereignty and respect for the rights of other countries. But this is

only a cloak.

Soviet foreign policy definitely broke with these traditions. Instead, it set earnestly and vigorously to work in the cause of peace and the maintenance and consolidation of friendly relations with other countries and nations. To people who are dominated by the old routine concepts of international relations, the peaceable aspirations of the Soviet Union are an inexplicable enigma. ...

The peaceable aspirations of the socialist state were often attributed to weakness The Nazis ventured to guide themselves in practice by this view, and how their gamble ended everyone knows. The peaceableness of the Soviet Union is not to be confounded with pacifism, which preaches non-resistance to evil and thereby only lightens the work of the aggressor. The Soviet Union is a peaceable state, but this does not preclude the fact that its people are ready to administer to any invader a rebuff so crushing as to discourage other imperialist marauders from poking their pig snouts into the Soviet garden.

In these post-war days it is being assiduously insinuated by circles which have an interest in doing so that the peaceableness of the Soviet Union is only a mask to conceal aggressive and expansionist schemes. But this malicious fabrication is refuted by the facts, which at the same time effectively expose its authors.

For everyone knows which country gave birth to the doctrine that proclaims tacit war on all regimes that do not please, or may not in future please, the Washington rulers. Everyone knows where the much-vaunted plan by which nations are to renounce their sovereignty in exchange for tenuous promises of dollar assistance originated. Does anyone have to be told which country it is that has laid hands on a network of naval and air bases located thousands of miles from its shores? Which country it is that is working for the resurrection of Japanese and German imperialism with a view to making them its future vassals? Which country it is that is strangling the freedom of the Greek people? Whose tanks and aircraft are destroying peaceful villages in Indonesia, and so on and so forth?

The American imperialists cannot speak of the Soviet Union without venom. They are conducting a rabid campaign of lies all over the world, vilifying the socialist power and trying to discredit it in the eyes of the nations. But in vain! For it has become abundantly clear that the American plans for world supremacy are prejudicial not only to the Soviet Union, but to all countries that treasure their independence. They represent a mortal danger to nations which are unwilling to sell their sovereignty for a mess of dollar pottage. The politicians of certain European countries who are shortsighted enough to act as the agents of Wall Street in the Old World are grievously mistaken when they think that the tide of American expansion constitutes no direct

threat to them. These British and French politicians are committing the same fatal blunder with respect to American imperialism which ten years ago their ill-starred predecessors committed with respect to German imperialism. The present-day imitators of Chamberlain and Daladier can see at every step how the American claimants to world hegemony unceremoniously put their feet on the European table, draw the noose ever tighter around the neck of Britain's economy, and "advise" France what Ministers she ought to have in her government. What, then, shall be said of the weaker countries, upon whom, under the guise of "Western democracy," the self-appointed saviours from overseas are endeavouring to impose their own political habits and ideology, which are fundamentally alien to the finest traditions of the European nations?

From this it will be clear how far from the truth is the assertion that the strained state of post-war international relations is due to the fact that the war has strengthened two powers: the Soviet Union and the United States. The increased strength of the Soviet Union means the increased strength of the biggest factor for peace in modern times. The growth of its power, authority and influence implies the growth of a force which is struggling for enduring peace and unmasking the machinations of the instigators of a new war. Quite different is the role of the United States in international affairs. In that country the question whether a policy of war or of peace should be pursued is being openly discussed, and plutocrats and militarists who enjoy no little influence in the counsels of government are all in favour of war.

... Spokesmen of the ruling camp ... try to show that ... war at the present juncture would be cheaper to America than peace, or that she has more to gain from it now than several years hence. Such is the burden of numerous books, pamphlets and articles, which are written with the purpose of creating a war psychosis. An example of this type of literature is a recently published book by James Burnham, Struggle for the World. ... The mental poison that pours in a turbid flood from the American printing presses these days differs very little from the concoctions prepared in Goebbels' kitchen ten years ago.

In these days of monopoly capitalism aggression springs from a desire to enlarge the area of exploitation and oppression, to extend the power of the ruling plutocracy to other territories and nations. ... The American expansionists claim that the world supremacy of the United States is the best way of ensuring mankind the uninterrupted peace it has so long been yearning for. ... it is needless to say that in our times, as the recent Nazi experiment showed, a struggle for world supremacy is bound to lead, through fire and blood, to ultimate failure and ruin.

The peoples today want real, not illusory peace. And in the

Soviet Union they see a mighty bulwark of international peace. Its policy is a formidable barrier to the accomplishment of the sinister designs of world reaction. And this role of the peaceable foreign policy of our country is enhanced by the growth of its international weight and influence.

... It is being ever more convincingly demonstrated that nowadays there is no international problem that can be effectively settled without the Soviet Union.

Many a development since the end of the war might be cited in illustration of this. The conclusion of the peace treaties with the five former allies of Hitler Germany in Europe showed how effectively the post-war settlement may be promoted by a policy of concerted action by the great powers. On the other hand, the unilateral policy of the Anglo-Saxon powers on the German question, which aims at the dismemberment of the German state and the destruction of the unity of the German people in open violation of the Potsdam decisions, only emerges from one impasse to find itself in another, and leads to ever-growing chaos.

“For the imperialists,” Stalin said in his message on the occasion of Moscow’s 800th anniversary, “there is nothing more profitable than war. It is not surprising that imperialist agents are trying in one way or another to provoke a new war. It is to the credit of Moscow that it indefatigably exposes the instigators of a new war and rallies all the peace-loving nations around the banner of peace. It is common knowledge that the peace-loving nations look with hope to Moscow, as the capital of a great peace-loving power and as a mighty bulwark of peace.”

... the Soviet peace policy answers to the hopes and aspirations of all progressive men and women. It is a policy of respecting the sovereign rights of all countries, big and small, and defending the independence and security of nations. The peoples of Europe and Asia, therefore, while they rightly fear the increasing activity of dollar diplomacy, observe with hope the growing international influence of the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union is a resolute champion of democratic principles in relations between states, and a firm and unshakable bulwark of peace and security.

THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND GREAT POWER RELATIONS

By Secretary of State George C. Marshall

Statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, May 5, 1948. In this testimony Secretary Marshall addressed himself to a movement which has been taking shape in Congress looking toward some fundamental change in the United Nations as a means of freeing that body from the debilitating effect of the veto in the maintenance of international peace and security. In his remarks Secretary Marshall touched upon one of the key issues in Great Power relations. The statement is reproduced by courtesy of the Associated Press (Boston Office).

... A vast amount of thought is being devoted throughout our country to means of furthering the objectives of the Charter in the prevailing world circumstances. The attitude of the United States towards the problems of the United Nations will have a profound effect on the future of the organization.

A clear understanding of the international situation is essential to decisions on the course we should pursue. Neither the United Nations nor any other form of world organization can exist as an abstraction without relation to the realities of a given world situation.

The United Nations was conceived on the assumption that certain conditions would develop following the war. These were: (1) That the major powers charged with responsibility for working out peace settlements would complete their task promptly and effectively: (2) that the critical post-war conditions in the economic and political fields would be brought to an end as speedily as possible, and (3) that the co-operation among the Great Powers pledged during the war and reflected in the Charter would be continuing.

The United Nations was specifically designed to preserve the peace and not to make the peace. The task of making the peace settlements was specifically recognized by Article 107 of the Charter as one for the responsible victor power. The United Nations can assist in this task, but the improvement of the United Nations machinery would not in itself solve the problem. Since the most important of the peace settlements have not been agreed upon, the United Nations has been compelled to carry on its activities under world conditions far different from those contemplated by the Charter.

It was obvious to the framers of the Charter of the United Nations that an effective organization to preserve the peace must include every major power. ...

This organization was designed to consolidate and strengthen over a long period of time the foundations of peace through common action in solving political, economic, social, cultural and health problems. Machinery was established for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means so that the advice and assistance of all members, and the mobilization of world public opinion, might be brought to bear in the pacific settlement of disputes. It was found possible to go considerably farther than the League of Nations in the establishment of enforcement machinery, but at the San Francisco conference none of the major powers was prepared to grant to this organization the right of enforcement against a major power.

When universal agreement to the Charter was achieved, the strength of the major powers in relation to one another was such that no one of them could safely break the peace if the others stood united in defense of the Charter. Under existing world circumstances the maintenance of a comparable power relationship is fundamental to world security.

The aspirations of the people of the world as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations have been shaken by developments since the summer of 1945. It gradually became apparent that the post-war conditions anticipated at San Francisco were not being realized. The failure of concerted action by the major allies rendered it necessary for the United States Government to attempt to create the desired post-war conditions in cooperation with other states willing to do so.

It became progressively clearer that serious misconceptions prevailed in the minds of the leaders of the Soviet Union concerning Western civilization and the possibilities for developing stabilized working relations between the Soviet Union and the other members of the community of nations. It is a misconception to suppose that domination of the world by a single system is inevitable. It is a misconception to suppose that differing systems cannot live side by side in peace under the basic rules of international conduct prescribed by the Charter of the United Nations. These rules are obligatory upon all members.

A fundamental task of the United Nations and of our foreign policy is to dispel the misconceptions of the Soviet leaders and to bring about a more realistic view of what is possible and what is impossible in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the world at large. In this way there can be restored to international society the equilibrium necessary to permit the United Nations to function as contemplated at San Francisco.

Our realization of the need for this equilibrium has led to action along several lines, all designed to create conditions favorable to the working of the United Nations. The first necessary step was to ensure the freedom and independence of the members. The ability of demo-

cratic peoples to preserve their independence in the face of totalitarian threats depends upon their determination to do so. That determination in turn depends upon the development of a healthy economic and political life and a genuine sense of security.

Therefore, the United States Government is responding to requests to provide economic assistance to various countries in Europe and elsewhere. The United States is cooperating with sixteen European countries in their recovery program providing for self-help and mutual aid.

The United States Government is now considering the steps necessary to bring the national military establishment to the minimum level necessary to restore the balance of power relationships required for international security.

The United States is acutely aware that the return of a sense of security to the free nations of the world is essential for the promotion of conditions under which the United Nations can function. The necessary steps for self-protection against aggression can be taken within the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter recognizes in Article 51 the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to preserve peace and security. Articles 52, 53, and 54 provide for regional arrangements dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security, on condition that such arrangements are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

In recognition of the possibility foreseen in the Charter that an armed attack might occur upon a member of the United Nations, despite the binding obligations accepted by every member to refrain from the threat or use of force against another state, the United States and the other American Republics concluded at Rio de Janeiro last year a treaty for individual and collective self-defense.

Certain countries of western Europe likewise have organized themselves into a Western Union for their individual and collective self-defense.

By such arrangements under Article 51 of the Charter and the articles providing for regional arrangements, constructive steps have been taken to bulwark international security and the maintenance of peace. Our intention to afford encouragement and support to arrangements made by free nations for the preservation of their independence and liberty has already been stated by the President in his Message to the Congress on March 17.

The United States Government has followed an active policy of strengthening the existing machinery of the United Nations.

(1) We have endeavored to assure that the United Nations would carry out its responsibilities in dealing with the dangerous political issues which have arisen in various quarters of the world. We have sought to promote its basic work on economic problems, human rights, freedom of information, health and related needs.

(2) We have made proposals toward restraining the use of the veto in the Security Council and reducing the scope of the veto through its elimination from matters of pacific settlement and the admission of new members.

(3) We proposed the establishment of an interim committee of the General Assembly, popularly known as the Little Assembly, to consider various possibilities for improving international cooperation and to put to work the undeveloped powers of the General Assembly in the field of international security. By means of this committee the far-reaching influence of the General Assembly is being brought more effectively to bear in fulfilling the purposes and principles of the Charter.

. . .

On several occasions negotiation in the United Nations, even during its short history, has postponed fighting long enough to remove the cause for fighting. It is a forum of negotiation where charges or distortions are held answerable, where violations of treaty obligations must meet the verdict of world opinion, and where those responsible must answer for their conduct.

. . . United Nations negotiation affords continuing working contacts in international relations and an open door to communication between the East and the West.

A number of projects designed to improve international conditions by new forms of international organization have been proposed. These projects envisage radical changes in the existing United Nations Charter. Some propose the elimination of a veto on enforcement measures, the establishment of inequality of voting among the major powers and the virtual elimination of the influence of small nations in Security Council decisions.

Others go beyond the revision of the United Nations Charter, and call for the establishment of new forms of international structure along the lines of world government. In general, the proponents of these projects recognize the probability that the proposals would not be accepted by at least one of the major powers and by a number of other governments now members of the United Nations. They advocate that in this case the respective projects be put into effect among such nations as would accept them.

All of these projects appear to rest on the assumption that the

present unsatisfactory state of world affairs is a result of inability on the part of the United Nations to prevent aggression; that this inability arises from the exercise of the veto power in the Security Council and the lack of a United Nations police force; that if the veto power on enforcement decisions could be removed and the United Nations provided with armed forces, aggression could be prevented, and that the principal barrier to world peace would thereby cease to exist.

The general assumption rests, I think, on an incomplete analysis of our main problems of foreign policy at this juncture and of the part which international organization can play in solving them.

... What is needed for the achievement of a world order based on law and dedicated to peace and progress is a widespread improvement in the material and social well-being of the peoples of the world. The responsibility for such improvement will always rest primarily upon the peoples and governments themselves. In this field the United Nations, however, can play an increasingly active role.

The factor of military strength is of immediate and major importance in the present world situation; but is not the element which will be paramount in the long run. The emphasis often placed solely on the military aspects of the world affairs does a disservice to the cause of peace. The more that present differences are talked about and treated exclusively as a military problem, the more they tend to become so.

The problems today presented to those who desire peace are not questions of structure. Nor are they problems solvable merely by new forms of organization. They require performance of obligations already undertaken, fidelity to pledges already given. Basic human frailties cannot be overcome by charter provisions alone, for they exist in the behavior of men and governments.

The suggestion that a revised United Nations, or some form of world government, should be achieved, if necessary, without those nations which would be unwilling to join, deserves special attention. Such a procedure would probably destroy the present United Nations organization. The result would be a dispersal of the community of nations, followed by the formation of rival military alliances and isolated groups of states. This result would weaken us and expose us to even greater dangers from those who seek domination of other states.

It is not changes in the form of international intercourse which we now require. It is to changes of substance that we must look for an improvement of the world situation. And it is to those changes of substance that our policy has been directed. When the substance of the world situation improves, the United Nations will be able to function with full effectiveness. Meanwhile we will continue our efforts in

cooperation with other governments to improve the working of the United Nations under the Charter.

The United Nations was created after years of study and after many months of difficult negotiations. It now has fifty-eight members. It is the symbol of the aspirations of mankind. Its success is the hope of mankind. All new efforts to attain order and organization in the affairs of men require time to grow roots in the loyalties of men. The history of our own people testifies to this necessity.

Let us not, in our impatience and our fears, sacrifice the hard-won gains that we now possess in the United Nations organization.

CHAPTER V

THE FORMATION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

The formation of foreign policy in any country is determined by a variety of factors. The constitutional requirements and political institutions of the country shape the mould in which it is formed. National interests, public opinion, and the personalities which the play of domestic politics bring to influential positions control the direction and application of policy. And pervading the process of policy making at all times are the fundamental factors of geography and economics affecting a nation's position in the world, together with the general climate of world politics at the time. Charles Evans Hughes when Secretary of State remarked that "Foreign Policies are not built upon abstractions. They are the result of practical conceptions of national interest arising from some immediate exigency or standing out vividly in historical perspective." Being a part of national policy, foreign policy and its formulation are necessarily affected by the many complex compromises constantly in process among the different elements participating in politics. Politics being "the art of the possible", foreign policy decisions rest upon considerations of what can be done, not only in countries with republican forms of government but also in those with parliamentary, monarchical and even totalitarian systems. Harmonizing the ideas and gearing together the activities of all who share in the manifold aspects of policy making is difficult in a democratic government like the United States. Without proper synchronization the national effort lacks full effectiveness in international affairs, if it does not expose the country to the unfortunate consequences of various bodies of officials working at cross purposes. With the heavy responsibility which rests upon the statesmen of the Great Powers in the present critical post-war period, correlation and planning have assumed new importance in policy making both in the United States and abroad.

For a brief comparative analysis of political philosophies underlying policy formation in the principal states see Louis Wasserman, Modern Political Philosophies and What They Mean, Chapters 2-5, 6-9. For exposition of policy making in the United States see Foreign Policy Association Headline Series No. 62, Who Makes Our Foreign Policy? by Blair Bolles. On current American policy see Department of State Publication No. 2961, Aspects of Current American Foreign Policy. On policy making in the Soviet Union see Vera M. Dean, The United States and Russia, Chapters 4-6. For additional current articles on policy making in the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union see Current Readings on International Relations, No. 2, Chapter IV.

THE NEW STRATEGY IN FOREIGN POLICY

By Robert T. Elson

Reprinted from the December 1947 issue of Fortune Magazine by special permission of the editor. A major problem in the successful formation and conduct of foreign policy is the effective organization of the Department of State, a labyrinthine structure which has grown so rapidly in the last decade as to be unwieldy and cumbersome in its operations. The efforts of Secretary Marshall and his political "chief of staff", Robert A. Lovett, to bring order and coordination into the Department are discussed in the following article by the head of the Washington bureau of Time Magazine.

... There is ... evidence that a new strategy in American foreign policy is ... evolving; there is hope, growing out of a new approach in Washington, that action in coming months will lead to clarification of American objectives; and that clarification in turn may enable the nation to unite as it once did in the past upon a continuing, coherent policy. The important news right now is that a new, yet old, dynamic concept seems to be once more motivating our policy. It is characteristically American, based, as any national policy must be, upon enlightened self-interest. The policy is predicated on the belief that the U.S. cannot survive as a free society except in a world where other free societies may exist; it assumes that the U.S. cannot prosper unless other people also have a chance to prosper and, finally, that there can be no social advancement unless other nations accept certain fundamental principles of justice common to all free societies.

Secretary of State George Marshall's declaration of American purpose to create such a world climate, in a speech on June 5 at Harvard, caused immediate repercussions abroad. In a few weeks the face of world politics changed; Soviet diplomacy was thrown on the defensive; the Comintern reappeared and nascent Russian imperialism was nakedly exposed. The U.S. was thus given a new opportunity to retain the initiative and keep hope alive in a world that had rapidly been giving way to despair. The credit for the resurrection of dynamic diplomacy belongs to a general, George Catlett Marshall. The hope for keeping it alive rests largely with a Wall Street banker who is the General's chief of staff, Robert Abercrombie Lovett.

Whatever history may say about Secretary of State Marshall, the place of General Marshall is secure. He is one of the great architects of an unlimited victory obtained at limited human cost. He is also a soldier who early learned that a general's success may be determined by his chief of staff. Nowhere is that more evident than at the State Department where, as a result of a pattern of operations set by Mr. Byrnes and carried on by Marshall, the Under Secretary has

an accidental importance that transcends most Cabinet posts. In these critical days of the "cold war," the Secretary negotiates, the Under Secretary operates.

Almost from the day he stepped off a plane returning him from his ill-starred mission to China, George Marshall started looking for a new chief of staff. Dean Acheson had run the department while Byrnes, his peripatetic boss, dueled with Molotov successively in London, Moscow, Paris, and the Waldorf Towers. Acheson, however, had stayed on reluctantly at the President's urgent request and his own compulsive sense of duty. Some six and a half years in public service had depleted his once ample resources, and he insisted on being permitted to return to private law practice to recoup his fortune. The first problem facing Marshall was: who could he find to be chief of staff?

The problem was solved fortuitously. One day not long before Marshall was to fly to Moscow for the fifth meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Acheson brought for Marshall's scrutiny a panel of names that had been suggested for the newly created Assistant Secretary of State for communications and transport (sea, air, etc). On it was the notation that the job had been offered to former Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert Abercrombie Lovett. To Marshall, Lovett's name shone from the papers as if it were in neon lights. As Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Lovett had been a member of the tight-knit inner circle around Mr. Stimson that had largely been responsible for governance of the war. Probably more than any other one man, it was he who provided the initial stimulus for aircraft production, who pushed through the heavy-bomber program, and who helped build the invincible air force. Soon after the fighting ended he returned to Wall Street as a partner of Brown Brothers, Harriman & Co., where he had compelling reasons to stay put. . . . These reasons would have been decisive except for one that was to Lovett still more imperative: Marshall asked him to take the job. At a dinner at a foreign embassy Lovett explained why he said yes. "There are three people to whom I can never say no -- my wife, Henry Stimson, and George Catlett Marshall. When the 'old man' calls for you -- you come."

. . . Lovett asked for a month of "dual instruction" under outgoing Under Secretary Acheson before going "solo." Too often in Washington the practice has been for one administrator to enter the office as the other picks up his hat, which makes for variety but is hardly conducive to continuity. Lovett has an abiding belief in continuity.

Lovett's re-entry into Washington was unusual in another way. When news of his appointment leaked prematurely, it was not at first

believed. The Washington bureau of one New York newspaper held the story for a week without publishing it. A powerful member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on hearing the story, snorted, "And who is Lovett?" For more than five years in Washington at a key war post, he had kept so quiet about himself and his accomplishments that when he left he was well known to only the key insiders in the war administration. His wartime career had been little noted in the press or congressional circles because he had deliberately planned it that way; the airmen got the glory and he ran the show backstage. Lovett is a reserved, modest personality although he gets along with people well. He once laid down a rule that should be a classic guide for the civilian administrator in wartime: "Every time somebody's head gets pushed over the top of the fence it makes a swell target. I look too much like an eagle as it is!"

The Under Secretary of State's description of himself is apt. Lovett does indeed look like an eagle; he is lean, with a long, hollow face, hawk nose, and a weathered pate from which the hair recedes as the outgoing tide. A writer in The New Yorker once described his face as that of a "humorous monk." Others have noted his fawnlike ears. His approach is as suave and as sure as his well-tailored appearance, which runs to the gray-flannel uniform of unostentatious success. He often talks so quietly that listeners, especially in his oak-paneled, one-and-a-half-storied office at State, have to strain to catch his words; but he also has a talent for ferocious invective that is all the more effective for its unemphatic delivery. At fifty-two, Lovett is the custom-built, hand-tooled product of a specialized and unusual career that was never intended to produce a diplomat. Few diplomats have been so lucky. A host of diplomats have been as wellborn, many have been better heeled, and most of them have been as expensively educated. The measure of difference between them and Lovett lies in his character, his experience, and his outlook.

...

At the State Department, Lovett, the banker and the practical businessman, brings the bread-and-butter experience of the market to complement General Marshall's great gift for shaping policy. This is fortunate for the country, particularly in view of the recent resignation of Will Clayton, whose vast knowledge of commerce was so useful in framing economic policy. Lovett had his first opportunity to put his business experience at the government's service in 1940 when he was asked how to improve the air force. He replied with a memorandum demonstrating that the U.S. could and should have the greatest air fleet in the world. When the top command read this paper, Lovett was promptly called to Washington as an adviser to the War Department. Soon he found himself Assistant Secretary of War for Air, a post calling for extraordinary management ability and personal tact.

To a man with Lovett's passion for organization, the State Department was certain to seem a cluttered anachronism. It had seemed so to General Marshall. It has seemed so to most newcomers with even the most superficial acquaintance with modern administrative techniques. It has seemed so to some of the department's oldest inhabitants, secure in forgotten dusty alcoves. The department has always resisted the best efforts to reorganize it. Mr. Stettinius, more concerned with shadow than substance, attacked with fresh paint, modern office equipment, and boisterous Y.M.C.A.-ish optimism, and retired undaunted but without making a dent in the convention-ridden departmental rank and file. His successor, Mr. Byrnes, knew little about management and cared less. His subordinate, Dean Acheson, came upon him (on one of the rare mornings Mr. Byrnes occupied his desk in Washington) pencil in hand, trying to answer an overnight cable. The Under Secretary explained there were drafting officers to take care of the Secretary's correspondence. The consequences of constant change at the top -- four Secretaries and three Under Secretaries in four years -- were reflected throughout the department.

For fifteen years the State Department was almost a personal-service institution for its various policy-making chiefs rather than an organ of government. In Secretary Hull's regime, foreign policy had been conducted by Roosevelt, Hull, Welles, and Morgenthau with interference or "assistance" by Berle, Breckinridge Long, and Henry Wallace. In Stettinius' time, Roosevelt for a while ruled almost alone. While Byrnes roamed from capital to capital, Acheson was left at home to make the day-to-day decisions largely without benefit of his superior's advice, since it was the Secretary's usual practice to commune only with his faithful counselor, Ben Cohen, and the other departmental aides abroad with him. While these changes at the top were taking place with rapidity, the department was growing up. In these years, while the department was without a real organizing director, it had literally exploded from an agency of some 4,600 people (900 in Washington and 3,700 overseas in 1938) to one of 17,000, of whom about 11,000 are abroad. It had also become the depository for the remains of wartime agencies such as OSS, OWI, FEA, BEW. Immediately after V-J day the State Department occupied forty-seven buildings in Washington alone; it still spreads over some twenty but will be reduced to fourteen in the next three years.

Obviously, before Lovett arrived the full burden of these staggering administrative problems fell wholly on General Marshall. He had no time to solve them in view of the many more imperative questions on foreign policy that required prompt answers. The General did take one immediate step forward when he rooted the department out of its nostalgic monstrosity on Pennsylvania Avenue and concentrated headquarters in the modern, efficient, air-conditioned new War Depart-

ment building situated on what was once known as Foggy Bottom. The move was a shock to departmental personnel. There was a leisured calm about the old building; the atmosphere within was between that of an academic institution and a Boston club. The old vaulted rooms with their fireplaces and marble mantels, their slatted swinging doors had a comfortable dignity that provided reassuring insulation against each hurried day. Then, before the department had recovered its breath, Secretary Marshall created what is now known as the Executive Secretariat on the model of an administrative instrument that he had used with good effect as Chief of Staff. To run the new secretariat he called thirty-two-year-old Carlisle H. Humelsine, who had left the Army and was then in an obscure post in State's administrative division. The job of the secretariat was to provide centralized control of all communications to and from the department, and particularly to and from the Secretary's office. Humelsine's first task was to create a series of alarms that would sound upon the first indication that some subsection chief was making an ad hoc policy decision, the kind of decision that had often involved the department in contradictory actions and made our diplomacy seem chaotic and amateurish. The secretariat's first mission is to read and screen all policy papers and cables, and to see that no decision involving policy is made until all divisions concerned have been given a chance to voice an opinion. The day is past when an ambassador might receive one directive from a Welles, another from a Berle, and a third advisory admonition from his desk man. The new system is essentially a direct application of the technique that bigger businesses, such as General Motors, have been using successfully for years in production control.

In establishing his secretariat Marshall had assured himself that whoever sat at the Secretary's desk would control State Department policy. Yet control did not guarantee the correctness of decisions or their continuity in a coherent policy line. To ensure this, the General created the diplomatic equivalent of the War Department's strategy-and-policy group. This is a select group of officers assigned to one mission only -- planning ahead, not only for one month hence, but as far forward as a quarter of a century. The unanimous nomination to head the planning group was the State Department's most brilliant student of the Soviet Union and world Communism. He is George F. Kennan, who, while Minister-Counselor at Moscow, had demonstrated by his reporting that he had never forgotten that Stalin was a Communist before he was a dictator. His new mission was as difficult as his instructions were direct and simple: to think ahead. On the Secretary's orders he was left free to concentrate upon the objectives of U.S. policy.

Lovett took over the administrative problem when pressure of other events forced Marshall to leave it. His first job was to tune up

the instruments for "communication control" and "forward planning." The new hand soon recognized that even under optimum conditions it would take from a year to eighteen months to achieve a thoroughgoing reorganization. As Lovett remarked to a friend soon after he had been appointed, "We have no time for housework because we are always standing in line for supplies." Seldom had the department been immersed in so many and such widely separated activities as it was during the summer months of Lovett's own initiation: there were seven important international conferences proceeding at one time -- the inter-American meeting at Rio; the international trade-and-tariff talks at Geneva; conferences on international telecommunications and international radio, both at Atlantic City; talks on the future of Ruhr coal production, at Washington; the conference on the level of German industry, at London; and the conference of sixteen nations on the Marshall plan at Paris. Each of these conferences put a new strain on an already taut staff; each called for day-to-day decisions.

When he entered the State Department, Bob Lovett quickly recognized that the global responsibilities faced by an acting Secretary of State are too big for any one man to administer; accordingly he broke the problem down to one-man size by introducing the principle of "assigned responsibility." The department, of course, had long assigned responsibility for geographical divisions to specialists. The top-ranking members of the department met daily to discuss day-to-day problems as they arose, but there was no system by which individuals were made responsible for specific operations. The top men, the new Under Secretary decided, should not operate as individuals but as a board of directors framing policy as a group. The system was applied to the preparations for the Rio conference. The Kennan group of planners set out the objectives, while the political divisions, operating under the Assistant Secretary, Norman Armour, reported what could be achieved and recommended the methods to be used. When the plans and operations reports were brought together, the solution of problems emerged. The success of the U.S. delegation at the Rio conference attests to the soundness of the system.

The next step in the new order was to persuade departmental personnel that, in operating abroad, they were acting not for just one executive arm but for the government itself and should, therefore, use the advice and counsel of other departments. Washington had known interdepartmental committees before but Lovett applied the principle with immediate effectiveness in the Washington planning for the Marshall report: an interdepartmental committee of technicians from Treasury, Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, etc., was set up. A Cabinet member said of Lovett, "The man somehow does manage to put over the team idea."

In his own department Lovett found that the best use was not being made of the expert knowledge of many devoted and underpaid foreign-service specialists. The department had become accustomed to meeting a frequent "five-o'clock crisis" -- the situation that broke as the workday was drawing to an end and the secret cables from abroad were decoded. One of these, occurring when Lovett was still on "dual instruction," resulted from the fall of the Independent Smallholders government in Hungary under Soviet pressure. When he inquired why the department had not foreseen the crisis, the Under Secretary found that the political divisions had forecast almost to the day the end of the Nagy government. Under the accumulated pressure of other papers, the forecast and its recommendations for future policy had never reached the topmost desk. This discovery led to the creation of the "sore spots" file, a "top secret" black book that reposes in the right-hand drawer of the Secretary's desk and contains the latest information on critical situations likely to cause immediate trouble. Because foreign relations in the last analysis are human relations, the "sore spots" file does not attempt to forecast trouble precisely as a meteorologist predicts tomorrow's weather. It is, instead, a current and pending catalogue of crises, with recommendations for U.S. action, if and when the emergency develops. Of eleven critical situations for which policy was determined in advance and directives written for inclusion in the "sore sports" file, two were forecast accurately and a third situation is developing.

In addition to the problems within the department, Lovett faced another, and even more delicate, problem in establishing good relations with Congress. These had always been highly personalized and had varied with Secretary and Under Secretary. Hull, through his prestige and popularity, and Byrnes, both as an ex-Senator and a warm and friendly human being, were often able to persuade Congress to accept Administration policies that went against congressional prejudice. But for the day-to-day, bread-and-butter business the department had been long dependent upon Dean Acheson, who had succeeded, first as Assistant Secretary and later as Under Secretary, in keeping a line open to "the Hill." Mr. Acheson had indeed been so effective that many members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarded his departure to private law practice as an almost irreparable loss. The new Under Secretary had the delicate and difficult task of convincing the legislators that he could fill Acheson's shoes. So diffident was he in pushing himself forward that, at his first meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with Acheson, one member said: "Poor fellow, I couldn't help but pity him." A month after Lovett had a chance to demonstrate his ability, the member was proclaiming to all who would listen, "This new man is splendid." The new man was also soon to realize that foreign relations, which depend on money grants, are as much a matter for the House as for the Senate. In mid-July, after the

Greek-Turkish aid program had been authorized, the whole foreign-policy program, then predicated on Congress' voting the money, was again jeopardized by the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, the terrible-tempered Mr. Taber. Mr. Taber belieyed no case had been made for the money. The issue was undecided until Lovett made a pilgrimage to the Hill, where he found Mr. Taber neither unreasonable nor impervious to logical persuasion. The money was finally voted with Mr. Taber's earnest recommendation. Of Mr. Lovett he said tersely, "He makes some sense." While Lovett's own relations with Congress so far have been good, the task of maintaining them requires all the tact that an administrator can muster.

Bob Lovett would be the first to admit that the mere establishment of sound administrative practice does not guarantee a coherent foreign policy. In the U.S., policy not only has to be built upon public understanding and consent but it must also square with American ideals. It is to the credit of the American people that they have usually resisted attempts to repudiate the moral basis upon which the republic was founded. The best example of this American characteristic is to be found in our relations with China, where the U.S. position is much clearer than that of other powers and where we have resisted attempted encroachments on Chinese sovereignty. When John Hay proclaimed "the open door," he sought to ensure American self-interest in her trade with China. At the same time and quite as effectively he was hoping to retain for China her independence. History proves that when, as in the case of the "open door," American policy equates self-interest with American ideals and aspirations, there can be agreement among the people, the Executive, and Congress. It is toward this difficult equation that the new team at the State Department is now working, and there is some reason now to believe that it can find the right answer.

The first step toward creation of a policy is to define the objective. In the immediate post-victory era, neither the Executive nor the people were clear about American objectives; they wanted peace but had no firm ideas about how it was to be attained once the unnatural wartime coalition, bound only by hatred of a common enemy, broke on the rock of conflicting ideologies. The "interminable discussion of disagreements" between Byrnes and Molotov more and more forced the U.S. into an untenable defensive position. European recovery was delayed as the prospect for settlements receded more and more into the future, and present misery aided and abetted the Communist political offensive everywhere. When General Marshall relieved Byrnes, he made a candid appraisal of the diplomatic situation; if the position remained as it was much longer, the U.S. could not avoid irreparable loss of wealth, prestige, and world leadership.

... Security alone, it was plain, could not be the enduring basis for American policy. The urgent need for something more constructive had been sharpened swiftly by the eastern Mediterranean crisis -- the sudden call for aid from Greece and Turkey. This crisis had broken on the department before it had adjusted itself to the change in top command. The crisis had been foreseen, but the familiar combination of political expediency, executive vacillation, and over-all Micawberishness had prevented decisive action until almost the last hour.

General Marshall faced the news with characteristic calm; he likened it to the Battle of the Bulge and regarded the action recommended to the White House as purely emergency in intent and extent. This State Department interpretation, however, was not wholly communicated to the White House. Consequently the President, in his anxiety to sell the emergency program to Congress, went from one extreme to the other, from a refusal to face the facts to an overstatement of them in such dramatic terms that most foreign chancelleries interpreted the Truman speech to Congress as an American commitment to subsidize anti-Communists everywhere. The journalistic magnification of a strictly limited aid program into a "doctrine" -- the Truman doctrine -- soon became an embarrassment in the conduct of our foreign relations. The undiluted unqualified Truman doctrine, as at first enunciated, was an open invitation to international blackmail; as it was first interpreted, foreign nations had only to line up outside the U.S. Treasury with hands extended and announce, "Those Communists are here again." Although Congress voted Mr. Truman the money he requested, it was obvious that both houses were reluctant to underwrite such a broad commitment. In this case Congress was most certainly wiser than the White House, for no nation would be rich enough to buy allies so indiscriminately. Even to the White House it was soon evident that as a policy the Truman doctrine would not do.

At this point the Kennan planners made their first report: a discouraging forecast of economic disaster in Western Europe unless U.S. assistance were forthcoming on a scale hitherto considered politically impractical. Their forecast was unexpectedly corroborated by Under Secretary Will Clayton who had just flown back from Paris to report on the dismal state of Europe. Clayton had gone abroad in pursuit of his long-cherished multilateral trade project, the International Conference on Trade and Employment at Geneva, and had been chilled by the depressing atmosphere there. His fellow negotiators from European countries were gloomy. They saw little point in discussing long-term trade prospects when, within months, the whole economic structure of Europe might collapse. The day Clayton returned he stated these facts to his colleagues in terms so alarming that all who heard him were asked to regard his report as "top secret." As events were

subsequently to show, the coincidence of the Kennan forecast and the Clayton report was a decisive turn in U.S. foreign policy.

Bob Lovett was just beginning his dual-instruction period when the new crisis broke. His arrival all but completed Marshall's executive slate and gave the General for the first time the backing of his own hand-picked "combat team." Its first task was to be the biggest single project initiated by the State Department since the U.S. laid down the blueprint for the United Nations. The Kennan forecast and the minutes of the Clayton meeting were taken as the basis for a speech proposing a new policy. An invitation from Harvard University to General Marshall on June 5 afforded the opportunity. The occasion was in marked contrast to the dramatic call to Congress, the tense, almost hysterical, appeal that the President made in the face of the Greek-Turkish crisis. The Secretary delivered his speech in calm, judicious terms in keeping with the academic atmosphere. General Marshall invited the European states to plan jointly for their own reconstruction and commented that "the U.S. should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace." In this there was no promise of outright unconditional aid, no assurance that Uncle Santa would be willing to provide for all of Europe's needs. The important thing was that the U.S. was asking Europeans to work together for their own future.

The impact and response to this appeal were not foreseen even by the policy group that drafted the General's speech. A few friendly words promising little but asking much rekindled Europe's hope. ...

Molotov's departure from ... [the July 1947 Paris discussions on a European recovery program] began a diplomatic retreat that is still in progress. The shrill attacks from Moscow on American imperialism increased in ferocity. Andrei Zhdanov, heir presumptive to Stalin in the Politburo, told the Communists of nine countries that they must do everything in their power to fight the Marshall plan, and then the Comintern (reborn in the name of the Cominform) emerged again. In Washington one of the top State Department officials said with satisfaction, "The tip of the iceberg has come up above the water again."

Behind these events were fairly basic and simple ideas. The first idea marks a return to economic literacy in U.S. governmental thinking about Europe. It involves the simple application of the known facts of European trade to strategy in foreign policy. It starts from the fact that Western Europe had long been the workshop for Eastern Europe, which in turn produced the goods and raw materials. Even under Nazi autarky the Germans had traded razor blades for Yugoslavian bauxite. The iron curtain cut these established trade channels, diverted the flow of raw materials to the Soviet Union, and increased

greatly Western Europe's dependence upon the Western Hemisphere. The problem was to reverse the trend. How? The Kennan committee answered that if Western European production could be restored to at least prewar standards, not only could the standard of living rise in the West, but also there would again be almost irresistible pressure for trade between the East and West. Unless the Soviet Union's economy could fill the gap in production previously provided by the West (which was unlikely), there would be trouble on the other side of the iron curtain.

The other concepts upon which the new policy rests are political. They arise out of the premise that if a society is to be really free its people must be guaranteed three things: freedom from aggression abroad (the threat of war), which is national security; second, reasonable prosperity at home; third, that the people shall live under a government of law that guarantees not only justice but equal opportunity for social advancement. The new approach to foreign policy assumes that it is absurd to distinguish between the steps necessary to security and those essential to maintain prosperity and justice. There can be no freedom from fear so long as the threat of war is present; there can be no prosperity unless there is security; and the highest form of justice is attained only in a community that is both prospering and peaceful. The U.S. to remain free must, therefore, create a climate in which our society can live and grow. Such a climate cannot exist unless there are other societies with like guarantees of justice and economic systems that are at least compatible with democratic capitalism.

...

THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF

By Ware Adams

In order to assure the more effective implementation of foreign policy over a long-range period the Department of State established a Policy Planning Staff in May 1947. Its functions, organization and general aims are set forth in the following article reproduced from The American Foreign Service Journal, September 1947. Mr. Adams is a career Foreign Service Officer. From 1946 to 1948 he served as First Secretary of the American Legation at Vienna.

The Department of State and the Foreign Service have been undergoing many organizational changes during the past few years, to enable them to fulfill their responsibilities resulting from the change in the role of the United States in international affairs from that of a

largely passive observer to that of active participation and leadership. Many improvements have been made. Still more remain to be made. One of the requirements that has become increasingly apparent is the need for advance planning. If our foreign policy is to be positive and active, rather than merely passive, it must be planned ahead.

This is not meant to say that the Department has not engaged in planning heretofore. On the contrary, extremely valuable work has been done by entities such as the former Committee on Postwar Programs and others including those dealing with the integrated planning by a number of different departments. Their very accomplishments have proven their value. But these entities have been either temporary in character or hampered by the fact that much of their personnel had to work under such strong day-to-day pressure of current operations, which were their primary duty, as to be impeded from devoting enough time and attention to long-range problems. Moreover, some of them were designed to deal with subsidiary, particular problems rather than the fundamental, all-pervading questions which confront the Secretary of State.

The long-recognized need for a unit specifically charged with this planning function was made acute by the growth and complexity of postwar problems. It could not long continue unfulfilled under Secretary Marshall. While he was Chief of Staff of the Army he always recognized a function to be performed, designated personnel to perform that specific function, gave them the necessary implements with which to do it, and then relied upon them to perform it successfully.

On May 7, 1947, the Department announced the establishment in the Office of the Under Secretary of State . . . of the Policy Planning Staff for the purpose of assuring the development of long-range policy.

George F. Kennan, Career Minister, then serving as Deputy for Foreign Affairs at the National War College, was designated Director of this Staff, and Carlton Savage, formerly Assistant to the Secretary of State, became its Executive Secretary.

The text of the Departmental Order setting up the Policy Planning Staff is as follows:

“(a) Purpose. Under the direction of the Under Secretary of State, to assure the development, within the Department, of long-range policy which will serve as a framework for program-planning and a guide for current policy decisions and operations.

(b) Major Functions. The Policy Planning Staff shall advise and assist the Under Secretary by performing the following functions:

- (1) Formulating and developing, for the consideration and approval of appropriate officials of the Department, long-term programs for the achievement of American foreign-policy objectives.
- (2) Anticipating problems which the Department may encounter in the discharge of its mission.
- (3) Undertaking studies and preparing reports on broad politico-military problems which the Department may submit for consideration by SWNCC [State, War, Navy Co-ordinating Committee], the Committee of Three, or other similar bodies.
- (4) Examining, independently or upon reference by the Secretary or the Under Secretary, problems and developments affecting United States foreign policy in order to evaluate the adequacy of current policy and making advisory recommendations pertaining thereto.
- (5) Coordinating planning activities within the Department of State.

In the discharge of the above functions, the Policy Planning Staff has no operational responsibility and will not issue directives, instructions, etc., to the operational organizations of the Department or to missions in the field. However, in order to insure a realistic basis for planning close contact shall be maintained between the Staff and operational organizations; and the latter shall be responsible for keeping the Staff informed of their planning activities.

...

... The new Policy Planning Staff does not in any sense represent a reorganization of any existing part of the Department or its functions. It is, on the contrary, an entirely new organ to perform functions supplementing those which have been performed and will continue to be performed by existing units of the Department. At the same time, it will not function independently, but in close consultation and collaboration with all other parts of the Department concerned with any question before it. The Planning Staff will, to a large extent, serve as a lens to bring attention to focus on a given problem which might otherwise extend beyond the field of any single division or office.

The Staff is small and is expected to remain so since it has no operational functions and relies on other units of the Department for factual studies and analyses. It will ultimately consist of about seven or eight officers altogether, chosen for their background knowledge of particular elements of our foreign relations plus an ability to apply that knowledge to specific problems when approached from the broadest viewpoint of our foreign policy as a consistent whole.

As a group, the Staff will include members with broad, practical experience in each of the major areas of the world, a knowledge and understanding of other governments and their working, and of our own government and its operation, as well as of the United Nations and other international arrangements and developments in the world as a whole. Although the background of individual members may be somewhat specialized, the group works not so much by division of labor but rather as a team which applies itself as a whole to each problem considered.

In actual practice, the Staff functions somewhat as follows. The formulation of views with respect to a given problem, for example certain aspects of the relationship of United States aid to European rehabilitation, may be undertaken by the Staff either voluntarily or at the direction of the Secretary or the Under Secretary. The Director will convene the Staff for an initial discussion of the problem. Steps will then be taken to gather all available information bearing on it. This may also involve fresh surveys made by various Divisions of the Department, or even possibly by other agencies of the government. After a study of this material, the Staff may then convene a meeting of all officials of the Department in a position to offer judgments on the problem at hand. It may also consult distinguished authorities outside the Government. Thereafter, the Staff prepares a formulation of views which may again be revised on the basis of comment by operating and research divisions.

When a paper has been so formulated, it then goes from the Policy Planning Staff to the Under Secretary and the Secretary of State for consideration. Unless and until it is approved by them, it has no formal or official status. The Staff thus functions as an advisory body
...

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

By James S. Lay, Jr.

Reproduced from The American Foreign Service Journal, March 1948. In recognition of the need for a closer correlation of foreign, domestic and military policies in the interests of national security, Congress provided in the National Security Act of 1947 for the creation of a National Security Council. The Council's function is to advise the President regarding the integration of policies "so as to enable the services and the other Departments and Agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." Mr. Lay is the

Assistant Executive Secretary of the NSC. See also U. S. News and World Report, April 2, 1948, pp. 42-45, and Current Readings on International Relations, No. 3, pp. 33-36.

The complex and numerous problems facing this nation and the governmental machinery required to handle them place an extremely heavy administrative burden upon the President of the United States. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of national security. In its broadest sense this field involves practically every Department and Agency of the Government and is affected to some degree by practically every governmental policy. Yet each Department or Agency has its own field of responsibility and is a spokesman for its particular point of view. The President must reconcile, correlate, coordinate and integrate all of these diverse interests into national policies which will insure the security of the United States.

Recognizing this problem and its vital importance, the President recommended and Congress in the National Security Act of 1947 provided for the creation of a National Security Council The President himself was designated to preside over this Council. The other permanent members are the Secretary of State, to present considerations of foreign policy; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, to present considerations of military policy; and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, to present considerations concerning the coordination of domestic, military, industrial and civilian mobilization. As required in specific cases and as designated by the President, the Secretaries of the other Executive Departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board may also sit as Council members.

The National Security Council, except for its direction of the Central Intelligence Agency, is purely an advisory body to the President. It does not itself determine policy. The end result of its deliberations are recommendation to the President who may accept, reject or modify them in his determination of the policies relating to the national security.

Through this new vehicle, therefore, the President is assured that the views of the heads of all Departments and Agencies concerned with the national security have been considered and so far as possible mutually agreed upon prior to Presidential consideration. The Council is in no way a buffer to insulate the President, nor does it detract from or infringe upon the prerogatives of the various Executive Departments and Agencies. On the contrary, it insures that all views are heard and, if agreement cannot be reached, that the divergent opinions are presented to the President.

In order to assist the Council in obtaining and reconciling the views of all interested Departments and Agencies, the National Security

Act of 1947 provides the Council with a staff headed by a civilian executive secretary appointed by the President. The first Executive Secretary is Sidney W. Souers. Mr. Souers, a business executive in New Orleans and St. Louis in civilian life, served as a reserve officer in Naval Intelligence during the war and was Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence when he reverted to inactive status in 1946. Subsequently, he helped to organize the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group, and was the first Director of Central Intelligence.

...

To advise and assist Mr. Souers, each head of a Department represented on the Council has designated his chief policy or operational planner. George F. Kennan ... Director of the Policy Planning Staff, represents the Department of State. The other representatives are Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer from the Army, Rear Admiral C. W. Styer from the Navy ... and Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad from the Air Force. In addition, R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, normally participates as a member of this group, generally referred to as the "NSC Consultants."

The NSC staff itself, except for Mr. Souers and James S. Lay, Assistant Executive Secretary, consists largely of individuals detailed from the offices of the above Consultants. The Department of State furnishes the coordinator of this working staff. ... Permanent members of the staff include ... a small group of specially qualified research and clerical personnel. It is planned to expand this permanent staff gradually by the addition of carefully selected career personnel who have outstanding abilities as students and analysts of world affairs.

This NSC staff works as a team in the preparation of reports for consideration by the Council. The first step is usually a meeting of the staff to define the subject and scope of a given report. Each staff member then obtains the facts, views and opinions of his Department or Agency on the subject from its particular point of view. For example, the political and economic aspects are obtained from the Department of State; the military aspects from the Army, Navy and Air Force; the intelligence estimate from the Central Intelligence Agency; and considerations of domestic resources from the National Security Resources Board. A second staff meeting is called to analyze the facts and to discuss and reconcile, in general terms, the varying views and opinions. One member is usually designated to prepare a first draft based upon this discussion. Each member checks this draft with all interested branches of his Department or Agency, and another staff meeting is held to reconcile any remaining divergencies and to agree upon a final staff draft. This draft is then sent to the NSC Consultants for their reactions. When their concurrence is obtained, the report is submitted to the Council for consideration at its next meeting. If appropriate, the Secretary of Defense obtains the military comments of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to the Council meeting. The report as adopted by the Council is then submitted for consideration by the President.

The duties of the Council specifically assigned by the National Security Act of 1947 are:

- (1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and
- (2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the Departments and Agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

Policies considered by the Council under (2) above run the gamut of our national security interests including such matters as export control, foreign information programs, base rights, etc. These generally are referred to the Council by one of its members or as a result of study by interdepartmental organizations such as the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee and, after consideration, are submitted to the President. If approved by him, all appropriate Departments and Agencies are directed to implement such policies, usually subject to the coordination of the cabinet member having primary interest in the subject. The Council, being an advisory body, does not participate in the implementation of such approved policies.

The preparation of reports . . . on the position of the United States with respect to specific countries or world areas in order of priority based upon their relative urgency and importance [has been made a continuing assignment of the NSC staff] . From these country and area studies, reports on a world-wide basis are being formulated. When completed, this series of reports will present to the President a clear and comprehensive picture of the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relationship to our military power, as it affects the national security. This will provide a sound basis for the formulation of domestic, foreign and military policies and for the conduct of affairs in a consistent and farsighted manner required by our position of world leadership and in the interest of world peace and our own national security.

THE SENATE'S ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY

By Elbert D. Thomas

Reproduced, by permission, from World Affairs Interpreter, Winter 1947. The following article, originally delivered as an address at the Institute of World Affairs in December 1946, is by one of the senior members of the upper house of Congress. Senator Thomas (of Utah) compares the obstructionist tactics of the Senate in foreign relations after the First World War with the Executive-Congressional cooperation which has prevailed during the past several years, and discusses the important and constructive role which the Senate should play in the formation of American foreign policy.

Under the American constitutional system the Congress is the policy forming branch of government. That, of course, is theory. In foreign relations, the Senate has the last word. That, too, is theory.

...

... The Senate's strength comes as a result of the two-thirds requirement for the ratification of treaties. But even this requirement has been tempered lately by a use of the resolution technique which requires only a majority vote and becomes effective after passage in both houses in Congress and the President's signature.

... international relations today are on such a day to day scale due to rapid communication and transportation that administration of a treaty has become the big factor just as the administration of a law is the big factor rather than the treaty or the law itself. Thus, the statement which I made before that the Congress of the United States, and, in regard to treaties, the Senate, while being a policy forming instrument under the Constitution, are today tempered by both time and circumstances.

Despite the fact that we have won a great war for democracy and despite the fact that we have crushed dictators, the executive branch of our government looms stronger, more important, and more active than ever. After the Civil War the Supreme Court put a constitutional curb upon the powers of the President, but during this war the Supreme Court sustained and made the Presidency more powerful than ever. The pen may still be mightier than the sword, but the doer has definitely the inside track over the theorizer, the deliberator, and the policy-former. The President is the doer in our Government.

...

Now, for a bit of history, which to date has not been recorded and hardly noticed. There has been in the United States Senate at least one Senator very conscious of the fact that the Senate of the United

States upset a constructive program of a farsighted President at the end of the last war. That Senator deemed that the Senate acted unwisely and not for the country's nor the world's best interest. . . . President Wilson stressed the writing of peace treaties that were never ratified and to a great extent never became operative. He stressed the ideal dreams of a League of Nations and a World Court which failed to come true because of the lack of cooperation of the most important sponsoring nation. The world watched, despite the lack of American membership, the growth and development of the International Labor Organization and the acceptance of its basic ideals by nearly three score of nations. Early in his first term, the Senator, mentioned above, . . . was one of those who fought for but failed to get American adherence to the World Court protocol. When World War Two broke out in Europe, this Senator remembered well the actions of his country after the last world war and believed that world organization was not only practical but necessary and consistently worked for placing America in the position of being prepared for peace when the war should be won. That single thought never left the mind of the Senator. Consistent with it, as time went on, the following things were done:

First, in order that the Senate of the United States might function properly in planning for the peace it was necessary to bring about a changed attitude on the part of the Foreign Relations Committee. This could only be done by changing the committee's membership. That most difficult task was inaugurated and consummated. . . .

. . . When the new Congress organized in January 1941 this action on the part of the Foreign Relations Committee was pointed out. Lend-lease was in the offing and I mentioned the fact that the Administration could not afford to take a chance with that. As a member of the Committee on Committees of the Democratic Steering Committee, I was asked what might be done. I pointed out that first of all no new Senator should ever be put on the Foreign Relations Committee and that Senators representing strong committees should be there so that if the President wished to use the Foreign Relations Committee as a Council of State he would have such an organization. The Council of State idea is very old constitutional theory. George Washington himself assumed that the Senate as a whole when it consisted of merely twenty-six members might act as such a council. It should be pointed out here that the Foreign Relations Committee in 1941 consisted of twenty-three members.

I was also asked what Senators I would suggest going on the Committee since I had mentioned new Senators should not be placed there. Immediately I suggested Senator Glass of Virginia and Senator Byrnes of South Carolina. These Senators both had great seniority and were Administration supporters. It was thought by some that Senators of long-standing would not give up their seniority on other com-

mittees to serve on this committee, but both Senator Glass and Senator Byrnes accepted. Senator Glass told me personally how grateful he was for the opportunity it gave him to serve his country. There were two Democratic vacancies and these two great Senators were named. The Republicans accepted the theory and Senator Austin gave up his ascendant position on the Judiciary Committee and accepted the position on the Foreign Relations Committee. Those three leading Senators, two Democrats and one Republican, gave up strong positions on other committees to serve in the most junior positions on the Foreign Relations Committee.

With the reorganization of the Foreign Relations Committee, the President now had a Council of State if he wished to use it, for the Committee now consisted of both the majority and minority leaders and the chairmen of the following committees: Foreign Relations, Finance, Banking and Currency, Military Affairs, Education and Labor, Interoceanic Canals, Appropriations, Audit and Control, Pensions, and Public Lands, and, in the course of time, the majority party whip. . . . Was the reorganization important for lend-lease? Even after the reorganization lend-lease was reported out of committee by just one vote. If the President of the United States had failed in having accepted his lend-lease recommendation no one can say today what might have happened to the President's whole war program.

In rapid succession Mr. Hull of the State Department appointed a committee of experts to study for the peace. A small group of Senators and Representatives were invited to meet with Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles with these experts. Senator Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, appointed a subcommittee of eight Senators to consider any propositions for peace which might be referred to the Committee. This committee of eight met regularly. At the time of its first meeting seven of the eight were opposed to doing anything. At the time of the reporting out of the Connally Resolution seven of the eight favored that resolution. This changed attitude, I am sure, came primarily because these men were almost daily struggling with a great problem and became convinced that a constructive start was necessary. Thus, through the Connally Resolution Congress spoke in favor of world organization to prevent war. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference was called. The Hot Springs Conference on Food and Agriculture was called. The International Labor Organization came to America in 1941 and then again in 1944 for the great session where it adopted the Declaration of Philadelphia. The San Francisco Conference was called and the United Nations Charter was worked out providing for various branches of international activities under the Charter. The Senate ratified the Charter. The Senate ratified the Constitution of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the United Nations

Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. These were all done while we were still at war. And before the world was legally at peace, the Senate of the United States acted upon the compulsory jurisdiction provision for the International Court of Justice. Thus, today, before the ratification of a single peace treaty, America stands legally and already in international organization.

Without constructive leadership in the Senate of the United States this could not have been. I emphasize the Senate's part in this program because it has all too soon been forgotten. Had we neglected to act during the war the United Nations Charter, like the Covenant of the League, would have been made part of the treaties and it might have suffered the same fate.

One other aspect of the Senate's activity in international organization; as early as 1935 in a conference made up of the undersecretary of State, Mr. Welles, and the President of the Foreign Policy Association, Mr. Raymond Leslie Buell, I advocated a closer relationship between the Senate and the State Department and the Executive. I even suggested the use of Senators as negotiators of treaties and conventions. That our government had turned its back definitely upon this idea, adhering strictly to President Wilson's theory of a harsh division between negotiators and ratifiers of treaties, was apparent from the reception my idea got. Still, in time it prevailed. Senator White was sent to Cairo. I was appointed to the Philadelphia Conference. Senators Connally and Vandenberg were appointed to the San Francisco Conference. Senators Murray, Chavez, Austin, Wagner, Tobey and Brewster were appointed to other conferences, and much good has been accomplished.

This practice provides for a better understanding, on the part of the Senate, of treaties that are to be ratified and helps in their ratification. The practice also has contributed greatly to what of late has become an accepted idea of both major political parties -- that foreign relations should be carried on as bipartisan or non-partisan activities. Surely in our conduct in relationships with other nations we should present this united front. The non-partisan idea has become reflected also in those other committees which represent a united nation such as the Committees on Military and Naval Affairs. . . . All of these things have not been accomplished just as a result of growth. They have been planned for and they have been fought for, and sometimes the going was not easy. There is no doubt in my mind, at least, that future generations will know that what has been done is good. Has the power of the President been made less effective because of his partnership in action with Congress? Has the power of the Congress been affected adversely because of its close connections with the Executive in our foreign policy? Not even the old fashioned stickler for the absolute separation of powers in our constitutional theory can point out

any evil result coming from this close relationship. International relations are not relations which are aloof and far off. They are relations which affect the homes, the firesides, and the people quite as much as any wholly domestic question. The bringing of the people closer to these problems through the action of the people's representatives in no sense does violence to our constitutional scheme or its theory.

Now, what of the Senate's role for tomorrow? ... the Senate has already had a part in framing the ideals and the ideas which will go into many treaties which will be presented to us. ...

... The President, of course, is important in all matters connected with the American Government and especially in foreign relations. The State Department, too, is important, but as long as our Constitution gives the Senate the last word regarding the making of treaties it is just childish not to let the Senate have one or two first words also.

... Under the Constitution, treaties ratified become the supreme law of the land. ... there is no doubt in anyone's mind that a treaty, because it is the supreme law of the land, can supplant legislation both of the state and the nation. Thus it is a tremendously great legislative principle at stake, and, therefore, it must be assumed that the Senate and the Congress will always be most jealous of its prerogatives. It is right that this should be. The people's representatives should have a voice in the law which governs the people.

...

... International war can be overcome by international organization if there is a will for such an objective. It cannot be brought about if we shirk because many of the things presented to us are hard and difficult. The Senate's role must still be that of having the last word, but with the last word should come a sense of the heavy responsibility which it must maintain. That there is a will to do this among the Senators today is one of the bright promises of the immediate future.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONDUCT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

In the Soviet Union foreign policy is formulated and conducted by a small group of men who wield great power and are responsible only to the tight hierarchy of which they are an integral part. As in a democracy, those who mould foreign policy in a totalitarian state are limited by political, economic, military and geographic factors. And, to a certain degree, they must defer to the social traditions of the people and the temper of the masses. Popular opinion, however, exerts far less pressure and is more easily channeled in an authoritarian regime than is possible in a government which is ultimately responsible to the electors for its continuation in office. In the Soviet Union policy making power is concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party, a small minority of the Russian population. The party exercises absolute control over every branch of the government. Unquestioning loyalty to its philosophy and goals is made to dominate those who serve the government.

Soviet foreign policy has two major purposes: (1) the achievement of the national interests of Russia per se; (2) the propagation of Communism throughout the world. Policy thus becomes to a unique degree a tool of ideology as well as of national politics. In the conduct of its foreign policy Moscow maintains relations with communist parties abroad, and since the reinstitution of the Comintern (renamed the Cominform) in 1947 it has sought further to promote and consolidate its influence beyond Soviet borders. Since the end of the war the Soviet Government has concluded a series of bilateral treaties with its European neighbors and China, the object being to guarantee Russian security in the continuing struggle with the West.

For readings on Soviet foreign policy see Sir John Maynard, Russia in Flux (1948), especially Part II; V. M. Dean, The United States and Russia; Frederick L. Schuman, Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad; Ernest J. Simmons (ed.), U. S. S. R., especially Part II; Current Readings on International Relations, No. 2, pp. 220-243.

THE MEN OF MOSCOW

The Western world knows relatively little about the inner machinery of the Soviet Government or the personality of the men in the Kremlin. Their influence on Soviet policy and their approximate order in line of succession to Stalin have been the subject of much speculation in recent years. The following article, reproduced from The Christian Science Monitor (copyright, 1948, by The Christian Science Publishing Society), January 15, 1948, by permission of the editor, presents brief biographical sketches of the leading Soviet statesmen.

The 'Innermost Council'

Thirteen men are grouped around Stalin in the Politburo, the "innermost council" and ultimate policy-making body of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

With the exception of Stalin himself and two or three others, they are virtually "unknown quantities."

They wield enormous power -- separately as well as in unison -- but they seldom are in the public eye. They avoid the limelight and their private lives, characters, foibles, and hobbies are a secret to the world. Only their early backgrounds and the main stages of their careers are a matter of record. From that information available the following brief sketches have been compiled:

Andrei A. Andreyev. Born in Smolensk, 1895, into a peasant family. He became a metal and railway worker, took part in the Revolution and up to 1921 advocated trade-union control for Russia. He later changed his mind, however, and has ever since been one of Stalin's staunchest supporters. He was admitted to the Politburo as early as 1926 and holds the two top posts of Chairman of the Party Control Commission and director of all state and collective farms. He is regarded as an able executive but also a ruthless disciplinarian and one who enjoys the use of power.

Lavrenti P. Beria. A Caucasian, like Stalin, born in 1899. He rose to the rank of police chief in the Caucasus and was appointed head of the NKVD (secret police) in the "purge year" of 1936. Although he delegated direct control of the NKVD to Colonel General Kruglev in April, 1946, he retained the post of People's Commissar of Interior Affairs and is believed still to exercise over-all control over the secret police. He has been an alternate member of the Politburo since 1939.

Nikolai A. Bulganin. Born in 1895 and a member of the Communist Party since 1917. He is famous for Moscow's civilian defense, which he organized as the Capital's wartime Mayor. A deputy member of the Politburo since 1946, he has been Chairman of the Russian State Bank, head of the chemical and metallurgical industries, and at present is Minister of Defense and Deputy Premier.

Lazar M. Kaganovich. Ukrainian-born, in 1893. Trained as a tanner, he joined the Bolsheviks at the age of 18, rose to Party prominence during the Revolution, and was elected to the Politburo in 1930. He holds the portfolio of the Ministry of Railways and is best known for his accomplishments in constructing the Moscow subway and for the fact that he is the only Jewish member of the Politburo. He is credited with major improvements in railway transport before and

during the war and at present is said to be responsible for Ukrainian affairs.

A. N. Kosygin. Born in 1904, he is the youngest member of the Politburo, to which he was elected in 1946. He made a name for himself by his share in the reorganization of Russian textile industry and has held various important government jobs. He is believed to be very close to Stalin.

Nikita S. Krushchev. A Ukrainian miner and miner's son in his early fifties, said to be a protégé of Mr. Kaganovich. He has been a Politburo member since 1939, in addition to being Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and head of the autonomous Ukrainian Government.

Georgi M. Malenkov. A native of Chkalov (Middle Volga region) born in 1902. He had a lightninglike career in the Red Army during the Revolution, and gained broad experiences in his successive jobs as member of the State Defense Committee, the Central Committee, the Orgburo, the Sovnarkom (Council of People's Commissars), and as Stalin's private secretary. He is reputed to have the life history of every important Party member at his fingertips, and, though he did not join the Politburo until 1946, he is considered one of the key figures in the Kremlin, especially since he was recently appointed representative to the Cominform, the new Communist Information Office at Belgrade.

Anastasius I. Mikoyan. Son of an Armenian worker, born at Tbilisi, 1895. Like Stalin, he was a theological student in his youth, and rose to his present position of Minister of Foreign Trade through his ability as organizer of Russia's food industry. Elected to the Politburo in 1936, he is, with the exception of Molotov, the only member of that top council to have visited the United States.

Vyacheslav M. Molotov. Born at Sovietsk, in Vyatka Province, son of a salesman, in 1890. He has been a Party member since 1906, a member of the Politburo since 1926, and Foreign Minister since May, 1939. His appointment to that post marked the end of the Soviet Union's pro-western orientation pursued under Maxim Litvinov.

Nikolai M. Shvernik. A poor worker's son in his late fifties. An old-time Bolshevik who used to control all organized labor in Russia. Though virtually unknown abroad, he enjoys a tremendous reputation among Soviet labor. He succeeded the late M. I. Kalinin as President of the Soviet Union, and was on the strength of that office recently admitted to the Politburo.

Klementy E. Voroshilov. Son of a railroad watchman, born in the Ukraine in 1881. He joined the Party in 1903 and was one of the military heroes of the Revolution. Appointed Commissar of Defense in 1925 and elected to the Politburo in 1926, Marshal Voroshilov, who

is only two years younger than Stalin, is widely believed to play a minor role in the Inner Council.

Nikolai A. Voznesensky. Born in Tula in 1903, he joined the party at the age of 16 and distinguished himself in economic planning. He took an important part in the drafting of the third Five-Year Plan and is said to have been the author of the recent trade pacts between the Soviet Union and the European satellite states. As graduate and instructor of the Moscow Institute of Red Professors he is, besides Zhdanov, the only Politburo member with college education.

Andrei A. Zhdanov. Born as son of a Ukrainian school inspector, in 1896. He did not become a Politburo member until 1934, but has risen to outstanding prominence during the last 13 years. He became widely known as the hero of the 29-month siege of Leningrad. His part in stemming the advance of the German northern army group helped turn the tide against invasion. Since 1934, he has been Secretary General of the Party, a post formerly held by Stalin himself, and is responsible for the co-ordination of army and party policy.

POLICY MAKING IN THE SOVIET UNION

Editor's Note

Information used in preparing this note was gathered from Edgar Snow, The Pattern of Soviet Power; Victor Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, together with an article by the same entitled "Soviet Politbureau" in the Sept. 1946 issue of Fortune; an anonymous article entitled "Soviet Diplomacy in Post-War World," in Corps Diplomatique, Nov. 1, 1946; and the leading article on International Affairs in Time Magazine, Aug. 19, 1946. For changes in Soviet foreign policy see the excellent Report entitled Trends in Russian Foreign Policy Since World War I, prepared for the U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Legislative Reference Service under the direction of Francis O. Wilcox (80th Congress, 1st Session).

To some the aphorism of Foreign Minister Molotov that the Soviet Union need not be studied since "Everybody who can read and write can understand it," may be true. But to most students of international affairs the formation of policy in the U.S.S.R. is one of the most baffling of subjects. Authentic information on precisely how policy is made is lacking. A veil of secrecy is thrown about the functioning of the governmental machinery by its own officials leaving outsiders little choice but surmise.

It is generally appreciated that foreign policy in the Soviet Union may emanate from Generalissimo Stalin personally, from the

Politbureau, from the Council of Ministers, as well as from the Foreign Office (Minindel) itself. Ultimate authority over the Soviet Government is held in the hands of the leader (Vozhd), Josef V. Stalin. From numerous accounts it is clear that the Generalissimo and Foreign Minister Molotov -- whom, it should be remembered, Stalin made Premier of the U.S.S.R. during the years 1930-1939 -- are close personal friends, and confide in one another constantly. It is natural to expect as a result of this that many questions and issues of foreign policy are settled in camera by these two men alone, and that many directives flow straightway from Stalin to the Foreign Ministry for action. Stalin's participation in the Big Three Conferences at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, as well as his frequent picturization at treaty signing ceremonies, attest his activity in matters of foreign affairs. Moreover, the decisions he gave to President Roosevelt on a number of occasions during the war, and those he made during the San Francisco United Nations Conference when negotiations at the Foreign Minister level had reached an impasse, reveal the Generalissimo as being an important part of the machinery of foreign policy making in the Soviet Union.

The central instrument of government and party in Russia is the Politbureau. This body exercises policy control over all governmental departments, and as the chief planning instrument of the Communist Party is "dedicated to the establishment of a communist society throughout the world." The Politbureau is composed of fourteen members including Stalin, who is the chairman, and Molotov who has been a member since 1925. The Politbureau has been described as the "brain trust" of the Soviet Union. Within its sanctum are thrashed out all major issues of national policy. It has been said that there is an inner circle within the Politbureau composed of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Andreyev, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Zhdanov who discuss and often predetermine important policy decisions. According to V. Kravchenko's article on "The Politburo," which appeared in the September 1946 issue of *Fortune*, when important questions regarding foreign policy are to be decided, policy memoranda are prepared simultaneously in advance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (NKVD - the secret police organization), and the Central Committee of the Communist Party representing the essential party interests. These memoranda are said to be elaborately documented and argued at length in the Politbureau after prior discussion by the inner circle. Where quick decisions must be made, Kravchenko says that these are reached by the technique of inter-office memoranda and telephone conferences. At various times in the procedure of international gatherings when the Soviet Foreign Minister has asked for a delay, or engaged in delaying tactics and then come into the conference with a rigid policy line, foreign statesmen have sensed that the subject was referred to Moscow for decision by the Politbureau. In this regard Foreign Minister Molotov, for all of his

position as No. 2 man in Russia, has been spoken of as "perhaps the best executor of policy in the world."

Between the Politbureau and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stands the Council of Ministers. This is composed of Stalin, who is chairman, ten vice chairmen including among their number Molotov, and some 42 Ministers who head the executive departments and bureaus. The Council of Ministers initiates and approves departmental policies within the framework of Politbureau decisions. It exercises general supervision over the ministries, coordinates their activities and gears together the thoughts of the various ministries that have some concern for foreign affairs (e.g. Defense, Foreign Trade, State Planning, Internal Affairs). Although the analogy is not complete, the Council of Ministers functions within the Soviet Government somewhat as does the Cabinet in England and in the United States. The powers, responsibilities and composition of these three bodies vary widely, but their administrative role is roughly the same. Within the Council of Ministers it has been said there is a Presidium of 3 composed of Stalin, Molotov and Mikoyan, together with a Bureau or sort of inner cabinet of 17 highest ranking officials which exercises the principal coordinating, directing and disciplining functions of the council.

In the Foreign Ministry itself and in its day-to-day operation Mr. Molotov exercises a large measure of autonomy. This is not challenged by the power granted by the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. to each of the Soviet Republics "to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic representatives with them" (Article 18a of the Constitution, as amended February 25, 1947). This provision was mainly a concession to "states' rights", in recognition of the heroic role played by certain republics (notably the Ukraine and White Russia) in World War II. Pursuant to its enactment, however, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics have despatched their own representatives to the United Nations and entered into diplomatic relations with some Eastern European satellites. Any observer of United Nations gatherings will note, however, that the Ukrainian and Byelorussian delegates faithfully follow the U.S.S.R. line.

The organization of the Soviet Foreign Ministry reflects the hierarchical structure of the government. Immediately below the Foreign Minister are a number of deputies whose functions are generally analogous to those assigned the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretaries of State in the United States. Mr. Andrei Vishinsky serves as chairman of the Deputy Foreign Ministers. Other present or recent deputies have included Andrei Gromyko, who represents the U.S.S.R. at the United Nations, Fedor Gusev, who is in charge of Western relations and formerly served as Ambassador to Britain, V. G. Dekanozov, who is reported to run the Ministry when Molotov and Vishinsky are

away, Jacob Malik, who has directed Eastern affairs and was formerly Soviet Ambassador to Japan, and V. A. Zorin, who appeared in Czechoslovakia at the time the communists gained control of the Prague government. On a level of near-equal prestige is a corps of specialists, advisers and consultants who reputedly counsel with Molotov and Vishinsky as a sort of cabinet or planning body. Among the prominent Soviet statesmen who have been reported in this group at one time or another have been Maxim Litvinov, Alexander Troyanowsky (both former Ambassadors to the United States), Professor Boris Stein, sometime representative of the U.S.S.R. at United Nations meetings, Ivan Maisky, wartime Ambassador in London, Professor S. B. Krylov, at present Soviet judge in the International Court of Justice, and Professor Sergei Golunsky who is Legal Adviser in the Foreign Ministry.

The lower echelons of the Foreign Office are said to be divided into three main groups, each of which has numerous sections dealing with specific areas and problems. The first grouping comprises the geographical section in which, according to information published in 1946, there are five subdivisions: (1) "Western Europe", including the Scandinavian countries and Poland; (2) Central Europe and the Balkans; (3) "Section West", which encompasses Italy, Spain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain and the American Continents; (4) "Section East", including the Near and Middle East; and (5) a second "Section East", which deals with matters relating to Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan and the Philippine Islands. The second main grouping in the Foreign Office is a "functional" division and has subdivisions responsible for legal, economic, consular, protocol, and press matters. The final group is devoted to administration and contains divisions handling personnel training, finance, etc. Both of these latter groups of divisions correspond in general to the traditional divisions and offices bearing similar designations in the United States State Department and the British Foreign Office. The essential difference, of course, in their operation is that the Soviet divisions function on a basis of Marxist philosophy, as well as upon the foundations of national interest and respect for international law which govern foreign office action elsewhere.

No account of the formation of foreign policy in the Soviet Union would be complete without reference to the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium. Although the legislative branch of the Soviet Government operates in a far less deliberative manner than do the English Parliament or the United States Congress, the Soviet Constitution and laws do assign to the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities certain powers and functions which have a direct bearing upon foreign affairs. The Supreme Soviet does discuss, albeit for the most part in a laudatory way, and act upon reports of the various Ministers including one by the Foreign Minister. Meetings of the Supreme Soviet afford the representatives an opportunity to express views which provide the government

with a modicum of public opinion on issues connected with foreign relations. The Supreme Soviet passes laws, and is the body which declares war on behalf of the Soviet Union.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is elected by both chambers of the legislative body. It comprises a President, sixteen Vice Presidents and fifteen members. According to Article 49 of the Soviet Constitution as revised in 1947, the Presidium interprets the laws, can conduct nation-wide polls, may annul decisions of the Council of Ministers not in conformity to law, appoints and removes the high command of the armed forces, may proclaim war between sessions of the Supreme Soviet "in the event of military attack on the U.S.S.R., or when necessary to fulfill international treaty obligations concerning mutual defense against aggression". It may order mobilization. It "ratifies and denounces" treaties, appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives, and receives the letters of credence and recall of foreign diplomats accredited to the U.S.S.R. by foreign states. Thus, in the realm of foreign policy the Presidium exercises a combination of functions which in the United States are divided between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.

In the space of three decades the personalities in and the tactics of the Foreign Ministry have radically altered. The change has been part of the evolution of Soviet power and has marked the supremacy of Stalinist principles. In the early years of the regime it was part of Lenin's strategy to gain, if not the acceptance, at least the tolerance of the West to win time for the weak Bolshevik Government to establish itself. Accordingly in the official conduct of diplomacy the Russians followed a "correct" course. The Soviet Government scrupulously washed its hands of the Communist International (Comintern) and officially denied it material aid or psychological support. The Foreign Ministry was for several years under the direction of Georgi Chicherin, a diplomat of bourgeois background and training. Soviet embassies were staffed by men whose chief qualification was not their communist zeal but their familiarity with orthodox diplomacy. Throughout this period Soviet emissaries fraternized with their bourgeois colleagues, and occupied themselves almost solely with the promotion of Russian national interests. At the same time, however, communism as a working philosophy was vigorously propagated within Russia and, even without the formal support of the government, it continued to flourish abroad.

By the end of 1927 when Stalin had emerged as undisputed ruler the staying-power of the Soviet Government was generally conceded by the community of nations. Only the United States, among the major powers, had not accorded diplomatic recognition to the Bolsheviks. Moreover, by 1928 the ruling communist minority had been in office long enough to have begun the selective training of a professional foreign service grounded, as their predecessors were not, in Marxian dialectic-

tics. In 1930 Chicherin was followed as Commissar of Foreign Affairs by Maxim Litvinov, an old revolutionary, who remained until 1939 when Vyacheslav Molotov was transferred to the Foreign Ministry from the Premiership. These changes, together with the attitude of Stalin, who had never approved divorcing communism from Soviet diplomacy, led to the gradual fusing of Soviet foreign policy with the revolutionary philosophy of the Marxists. Ostensibly, the Comintern remained an extra-governmental organization and Moscow assumed no responsibility for its activities abroad. But through the years the Foreign Office quietly and carefully recruited personnel from the ranks of the Comintern. Even communist nationals of neighboring states, who had fled to Russia because of the Nazi menace before and during the war, were temporarily transferred from their positions in the Communist International to the Soviet Foreign Office. Outstanding among these political refugees were Ana Pauker, now Rumanian Foreign Minister, and Georgi Dimitroff, present Prime Minister of Bulgaria. By 1944 when Stalin ordered the dissolution of the Comintern, the decree was largely a hollow formality, for the functions and philosophy of the organization had already been absorbed by the Foreign Ministry and the diplomatic corps. The revitalization of the Comintern in 1947, under the pseudonym "Cominform", was partly a psychological and defensive move against the positive diplomacy of the West. At the same time this move represented a step in the Politbureau's strategy of gearing the communist movements throughout Europe closer to the main wheel of Moscow direction.

As a result of the Kremlin's efforts over the past twenty years, Soviet foreign policy today is the hybrid product of national interests and ideology. Only in the light of both these factors can the devious strands of Russian diplomacy be untangled and set in a meaningful pattern.

WHAT THE RUSSIAN GENERALS ARE THINKING

By Ellsworth L. Raymond

Reproduced from United Nations World (copyright 1947 by U.N. World Inc.), March 1948, by permission of the managing editor. In the following article Mr. Raymond, who was formerly Chief of the U. S. Army's Russian Economic Section, discusses the revolution in Russian military thinking which has occurred within the last year and a half. The new concept of the armed services as a subordinate instrument of the Politburo represents a further centralization of power in the hands of that body, and will inevitably influence the formation and conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

The month of February, 1947, brought a revolutionary change in the Soviet Union's military philosophy which in its potential consequences may be truthfully compared with the political changes that occurred in Russia in 1917.

The change went generally unnoticed in the outside world, even though it shook the armed forces of the USSR from top to bottom. With it the Soviet Union embarked upon a path of coordinated military thinking, divorcing itself from the German prototype on which its former theories and practices were traditionally patterned. A new military philosophy was born and today it confronts the rest of the world.

In its simplest terms, it is the Soviet version of Total War -- far more comprehensive in time and space, in men and weapons, in strategy and tactics, in methods and attitudes than the German total war, that seems primitive by comparison.

The change came rather unexpectedly and without warning in the midst of a violent but effectively concealed argument between the Communist Party and the marshals of the Red Army.

During World War II, the failures of such "Party marshals" as Voroshilov, Budyenny and Zhdanov, and the successes of professional soldiers like Zhukov, Malinovsky, Rokossovsky and Konev, established the marshals in a position of military dominance. Firmly entrenched in popular esteem and apparently also in the Soviet political hierarchy, the marshals proceeded to create a post-war army according to their own predominantly professional military concepts.

The crux of this concept was a complete divorce of the armed forces from the Communist Party, an autonomy in both technical and political matters which no other organ of the Soviet state enjoys. The structure of the armed forces was to be established along conventional military lines, with emphasis on land warfare devoted to the defense of the Soviet Fatherland. There appeared no place for political or

revolutionary consideration in this concept. The army was to follow the teachings of its idol, the 19th century German General Karl Clausewitz who, at one time in his career, actually served Tsarist Russia.

A triumph of these concepts was bound to create a static army, similar to the professional standing armies of the West, whose non-political character is constantly emphasized. This clashed with the dynamic concept of Bolshevism in which the army is one of several political instruments of revolution, the terms "war" and "revolution" being alternately used to describe the same struggle.

The leader of the movement within the Red Army was Marshal Gregory K. Zhukov, hero of Moscow, and the man who saved Leningrad when it had seemed doomed as a result of the panicky blunders of the "political marshals," Voroshilov and Zhdanov. Around Zhukov was a small group of professional soldiers, including Marshal Novikov of the Air Forces.

Opposing him was the Communist Party as a whole, led by Bulganin, its top military specialist. Within the Red Army, Marshals Rokossovsky and Konev appeared to be the most prominent members of opposition to Zhukov.

The outside world suspected the existence of some controversy, but had no inkling as to its actual nature. On October 1, 1946, General Eisenhower remarked that he had not heard from Zhukov for a year. At that time Zhukov was already in disfavor.

Then, in February 1947, the behind-the-scenes clash burst into the open. The magazine Bolshevik, authoritative theoretical journal of the Party, published a letter by Stalin the significance of which escaped all but insiders. It was written to a certain Colonel E. Razin, known to be the theoretician of the Zhukov group, purportedly in answer to the Colonel's inquiry about the place Clausewitz occupied in Russian military thinking.

Colonel Razin quoted Lenin's endorsement of Clausewitz in an attempt to justify a continued acceptance of the German's theories. But Stalin used blunt language to demolish this argument:

"In contrast to Engels," Stalin wrote, "Lenin did not regard himself as a military expert . . . Consequently, Lenin approached Clausewitz's works, not as a military man, but as a politician, and was merely interested in questions raised by Clausewitz insofar as they concerned the relationship between war and politics."

Then Stalin posed the crucial question: "Should we criticize the military doctrine of Clausewitz?" He answered it in unequivocal words: "Yes, we should! . . . Clausewitz has certainly aged as a military authority. He was a representative of the manual period of war.

But now we live in the machine period of warfare. This period requires new military theorists. It has now become ridiculous to accept the teachings of Clausewitz."

The role of the army in the Soviet order of things was completely redefined along lines which Stalin himself described as "the three major characteristics of the Red Army." According to him, the Red Army is, "first, a weapon for the liberation of workers and peasants from the yoke of landowners and capitalists; second, it is an army of brotherhood among the peoples of the USSR; and, third, it is imbued with the spirit of internationalism, an army of world revolution, an army of the workers of all countries."

The strategic concept which thus re-emerged is outlined in detail in the classic manual of the Red Army. This is Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov's The Brain of the Army, a two volume work on the role and functions of the General Staff in war.

...

Shaposhnikov accepts Clausewitz's basic tenet that war is a continuation of politics by other means, but he proposes to go far beyond it. According to him war is both the highest form and the most important weapon of politics.

"Wars are conducted by states," Shaposhnikov wrote, and "not by the armed forces alone. ... In the final analysis, victory is gained or defeat is suffered, not by armies, but by peoples as a whole. With them is defeated or helped to victory the entire machinery of the state in whose hands the direction of the war must be concentrated."

The practical strategic consequence of this doctrine is the alternate use of politics and of war, either singly or jointly, as circumstances demand. This type of "war" is not directed by any one military organization, but by the supreme political organization of the state, in Russia's case the Politbureau.

Thus war assumes a total and permanent character. Every act of the state and of its individual parts represents a tactical move to implement the strategic concept. From this point of view, a speech delivered by Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky at Lake Success, the general strike of French workers, the building of a new power plant in the Kazakh Republic, the term papers prepared by children of the Russian Schools must be regarded as tactical moves.

In contrast to Zhukov's ideas, the whole nation is engaged in a permanent and total effort, maintaining its military might merely as a deterrent or an implement of persuasion or, to be used only as a last resort.

In the light of this development, it may be stated categorically that the Soviet Union does not want a shooting war now, in ten years,

or at any time in the future. The outbreak of a shooting war would constitute evidence of her complete political failure.

While her political forces are engaged in the waging of an admittedly aggressive struggle, Russia's military forces are trained along largely defensive lines.

This statement may seem to be in conflict with the superficial picture of Russian military strength presented at this moment. According to American intelligence sources, the Soviet Union has 4,500,000 men under arms. It has a total of 14,000 combat planes, including 1,000 long range bombers comparable to the American B-29. A considerable portion of the Soviet Air Force is composed of jet fighters.

But the strength of the Soviet army must be viewed qualitatively rather than quantitatively, especially in its relation to the Soviet Union's world-wide commitments, and in the light of its standard of mechanization. In this context, the apparently overwhelming military preponderance of the Soviet Union is likely to shrink considerably.

Military thinking in the Soviet Union now recognizes the integrated role which the Soviet armed forces play. This is the major theme of military thinking within Marshal Vassilevsky's General Staff in which today younger officers predominate. The complete coordination is further reflected in the fact that all staff officers above the rank of captain must be Party members, whose adherence to the Party line is matched by their military skill.

...

How ... do Russian military thinkers envisage the shape of a future war? According to them it will undoubtedly start with a mass attack from the air, in which the attacker will utilize all kinds of absolute weapons, leading to a temporary economic paralysis of the attacked. On this score, Soviet military specialists state bluntly that they do not expect decision in this "first phase" of the future war. They are emphatic in their belief that the war will continue long after this first all-out assault. Since decision cannot be gained immediately, they expect the war to "settle down" to a protracted period of attrition, not unlike the period which followed the initial German attack on Russia in World War II, on a far more gigantic scale.

This indecisive strategic assault is expected to be followed by the second phase in which conventional armaments are again expected to come into their own. Among such conventional weapons are now listed jet planes, rocket guns and guided missiles.

The decisive phase of this imaginary war is its third in which the nation attacked mounts, what Colonel Pavlenko of the Soviet General Staff calls, the "strategic counter-offensive." It is in this third phase

that all new weapons are put to effective tactical use with an appropriate regard for vastly increased mobility and firepower.

The scope of this strategic counter-offensive knows no limitations. It aims at "the total annihilation of the exhausted and defeated enemy." This phase ends with what General Bronewski calls "operational pursuit on a strategic scale" in which jet planes and self-propelled rocket artillery plays a predominant role.

From this description of the future war based on original Soviet sources it is evident that the Russians expect to be attacked in the first phase, and to mount the strategic counter-offensive in the third. Despite the departure from Clausewitz's theories, they still agree with the German military philosopher that geography is the invincible ally of the Russians. It is their geographical advantage which permits them gargantuan retreats in depth which, they believe, will enable them to withstand the second phase and prepare for the third during its protracted period of attrition.

Thus it may be said that Soviet military theorists think of World War III in terms of World War II. In this respect, it would appear that the frequently voiced criticism of the French General Staff fits them with uncanny accuracy: they are perfectly prepared for the last war.

But it must not be forgotten that the armed forces of the USSR represent but one component of the complex machinery with which the Soviet Union expects to wage its particular brand of war. In the words of Major Kryvelov, men rather than machines, morale rather than atomic bombs will decide the next war. It is in the human equation that the Soviet Union believes itself to be superior to all of its potential opponents, not only because of the greater stamina of its own people in the face of an atomic war, but even more through its ability to foment revolutions behind its enemies' lines.

SOVIET PARTY 'CELLS' WEAVE PATTERN FOR ARMY COUPS

By R. H. Markham

Reproduced from The Christian Science Monitor (copyright, 1948, by the Christian Science Publishing Society), March 20, 1948, by permission of the editor. The role of the Communist Party in carrying out Soviet foreign policy through the organization of "action committees" in third countries is described here by a staff writer of The Monitor who has spent many years in the Balkans.

Various sources indicate that Communist-led "Action Committees" played a major role in bringing a Communist-dominated regime to power in Czechoslovakia.

...

An action committee is a revolutionary "cell" or conspiratorial group following political aims. Its power depends upon the revolutionary framework in which it operates. At the beginning, such committees are secret. Prior to power seizure they are "illegal."

Action committees are basic units of Communist parties, and, as a rule, are composed of tried, and ruthless volunteers. They are ready for any action, however unpleasant, and the members usually have pledged themselves to make the supreme sacrifice.

Such cells have been vital factors in communism for more than 50 years. During most of the present century, they have contained some women. ...

These conspiratorial bands make a Communist party different from most other political parties. Communists through secret cells almost always operate partially underground, even when in power. Always when in a coalition. They are almost never what they seem.

How many members in a committee? That depends upon the institution in which the committee functions and the work to be done. Every such committee has at least three members, and usually it hasn't more than a dozen. The head of each committee is a dictator, just as the head of the network of committees, belonging to the Central Committee or National Committee, is a dictator.

Communists openly and proudly call their regimes a "dictatorship of the proletariat," but they also like to use the more genial term "centralized democracy" -- that's a "Sunday name" to be used before company.

Here is an illustration of how an action committee is formed and how it works:

A Bulgarian Communist, with whom I have been acquainted for more than 15 years, told me in the autumn of 1945 in Sofia, that Sept. 7, 1944, he had left his home, and gone to the mountains, illegally.

Communist veterans feel ashamed and unworthy, if at some time or another they have not been "ee-le-gál."

This Bulgarian Communist, a university graduate and expert agronomist, met his committee colleagues in the mountains -- as when an army is mobilized -- and during the night of Sept. 8/9, when the Communists seized power in Sofia, his action committee moved to its objective, a mountain village, where it seized the town hall.

That was that committee's part in the revolution. For that its members had been secretly prepared. And that kind of action by that kind of committee took place throughout Bulgaria. In the course of two days' action committees had the country in their hands.

The overturn had been planned with extreme care and was led by revolutionists who had come from Russia. Already the Soviet Army had crossed the Danube into Bulgaria and was approaching Sofia, so success was assured. Resistance was useless. Most of the nation stood around confused and dazed, or confused and expectant, while 15,000 Communists took over 7,000,000 people.

And they are still masters. At first their power was tentative and partial. They shared it with gullible, democratic colleagues. Now Communist power is consolidated, streamlined, and absolute.

Here is a much more recent example:

In Bratislava, March 6, at 1 p.m. a Slovak Communist announced over the radio: "The parliamentary action committee reports that the following members of Parliament are no longer to be considered members of the Government Front." Then followed the names of 18 important Members of Parliament who had been chosen at fair elections by the Slovak people.

After that, the announcer went on to say most solemnly: "If these men haven't resigned or don't resign, they'll be considered in the opposition camp." In other words, they were publicly proscribed. In Communist-ruled lands, to be declared an oppositionist is practically the same as being pronounced an "outlaw."

In addition, the radiocaster proclaimed that the action committee rejected the cooperation of 21 other Members of Parliament.

In other words, this small self-appointed Communist-led action committee presumed to decide who must resign and who might continue to serve in Parliament. So irresistible was the authority of the committee that every person who was authorized to return to Parliament voted as the Government asked. The opposition disappeared; unanimity reigned.

To realize what that meant, an American could picture a self-appointed committee announcing over an American national hook-up that on the following day 20 senators, listed by name, should resign or be considered outlaws.

As the Czechoslovak Parliament was thus purged, every organization in the country was purged in a similar manner. Factory committees took over factories, sport committees took over sport clubs, newspaper committees took over newspapers, women's committees took over women's organizations, school committees took over schools, Boy Scout committees took over the Boy Scouts.

In Yugoslavia, the action committees are called Odbori; in Bulgaria, komeetete. In both cases they have acted in exactly the same manner. In Bulgaria, indeed, priests' action committees even took over the clerical organizations. In all the eastern European lands they have taken over property, including houses, automobiles, furniture, and in some cases clothes.

In these nations, the committees correspond, roughly, with what the Russian Bolsheviks call Soviets. A Communist government or a Soviet government is government by committees -- self-appointed, extra-legal, Communist committees.

Now one asks: How do such committees manage to seize everything?

The answer is plain, though not simple:

1. The Communists are well organized and well trained while their opponents are not.

2. The Communists undertake sudden, nationwide action, which sweeps their opponents off their feet.

3. The Communists' technique is to operate after they have intimidated and confused the non-Communists by mass demonstrations, violence, and deceit.

4. Many of the Communists are armed, while the others are not.

5. Communists, before acting, obtain the support of the army, the police, a specially formed militia, and semimilitary groups.

If Communists have been a minority everywhere -- and they admittedly are -- why do the non-Communists permit action committees to get possession of key positions and to build up armed force?

There is a double answer:

1. The Soviet Army forcibly placed Communists in key positions throughout eastern Europe, after which Communist cells stealthily created an all-enveloping network of power.

2. Communist action committees in all cases have used deceit. They have called themselves "democratic" or "progressive" or "reformist." They have denounced "reaction, feudalism, exploitation, fascism." Thus they disarm opposition. They operate as "liberators."

Everywhere, without exception, they have set up "third parties" or "fronts" and lured "liberals" into the fronts. Having thus broken the ranks of non-Communist forces, Communist committees destroy their opponents, one section at a time. In this destruction, they include their "liberal" dupes.

Most action committees in eastern Europe contain some non-Communists to serve as bait or lure. This is the case in Czechoslovakia, Finland, Italy -- and also in China. A new "front" has just been established in the last-named country.

Can Communist action committees succeed in countries where they do not control such vital institutions as the army, police, courts, and propaganda?

In such countries their success is far slower and far smaller. For instance, they have been frustrated in France, Norway, Greece. Communists have never in history won power without the use of force. Deceit and conspiracy have not proved sufficient. So far, action committees always have appealed to force -- as in Czechoslovakia.

THE SOVIET-FINNISH MUTUAL AID TREATY

The following treaty, concluded in Moscow April 6, 1948, marked the latest in a series of bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and its neighbors. It represented one phase in the overall Soviet foreign policy of consolidating Eastern Europe as a bloc against the West.

The Presidium of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' Supreme Soviet and the President of the Finnish Republic,

Aiming at the further development of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Finland,

And convinced that the strengthening of good neighborly relations and cooperation . . . meet the vital interests of both countries,

And taking into account Finland's desire to stand aside from contradictions between the interests of great powers,

And expressing their inalienable endeavor for cooperation in the interests of upholding international peace and security in accord with the principles of the United Nations Organization,

Have decided to conclude with these purposes the present treaty . . .

ARTICLE 1

In the event of Finland's or the Soviet Union's, across the territory of Finland, becoming objects of military aggression on the part of Germany or another state allied with her, Finland, loyal to her duty as an independent state, will fight to rebuff aggression. In that event, Finland will send all the forces at her disposal to defend the integrity of her territory on land, sea and in the air, acting within the boundaries of her frontiers, in accordance with her duties by the present treaty, with the assistance, in the event of necessity, of the Soviet Union or together

with it.

In the above case, the Soviet Union will render Finland necessary assistance, on the rendering of which the parties will reach mutual agreement.

ARTICLE 2

The high contracting parties will consult each other in the event of the existence of a threat of military attack provided for under Article 1.

ARTICLE 3

The high contracting parties confirm their intention to participate in the most frank manner in all enterprises aimed at the upholding of international peace and security in accord with the purposes and principles of the United Nations organization.

ARTICLE 4

The high contracting parties confirm the obligation to refrain from concluding any kind of an alliance or to participate in coalitions aimed at the other high contracting party, as provided in Article 3 of the peace treaty signed in Paris Feb. 10, 1947.

ARTICLE 5

The high contracting parties confirm their determination to act in the spirit of cooperation and friendship for the purpose of further development and consolidation of economic and cultural relations between the Soviet Union and Finland

ARTICLE 6

The high contracting parties pledge themselves to follow the principles of mutual respect of state sovereignty and independence as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of the other state.

ARTICLE 7

The realization of the present treaty will be in accord with the principles of the United Nations organization.

ARTICLE 8

The present treaty is subject to ratification and will be in force for a period of ten years beginning from the date of its entry into force. The treaty will come into force from the day of exchange of ratification instruments to be effected in Helsinki in the shortest possible time.

If neither of the high contracting parties denounces the treaty one year prior to the aforesaid expiration in ten years, the terms of the treaty will remain in force for every subsequent five years until one of the high contracting parties gives written notice one year prior to the termination of the current five-year period of its intention to suspend its validity.

CHAPTER VII

THE PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy is defined as the art and practice of conducting international negotiations and consists of various procedures whereby the nation seeks to implement its foreign policy. In the realm of big-power relations a number of factors determine the success of a country's diplomacy. It must be based on integrated, thoughtful and inclusive objectives which are realistic in terms of national interests and national strength. The professional diplomat should be thoroughly cognizant of the overall foreign policy of his government and of the relative importance of his particular assignment in the total scheme. Because diplomacy is of necessity a two-way street, compromise is one of its essential ingredients. The process of adjusting conflicting viewpoints peaceably and without the sacrifice of basic policy objectives requires the utmost in skill and maturity. These attributes, together with a sense of timing and an ability to distinguish between that which is possible and that which is desirable at a given moment, are indispensable to the successful diplomat. Only an efficient corps of trained experts is adequate for the manifold tasks of diplomacy today, which include the gathering and analysis of information, representation of the nation abroad, and the drafting and implementation of policy objectives. Accordingly, the nation's foreign service plays an increasingly responsible role in the practice of diplomacy.

The initiation of the United States in active world politics in the First World War marked the beginning of a new trend in international negotiations towards what President Wilson termed "open covenants openly arrived at." The partial substitution of "forum diplomacy" for the historic secret conference behind closed doors reflected the growing influence of American democratic procedures on the conduct of international relations. This trend was manifested in the work of the League of Nations. It has been accelerated since World War II. The meetings of United Nations bodies have been notable for the wide publicity attending them. Some of the results of open diplomacy have not been salutary, however. Compromise between conflicting views is rendered more difficult when preliminary negotiations are conducted before the bar of world opinion, and the temptation to exploit public conferences for purposes of nationalistic propaganda is not conducive to the furtherance of international cooperation. Nevertheless, the potential advantages of open diplomacy -- such as the arousing of greater popular interest in world problems and of a broader sense of international responsibility on the part of leading diplomats -- go far to counteract the difficulties involved.

For general readings on the practice of diplomacy see F. L. Schuman, International Politics, Chapter IV; Sharp and Kirk, Contemporary International Politics, pp. 33-40, and Chapter XX; J. R. Childs,

American Foreign Service; The Foreign Affairs Reader, pp. 1-9, 395-413; Current Readings on International Relations, No. 2, Chapter V.

THE CHALLENGES OF OPEN DIPLOMACY

By Paul-Henri Spaak

Reproduced, by permission of the editor and the author, from The New York Times Magazine, December 22, 1946. The trend away from traditional "secret diplomacy" since the end of the war reflects the growing influence of democratic thought (notably American) on the conduct of international relations. The respective advantages and disadvantages of "open covenants openly arrived at" comprise the subject of the following article. Mr. Spaak, who is Premier of Belgium, was formerly President of the U. N. General Assembly.

Is the world fully aware that a veritable diplomatic revolution has been under way since the end of the war? For the first time in history, we dwell under the sign of open diplomacy.

After the first World War a timid, incomplete and sometimes even rather hypocritical effort was made at Geneva to put an end to secret diplomacy. At Geneva there were public sessions of the League of Nations, but they were carefully prepared behind the scenes, everyone played the role assigned him, and if anybody allowed himself to disregard the rules of the game, he was promptly labeled an enfant terrible.

Since San Francisco, this has no longer been the case. Most diplomatic meetings are public in the real sense of the word, that is to say, each delegate attending them openly sets forth the point of view of his Government, defends it, has no fear of opposing other delegates, often passionately, and accepts victory or defeat in the discussion itself; all this as millions of men and women watch with great interest.

Public opinion has hardly been prepared for this radical transformation. To be sure, for a long time many worthy souls have been quite properly demanding the end of secret diplomacy. President Wilson received many expressions of approbation and encouragement when he made himself the official champion of that idea.

... Secret diplomacy is a method contrary to the democratic principles which dominate the world today, and is completely inadmissible, now that war demands the cooperation and eventual sacrifices not only of some professional soldiers, but of whole nations. People who accept fighting as a duty have the right to know the fundamental reasons for which they are required to risk their lives.

This seems to me to be indisputable. Never again will anyone be able to propose a return to secret transactions of the chancelleries, to hidden dealings, to an international political system and methods not responsible to the control of the people. If, as I believe, this is the truth, it behooves us to adapt our minds to it and modify our attitudes.

The numerous and often sensational international debates with which we have been regaled these past months have, according to all the evidence, surprised, confused and even disquieted world public opinion, which found itself brusquely confronted with some of the consequences of that open diplomacy which it had demanded. People are not accustomed to seeing the representative of a great nation expound without dissembling the aims which he proposes to achieve, and, more frankly still, oppose the aims which others propose to achieve.

This sort of thing has given rise to angry remarks, sometimes very sharp, which recall internal parliamentary fights rather than the manners, so reserved, so delicately shaded, so subtle, which once characterized diplomacy.

But there is no reason, it seems to me, for us to be disturbed about this. Rather, we should be concerned to adapt ourselves to it. When the chief of a parliamentary opposition vigorously attacks the head of a Government, nobody imagines that civil war is imminent. When the representative of a great nation attacks the representative of another great nation, that does not mean war is at our gates. It is, quite simply, the visible and, without doubt, inevitable result of a new method of diplomacy.

Everything which is happening today before our eyes has happened in the past -- but in other forms. Diplomatic notes, ambassadorial demarches, all such activities, of which the peoples sensed only the feeble echoes and in which the element of mystery could not but alarm them, are today replaced by the open, resounding speeches of foreign ministers encountering and opposing one another.

...

Never has the responsibility of the journalist been so great as it is today. He must avoid two great pitfalls: indiscretion and dramatization of developments. Let him accept the idea that he should not try to foresee too much; let him be content to comment on news when he has verified it. Hints, rumors, half-truths and allusions charge and trouble the atmosphere; they are capable of considerably hampering the work of diplomats, they tend to discourage good intentions and to bring projected plans to failure.

As to dramatizing events, that must be avoided above everything. ... In commenting on international diplomacy, the journalist should endeavor to distinguish what is basic from what is propaganda, and he should try, in a spirit of understanding and fairness, to canalize

a public opinion already too sensitive to various manifestations of open diplomacy.

For, let us beware. We have launched into open diplomacy with all the ardor of neophytes, and I believe that we have gone a little too far.

A comparison, drawn from cookery, will make my meaning clear.

I think it entirely right that people should be informed about what their diplomat-cooks propose to give them, that they should know the dinner menu which is being prepared for them. But I wonder if it is really necessary that the people should know not only the recipes, but that they should also take part in preparing the dishes. The best way of stimulating appetites is surely not to plant one's self in the kitchen. Even in the best-ordered kitchen, there are too many peelings!

Today, statesmen are expected not only to make their ideas known, to state their aims and pursue them publicly, but people also want to know their methods, their proceedings in discussion and to see every phase of their work.

This continuous publicity has very often transformed a diplomat into a propagandist.

At Paris, during the twenty-one-nation conference, this grave fault was revealed to the fullest extent. Many speeches were made not to convince colleagues but with the manifest intention of impressing public opinion, more particularly, the public opinion of the country which the orator represented.

What a temptation it was, indeed, what an occasion to justify one's self before journalists from all the corners of the earth! But what a danger, too! For once a position is taken in such circumstances, and has been expounded before such an audience, it becomes difficult and often impossible to modify it.

Public debates do not speed up action or encourage compromises and, because of that, do not create the best atmosphere for finding solutions of problems.

Herein one unquestionably finds the weakest point in the new diplomacy. The new method influences diplomats to seek successes which are more orators' and politicians' successes than diplomatic ones, properly speaking, and it requires courage and self-reliance infinitely greater than if things were done, as in the past, in private sessions. For the least check encountered is now known to the entire world.

Thus, open diplomacy does not constitute a perfect method. It has its dangers and its shortcomings. It requires statesmen who are

at once well informed and very influential and, at the same time, one demands a patient, calm and informed public opinion.

All these conditions are not completely met today. That is in part the reason for the confusion and uneasiness in which we live.

But the experiment which we have undertaken can be perfected. The actors, little by little, will play their roles better, they will doubtless renounce useless speeches, they will come to understand that, when all is said and done, it is worth more in the eyes of the people to be moderate and firm than unfairly aggressive; and the spectators, growing accustomed to the new method, will form their judgments with more care and poise than they do today.

Then open diplomacy will become truly effective. It will attain its end, which is to create an enlightened world opinion, thoroughly up to date, which will no longer consider international problems mysteries, no longer think international questions so delicate and complex that they must be left for just a few little groups of initiates to deal with.

Then the peoples will understand international problems the way they understand their domestic problems, they will really interest themselves in international politics and will influence it directly. Then a real step toward a just and durable peace will have been taken.

THE RIVALRY OF NATIONS

By Walter Lippmann

Reproduced from The Atlantic Monthly (copyright 1948, by The Atlantic Monthly Company), February 1948, by permission of the editor and the author. Mr. Lippmann has been a student of international politics over a period of three decades. In the following article he analyzes some of the weaknesses of American diplomacy, which he attributes to an error in our philosophy of international life. Readers of this article may wish to refer to two of Mr. Lippmann's more recent books: The Cold War (1947), and U. S. Foreign Policy Shield of the Republic (1943).

If we study the history of American foreign relations during the past forty years, we must be struck by an extraordinary paradox. During this period the United States has emerged from its long isolation. It has become one of the leading powers of the world. Not once but twice during this period the American people have had to face the awful issues of war and peace. Can it be said that during this momentous period we have ever succeeded in forming and agreeing on a foreign policy which foresaw correctly and enabled us to deal successfully

with the actual course of events? The record is, I think, clear. We have won both wars. But on the crucial issues our diplomacy has thus far always miscarried. It has been unable to prevent war. It has been unable to avoid war. It has not prepared us for war. It has not been able to settle the wars when they have been fought and won.

At no critical phase in this epoch has the actual outcome conformed with our declarations and our expectations. Never has the country been able to achieve any of the principal objectives to which again and again it has been so solemnly and fervently committed.

Thus from 1914 to 1917 the country believed and hoped that it could avoid participation in the First World War. Yet it was compelled to participate. And when it did participate, it was unprepared because it had believed that it would not have to participate. During that war the country hoped and believed that by a victory it would achieve a lasting and democratic peace. The victory was attained. But the peace which had been promised was not achieved. After the First World War the country again believed that if there were another war, it would be able to remain out of it. Again it did not prepare for war. Once again it was unable to remain out of the war when it came.

During the Second World War the country again believed that with victory over the Germans there would begin an era in which all the victorious powers would agree and be harmonious and become unanimous on the terms and conditions of a just and durable peace. We have had the victory. But we have not been able to attain that peace.

Now, after two victorious world wars we find ourselves discussing the possibility of a third world war. And so we must ask ourselves whether we have become entangled in a degenerating cycle of wars that breed more wars, each more savage and more inconclusive than the last. It is a grim question. We must, however, face it; and I believe that we must answer it by saying that if our present estimates and calculations are no more correct than those on which we acted before, during, and immediately after the First and Second World Wars, then we shall be surprised and disappointed again. Once more we shall not know how to prevent war, or how to prepare for it correctly, or how, assuming we win it, to make peace after it. And if a second world war leads to the third -- because we cannot make a settlement of the war we have just won -- what ground is there to suppose that we could settle a third world war so that it did not lead to a fourth?

Is it not true . . . that the course of events during the American rise to pre-eminence is strewn with the debris and wreckage of high and hopeful declarations of policy: with Wilson's neutrality, Wilson's Fourteen Points, and the Covenant of the League of Nations; with the Washington treaties of disarmament and the Kellogg pact to outlaw war; with the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan, and the Hoover Moratorium to

reconstruct the world after the First World War; with the Stimson doctrine to prevent aggression; with the Neutrality Act before the Second World War; with the quarantine speech of Franklin Roosevelt, and the Four Freedoms, and Hull's Seventeen Points, and the Atlantic Charter, and the Yalta Declaration, and the Truman Doctrine ?

When we reflect on this series of declarations and the disappointments which followed them all, we must be struck by the contrast between our capacity as a people to develop national power, and our ability to use it and to manage it successfully. And is it not plain that our failures lie in the field of policy -- that is to say, in deciding correctly when, where, how, and to what ends we shall exert the enormous power and influence which we are able to generate ?

It cannot be argued that the miscarriages of American diplomacy during the past forty years are due to the weakness of the American nation. ...

We must seek the cause of our diplomatic failures, therefore, in our own minds. We must look for the cause of trouble not in material circumstances but in our own habits of thought when we are dealing with foreign affairs and with the formation of American policy. ...

We have brought along with us ... from the nineteenth century when we were isolated and when we were sheltered from the rivalries of states and empires, an ideological picture of the world ... [which] is imaginary and false. And because our philosophy of the nature of international life is imaginary and false our efforts to play an effective part in world affairs are frustrated.

2

What then is it in our philosophy which, instead of guiding us, misguides us continually ? ... I think the error is a refusal ... to take as the premise of our thinking, the fact that rivalry and strife and conflict among states, communities, and factions are the normal condition of mankind. The popular American philosophy of international life refuses to recognize this fact. It denies that in the world as it is, the struggle for existence is fundamental and in the nature of things. This, I believe, is the philosophical error which prevents us from forming an effective foreign policy.

In the American ideology the struggle for existence, and the rivalry of nations for advantages, are held to be wrong, abnormal, and transitory. Our foreign policy throughout this period has been dominated by the belief that the struggle does not exist, or that it can be avoided, or that it can be abolished. Because of this belief our aim has not been to regulate and to moderate and to compose the conflicts and the issues, to check and to balance the contending forces. Our aim has been either to abstain from the struggle, or to abolish the struggle

immediately, or to conduct crusades against those nations that most actively continue the struggle.

Yet in the world as it actually is, the struggle is not abnormal, and it is perpetually renewed. . . . Twice we have sought, by forming universal societies like the League of Nations and the United Nations, to abolish the struggle. They have not abolished the struggle.

Our refusal to recognize the struggle for existence as the normal state of mankind in international affairs has resulted in the repeated miscarriage of American policies. Our efforts to deal with events, as if they conformed or could be made to conform with our ideological picture of what they ought to be, has been rather like using a map of Utopia to find your way around New York City.

The American refusal to recognize the struggle for existence has in this century crystallized in three recognizable patterns of conduct: in a neutrality which assumes that the struggle can be ignored and avoided; in crusades that assume that by defeating the chief troublemaker the struggle for existence will end; in the sponsorship of a universal society which assumes that the struggle can be abolished.

Since 1914 American relations with the outer world have oscillated among these three patterns of conduct. The great debates within this country have turned upon them. But the experience of these forty years shows conclusively, I think, that if we insist on treating the conflict of states, communities, and factions as abnormal, as exceptional, as transitory, we are unable to form an efficient foreign policy. Our American ideology, which we have brought over from a time when we did not have to play a responsible part among the powers of the earth, distorts our judgment when we deal with the problems of power. It distorts our judgment when we have to calculate how a balance can be struck between our aims and our power to realize them.

In practical judgments -- and diplomacy, when the stakes are life and death, calls for very practical judgments -- the criteria are always relative. There is no such thing as absolute power. Whatever the wealth, the power, and the prestige of a nation may be, its means are always limited. The problem of the maker of policy is to select objectives that are limited -- not the best that could be desired but the best that can be realized without committing the whole power and the whole wealth and the very existence of the nation.

But if we examine the issues of foreign policy as they are presented to our people, we find an overwhelming disposition to regard the choices before us not as relative but as absolute. We are disposed to think that the issue is either this or that, either all or nothing, either isolationism or globalism, either total peace or total war, either one world or no world, either disarmament or absolute weapons, either

pious resolutions or atomic bombs, either disarmament or military supremacy, either nonintervention or a crusade, either democracy or tyranny, either the abolition of war or a preventive war, either appeasement or unconditional surrender, either nonresistance or a strategy of annihilation.

There is no place in this ideological pattern of the world for the adoption of limited ends or limited means, for the use of checks and balances among contending forces, for the demarcation of spheres of influence and of power and of interest, for accommodation and compromise and adjustment, for the stabilization of the status quo, for the restoration of an equilibrium. Yet this is the field of diplomacy. These are the substance and the matter of an efficient diplomacy.

Our ideologists, however, regard the use of power to achieve and maintain an equilibrium of power as "power politics." And they regard the recognition of spheres of influence as "appeasement." Yet in the absence of a world state, and except in a world dominated by one supreme power, there must be an equilibrium among several powers and a recognition of their spheres of influence. A diplomacy for the world as it is, which is not to expend itself in verbal declarations on the one hand, and on crusades of annihilation on the other, must deal with the balance of power and the determination of spheres of influence.

But under the spell of our ideological picture of the world, we exclude from our minds the very subject matter of diplomacy itself. We would exclude it, we would outlaw it, and we would excommunicate those who discuss it. We insist on treating the rivalry of nations as something that could not exist among right-thinking men. We do not regulate the rivalries because we hold that the rivalries ought not to exist. And so we are left with our three patterns of policy: to ignore the rivalries by proclaiming our neutrality, or to deny the rivalry and to believe it will disappear if the nations are members of a universal society, or to conduct crusades of annihilation against the lions who do not wish to lie down with the lambs.

3

How does what I have been saying bear upon . . . our relations with the Soviet Union, with which we are now engaged in a world-wide diplomatic conflict?

The beginning of wisdom on the Russian question is, I believe, to recognize the historic fact that the division between eastern and western Europe, the rivalry between Russia and the nations of the West, did not begin with Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, nor would it end if the Soviet regime were overthrown or defeated. The cultural and ideological division of Europe is as old as the division of Christendom

between Rome and Byzantium. The imperial rivalry with Russia in the Baltic, in eastern and central Europe, in the Danube valley, in the Balkans, in the Middle East, and in the Far East . . . was one of the great fields of diplomacy under the Czars as it is under the Communists. Rivalry with Russia is a new problem for the United States. But the British Foreign Office has been preoccupied with it for a hundred and fifty years. We had better make up our minds that we shall now be preoccupied with it for a very long time to come.

That being the case, we must give up the notion that the choice is between one world, in which the Russians are our partners, and two worlds, in which we must annihilate the Russians or they must annihilate us. I do not believe that we must either marry the Russians or must fight them, that we must have either a perfect peace or a total war. I believe that the best policy is to recognize that the rivalry will remain, and not to expect it to disappear, and not to think it could be abolished by the United Nations, and not to think it could be abolished by a victorious war; and having recognized that the rivalry is a permanent fact, to use our whole power and influence to regulate it, to keep it within bounds, to establish spheres of influence which limit the rivalry, and a balance of power in the world which checks it.

. . . I . . . believe we have enough power and influence, if we use them efficiently, to bring about a settlement with Russia in this generation. But it will have to be a settlement which aims . . . not at the abolition of all our differences and disagreements, but at a truce in the cold war, a modus vivendi during which the nations can recover from World War II, at treaties which end in the withdrawal of the armies of occupation in Europe, and the restoration of Europe to the Europeans.

This will not be easy to achieve. It will require the pressure of power -- which will offend those among us who do not like power politics. It will require political and economic compromises -- which will offend those who regard all compromise as appeasement. But if a truce, and a modus vivendi, and a treaty are hard to achieve by power and by compromise, it is certain that without power on the one hand, and compromise on the other, nothing can be achieved.

If we will not or cannot use the classic procedure of diplomacy -- which is always a combination of power and compromise -- then the best we can look forward to is an era of disintegration in the civilized world, followed perhaps by a war which, once it began, would be savage, universal, and indecisive.

That must not happen. And it need not happen if only our people will abjure their illusions about the nature of the world in which they have so recently become a leading power, and will permit and assist those who must form our policy, to go forward on the assumption that our aim . . . is to transact our necessary business with the Russians,

at arm's length, coolly, shrewdly, without fear and without extravagant hope, and with as much justice as may be possible where there is as yet no agreement on first principles and where the rivals do not live in the same moral order.

Diplomacy and the Foreign Service

A nation's Foreign Service constitutes an integral part of its diplomatic machinery and is therefore of vital importance to the successful conduct of international relations. The changing role of the American Foreign Service to meet the increasingly heavy responsibilities of the United States as a world power are discussed in the ensuing two articles by the Director of the Foreign Service Institute, Department of State. The third article below discusses, in somewhat similar fashion, the evolution of the British Foreign Service.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE IN TRANSITION

By William P. Maddox

Reproduced from Foreign Affairs (copyright 1946, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.), January 1947, by permission of the Business Manager.

Somewhere along the road between Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima a fundamental schism in the American outlook on foreign affairs disappeared. . . . In striking contrast to the political generation of 1919 and 1920, the overwhelming majorities of both parties stand together in the conviction that the welfare and security of the United States demand today an energetic and positive participation in world affairs, and an unshakable policy directed towards the achievement of world peace and justice through international cooperative action. . . .

This public awareness of America's world-wide concerns has already produced its chain of repercussions on the principal governmental instruments charged with the conduct of our foreign relations, viz. the Department of State and the Foreign Service of the United States. . . . Commensurate with the new responsibilities which the Department of State must assume in Washington, the Foreign Service now faces tasks abroad more exacting, vast and various than any it has performed before. It constitutes the front line of America's world-wide peace organization, yet it is not equipped in human resources to hold this line effectively under the pressure of enlarged responsibilities. The first major step in expanding, strengthening and developing the Foreign Service was taken . . . when Congress passed the Foreign

Service Act of 1946. . . . This was the most important legislative reform of the Foreign Service since the original Rogers Act of 1924. It is significant to note that while five postwar years elapsed before the passage of the Rogers Act, Congress and public opinion responded to the peacetime needs of the Foreign Service after the Second World War in less than one year. This is indicative of the greater swiftness with which the implications of America's new world position issuing from the second great war have been publicly perceived.

A picture of the Foreign Service in the 1930's would bear little resemblance, in dimensions or in scope of functions, to that of today, and still less to the Service projected for tomorrow. . . . In 1939, the entire Service consisted of some 800 career officers, 2,000 clerks, and 1,250 miscellaneous employees -- a total of 4,000. As of today, the over-all strength is about 11,000 made up as follows: 58 Ambassadors and Ministers, 980 Foreign Service Officers, 3,800 other American officers and employees, and 6,200 aliens. Careful surveys conducted during the past year by the Division of Foreign Service Planning indicate that the Service is still badly hampered in the performance of its enlarged functions by staff shortages, in some cases critical. The Planning Division has estimated that satisfactory efficiency in 1948 could be obtained only if authorization is provided for a Service of over 16,000, of whom 1,400 would be career Foreign Service Officers, 600 Reserve Officers, 5,300 staff officers and employees, and some 9,000 alien employees (chiefly maintenance personnel and minor clerks).

...

As is generally known, the career Foreign Service Officer has been selected by a competitive examination system since 1924. Ambassadors and Ministers are, of course, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, without examinations. Until 1942, from 20 to 40 new officers were admitted annually, with the exception of three years in the early thirties when recruitment was suspended due to insufficiency of funds. Thousands of young men and women became familiar with the pattern of these examinations during the prewar years. They consisted of four general examinations designed to test the general intelligence and fund of knowledge of the candidate, a language examination, and three special examinations in law, history, economics and government. Upon receiving a passing grade of 70, the candidate appeared personally before an examining board at the State Department for a half-hour or more, and if he survived this test was then admitted into the Service. Whether the examination process is well designed to attract and to select men of the high quality needed today is open to debate, but it should be noted that the Board of Examiners is undertaking an exhaustive inquiry to determine whether its methods are adequately devised to obtain the results desired today.

The spirit of the Foreign Service in 1947 is one of change to meet a new situation and new obligations in a changed world. A certain complacency and stodginess of which some in the Service were not entirely devoid were given a rude shock two years ago when, on an open invitation from the editors, the Foreign Service Journal began to receive, and to print, letters of searching self-criticism from Service officers. Out of this healthy ferment eventually developed some of the most constructive provisions of the 1946 Act. Outworn habits of administration, which groaned and creaked and nearly collapsed under the wartime and postwar inundation of hordes of new personnel and pressures of work, are being progressively overhauled in an effort to adapt the machine to the fast-moving requirements of the new enlarged Service. The composition of Service personnel is undergoing radical change. . . . the Foreign Service Officer (projected) Corps of 1,400 in 1948 will be composed of 40 percent new personnel, most of whom will be war veterans. And these figures do not include an even larger number of reserve and staff officers authorized by the 1946 Act, who, for the most part, will represent an additional infusion of new blood, new energies and new ideas into the Service.

Expansion in the size of the Service is due to the more extensive and varied responsibilities imposed upon it, not only by the Department of State, but by other government departments in Washington. In turn, these Washington agencies act in response to requirements laid upon them by the President or by Congress, which, along with public opinion, have formulated a new and broader conception of American national interests abroad in the light of postwar situations. Moreover, as a result of America's new commitments arising from membership in the United Nations Organization and other bodies, and from participation in scores of international conferences, the Foreign Service must have at hand a reservoir of personnel, skilled and experienced in international negotiations.

As of October 1, three hundred embassies, legations, consulates-general, consulates, vice-consulates and consular agencies were being operated abroad. The functions performed in these establishments may be conveniently divided into six basic categories: political, economic, commercial, consular, informational and cultural, and administrative. Of these six, the informational and cultural represents a phase of activity which has only recently been accepted officially as a definite and clearly defined function, but most of the others have expanded in scope and dimensions. In addition to his responsibility for all these activities in his sphere of jurisdiction, the chief of mission has an additional duty -- that of being the chief representative of the United States, and the spokesman for the government, in the country or area to which he is assigned.

Of the 2,000 officers (including reserve officers and top staff personnel) presently in the Service, some 18 percent are employed in political work, i.e. as diplomatic secretaries or counselors. That means they are engaged, under the Ambassador's direction, in handling diplomatic relations with the local Foreign Office, ranging from minute day-to-day matters to large-scale agreements. They are also responsible for the preparation and transmission of reports on the political situation in the country. In an earlier day, the drafting of political reports was too frequently a routine and leisurely performance consisting of culling items from a morning newspaper or relating gossip from the previous evening's cocktail party. This practice has not been wholly abandoned, but the trend to a new order of political reporting is now so pronounced that tomorrow's Foreign Service Officer will not dare, if he values his career, regard it as more than a superficial minimum exercise. The man sitting at a desk in the State Department requires a living, continuous and comprehensive picture of all the significant political forces and ferments (in their larger social, economic and psychological contexts) operating in the country with which he must deal. Today the reporter must know the foreign government with which he is dealing, but he must also reach below to the man in the street, to representatives of the opposition parties, the labor unions, etc., in order to gauge political currents and "foresee" developments. He must supply judicious appraisals, analyses and interpretations of the facts he is reporting. On the basis of his reports, action recommendations are formulated in the "geographical" divisions of the State Department for the consideration of the Secretary of State. The career officer plays an additional role from time to time when he is called to serve a tour of duty in the State Department as an expert on a given region. In this capacity, he is immediately responsible for recommending policy decisions to the Secretary of State. Of the fifty-odd officers in the political-geographic offices of the State Department, approximately 80 percent are, or once were, in the Foreign Service.

The economic functions of the Service are no less important; and in the performance of them 22 percent of officer manpower is engaged. Economic and financial analysts of a caliber equal to that produced by the best university graduate schools need to be developed in greater numbers, along with specialists in agriculture, mining, petroleum, aviation, shipping, labor and tele-communications. In these specialized fields service is rendered to other government agencies in Washington; but the vast new structure of economic offices and divisions in the Department of State is also closely concerned with broader as well as technical aspects of our economic foreign relations. Closely associated with the economic function is the commercial function, largely in the way of trade promotion and market reporting. Thirteen percent of Foreign Service officers are engaged in these duties and, for the most part, their service is rendered to the Department of Com-

merce for the benefit of the industrial and business community. Private foreign trading, generally suspended during the war, is beginning to revive, which means that the commercial responsibilities of the Foreign Service are expanding rapidly. The same may be said of consular duties, in which nearly one-fourth (24 percent) of the Service is engaged. . . . consular staffs the world over are deluged with an accumulation of work, much of which was in suspense during the war. This includes the handling of American citizenship cases, applications for visas, shipping services, assistance to displaced persons, and tens of thousands of requests from American citizens for aid in locating relatives, in identifying and recovering property, and similar services.

The informational and cultural program, under the general direction of Assistant Secretary of State Benton, represents a new type of specialization in which at the present time 12 percent of officer personnel are engaged. Many of these officials, like their functions, were inherited from the wartime Office of War Information and the Office of Inter-American Affairs. The assumptions underlying this program are that America must undertake positively and energetically to make its way of life known to peoples the world over, both in order to foster a better understanding of America as a step toward better international understanding, and to assist in the cultural, economic and technological development of less advanced countries. Through the informational media of motion pictures, press releases and the radio, and the cultural services afforded by the exchange of students and scholars and the operation of libraries and institutes, the Foreign Service brings the life of America into the lives of other peoples. The obvious corollary is that Foreign Service Officers must develop a commensurately keen and sympathetic appreciation of foreign cultures.

Last but not least in the order of Foreign Service functions is that of administration, which occupies 11 percent of the officer personnel. Efficient administration has never been the strongest feature of the Foreign Service, but the phenomenal expansion in numerical strength and functions of the past few years has rendered it indispensable. . . .

The new Foreign Service Act (Public Law 724 - 79th Congress) retains the Rogers Act principle of a professional career Foreign Service, with appointments and promotions dependent on merit, with political influence rigidly excluded, and with sufficient compensation to attract able men regardless of their private means. The Foreign Service is placed under the administrative control of the newly-authorized Director General, subject to the supervision of the Secretary of State, but with the assistance of administrative policy recommendations from a new statutory Board of the Foreign Service, comprised of three Assistant Secretaries of State, the Director General, appropriate representatives designated by the Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture

and Labor, as well as ad hoc representatives of other departments when their interests are concerned. This Board replaces a predecessor of more limited representation and authority; its creation serves to emphasize the legitimate concern of government agencies, other than State, in the Foreign Service.

Steps have been taken towards sounder administration by establishing a more systematic classification of the Foreign Service into five principal categories: Ambassadors and Ministers, Foreign Service Officers, Foreign Service Reserve Officers, Foreign Service staff personnel, and alien personnel. Adjustments have been, or will be made, in the salaries of most of these personnel, but none more deservedly than in the case of Ambassadors and Ministers. For nearly a century -- from 1855 until 1946 -- the maximum salaries of Ambassadors and Ministers remained fixed at \$17,500 and \$10,000 respectively. Even with official allowances, modest enough (in London, about \$12,500), no man has been able to accept an appointment as Ambassador to a large capital such as London or Paris unless he enjoyed a substantial independent income. In its report on the Bill, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs pointed out that, in sharp and humiliating comparison, the British Government furnished its Ambassador in Washington with an annual compensation of \$70,000 tax free. The new Act provides that embassies and legations shall be grouped into four classes according to their importance, with salaries for the chiefs of missions, respectively, of \$25,000, \$20,000, \$17,500, and \$15,000. Moreover, an "establishment allowance" is authorized to enable a representative to maintain a residence worthy of his official position.

The salary of the entering Foreign Service Officer has been fixed at \$3,300, ranging upward through six classes (replacing 11 at present) to the seventh class of "career minister" who receives \$13,500. The allowance system has been improved and strengthened, ... retirement provisions have been altered to permit an officer to retire between the ages of 50 and 60 with a more advantageous annuity than heretofore. On the other hand, as a safeguard against the risk that career security may develop a cult of humdrum mediocrity, the Navy system of "promotion-up or selection-out" has been adopted so that officers who fail to receive a promotion during a prescribed number of years will be separated from the Service.

The Reserve Officer class is a new creation. It is designed to provide a flexible means for the temporary employment (up to four years) of specialists from any government agency or from private life. By this means, the Service will obtain the benefit of periodic infusions of new talent and energies to perform specialized tasks and, it is hoped, such officers would constitute a recruiting nucleus in the event of an emergency. The Reserve Officer occupies a position of rank among Foreign Service Officers appropriate to his age, experience, and responsibility.

All other American employees -- specialists, technicians, administrators, clerks, etc. -- constitute the staff corps, appointment to which is made on the basis of technical qualifications similar to those in the Civil Service. There are 22 classes ranging from the lowest employee to a high-ranking staff officer receiving up to \$10,000. Corresponding to the "CAF" classification in the Civil Service, capable employees will be able to rise from lower classifications to the upper brackets where they may discharge responsible duties of a consular, administrative or technical character.

...

The legislation of 1946 provides only a framework for Foreign Service reform. To become the living organism envisaged by its creators, the skeleton will require the flesh and blood of firm and diligent administration, of adequate annual appropriations (which need not, however, exceed the construction cost of a single battleship), and of more and better-trained manpower. Only then will the Foreign Service be suitably equipped to perform its role as an efficient instrument of America's postwar determination to "wage" a vigorous and constructive peace. Only then will a small and good organization -- but good enough only for a semi-isolationist age -- have effected its full transition to the high-powered Foreign Service demanded today.

FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

By William P. Maddox

Reproduced from Higher Education (U.S. Office of Education), October 15, 1947. Mr. Maddox is the Director of the Institute.

... on March 13, 1947, ... pursuant to the authority granted by Congress in Title VII of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, the Department of State established the Foreign Service Institute. ...

What the Institute Is For

By the terms of the basic statute, the Institute is "to furnish training and instruction to officers and employees of the [Foreign] Service and of the Department [of State] and to other officers and employees of the Government for whom training and instruction in the field of foreign relations is necessary." In large terms, the purpose of the Institute, as stated in the Departmental Orders, is "to improve the skills, broaden the understanding, and develop the abilities [of personnel] ... by furnishing extensive and systematic training and by promoting and fostering programs of study incidental to such training."

Why the Institute

The value and urgency of such training cannot be contested. The experience of the armed services especially has proven that regular programs of advanced and specialized, as well as initial, training are necessary to aid personnel to improve in general or technical competence and in awareness of the changing world; and to become active and efficient parts of a great organism working as an integrated whole. Just as the armed services must prepare themselves to wage war successfully, so must the Department of State and the Foreign Service undertake to meet the equally critical emergencies of the years of peace in the postwar world.

The responsibilities involved in the conduct of American foreign relations are infinitely greater than before the war. . . . The diplomatic, political, and economic problems which must be dealt with by the United States Government have achieved a magnitude and complexity out of all proportion to our traditions and experience.

The Department of State and its overseas arm, the Foreign Service, must be capable, therefore, of performing tasks of the most exacting, intricate, and comprehensive character. It can almost be said that there is nothing which happens in the world today which may not have a bearing on their activities. The occurrences of a single day in China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Palestine, the "curtain" countries, Italy, Great Britain, and the Argentine -- to mention only a few -- heavily tax the personnel resources of the Service and the Department in their efforts to understand the facts, to appraise their significance, to weigh the probable reactions of other governments, and to plan our own programs of action on the basis of the more likely hypotheses.

Science and technology, expansion of our commercial and financial interests, obligations under the United Nations, and our vital concern with the advancement of freedom and democracy, have radically altered traditional diplomacy. The modern Department of State and Foreign Service requires the trained political analyst and negotiator, but it also needs officers thoroughly versed in industrial, agricultural, banking, labor, and engineering processes. It must have officers to handle problems of aviation, shipping, radio communication, mining, oil production, together with the long-established administration of visas, immigration regulations, citizenship cases, and services to American citizens abroad. It must have a corps of personnel who have specialized in acquiring an understanding of the language, customs, and ways of thinking of one or more of half a hundred diverse cultures in the world. And, finally, representatives of the Government abroad must have a thorough familiarity -- periodically refreshed -- with every aspect of the American scene from folk music to the TVA, to enable them to furnish foreign peoples with adequate interpretations of our way of life.

Evolution

... The immediate predecessor of the Institute was the Division of Training Services, established by Departmental Order in 1945. It developed, or planned, the range and scope of programs inherited by the Institute

The training of new consuls -- for periods of 30 days -- was started in 1907. Following the consolidation of the diplomatic and consular services by the Rogers Act in 1924, a Foreign Service Officer Training School was established and operated until 1941. It was concerned, however, only with the initial training of new officers. Prior to the war, the only advanced training was that offered by universities, to which 12 officers were assigned, during the period 1936 to 1941, for the study of economic subjects; and the very limited opportunities offered officers to study foreign languages, chiefly in China and Japan.

Current Programs

In addition to the traditional basic training for new Foreign Service Officers, the Institute's program includes: Advanced and specialized training for middle-grade and senior officers both of the Service and of the Department; training for all classes of management, supervisory, administrative, and clerical personnel; language training for all new Foreign Service personnel and for other personnel as required; and regular daily orientation lectures open to all personnel on duty in Washington. The Institute operates four schools, each headed by an assistant director, as follows: Basic Officer Training, Advanced Officer Training, Management and Administrative Training, and Language Training. The programs offered by these schools are adapted to the needs of personnel and to the length of time available. They include at present, various types of services, such as: Classes, or group instruction for full or part time; supervised on-the-job training for Department personnel for, say, 2 or 3 hours a week over a period of several months; individual instruction (in languages) and consultations; and the arrangement of assignments for a selected number of officers to universities, the National War College, and other institutions.

An indication of the variety of programming may be given by taking a typical month, such as July 1947. During this month, some 64 new Foreign Service officers, in two classes -- one having started the previous month -- were taking a 2-month program of basic training in the duties and life of an officer abroad; 5 staff officers were receiving full-time, and 31 part-time, training for periods from 2 to 6 weeks; 102 new Foreign Service clerks were attending classes for 1 month; some 130 Department supervisors received a total of 5-hours training conferences; and 50 members of the Special Mission to Greece were given brief but intensive indoctrination. In addition, full-time intensive language-and-area instruction was given 7 persons; class instruction (usually 1 hour or so each day) to 68 persons, and individual instruction

to 145, in a total of 25 foreign languages. Attendance at 40 orientation conferences, open to all, totalled 3,294, an average of 82 a lecture. Consultations were held with 2 military attaches. Finally: One officer was assigned to the Naval War College; 8 officers were studying languages and cultures at universities; 9 officers were engaged in full-time language study at the Institute's branches in Peiping and Beirut; and some 73 Foreign Service personnel were receiving part-time language instruction under the Institute's auspices abroad.

Thus, a total of over 500 personnel received part- or full-time training, provided or arranged by the Institute, at some time in the month of July. This figure excludes the occasional attendance at orientation conferences. While some of the programs and classes are regularly repeated every month or every 2 months for new groups, others are arranged in accordance with changing needs.

... This September, the Institute sent 18 officers to universities, more than were ever sent in all the years before 1945. Four officers are studying in the field of economics -- 2 at Princeton, 1 at Columbia, and 1 at Harvard. Fourteen are studying languages and cultures as follows: Four in Japanese at Harvard, 3 in Chinese at Cornell, 1 in Korean and 1 in Siamese at California, 4 in Russian at Columbia, and 1 in Turkish at Princeton. During the summer of 1947, other officers studied languages at Pennsylvania (Hindustani), California (Siamese), and Yale (Japanese).

Plans for the Future

Most of the contemplated programs at the Institute proper are in operation in all schools save in the School of Advanced Officer Training. The Institute has not yet received funds sufficient to build up its staff to the level required. If additional funds are obtained, programs of several kinds will be inaugurated. First of all, Foreign Service Personnel returning from abroad will attend a 1-week American reorientation conference, repeated each month. This will be designed for personnel who have been out of the country for a considerable period to bring them up-to-date on the current political, economic, social, and technological aspects of the changing American scene. Second, a selected number of officers will be sent on planned tours to visit industrial plants, agricultural communities, and other places to get in touch with the "grass roots" of the country. For men and women who spend most of their lives abroad but who must, nevertheless, remain thoroughly American, and explain everything American, this sort of experience is extremely important. In addition, seminars for both Foreign Service and Department officers are being planned at the Institute for 3-month periods in economic, political, and socio-psychological subjects. Eventually, the Institute will develop a program of training for near-senior officers in policy planning, and diplomatic strategy and techniques, on a level comparable to that maintained in the top command

and staff colleges of the Armed Services.

In the fiscal year 1949, it is hoped that university assignments may be substantially increased, especially in regard to language-and-area specialization. The most critical deficiencies to be met are in Russian, and in the languages and areas of eastern Europe and of Asia. University assignments will continue to be made where it is believed that facilities are better than the Institute can develop with its limited resources, and where an officer's services can be made available for the period of time necessary. ...

All language instruction at the Institute and at the several field installations abroad utilizes the principles and methods (records, manuals, and native informants) devised for the Army by linguistic scientists, with the aid of the American Council of Learned Societies, during the war. ...

Location

The Institute is presently housed in an eight-story former apartment house, one-half block from the New State Department Building. ...

Only In-Service Training

It should be emphasized that the Institute is an in-service training agency, and that its facilities are not open to private citizens who seek an education to prepare themselves to take the Foreign Service examinations or to qualify for other appointments. Such persons must meet the necessary qualifications and receive an appointment to either the Foreign or the Departmental Service before an assignment to the Institute can be made. ...

... The Department of State looks to the colleges and universities of the country to provide the broad foundations which the prospective Departmental and Foreign Service officer of the future should have. The basic objectives of such education on an undergraduate level closely approximate those required for enlightened and responsible citizenship in the world of today. ...

The educational and training functions of the Institute gear into those of the universities of the country. The better the job done by the universities in producing capable, integrated, and well-rounded men and women, the easier will be the task of the Institute in furthering the process of growth, and in developing that high level of professional competence needed in the Foreign Service and in the Department. If the universities and the Institute can each perform their tasks with distinction, we can have full confidence in the ability of our governmental personnel of tomorrow to meet the requirements of America's new world-wide responsibilities.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

By W. L. Burn

Reproduced from The Fortnightly, May 1946, (published by The Fortnightly Review, Ltd., London), by permission of the editor. Mr. Burn describes the growth and some of the present-day problems confronting the British Foreign Service. In so doing he reveals that other governments than the United States have had difficulties in adjusting the foreign service to changing circumstances.

The Foreign Office was formed . . . in 1782 and it is clear that in studying a period of over 160 years we must expect to discover innumerable divergences and innumerable repetitions. . . . It is sometimes suggested that the high degree of dependence of the Foreign Secretary on the Prime Minister which existed under the Lloyd George-Curzon and the Churchill-Eden regimes is an ultra-modern phenomenon. The source of this belief probably lies in the fact that Palmerston is the only Foreign Secretary of the nineteenth century whom most electors have ever heard of and they regard his highly personal conduct of foreign affairs as the rule in his day. It was, however, exceptional, though both Granville and Clarendon were accorded a considerable amount of independence. But Canning's foreign policy was worked out in close co-operation with his Prime Minister, Liverpool; as Aberdeen's was with Peel. That is the middle, and probably the best, solution. But there were many nineteenth century Foreign Secretaries who were kept closely under the Prime Minister's hand and eye: as the younger Pitt kept Mulgrave, as Wellington kept Dudley, as Salisbury kept Iddesleigh.

Again, it is suggested, that the supersession by the Prime Minister of the ordinary Foreign Office machinery, either by personal contacts with leading foreign statesmen or by the despatch of special, ad hoc representatives, is a breach with long-established tradition. In fact, though it may be open to criticism on other grounds, it is safe from criticism on that ground. The man who said of the leading professional diplomats of his day: "I wish we could get rid of the whole lot. They seem to me quite useless" -- was not some Left Winger of 1945 but Disraeli in 1877. Long before that, in the 'forties and 'fifties, diplomatic machinery was constantly being short-circuited by private and semi-private letters from the Foreign Secretary

We must take it, then, that the relations of the Foreign Secretary with British ambassadors abroad and with the Prime Minister of the day at home (as well as with the Crown, Parliament and Press) cannot easily be reduced to permanent principles. The history of what

is now the Foreign Service, regarded as a profession, is a good deal easier to deal with.

At the bottom, a hundred years ago, in influence, salary and status, were the Consuls. Only on the very fringes or altogether outside Europe could they have any reasonable hope of acquiring fame or exercising a perceptible influence on policy. Elsewhere, they spent most of their time dealing with routine matters and although their commercial functions were potentially very important that importance did little to improve their standing, since the relation established in the Foreign Office procedure between political and economic questions was very unsatisfactory. For most of the nineteenth century consular officers were chiefly merchants ordinarily resident abroad (usually rather unsuccessful merchants); varied by a sprinkling of politicians who had failed in politics or the friends of successful politicians who for one reason or another wished to live abroad but could not afford to do so on their own resources. It was not until 1903 that the Consular Service was placed upon a regular, professional footing and it still continued subordinate to the Diplomatic Service and the Foreign Office.

These bodies had existed, for much of the nineteenth century, in largely water-tight compartments; physically as well as professionally. A young man entered the Diplomatic Service by finding some ambassador or minister who would recommend his appointment, or take him if otherwise recommended, as an unpaid attache. In that capacity he lived for some years (fixed, in 1862, at four) at his own or his parents' expense, as a member of the ambassador's family. He was expected to make himself useful and at the same time to learn his business by doing whatever had to be done: copying despatches, going into society (with his eyes and ears open), exercising the ambassador's horses, escorting the ambassador's daughters. After this probationary period he could be recommended for permanent appointment but the necessity for a private income (eventually fixed at £ 400 a year) remained. Usually he spent by far the greater part, if not the whole, of his career abroad.

The members of the Foreign Office, on the other hand, spent the greater part of their careers at home. Their duties . . . were confidential but not responsible. That is to say, they dealt with confidential material in the way of receiving, copying and despatching it but they had very little influence on its form or contents. It was a life suitable for a man who wanted a profession and one that would give him a standing in society but who was not conscious of possessing great talents or great ambitions. Even if he worked his way to the top, his influence on policy was not likely to be great; especially under such a Foreign Secretary as Palmerston. The Permanent Under-Secretaries of the mid-nineteenth century, such as Addington and Backhouse, were not much more than head clerks. Hammond was rather more, but it

was he who told his chief, only three weeks before the Franco-Prussian War broke out, that he had never known so great a lull in foreign affairs. Granville almost certainly knew better but that was because he had other sources of information than his own staff who obviously suffered from inadequate liaison with our diplomatists abroad.

It is characteristic of the traditional British way of doing things that although the Diplomatic Service and the Foreign Office were not fused until 1918 (when the necessity for a private income in the former was abolished) practice had long preceded theory. The last quarter of the nineteenth century had seen an increasing, though undefined, amount of interchange; with Assistant-Under-Secretaries . . . being appointed to the embassies, and Hardinge and Nicolson returning from embassies to take charge of the Foreign Office. The institution in 1880 of identical entrance examinations for the two services was a movement in the same, and eminently sensible, direction.

Examinations (at first merely qualifying, later competitive) have been instituted as a condition of entry into the Foreign Office since 1856. As they grew more difficult they began to have a perceptible effect, not only on the type of man recruited but on what was to be done with him when he joined. A man who had taken a good degree at Oxford or Cambridge and had probably spent some terms at a crammer's afterwards, who might have had a prosperous future at the Bar or in academic life, was not inclined to spend the next twenty years in copying despatches and decoding telegrams. More highly educated men demanded more responsible work and in the end they got it; assisted by the introduction of the typewriter (in 1889) and of Second Division clerks for employment in routine duties, in the eighties.

There followed the golden age of the Foreign Office. The Permanent Under-Secretaries, such as Pauncefoot, Sanderson and Eyre Crowe, were men who consciously exercised great power and trained up a generation of younger men to succeed to it. The volumes of British Documents on the Origin of the War bear the fullest testimony to the influence in that period of the professional Foreign Office official. This, indeed, was the moment of his apotheosis.

. . . The fusion of the Diplomatic Service and the Foreign Office with the Consular Service was the logical conclusion of a century of reform; and, with the reservation that the qualities required in a senior diplomatic official in an important post are not necessarily the same as those which make for success in a consular appointment, should prove on the whole beneficial. The other major reform related to recruitment and provided that after a candidate had passed a preliminary selection board he should be sent abroad to perfect himself in foreign languages at the public expense; his permanent appointment to the Service being dependent upon his passing another test on his

return. This reform, since the first test will be roughly equivalent to an Honours examination in a university, should provide a salutary check against too-early specialization in foreign languages to the neglect of other studies. It is also likely to widen the field of recruitment since the expense of living abroad for a year or two or attending a crammer's establishment doubtless deterred a number of young men from offering themselves as candidates.

A good deal of nonsense is talked about making the Foreign Service more "democratic". It is no doubt desirable that the members of the Service should be in touch with current ideas on political and social problems; but the ultimate test is whether the Service, however recruited, is successful or not in the extremely difficult task of satisfying the pride, the interests and the conscience of the country. Before we take leave of professional considerations there are two final points to be made. Under no system of recruitment can the Foreign Service hope to do more than acquire its proportion of intelligent and well-educated men and women, and the standard of its recruits will be directly related to the standard of national education; a matter that very few well-informed people are happy about. The other is that if British policy becomes subservient to that of any other great Power it finds just the kind of professional servants for the purpose; and they will not be Pauncefotes or Nicolsons or Eyre Crowes. One other important internal reform calls for notice, the creation during the late war and the proposed retention on a permanent basis of a Research Department whose members are to be largely exempt from day-to-day routine and able to devote themselves to questions of long-term importance.

But assuming that the Foreign Service were as nearly perfect as human care could make it, it would still be only one of the many departments of government. Foreign policy today can be vitally affected not only by the policy of the departments (the Service departments and the Treasury) which it has had traditionally to consider by that of the Ministry of Labour, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Fuel and Power. It is also directly related to the operations of the B.B.C. and of whatever body succeeds to the functions of the Ministry of Information. In strict logic it is arguable that the Foreign Service should be either the mere executant of national policy in its international aspects or that it should be dominant in the sense that the policy of other departments should be adjusted to its own. In practice, neither of these developments is in the least likely to happen, though we shall probably see a considerable extension of the traditional sphere of the Foreign Office to cover ancillary functions. There still remains the more important question which is summed up in the term "co-ordination"; easiest of words to use, most difficult of arts to practise. It has been suggested that the need might be met by regular meetings, under Foreign Service chairmanship, of the heads of those departments

whose activities relate, directly or indirectly, to foreign policy and the means of executing it. There may have to be some such machinery but it is quite idle to regard it as either a condition of, or a particularly useful contribution to, a successful foreign policy. The mere fact that a large number of people take part in shaping a policy does not ensure its success: it only ensures that everybody will escape blame for its failure. We shall doubtless see innumerable experiments in co-operation. What it is hoped we shall not see is such a careful balancing of interests that the Foreign Service and foreign policy become submerged in a mass of inter-departmental memoranda.

There remains the third problem, that of the place of the Foreign Service in a world which is equally unscrupulous about ends and means. Two world wars and long periods of acute international tension between them have not been sufficient to make the man-in-the-street regard foreign affairs as of primary importance. . . .

. . . The particular problem . . . [of making] the man-in-the-street as well acquainted with questions of foreign policy as he is with the policy of his allotment-committee or his favourite football team, probably has no solution. A gap of varying width, but always a wide one, is likely to remain between him and the framers and exponents of policy. That may be undesirable but it is not the worst thing that could happen. The worst thing would be to have the gap bridged, not by the growth of a genuine understanding but by various expedients designed to give the elector the feeling that he had superseded the professional in the exercise of diplomatic power whereas all he had done, in fact, was to transfer that power to the hands of infinitely less competent amateurs or to make its exercise by anyone at all impossible.

PORTRAITS OF BIG FOUR FROM LANCASTER HOUSE

By Herbert L. Matthews

Reproduced from The New York Times, December 7, 1947, by permission of The New York Times and the author. From his vantage point as London correspondent of the Times Mr. Matthews has had an opportunity to watch several meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers. He here records his impressions of Secretary of State Marshall and Foreign Ministers Bevin, Bidault and Molotov as they conferred at the abortive meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers late in 1947.

Diplomacy, like politics, is an art, not a science. The very word diplomacy conjures up qualities like tactfulness, skillful management, dexterous handling of affairs, clever manipulation. A govern-

ment has policies; a diplomat must put them into effect in his personal dealings with other diplomats pursuing other policies.

. . . Foreign Ministers . . . all have to follow certain policies agreed upon by their departments and their Governments, but much depends on how they carry these policies out in daily clashes

One has only to think of the difference that obtains now with Secretary Marshall, representing the United States in the place of Mr. Byrnes. Mr. Byrnes was a born politician and diplomat [He] . . . is affable, friendly and sociable, with a delightful sense of humor and a temper that quickly flares up and disappears.

Secretary Marshall's great qualities take other directions. He is the born and thoroughly trained military man. His mind is methodical, careful and slow to decision but implacable in carrying it through. Like all soldiers, he has been trained to infinite patience, to taking blows and reverses as well as to striking back. Once he sees the path he considers right, he drives for it with the relentlessness of an army on the offensive.

His mind is straightforward, not supple; he seeks a decision, not a compromise. He wants everything to be in black and white, to be clean-cut rather than smudgy. His enormous experience in negotiation has taught him what to expect and how to achieve his goals, but if he sees that those goals are unattainable -- as he did, for instance, in China and at the last Council of Foreign Ministers . . . -- he frankly accepts defeat in the one battle so as to bide his time and fight again another day.

It need not be doubted that Mr. Molotov, or Mr. Vishinsky and the other Russians for that matter, prefers the Byrnes type to the Marshall type. Their own temperaments are closer to the Celt than to the Anglo-Saxon. A character like Marshall's simply baffles and disconcerts them.

To be sure, Russian diplomats like Molotov need very special and very modern gifts. The policies behind Molotov's diplomacy leave very little room for the give and take of negotiation which is the very essence of diplomacy. Soviet delegates must obey orders and follow a rigid line.

Molotov's technique is perplexing only because the policies behind it are kept secret and because he is the tactician while the strategists in Moscow keep their plan of campaign hidden.

The inability of the Slavic mind to meet the Westerner on his own plane of logic and thought brings a constant apparent incongruousness to Molotov's diplomacy. He is innately suspicious. He seeks for hidden meanings and tricks where there are none. He takes it for

granted that his opponents are trying to trick him and put over something nefarious.

There is no subtlety about him. He has a triphammer technique with the same repetitious motions of the triphammer. He will think nothing of repeating himself a dozen times in one session.

The only delegate of the four who qualifies as subtle is the Frenchman Bidault. The real personal drama of this conference lies in the sharp daily duels between him and Molotov.

The Russian doesn't want Bidault in any circumstances to return to Paris with a triumph -- even a small one like the economic integration of the Saar into France. The Soviet Union's agents and fifth columnists have brought France to her present plight and it is apparently the Soviet aim to keep her there. Bidault is bitter about this.

Far from being weak, the French delegate has been at his strongest and cleverest in these conferences. Where Marshall and Bevin sit glum and silent or reply mildly and wearily, Bidault strikes like a rapier. Since he is clever and subtle and has the typical sharp, clear logical French mind, he invariably gets the better of Molotov on a strictly academic debating plane. ...

Bidault has been carrying the ball while those two heavyweights, Marshall and Bevin, hold back and wait. Bevin keeps reminding himself and the world that he is exercising the patience of Job, although he is utterly unsuited to that role. Everyone knows his coleric, blunt, open-hearted character. There is nothing subtle or clever about him. But he has had a lifetime of experience in negotiations in British labor unions. Conferences are meat and drink to him. He has developed a great flair for tactics.

Molotov, therefore, faces three formidable opponents but so far he is more than holding his own. The reason is simple. The others are fighting a shadow, a voice, a facade. Their real contender is safely entrenched behind the walls of the Kremlin.

CHAPTER VIII

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law is defined by the leading English authority, W. E. Hall, as consisting of "certain rules of conduct which modern civilised states regard as binding on them in their relations with one another with a force comparable in nature and degree to that binding the conscientious person to obey the laws of his country, and which they also regard as being enforceable by appropriate means in case of infringement." This body of rules, customs, treaties and agreements which has grown up during the past three centuries has often been hailed by professional international lawyers as being one of the ingredients of a "stable system of law and order" in world affairs. Resting as it does, however, upon a foundation of national sovereignty -- which in itself denies the binding force of anything not according with the will of the individual state -- the law of nations has frequently been impotent where the disputes and actions involve vital matters of national interest. The law, to be sure, has contained some principles of state responsibility. But the greater part of its corpus has consisted of rights, many of which have grown out of self-assertion by the more powerful states. Treatises, arbitral awards and international accords have authorized the award of damages where force has been "illegally" used, but the law has been a weak and broken reed in preventing or stopping the use of armed force. Moreover, it has lacked the assistance of a genuine international legislature, representing the interests of the community of nations as a whole, to enact and revise, as well as any institution of enforcement other than self-help by states.

These facts, coupled with the general reorganization of the machinery of international organization accompanying the conclusion of World War II, have impelled re-examination of the place and future of law in international relations. The war crimes trials in Germany and Japan established precedents of individual responsibility and community concern which may be of far-reaching importance in the evolution of international law. The Report of the United Nations Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification, and the establishment of the International Law Commission by the Second Session of the General Assembly have paved the way for making a "fresh start . . . in the revitalization and strengthening of international law." Before this can proceed far, however, the true position of law in international affairs must be grasped, and something of an inventory made of the lessons to be drawn not only from the late war, but as well from the political difficulties which beset the machinery of international organization. The articles which are reproduced in this chapter have been selected for the significant light which they throw upon these aspects.

For other readings see: J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (3rd ed., 1943); P. C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1948); E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, Chapters X-XIII; F. L. Schuman, International Politics, Chapter III; Current Readings on International Relations, No. 2, Chapter VII; Yuen-Li Liang, "The General Assembly and the Progressive Development and Codification of International Law," American Journal of International Law, January 1948, pp. 66-97.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW ?

By Edwin D. Dickinson

The following article, reproduced by permission of the author, was delivered as the Seventh Bernard Moses Memorial Lecture at the University of California, May 22, 1946. Dr. Dickinson is Professor of Law and Dean of the School of Jurisprudence at the University. He is the author of The Law of Nations, Cases and Readings. It is his contention that international law is inadequate largely because it is rooted in a system of global anarchy. From this it follows that the future effectiveness of international law will depend on the successful development of international political institutions.

I

As the term implies, international law is a law of or between nations. Its community is the community of nations, consisting . . . of . . . [the] United Nations members, the former Axis nations and their satellites presently under military occupation, the former neutrals and certain other countries or peoples of uncertain or transitional status. There are more than seventy in all at the present time.

The members of this community are of course extraordinarily variant in everything that goes to make a nation. They are a community of great peoples and small peoples, of peoples mature in the arts and skills of government and others hardly on the threshold of essential experience, of peoples clinging tenaciously to vast empires and others of small domain, of peoples rich in basic resources and others who are relatively poor, of peoples who are landlocked and others who look to the sea, of peoples conscious of an awesome military might and others of negligible strength, of peoples who live in relative security and others who live in insecurity and fear, and of peoples of the most varied languages, cultures, faiths and political ideologies.

The pattern of relationships among the world's peoples, as it has developed during the past three hundred years, has been essentially that of a jungle peace progressively but imperfectly mitigated by

humanity's continuing struggle against unreason. The acerbities of international relationships have been substantially ameliorated through acquiescence in customs founded upon a slowly expanding appreciation of mutual or common interests. With the growth of modern means of communication and transport, customs have been progressively supplemented by more formal agreements. In recent times the integration of the international community through organized cooperation has had a remarkable development, but there has been no successful confederation and no approach to anything of the nature of world law applicable alike to all the races of men. In such measure as each nation has either possessed resources which others coveted or been compelled to look abroad for the basic conveniences or necessities of its life, each has lived in fear. In corresponding degree, each within its own plot on the earth's surface has been or has sought to become a law unto itself. The distillation of the hopes and fears and vanities of each has been called its national sovereignty.

... it has been a basic shortcoming of this singular community that its pretensions of legal order have concealed imperfectly an underlying political anarchy. In flight from complete political disorder, statesmen and publicists alike have been disposed to attribute to nations as international persons an engaging simplicity of rights of independence, dominion, jurisdiction, equality, intercourse and self defense. Each nation has been assumed to be independent in its own right, to be entitled exclusively to its own territorial domain, to enjoy therein a well-nigh exclusive jurisdiction, to be in all cases equal before the law, to be largely the final arbiter of its intercourse with others and to be the ultimate defender by means of its choice of its own continued existence. Yet, perforce, in such a community there can be or at least there has been no acquiescence in the right of a nation to be born or in its right to be born free. Parturition has usually taken place in violence. In the words of one of our most respected publicists, the welfare of international society "may not require the maintenance of a particular state; its very extinction may be deemed to be for the general good." ...

The people of Atlantia have thrown off what is regarded locally as the tyrant's yoke, have established control of their own territory, have formed a government of their choice, and through this government have announced their determination to maintain and foster a place of independence and dignity in the community of nations. Yet Atlantia has no right under international law to acknowledgment or recognition and until it is recognized by others there can be no assurance that its good name will be more than an adjective in the long history of unsuccessful revolutions. The recognition of Atlantia by other nations is [a] matter of policy rather than of right or duty. The sensitivities of Atlantia's late sovereign must be carefully considered. Likewise the unbalance

of a preexisting balance of power. Likewise a number of essentially political considerations. Atlantia may even achieve a measure of recognition from others, its government may incur disfavor by turning left or right, and recognition may be withdrawn or no longer accorded. A community of law thus narrowly confined by considerations of more or less transient policy is not a community of law and order. It is a paradox of law feebly imposed upon the disorder of a vast and complicated confusion.

Something of realism may be added by substituting for Atlantia a reference to the birth and death of the Baltic Republics, to the long and costly period in which the Soviet Union remained a political outcast, or to the troubled history of Poland in Europe. For a variety of reasons, certain of the American republics have been politically and even juridically ignored for more or less protracted intervals. Comparable problems are presented in the contemporary scene with respect to Albania, Indonesia, or Korea.

II

It is perhaps an even more impressive shortcoming of international law that it has continued down to our own time in large measure a system of rights without remedies. ...

So far as it has been achieved at all, the practical amelioration of international law has been accomplished chiefly through the procedures of international agreement. There has been a notable progress during the past century, and particularly during the League of Nations interval, in the making and implementing of rule-making agreements of limited or general effect. More recently the international conference as an agency of so-called international legislation has had persuasive apologists. By gathering together such agreements as are remotely in point, of concern to three nations or more, of local or general import, and ratified or not, it has been possible to create the impression of far-reaching achievement; but ... [it] is ... illusory to describe the accumulated bulk as "the legislative content of international law." ... there is no general acquiescence in obligation to participate in international conferences or to accept the result of conference deliberations. Limitations upon equality of voting and the requirement of unanimity have had at best a halting and imperfect development. The truth is that the community of nations has yet to mount the threshold of anything fairly described as an international legislative process.

There has ... been notable progress ... in the development of rudimentary institutions and procedures of administration and adjudication. It is a progress, however, which falls far short of assuring an essential balance between assertions of right and confidence in remedial devices. Though much improved, the procedures of international nego-

tiation are still impeded by an excessive formalism. Good offices, mediation, commissions of investigation and conciliation and the like are more impressive on paper than in actual use. International arbitration has had a notable development and there is an emerging body of remedial principle in the thousands of awards which have been handed down over the years by an impressive number of arbitral bodies; but it is perhaps symptomatic that the so-called Permanent Court of International Arbitration in all its years has disposed of hardly more than a score of cases and that only a few of these may be said to have been of first-rate importance or to have contributed substantially to the progress of law. International adjudication has had a brief but hopeful history since the Permanent Court of International Justice was opened at The Hague in 1922 as a constituent part of the plan of organized cooperation envisaged in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Court's life was too brief to give reliable indication of its ultimate significance. In constitution, organization and procedure it was a truly judicial body. Time and circumstance considered, it had a fair amount of judicial business. [32 Judgments and 27 Advisory Opinions from 1922 to 1942. ed.] ...

Progress in supplementing and improving international law through agreement has been a useful and significant experience. The same may be said of progress in the use of arbitration and adjudication in the settlement of international disputes. It is upon the basis of such experiences as these that we may hope to build firmer and better ordered relationships. At the present stage of their development, however, they are hardly to be appraised as constituent parts of a balanced legal order. ... Like any other, the community of nations is a community of continuing change. ... Without adequate law-making and law applying procedures, the jurisprudence of such a community tends inevitably to become a rigid and sterile thing, more used in fortifying than in settling controversies, a law in books rather than a law in action. It will perhaps be useful to pause again for practical illustration.

The people of Butania have produced a new explosive, based upon atomic fission, and exceeding in its destructiveness the aggregate of everything hitherto known in warfare. ... Not only is international life revolutionized in prospect, but all life upon the earth is imperiled. The old political equilibrium is gone. ... In comparable national crisis, the national legislative body would almost certainly meet in emergency session and almost certainly it would proceed at once to vest emergency powers in the executive subject to further report and review. There would be conscious and more or less effective effort to bring law abreast of the exigencies of the time. Not so in the community of nations. The urge is present, but the procedures are lacking. National policies looking toward the preservation of national in-

terest and ultimately toward international understanding must first be formulated. Time must then be consumed endlessly in international negotiations and conferences in quest of ultimate agreement. What frustrations of rivalry or fear may come meanwhile, and with what untoward consequences, no man may know. It is of course superfluous to add realism by substituting America and the shadow of clouds over Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

... a further illustration may be in order. The people of Carinthia have a pleasant country, though its arable portions are somewhat less than enough to support a growing rural population. There are metals in the land and areas rich in petroleum. Against a background of harsh colonial experience, these people have struggled fitfully throughout a century of political independence to improve the common lot. They have had leaders who were strong men, ... and their country has attracted the investment of much foreign capital, in this instance a euphemism for foreign exploitation. Eventually their patience runs out and for a generation there is revolt and the unsettlement of radical agrarian reform, nationalization, and a good deal of ardent "Carinthia for the Carinthians." Thousands of foreign residents are hurt and millions of foreign investments are lost. Claims presented by foreign governments in behalf of their nationals multiply. It happens that principles to govern the adjustment of such claims have long been expounded in the books of international law, but there are no arbitral or judicial institutions for their practical application. The necessary institutions must be improvised through agreements achieved when, of all times, it is most difficult to reach agreement. In the result, claims are permitted to multiply in an aggregate sufficient to bankrupt Carinthia; irritations accumulate; there is a succession of crises with threats of force and resort to self-help; and there are ad hoc commissions that fail and ultimately others that partially succeed. Eventually, when most of the accumulated grievances have been liquidated, the awards will go to the children or grandchildren of the original claimants and to the claims attorneys who specialize in such business. Law thus retarded in its application is perhaps better than no law, but it is not a law which supports decency and order. By substituting Mexico for Carinthia, we may add realism and remind ourselves of more than thirty years of troubled international relations in this hemisphere.

III

We come now to something that has always been so patently wrong with international law that it has completely overshadowed all other deficiencies. I refer, of course, to the ever present likelihood that disputants will take the law into their own hands and resort to force, a likelihood which has not only been recognized and legalized in the paradoxical jurisprudence of nations but has been repeatedly realized in the actual conduct of international affairs. ...

The treatises on international law remind us that there are amicable modes of adjusting international disputes and non-amicable modes short of war. Non-amicable modes short of war are variously described as retorsion, retaliation, reprisals, embargo, non-intercourse, severance of diplomatic relations, pacific blockade and the like. There has been a broad and undefined area within which such measures were clearly permissible. Retorsion, sometimes defined as action taken to compensate for damage suffered or to deter objectionable action, may be in answer to allegedly illegal conduct or to conduct which is merely unfriendly and may assume a variety of forms. Reprisals have been described as the taking or withholding of the property of a foreign country or its nationals as a means of obtaining reparation for allegedly illegal conduct for which redress has been refused. Embargo may take various forms and may be pacific or hostile. Non-intercourse is the permissible recourse of a country which would save itself or its nationals from the allegedly illegal or reprehensible conduct of another. The severance of diplomatic relations has never been internationally illegal. So-called pacific blockade is a blockade presumably having impact only upon the parties immediately concerned, though maritime powers have never been able to agree upon its scope. Such measures are essentially the remedy of the strong against the weak. They are mere variations on self-help and too often a mere prelude to war.

The so-called law of war has been a principal preoccupation of international lawyers throughout the centuries. Its consideration has occupied anywhere from one-third to two-thirds of the typical treatise. Patently we are here in the presence of a body of practice which has been an incident or by-product of the negation of law. Right struggling even feebly against might in such a milieu has been a miscast figure of speech. ... International law brewed in the witches' caldron of warfare has been something of an antidote, but it has been no prescription for decency or justice. I leave to your imaginations the query as to how much of it may be usefully conserved in the atomic age in which we now live.

... As a brilliant and effective English publicist has put it: "To hold at one and the same time that states are legally bound to respect each other's independence and other rights, and yet are free to attack each other at will, is a logical impossibility. Yet that is what the accepted international legal theory today requires us to do, and it leaves us therefore with no real answer to attacks on the reality of international law."

IV

... international law has suffered further ... from the frustrations of tough and resistant localisms. Political disorder and threats

of force have combined to make the normal condition of international relations one of apprehension. The lack of ameliorating and remedial devices has left apprehensive peoples without adequate means of pressing forward through adjustment and compromise to an ultimate consistency of practice. Centrifugal tendencies have been strongly reinforced by extraordinary variances in the physical and moral bases of national existence in different parts of the world. In the result, international law has been characteristically deficient in practical principles of widespread acceptance and general application. It has been made up in much larger measure, on the contrary, of competing or conflicting national contentions with respect to the principles which are or which ought to be accepted and applied. Divergences of national interpretation and contention may be illustrated from every phase of the subject. ...

Consider, by way of example, the very practical problem of the limits of a maritime nation's territorial authority in its marginal seas. How far out to sea, and with what consequences for others, does the national authority extend? American, British, German or Japanese sources of international law in the twentieth century are explicit that the authority of the littoral state extends three marine miles from shore. ... If French, Italian, Norwegian, Russian or Spanish sources are consulted, however, it will appear that many and perhaps a majority of the maritime nations have long insisted upon a wider zone. ... The difference rests, of course, upon something more fundamental than law Latin. On the one side are sea power and interest in exploiting resources in proximity to the coasts of others. On the other is concern to protect and conserve coasts and the resources of coastal waters. The most that can be said is that nations are generally agreed that territorial waters should extend seaward for at least three nautical miles.

... consider the troublesome problems which arise when one nation endeavors to afford protection to its citizens within the confines of another. ... When is a nation liable for injuries to aliens resulting from the acts of its officials or from the acts of individuals, mobs, bandits or insurrectionists? Within what limits should it respond for breaches of public contracts or concessions? On the one hand, a very large group of nations has endeavored consistently to restrict liability to liability for breach of national standards recognized as controlling in cases involving their own citizens. On the other hand, and with comparable persistence, a smaller but more powerful group has insisted that there are international standards and that if any nation fails to maintain its system of law and administration at or above these standards it does so at the risk of international responsibility. Nations of the former group are frequently immature in economic or political development, in need of foreign capital and enterprise, relatively less

effective in the protection of aliens, and correspondingly reluctant to concede international responsibility for injuries to the nationals of other countries. Nations in the latter group generally have capital, enterprise or population for export, enjoy normally a somewhat more stable administration of government and law, and are correspondingly insistent upon higher standards of protection for their nationals abroad.

...

The toughness of these localisms was ... demonstrated in the frustration of attempts at codification initiated under the auspices of the League of Nations. ... at the conference which met at The Hague in 1930, there was an almost complete failure to come to grips with important substantive problems. National delegations were generally content to present and stand upon the national contentions or interpretations with which their respective countries had long been identified.

...

If the troubled history of international relationships demonstrates anything, as I think that it does, it demonstrates surely that there is no escape from juridical chaos in patience and watchful waiting. The fluidity of international life multiplies new difficulties even as it assuages old ones. ...

... The deficiency of international law has not been that there were natural and understandable divergences of interest and viewpoint, but rather that they have been accepted as unavoidable and enduring phenomena. Stalemate has been accepted as normal. There have been no adequate efforts of resolution. In the result, too much of what has passed for international law has actually been an arsenal of continuing controversy rather than a storehouse of ameliorating principle.

V

Finally, ... international law has tended consistently to sanctify an irresponsibility on the part of its subjects that is in basic conflict with order and decency in international relations. It has found no alternative to an acceptance and rationalization of the existing confusion and disorder. ...

The evidences of this basic shortcoming are writ large throughout the system of international jurisprudence. They are exemplified in a pervasive insistence that each nation has a right to choose its own form of government, define the allegiance of its own people, do what it will with its own nationals, exclude or discriminate against the nationals of others, determine the scope of intercourse with others, act in self-defense and generally remain free from external control. They are manifested in the assertion of exclusive and generally irresponsible rights of territorial authority or jurisdiction and above all in the ever present right to frustrate agreement and appeal to the ordeal of battle.

Where else in jurisprudence, for example, has there been such a paradoxical combination of the principle that agreements are made to be observed and the proposition that legally binding agreements may be made at the point of the gun. Where else, even in the loosest of federations, has there been such glorification of the artificial political entity and such cultivated unconcern for the rights and duties of the individual human beings whose welfare is the ultimate need and occasion for all law. In a very real sense the German extermination camps in all their incredible horror have been the apotheosis of an ideal of ultimate irresponsibility long and carefully nurtured in the law of nations. ...

... [In] the case of the steamship "Lotus," decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1927, ... the Court [said] ... each state has been left "a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable."...

The result, though debatable, was probably correct; but the reasoning was nothing more nor less than a glorification of juridical anarchy. ... the Court settled the case; but it ... delivered itself of an opinion devoid of judicial statesmanship and left adjustment under law a sterile and uninviting recourse in later controversies. Its reasoning was a sanctification of irresponsibility and the law invoked a thing of shreds and patches.

VI

There prevails throughout the world today a profound disillusionment and dissatisfaction with what has passed hitherto for law in international relations. This is both understandable and encouraging. ...

... surely no one would question that international law is inadequate, or deny that the present appraisal is at least suggestive of the place and proportion of inadequacy in the existing system. And all will agree, I think, that inadequacy stems largely from the circumstance that international law has been a product of life in what has been hitherto a loosely organized and politically chaotic community of independent nations. ...

... there are still those amongst us ... who profess to believe that we can achieve an essential minimum of peace and order by a policy of inaction. They are our surviving isolationists, our political introverts Surely their program of inaction is inept and utterly unresponsive to the obvious deficiencies of the existing international system. Increasingly their negations are being and must continue to

be relegated to the limbo of myopic futility. . . .

. . . more articulate . . . are those who believe that peace and order may be achieved through incantation. . . . They are the evangelists of "outlawry of war," "world law," "world peace," "peace and democracy," or more specifically of "disarmament," "compulsory arbitration," "compulsory submission of legal disputes" and the like. . . . their concrete proposals often have a relative merit; but they reckon superficially, if they may be said to reckon at all, with the more basic difficulties. They have no sense of timing, they are afflicted with an incurable propensity for over-simplification, and the important principle of first things first is not in the manual of their procedures. . . . We can hardly do without them in the difficult business of achieving progress through the processes of free discussion, but the outlook would be dark indeed if we were compelled to regard them as a principal reliance.

Closely akin . . . are those who project peace through the grand design. They are the blueprint advocates, the perfectionists, the self-appointed prophets of an immediate and comprehensive political revolution from which the world is to emerge at last in potential harmony and order. Undismayed by the world's indifference to countless earlier utopias, they press on in the magnificent obsession that theirs is the ultimate design of earthly regeneration. Currently they offer us a wide variety of schemes ranging from the bridge expert's ingenious "quota force" mechanism for making aggression impossible to a well-intentioned but somewhat elusive project for peace through development of an "international civilization." . . . over-simplification . . . is a consuming fever among the perfectionists. . . .

In this category, though with reluctance, we must place the plan for a "world federal government" . . . these proponents . . . have pointed up, more effectively than others, the existing anarchy of the community of nations, the urgency of a more effective political integration, and the fundamental truth, too often ignored, that international justice under law requires a law in unquestioned derogation of so-called national sovereignty and so directed as to compel a decent respect for essential human duties and human rights. We must group these good people with the perfectionists, nevertheless, for the elemental reason that a vast deal of political understanding and unification must be achieved, through the processes of international cooperation, before the motley hordes of the world's two billion inhabitants can possibly be made ready for a complete world government exercising powers directly over the individual and without power of expulsion or right of secession. . . .

We now have in the Charter of the United Nations an instrument which represents the maximum of agreement yet achieved with respect to the framework of practical international cooperation. . . .

The Charter, in brief, is the latest and in all respects the firmest expression of a common determination to have justice under law in international relations. If we have only the will and the persistence to implement it effectively and to make it serve, we may have the firm beginnings of a true law in our time. It is pre-eminently the responsibility of our generation to take full advantage, in realistic and effective sequence, of every promise that is express or implicit in the instrument written at San Francisco. It is in respect for the principles and in effective use of the procedures of that instrument, I am firmly convinced, that we find our best hope of making this prelude to the atomic age a forecast of a better international order.

THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

By Philip C. Jessup

Reproduced from the Political Science Quarterly (copyright 1947, by the Editors of the Political Science Quarterly), March 1947, by permission of the Managing Editor. Professor Jessup, of Columbia University, last year represented the United States on the United Nations Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification. At the present time he is the United States representative on the Interim Committee of the General Assembly. Professor Jessup has had a long and distinguished career in international law. Among his most recent publications is a provocative volume entitled A Modern Law of Nations. Dr. Jessup believes the two most significant results of the trial of war criminals in Nuremberg and Tokyo were the acceptance by the states of the world of restrictions on their historic right to wage war, and the application of international law to the individual. Some of the implications of these results are discussed in the following article.

It would be unnatural if so dramatic and epochal an event as the trial of the major German and Japanese war criminals had not elicited sharply divergent views on the wisdom of the policy and on the soundness of the law. ... The problem which confronts us today ... is to find the ways in which the precedent can be turned to its greatest use in promoting the future peace and welfare of mankind. ... One way to strengthen the foundation was suggested by Judge Biddle in his report to the President on the Nuremberg Trials, when he urged that the Charter of the Tribunal, which was promulgated with the approval of nineteen United Nations, be ... approved for the future by formal act of all ... members of the United Nations.

The General Assembly of the United Nations acted upon this suggestion by adopting a resolution . . . instructing the Codification Committee to study the subject and report back to the Assembly. But the resolution also contained . . . affirmation of the principles contained in the Nuremberg Charter

Although this affirmation does not have the binding force of a treaty, its political, and probably its legal, force is as great as if it were already embodied in treaty form. Fifty-four states of the world are now on record as approving for the future the principles on which the major war criminals were tried.

The General Assembly also adopted a resolution on genocide, a term . . . meaning "the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group" . . . the General Assembly referred the elaboration of a convention on this subject to the Economic and Social Council possibly for study by its Commission on Human Rights: the implicit suggestion that the violation of the fundamental rights of man under an International Bill of Rights may also be made an international crime involves rather startling possibilities.

...

The two aspects of the precedent afforded by the trial of the war criminals which are most important for the future are, first, the control of war by law and, second, the application of international law to the individual. . . . This is the first moment in history when action upon such proposals is not only politically possible but necessary. It is "necessary" because the precedent will not stand still. If we do not strengthen it and move it forward, it will slide backward. Inaction by the whole society of nations from now on would constitute a repudiation of the precedent with the consequence that the last state of the world would be worse than the first. It would constitute an assertion that aggressive war is not a crime and that the individual who is guilty of endangering the international public repose is not to be treated as a criminal.

What, then, under the traditional law and practice of nations were the deterrents to the use of force?

First, in regard to states and their governments viewed as collective entities devoid of individual human personality, there was a somewhat feeble deterrent in the existence of the "law-habit" in international relations. By and large, man is habituated to law in all his relations, and the existence of rules as guides for behavior is a universal convenience. . . .

The second deterrent was the fear of counter-action by the state affected, which might resort to retaliation or reprisals or to war itself.

The third deterrent was the fear of joint counter-action by a group of states whether they were united in an alliance or more highly organized in the League of Nations. Sanctions and the Stimson non-recognition doctrine were among the emerging instruments of such joint action in the inter-war period.

All these three deterrents were ineffective when the wrongdoer was strong. They were ineffective for at least four reasons:

1. The state was judge in its own cause and the international system had evolved no satisfactory substitute for war; the problem of "peaceful change" was never solved.

2. War itself was not illegal though some lesser uses of force were considered illegal and the manner of waging war was brought under legal regulations.

3. The individual government official, civil or military, was merged in the anthropomorphic fiction of the state and was protected by the concept that it was the state and not the individual who acted.

4. There was no adequate international organization to judge causes and to marshal collective action against a wrongdoer.

In regard to an individual contemplating action disruptive of the international public peace, the deterrents were merely the possibility of punitive action by his own state as in the case of counterfeiting foreign currencies, the traffic in narcotics and the slave trade, or action by some other state if he were apprehended at the foreign scene of his crime or extradited to that place.

The defects in these deterrents were the legal limitations on jurisdiction to punish, laxness and corruption in the law administration of some states, and actual connivance or encouragement and protection when the act was performed in pursuance of some national policy. Extradition was limited by the practically universal exception of political crimes and by the refusal of many states to extradite their own citizens. International law was considered to be inapplicable to the individual and he could be punished only when he broke some national law.

The trial of the war criminals involved the rejection of the theory that the state itself is guilty and can be punished for waging aggressive war. Reparations payments are being considered more like compensatory damages in a civil suit than like fines in a criminal action. Collective punishment of a group for the offense of a member of the group is by no means unknown to certain legal systems, but the punishment of a whole state and people like Germany and the Germans is both difficult and obnoxious to many people's sense of justice. Whereas the traditional international system put the burden on the

state to restrain the individual, the precedent of the trial of the war criminals suggests that pressure in the form of fear of punishment should be put upon individuals to restrain the state. It should be anticipated that as international organization -- in the form of the evolving United Nations or in the ultimate form of world government -- is perfected, collective force will be used to restrain states or other groups of individuals in advance but that punishment after the event will be visited upon individuals and not upon the group.

So far as influence upon the fictional collective minds of governments is concerned, deterrents must be sought in the development of the procedures of the international society rather than in the elaboration of new substantive law. . . . It is also absolutely essential to develop law and procedures for peaceful change. Peace will never be secure if we merely put an international lid on a national boiling pot. When there is a strong national feeling of injustice, resentment will eventually produce conflict unless there is some assurance that there is a peaceful substitute for resort to violence. . . .

In the development of international law applicable to the individual and designed to act as a deterrent to acts which will disturb the peace and comfort of the world, both procedural and substantive progress must be achieved.

On the substantive side there are numerous experiences on which to build, including notably the conference convened under League of Nations auspices to study the international suppression and punishment of terroristic crimes. This effort was the result of the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934. It led to the drafting of two conventions dealing with such crimes and with the trial of their perpetrators before an international criminal court, but the conventions were never brought into force. This experience although then fruitless should be utilized along with comparable approaches to the punishment of offenses which have an international interest, including piracy, the slave traffic, traffic in narcotics, counterfeiting, and traffic in arms and fissionable materials. The first step, after securing formal general approval of the Charter of the Nuremberg court, is to secure agreement, based on the Nuremberg precedent that such individual acts should be recognized as international crimes as contemplated in the General Assembly's resolution on genocide. Thus the list of crimes set forth in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal would be expanded. Perhaps in all the examples mentioned it would not be difficult to secure agreement in principle.

When one comes to dealing with plotting against the government of a state, the answer is much more difficult. . . . The subject involves the delicate question of the extent to which the international community can usefully interfere in revolutionary strife and civil wars within states. . . .

Progress will be made if one begins with the least controversial cases. Among these cases one might, in the light of the trials of the war criminals, include the crime of conspiring to wage aggressive war, but a dilemma appears upon the legal horizon. It is one thing to punish the perpetrators of war after they have waged and lost the war; it is quite another thing to indict them and bring them to trial before war breaks out. If the Soviet government charges Churchill with planning or inciting a war against the Soviet Union, who decides whether the defendant shall be indicted and tried? Is it to be decided by the Security Council and in that case could Great Britain exercise its veto? Who anticipates that we shall soon have an International High Prosecutor with authority to decide such a question?

Taking a less controversial or less fantastic case, let us suppose that in twenty years a resurgent Japanese government plans revengeful blitzkrieg with still newer and more terrible weapons. Suppose the secret services of one or more Powers are satisfied that the plot is well advanced. It is certainly clear that one cannot apply the analogy of the policeman who arrests the individual gangster. Although we have agreed that the individuals are criminally liable, the preventive steps would have to be taken against Japan as such; and this would require the international solidarity and perfection of international procedures which were so lamentably lacking when Japan attacked China or when Mussolini attacked Ethiopia.

... is there to be an international secret police which will at once make an investigation on the spot to determine who is guilty? Would such international police officials have authority to arrest suspects and to take them away to the seat of an international criminal court for trial? If the murderers had escaped to the United States and were found here, our laws would need to be changed to enable a court to deny their application for a writ of habeas corpus.

Such difficulties are mentioned, not in despair, but as indicative of the fact that the development of an effective system of criminal law administration cannot be achieved overnight. ... A relatively simple first step might be to implement the already highly successful procedures for the control of the narcotics traffic by the creation of an international tribunal before which offenders could be tried. At the present time, the enforcement of the law is left to the national states and it is the states which are required to enact statutes to make the acts covered by the international treaties criminal and therefore punishable in their courts. ... If, following the precedent of the war crimes, violations of the convention were agreed to be international crimes and if an international jurisdiction were established, a further precedent would be set. ...

... control of war is the supreme problem which human society

must solve. Law is needed here, as in other human activities, for the definition and punishment of illegal conduct. But law alone is not enough. It will not operate in a sovereign vacuum. The causes of international conflict must also be met at the source. On the legal side two great advances have been registered by the trial of war criminals and the reaffirmation of the principles on which they were tried. First, the states of the world have relinquished their historic freedom to wage war for the vindication of what they unilaterally assert are their rights. It must not be forgotten that the restrictions on the use of force which the Charter of the United Nations imposes constitute an important milestone in this general progress despite the procedural defects of the United Nations system. Second, international law has been brought home to the individual. The individual can no longer hide behind the legal screens of sovereignty, acts of state, and superior command.

Whether or not one has agreed with the bases of the trials of the major war criminals, the obligation of jurists, or historians, and of all scholars and citizens is to look forward, not back. . . .

CHAPTER IX

SCIENCE, HUMANISM AND PEACE

Were Francis Bacon, who believed that science if given a suitable opportunity could enlarge the "bounds of human empire to the effecting of all things possible," to step into the world today he would not only marvel at the material things which science has already accomplished but be deeply concerned with the roles of mind and spirit in directing the destinies of civilization. For it is becoming ever clearer that if mankind is to survive the technological revolution a greater humanism must accompany the broadening stream of cosmic knowledge. Likewise, there must be a wedding of politics -- in the broadest sense of the word -- and science if the promise of a greater destiny, contained in the newer achievements of the physical and biological sciences, is to be realized. Science can provide man with more effective tools to solve the problems of his material world. It can help him rid mankind of the scourges of disease. It can assist him to the pleasures of greater leisure. But it cannot provide man with a directive to the things of the spirit which are the wellspring of human emotions, the driving force behind man's striving.

Professor F.S.C. Northrup of Yale offers the notable suggestion in his volume on The Meeting of East and West that if the present "world of conflict" is to end in anything other than ignominious destruction a new philosophy must be found. This he believes must combine the "aesthetic component" which the Orient has mastered and the "adventure of ideas" which is the genius of the West. The distinguished papers which follow emphasize the importance of developing cooperation on a rapidly increasing scale, and of cultivating the forces of a world-centered humanism which will erect a tower of thought inspiring men to peace rather than war. For other readings on science and world affairs see Aldous Huxley, Science, Liberty and Peace (1946); George A. Lundberg, Can Science Save Us? (1947); F.S.C. Northrup, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (1947); Arthur H. Compton, "What Science Requires of the New World," Science, January 14, 1944.

SCIENCE AND STATECRAFT

By Marshall H. Stone

Reproduced from Science Magazine, May 16, 1947, by permission of the editor. Dr. Stone, the son of a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is Professor of Mathematics at The University of Chicago. In the following article (delivered originally as an address on retiring from the vice-presidency of the American Association for the Advance-

ment of Science) he explores the growing feasibility of introducing scientific methods into statecraft. The result, he suggests, would be a closer union of science and politics which would give new scope for the former and make possible greater accuracy in the shaping of policy.

There must be many who share my impression that the formation of new and intricate bonds between science and statecraft is a feature of recent history which merits particularly careful analysis. . . .

Let me begin by emphasizing the broad use I intend to make of the term "statecraft." The word "politics" in its antique acceptation would serve as well, were it not that its current meaning would introduce a certain confusion by too insistently directing attention to the minor and often ignoble tactical devices of politicians. What I wish to discuss is . . . the high art of guiding human affairs at the level of complexity represented by the elaborately organized modern state; and I believe that in applying the term "statecraft" to this art I can suggest both its practical nature and its high place on the scale of human activity. Statecraft, thus broadly conceived, includes the handling of both domestic and foreign affairs and, by implication, also embraces the military art. . . . We are extremely reluctant to admit the lesson of history that tensions and conflicts are the rule in international affairs as in the other affairs of men; and we are even more reluctant to accept the implications of this lesson for the statesman's role in war and peace. The Teutonic directness of Clausewitz' doctrine, asserting that war is the continuation of national policy by other means, we find repellent. As for the inverted form of this doctrine, which might be phrased to assert that "peace is the opportunity for aggression by other means," even direct observation of its practical application in our times appears to fall short of carrying conviction to the American mind. Yet any objective consideration of the nature of statecraft, whether couched in universal or in national terms, must lead to the conclusion that under the circumstances of our epoch the statesman must understand both phenomenologically and theoretically the application of military force in relation to international conflicts. It is, indeed, no accident that history often reveals the great statesman and the great general combined in a single person, since the understanding of the behavior of complex societies probably meets its most direct, if not its most fundamental, challenge under the conditions of a bitterly contested war. In any event, there can be no question that the waging of a great war brings a wide range of social phenomena under a detailed scrutiny such as would normally be foregone in times of peace and which, nevertheless, provides insights of the utmost potential value for the guidance of men's peaceful affairs. It is this connection

between statecraft and the military art which has particular significance in the present context

At no time in history, I venture to say, has our organized knowledge been brought so fully to bear upon a single, immense human undertaking as it was during the prosecution of World War II. It is hardly necessary to review the contributions made by scientists in the various warring nations to the development of military material of extraordinary variety and effectiveness, or to repeat that the fantastic achievements of science in the fields of radar, long-range missiles, and atomic explosives spell out a profound alteration of our military capabilities. . . . there is as yet no adequate public realization or appreciation of the . . . effort devoted throughout the war to the planning and execution of military operations of every kind. Whatever appeared to be of relevance in earth science, psychology, economics, or any other branch of organized knowledge was applied for military purposes with refinements of calculation which no doubt mark a significant transformation in the military art itself. Selection and training of personnel for specialized tasks, choice and adaptation of the means to be employed under the most varied circumstances, development of tactics appropriate to the shifting realities of combat, designation of objectives at both tactical and strategic levels, analysis of the actual performance of men and of material under field conditions, and evaluation of the results achieved in specific operations were all undertaken to a surprising extent in the scientific spirit and with an extremely intelligent use of the resources of organized knowledge. In the domain of grand strategy the nature of total war manifested itself in the urgent need at all times for accurate current estimates of the total state -- economical, political, psychological, and military -- of each hostile power, and in the equal need for continually revised calculations of the optimum application of forces designed to encompass its eventual surrender. It is probable that no more serious or intensive attempt to arrive at a total evaluation of the dynamic state of a complex social organism has ever been made than was done under the compulsion of military necessity. It would be too much to claim that the applications made of organized knowledge were perfectly adequate to all the demands made upon it for military purposes. On the contrary, anyone familiar with one segment or another of the facts could cite many instances where relevant knowledge was overlooked, inefficiently applied, or deliberately ignored, and equally many where the imperfect state of our knowledge was clearly revealed in the light of specific military requirements.

. . . by its very essence military planning constantly involves predictions which are subject to the immediate test of the battlefield. The ultimate penalty for error is disaster and defeat. In consequence, accuracy of observation, closeness of reasoning, and care in execution

stand at a high premium in the military sphere. For all those branches of knowledge which have become allied to the military art during the recent war, this has profound implications.

It has often been observed that war accelerates and intensifies the development of new devices and new methods to an extent difficult to attain under the conditions of peace. I believe that something of the sort has occurred during the recent war with regard to the applications of science and scientific method to the problems of statecraft. In so far as those problems are of a military nature, there can be no question that the war did open up new possibilities and did afford us valuable experience in exploiting them. I have little doubt that the lessons of that experience have, at least potentially, direct significance for some of the problems of peace.

For example, the development of territories still in a wild or partly wild state, like Alaska, the Amazon Basin, or portions of Siberia, is the proper concern of statesmen and under modern conditions must apparently be contemplated in a spirit somewhat different from that which animated the explorers and pioneers of earlier generations. It seems to me reasonably clear that successful colonizing operations require organization and preparation along lines not too different from those followed by our armies in order to establish themselves in the wilderness of New Guinea. Colonization resembles a military venture even with respect to the swiftness of the retribution which may overtake erroneous appraisals of the obstacles to be mastered, as history clearly shows. A second illustration of an entirely different kind is to be found on the border line between economics and engineering, where it is becoming evident that we need a considerably improved understanding, at a strictly technical level, of the whole process of production in an industrialized society. The war confronted us with at least two major problems which made extremely heavy demands upon our knowledge in this domain: that of managing our own productive processes with maximal efficiency in relation to our total wartime requirements, and that of throttling those of our enemies in the most effective possible way with the means at our disposal, especially by strategic bombing and by submarine warfare. I believe that the experience gained in working with these wartime problems, with their definitely military character, can be used to guide our study of production under peacetime conditions for peacetime needs. If the time should ever come when it will be possible to predict with accuracy the effect upon production of variations imposed at specified points of the productive network, some of the most serious uncertainties which now confront the statesman would be removed. Some of the steps in this direction can reasonably be expected in the years to come.

Leaving aside any impetus originating in the experiences of the war, I should like to suggest that there are inherent reasons why mod-

ern statecraft must move in the direction of a more scientific technique. As the integration of our great industrial societies becomes progressively tighter and their productive potentials ever greater, the acts of the statesman tend to have ever wider, deeper, and more decisive influences upon the course of events. The effects of such acts are propagated more rapidly to all parts of the social structure and are likely to be felt by the individual member of society as something of greater and more direct personal importance than was the case under older and looser forms of organization. In these circumstances it is inevitable that the statesman should calculate with increasing care the probable consequences of his acts, and that he should thus find himself forced into the position of requiring the aid of theories enabling him to predict as closely as possible the results which will flow from any course of action he may propose or adopt. Like the soldier, he realizes that his decisions may lead not merely to some form of personal failure but also to a disaster involving the entire society which he serves and guides. Accordingly, he is inclined to look favorably on the means which will help him to avoid the dangers and the pitfalls which lie ahead. Such an emphasis upon prediction as an increasingly important element in statecraft inevitably links statecraft with science, for the true distinction between science and other forms of organized knowledge lies in the concern of science with the possibility of accurate prediction. In so far as the statesman attempts to organize the knowledge relevant to his particular tasks in such a manner that he will be able to forecast the trend of events with an accuracy sufficient for his needs, he adopts the scientific attitude and gives science itself new scope.

... It is alleged that human affairs are essentially unpredictable and beyond the reach of experiment, thus falling outside the scope of scientific inquiry. I would contend that the experience of the war years does, in fact, run strongly counter to this allegation. Be that as it may, there is also room for rebuttal on logical grounds. An analysis of the objection as it is usually elaborated will show that it reposes essentially upon certain misunderstandings of the nature of modern science and, in particular, of scientific method. The science which, in this objection, is declared incommensurable with the essential character of history or politics proves upon examination to be that perfectly deterministic science with unrestricted capabilities of experimentation which constituted the philosophical ideal of the 18th and 19th Centuries and which reached its most complete expression in classical physics. It is well known, if not adequately appreciated, by everyone who discusses science that since 1900 physics has been subjected to a radical revision reaching down to its most fundamental principles. As a result it has to be conceded that, in principle as well as in practice, (1) it is not possible to know at a given instant of time all the factors which will prove to be relevant to events observable at a specified subsequent

instant; (2) it is necessary to place all predictions on a statistical basis, at a sacrifice of determinism of the classical variety; and (3) it is impossible to conduct an experiment in which the experimental process does not influence in some measure the phenomena to be observed, altogether contrary to the convenient fiction that the system to be observed can be absolutely isolated from the rest of the universe throughout the experimental period.

... Thus, it seems to me that, except for a matter of degree, we find science proceeding in its various recognized branches along the very lines which the skeptics consider inaccessible for the scientific method as soon as its application to history or politics is suggested. ...

A second objection to the extension of scientific method into the domain of social thought is more clearly of psychological origin and has, accordingly, less substance. This takes the form of characterizing all existing techniques as inadequate and simultaneously rejecting all innovations as speculative or unsound. There cannot be any logical answer to an objection of this order, but it might be worth pointing out that the techniques suitable to a particular field have been developed in the course of actual investigations quite as often as by transfer from other fields. It seems to me that the social sciences will have to devise many scientific techniques of their own in addition to those which can be borrowed from the more fully developed branches of science. ...

Coming to the final stage of my argument, I should like to present the hypothesis that the moment is ripe for statecraft to draw enrichment on both the practical and the theoretical sides from contact with the spirit of science

...

... If I am right in thinking that the potentialities of disaster are slowly forcing statesmen to a much more careful reckoning of the consequences of their acts, then I would anticipate that in the future both theory and practice in the social studies would assume a character considerably more objective ... and more nearly consonant with their claims to rank as branches of science. ...

The problem of matching theory and practice is difficult, even in the fields of physics and engineering, and becomes formidably so in the domain of statecraft. ... During the war, however, a great deal of experience in the conduct of highly technical military operations has shown that a rapid adjustment between theory and practice, such as was desperately needed in many situations, can best be attained by organizing teams to work specifically and directly with this kind of problem. Something of the same kind must be done, I think, in the domain of statecraft, if theory and practice are to be brought success-

fully together. At best, scientific theories uniformly present a rather fragmentary and somewhat idealized synthesis which provides only a more or less approximate understanding of any specific concrete problem; and this is particularly obvious in the case of the social sciences, dealing as they do with the most complex phenomena of all. It thus appears to be in the nature of things that there should be created a new art devoted to the skillful interweaving of theoretical insights with practical experience in a variety of domains, including that of statecraft.

In conclusion, I should like to mention a concrete problem upon which the scientist and the statesman have already begun to collaborate. This is the problem of understanding and controlling the impact upon society of the discoveries made in the physical and biological sciences. The recently formed Atomic Energy Commission is, no doubt, primarily intended to provide for a properly safeguarded engineering development of atomic power, but it will obviously have to consider many questions which fall within the domain of the social sciences. It seems to me important that similar attention should be given to the social effects of the many other innovations flowing in an ever-widening stream from our laboratories. . . .

REPORT

By Raymond B. Fosdick

Taken from The Rockefeller Foundation: A Review for 1947. This is the final report of the retiring President of the Foundation. Dr. Fosdick has been head of the Rockefeller Foundation since 1936. His annual reviews of the work of the Foundation have contained many wise observations on the state of the world. The present review is especially pertinent in the light of the grave implications held in store by the scientific arming of the Great Powers. The extracts from the Review are reproduced through the courtesy of the Foundation.

All centuries are dangerous, said Professor Whitehead; and he added: "It is the business of the future to be dangerous." This was written in 1925, and certainly there can be no question of the accuracy of the prognosis as it applies to our generation. The challenge of today's crisis is the most commanding which Western society has ever faced. We have always known that knowledge was a perilous possession, because it could equally well work in the wrong direction; but the knowledge that has been placed in the hands of this age is so supremely capable of misuse -- and misuse could so easily reduce the hopes and monuments of men to drifting dust -- that the impact of the challenge finds us confused, uncertain and fearful.

Like all frightened people everywhere and in all ages, our first reaction is physical force, and our instinctive faith is given to military power. Let us grant at once that in this unprecedented crisis a measure of physical force is essential. We do not live in a utopia, and it would be suicidal to act as if we did. Equally suicidal, however, is the assumption that the crisis can be met solely on the level of force, or that mechanisms, power and dollars constitute the essential elements of the solution.

The present is one of the supreme moments of challenge, in which, as Toynbee says, the character of our response determines the chances of survival. . . . Unless we can rise to greatness and lift our answers to an intellectual and ethical plane, our fate will be the fate, not only of the nations that preceded us in history, but of all species, whether birds or brontosaurus, which specialized in methods of violence or defensive armor.

One of the difficulties in putting our response on a higher level of human searching is our emphasis here in America on the task of raising the material standards of living. In this ambition we have been incomparably successful; our productive and consuming capacity is greater than that of any other country in the world. But the result is that our principal standards are standards of quantity Consequently our vision is not so much of a world peopled by wise and honorable men as it is of a world in which "every family has its automobile and every pot its chicken." We have too easily made the assumption that other values would automatically follow our material well-being, that out of our assembly lines and gadgets the good life would spontaneously be born.

. . . Although our religion and ethics have long tried to enlighten us, many of us are still only dimly aware that purchasing power is not the measure of a great society, and that wisdom and cultural values are not the inevitable consequences of an increased capacity to consume.

It is, of course, obvious that a solid material foundation is an essential basis for a high civilization; but it is a basis, not a superstructure. Our tendency is to confuse one with the other, to mistake the foundations for the towers and turrets of the new city. There is a spiritual hunger in the world today that is not being satisfied by American exports. "God knows we need food and coal to survive," said a European delegate to Lake Success, "but unless America can take the lead in providing a vital faith, in giving us a song that mankind can sing, all her exports will merely postpone the day of reckoning, and the world will die anyway."

Another aspect of the difficulty which we face in placing on a higher level our response to the challenge of our time, is our superstitious reverence for the physical sciences. They have become sacro-

sanct -- the dispensers of the gifts of life. The doctrine that "civilization can be bred to greatness and splendor by science" is widely accepted. Even our universities have succumbed to this twentieth century worship of methods which give mastery in the physical world.

...

... We cannot escape the obligation, in this scientific age, to comprehend science; but in the supreme question which faces our generation, physics and chemistry and engineering have no answers for us. They are ethically neutral. They are preoccupied with physical matter. They can give us more horsepower; only the naive, however, will claim that horsepower can develop within itself the means by which our runaway technologies can be brought under control. They can help more men to better health and longer life; but they have little relationship to the problem of discovering a new set of human purposes, or to the art of human relations, or to the winning of social and moral wisdom, upon which peace and successful government depend.

... Every contribution of science to the problems of society is to be welcomed. But the ... issues of our time and of human destiny will be determined, not at the physical, but at the ethical and social level. Material power and dollars and military ascendancy may preserve us temporarily; but the dynamic tensions of our society can be relieved only by moral and social wisdom, and that kind of wisdom cannot be precipitated in a test tube nor can it be won by the brilliant processes of nuclear physics.

In the same essay which was quoted at the beginning of this section, Professor Whitehead went on to say: "It must be admitted that there is a degree of instability which is inconsistent with civilization. But on the whole, the great ages have been the unstable ages." This is the ray of hope that lightens the darkness of the present hour. It is not in times of security that men build a Chartres Cathedral or write a Hamlet or push their boats across an unknown ocean to discover a new continent. Oddly enough these achievements occur in years of instability.

Danger and hazard mark our age today. But in Professor Whitehead's phrase, it can be a great age Its greatness, however, if achieved, will consist in its search for an enlightened humanism and for rational and ethical values that will rise above our time as the spires of Chartres rose above the twelfth century.

... The conflict of ideologies -- what Gibbon called "the exquisite rancor of theological hatred" -- divides the world today in bitter partisanship, just as Europe was divided by its religious wars of the sixteenth century. As a matter of fact, ideologies have always divided mankind; the rifts are centuries old; there has never been one world. What we are attempting today is something that has never in recorded

history been accomplished. We have barely begun on what is unquestionably the noblest as well as the most discouraging task which statesmen and nations have ever undertaken.

If the aim were to iron out all the differences which exist among men -- to achieve a utopia of unruffled unanimities -- it would be fatuous even to begin it. The world of the future -- if any world survives -- will be a world of diversity, held together by a conception of common interests. It will be a world in which many political faiths and economic creeds are tolerated and widely differing points of view fertilize each other for the common good.

Our challenge in this generation is to discover the common interests, the terrain of possible collaboration, the overlapping areas of curiosity and sympathy, of aspiration and mutual advantage, that bind the human race together regardless of ideologies or boundary lines. The search for these rallying points of unity, the development of new techniques and areas of cooperative action where ideas and experience can be pooled and combined -- this is the immediate task; this comes first; this is the foundation of the ultimate structure of a united society.

The activities of the World Health Organization of the United Nations furnish a pertinent illustration; for health is something that all men desire and there is no limited supply for which nations must compete. Public health work carries no threat to anybody, anywhere. Cancer and scarlet fever have no political ideology. There is no Marxian method of eliminating gambiae mosquitoes as distinguished from a Western democratic method. ... Infantile paralysis is the same thing in Moscow and in Washington, and human sorrow is no less poignant in one city than in the other. The world of disease and misery is not divided; it is a common world. In terms of human suffering the world is truly and tragically one world.

What is true of medicine and public health is true also in the fields of science and humanism. There are no French or English enzymes, no German or American electrons. The second law of thermodynamics is not the property of any group or nation. Tolstoy and Shakespeare and Beethoven and Tschaikowsky belong to the world, just as the spiritual ideals of Gandhi have now become the heritage of mankind. These are some of the common interests whose waves are breaking over the old flag-marked boundaries and are bringing to the world a conception of civilization and of the intellectual life of man as a cooperative achievement.

In spite of all evidence to the contrary the things that divide the world are trivial as compared with the things that unite it. The mutualities of human beings everywhere far exceed their divergencies. ... people are dominated by a passionate hope for peace, security and

a better life. They seek a world in which men may grow in strength and dignity. They want no world in which war periodically tears to pieces the bright promise of the future. . . . Men differ as to the means by which these ends are to be secured, but as to the goal itself there is little diversity of opinion.

This substantial unanimity of aim, sharpened and oriented in our time to a new point, is at least a gleam of hope in a dark age. Mankind is conscious as never before of common roots and common potentialities, of common basic desires and appetites and the common skills required for their satisfaction. A recognition of kinship exists which wars and clashing ideologies can blur but cannot eliminate. Slowly but perceptibly there is developing a conception of the inter-meshed interests of men, of the universality of human need, of the single destiny that awaits life on this planet, whether it be good or evil. This is the principle that lies behind the United Nations, the incentive that gives moral and intellectual greatness to the work of this generation in clearing the ground for the new advance.

It is idle, of course, to minimize the towering difficulties that confront us or the heart-breaking frustrations through which we shall live in the years immediately ahead. But we must push toward the ultimate goal of world unity with iron determination and fanatical patience. We must believe in it against all discouragements, against all failures, against all betrayals. . . . the only alternative involves a price in terms of cosmic disaster which, unless the world is overwhelmed by a Gargantuan madness, it will not consent to pay.

Benjamin Franklin, writing in 1789, said: "God grant that not only the Love of Liberty, but a thorough Knowledge of the Rights of Man may pervade all the Nations of the Earth, so that a Philosopher may set his Foot anywhere on its Surface, and say, 'This is my country'."

That was the dream of 160 years ago; that was the faith that inspired our forefathers as they hammered out the larger loyalty of the federal union; and today as we face the necessity of building that loyalty on even wider foundations, we must not let the song die on our lips. It is not the mistakes of our idealists, but the cynicism of our realists that will defeat us.

...

The point cannot be too often stressed that the health of the intellectual life of the world depends upon the free and unhampered exchange of ideas and personnel between universities and research institutions in all countries. Scientific growth is almost invariably the result of cross-fertilization between laboratories and groups in widely separated parts of the world. . . . Ideas are starved when they are fenced in behind frontiers, and barricaded research in the long run can result in intellectual stagnation.


This is why the heavy concentration in the United States of research in atomic physics is unfortunate. The grim necessities of security seem for the time being to make any other course impossible, but we must face the fact that from the standpoint of the growth of knowledge, it is an unhealthy arrangement. All knowledge is so interlocked that we cannot control research on the destructive aspects of atomic energy without at the same time interfering with world-wide research on its beneficent possibilities. . . . In the history of modern science no single country by itself has ever had the intellectual resources or the imagination to bring to full fruition all the potentialities of a new idea.

Equally unfortunate is the growing isolation of the scientists and scholars of Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union, for example, has long had distinguished mathematicians. Her work in biomedicine has been imaginative and stimulating. But how can these workers and scientists maintain the high level of their creative research if they are not allowed by their government to have direct and intimate relationship with what is being done in these same fields in other parts of the world? To speak of "bourgeois mathematics" or "capitalistic medicine" is to use terms which, at least to a Westerner, are meaningless. The truth or falsity of a mathematical formula does not depend on latitude or longitude, and the effectiveness of penicillin against disease has nothing to do with economic theory. The Soviet Union is planning the restoration of the great Pulkova Observatory near Leningrad and of Simeis in the Crimea, both of which were totally destroyed in the war. But what kind of astronomy can be developed in the Soviet Union if her astronomers are isolated from contact with their fellow scientists and observers elsewhere? The stars in their courses do not look down on Russia alone. The intellectual and cultural life of men cannot without impoverishment be walled in behind national boundaries. Isolationism is a blight which undermines the vitality of everything it seeks to preserve.

M A P S

WORLD POWER CENTERS

The map opposite shows the principle world power centers which Professor Poole envisages in a world bound together by a complex balance of power as described in his article beginning on page 101 above.



AFRICA - FUTURE OF EMPIRE

The map opposite has been inserted as reference for the articles by Mr. Vernon McKay and Professor Lowell Ragatz, on pages 70 and 84 above.



